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1 Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Record Group (RG) 469, United
States Operating Missions (USOM), Mission to Austria, Productivity and Technical
Assistance Division (PTAD), Subject Files (SF) 1952-58, box 4, folder (f.) “Briefing
Materials,” memo, Hall to Russell, 23.9. 1954, “The FOA Productivity Program.”
2 EPA Information Bulletin, Paris, September 1961, “Eight Years of Promoting
Productivity.”
3 The EPA was an integral part of the OEEC, and all 17 OEEC countries were co-
founders of the EPA. The agency thus comprised Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The United States and
Canada, which had been associated members of the OEEC since 1950, became
associated members of the EPA from its initiation. Later on Yugoslavia (from 1957) and
Spain (from 1958), also became associated with the agency (cf. OEEC, 9th Report. A
Decade of Co-operation. Achievements and Perspectives).
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of the productivity program in Europe is nothing less than the reshaping
of the European economies from a static pattern characterised by restrictionism
into a pattern of dynamic and expanding free and competitive enterprise. This
alone will make possible continually rising living standards and ever-increasing
consumption of more and better things by more people. Behind this objective, of
course, and the ultimate justification, is the compelling need to keep the countries
of Europe willing and effective partners in the free world.1
It is sometimes said that no man is truly dead as long as his work lives on. The
EPA will now disappear from the list of international organisations, but its name
will live on in thousands of mouths all over Europe. “We started our collaboration
through meeting at the EPA conference.” “It was an EPA consultant who showed
us how to reorganise.” “We got our stud bull through the EPA.” “We work to
EPA standards here.” So very little money has been spent and so few people
employed that it is a wonder so much has been done. Now the torch of Productivi-
ty passes to the OECD.2
A. Aims
The European Productivity Agency (EPA) was a product of the Marshall
Plan’s technical assistance program initiated in 1948. It was an American
idea, created in March 1953 as a semi-autonomous organization within the
framework of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC).3 Its purpose was to promote productivity in the member countries,
and it was primarily financed by the United States. The EPA was a short-
lived experiment, since it was wound up after only eight years, when the
4 Indeed, it seems that the EPA has never been discussed during an NSC meeting.
5 See Chapter IX.
6 Interviews with Alexander King (23.6. 1995) and G.L.G. de Milly (31.5. 1995); Vera
Zamagni, “The Marshall Plan: An Overview of its Impact on National Economies,” The
Johns Hopkins University, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Bologna Center, Occasional Paper no. 73., April 1992; James M. Silbermann and Charles
Weiss, “Restructuring for Productivity. The Technical Assistance Program and the
Marshall Plan as a Precedent for the Former Soviet Union,” World Bank Industry and
Energy Department Working Paper, Industries Series Paper, no. 64, November 1992.
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OEEC was transformed into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). Today, few have heard of it. The early death of
the EPA and its quick slide into oblivion could lead one to conclude that the
experiment was a total failure. This book will argue that such a dismissal is
unwarranted. First, the EPA was historically a very innovative experience.
Never before had an intergovernmental organization been created with the
purpose of improving productivity in its member countries. Although it was
imitated, no similar organization has reached the same level of activity.
Second, two essential features of the US economic aid policy towards
Western Europe after World War II were the “productivity crusade” and the
push for European integration. These driving forces came together with the
creation of the EPA. Obviously, the EPA was not the focal point of the US
policy towards Western Europe in the 1950s. It dealt with “low politics” and
could thus hardly be a major focus of the US National Security Council’s
deliberations.4 However, it constituted one of the non-military frameworks
which brought Europeans and Americans closer together and it is therefore
an important case study for US-European relations as well as European
cooperation in the 1950s. Third, the EPA was established to play a key role
in the European productivity drive of the 1950s. Although its overall impact
is impossible to assess, scholars have argued that its influence was strong in
various fields.5 Fourth, it has been argued that what the Eastern European
countries needed after 1989 was less a massive transfer of capital than
assistance to revolutionize ways of thinking and working. Since this is exactly
what the EPA was supposed to do in the 1950s, it appears relevant to
investigate its history.6
This book will analyze the political history of an intergovernmental
organization. It will discuss the reasons why the EPA was created and
subsequently terminated, the roles which it played and the results it achieved.
In answering these questions it will shed light on the policies of the
governments involved, and more specifically on US-European relations and
on European cooperation in the 1950s. However, the agency’s intergovern-
mental status was not always clear-cut. Some saw it – or wished to see it – as
7 See for example: René Girault and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (eds.), Le Plan Marshall et le
relèvement économique de l’Europe, Paris, 1993; Peter M. Stirk and David Willis (eds.),
Shaping Postwar Europe. European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957, London, 1991; Frederico
Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement 1944-1951, Chapel
Hill and London, 1992; Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the
Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge, 1989; Nick Tiratsoo and Jim
Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention: Labour 1939-51, London and New
York, 1993.
8 For exceptions, see: Anthony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan, Manchester, 1987;
Jacqueline McGlade, “The Illusion of Consensus: American Business, Cold War Aid and
the Industrial Recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958,” Ph.D. diss., George Washington
University, 1995; Sergio Chillé, “Il ‘Productivity and Technical Assistance Program’ per
l’economie italiana (1949-1954): accettazione e resistenze ai progetti statunitensi di
rinnovamento del sistema produttivo nazionale,” in: Annali della Fondazione Giulio
Pastore, vol. 22, 1993, pp. 76-121; Pier Paolo D’Attore: “ERP Aid and the Politics of
Productivity in Italy During the 1950s,” European University Institute Working Paper no.
85/159, April 1985; International Cooperation Administration (ICA), European
Productivity and Technical Assistance Programs, a Summing Up, 1948-1958, Paris, 1958;
Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, 1951-64:
Thirteen Wasted Years?, London and New York, 1998; Marie-Laure Djelic, Exporting the
American Model. The Postwar Transformation of European Business, Oxford, 1998.
9 For exceptions, see: Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan; contributions by Rolv Petter
Amdam, Gunnar Yttri, Giuliana Gemelli and Bent Boel to: Nick Tiratsoo and Terry
Gourvish (eds.), Missionaries and Managers: United States Technical Assistance and
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a tripartite organization based on close cooperation between labor, manage-
ment and governments. Some light will thus also be thrown on the role of the
European organizations for trade unions and employers.
This book is not an economic history of the EPA. While it will discuss the
agency’s achievements, it will focus on the perceived impact rather than on
the actual one. Moreover, it will not analyze the productivity discourse in the
1950s. Such an analysis would have to build on a different body of texts than
those used for this research. The governmental archives which have been
examined do not generally address the concept of productivity and its
different permutations. Neither does this book claim to be a contribution to
organizational theory. The lack of sources from the EPA bureaucracy
precludes such a study.
B. Historiographic Introduction
Although the American technical assistance program and the European
productivity drive until 1952 have been the subject of previous studies,7 the
subsequent years have received only scant attention,8 and in particular the
EPA has been ignored.9 One possible explanation for this historiographical
European Management Education, 1945-1960, Manchester, 1998; Bent Boel, “The
European Productivity Agency: a Faithful Prophet of the American Model?,” in: Matthias
Kipping and Ove Bjarnar (eds.), The Americanisation of European Business. The Marshall
Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models, London and New York, 1998; Bent Boel,
“The European Productivity Agency,” in: Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), Explorations in
OEEC History, Paris, 1997.
10 Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International
Economic Policy after World War II,” in: Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability.
Explorations in Historical Political Economy, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 121-52 (originally
published in: International Organization, vol. 31, 1977, pp. 607-33).
11 Thomas J. Mccormick, “Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American
Diplomatic History,” in: Reviews in American History, vol. 10, no. 4, December 1982, pp.
318-30; Michael Hogan, “Corporatism,” in: Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson
(eds.): Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, Cambridge 1991, pp. 226-37.
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vacuum is that productivity policies have generally been dealt with as an
element of US-European relations during the Marshall Plan years, 1948-51.
Another reason for this oversight may be that the sums involved were modest
compared to the total Marshall Aid.
The literature relevant to the productivity drive in Western Europe in the
1950s deals with four main categories of questions: the origins of this policy,
its outcome, the driving forces behind European integration and cooperation,
and the nature of the US-European relations during this period.
1. Origins: The US and the “Politics of Productivity”
The first major discussion of American foreign productivity policy was
introduced by Charles Maier when he proposed the concept of “politics of
productivity” as an explanatory framework for the American policy towards
Western European countries after the World War II. The politics of pro-
ductivity were supposed to depoliticize social and economic issues. Enhan-
cing their productivity, Western European societies would be enabled to
overcome social conflicts resulting from scarcity, as had already been ac-
complished in the US, according to a common American self-perception.
What should move societies was not the dialectics of class struggle, but the
forward-going movement from scarcity (viewed as a result of inefficient use
of resources) to abundance. The means to achieve a successful transition
from the former to the latter was a matter of engineering (of finding the most
efficient way), and not of politics (of differing interests).10 Maier’s work has
inspired other historians. His focus on the domestic roots of American
foreign aid policy has encouraged the “corporatist” approach to analyzing
American foreign policy.11 Further, several authors have investigated the role
12 David W. Ellwood, “The Marshall Plan and the Politics of Growth,” in: Stirk and
Willis (eds.), Shaping Postwar Europe, pp. 15-26.
13 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 151, 427-29.
14 Ibid., p. 445.
15 Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan, pp. 249-50.
16 Ibid., pp. 184-200.
17 David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe.Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruc-
tion, London and New York, 1992, pp. 2, 226-32. There is an obvious parallel to the
discussions about the Marshall Plan aid and its importance for Western European
reconstruction: while some stress the importance of American aid for the latter’s success,
other scholars prefer to emphasize the key role played by domestic factors (see Lucrezia
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of the politics of productivity or “politics of growth” in Western Europe after
the war.12 For instance, Michael Hogan interprets the Marshall Plan as the
foreign policy manifestation of the “New Deal Synthesis” achieved in the US
at the end of the 1930s and during World War II. In other words, American
foreign policymakers are seen as projecting in their foreign policy the cor-
poratist model achieved at home. Although Hogan does not use the term
“politics of productivity,” he makes a similar analysis of the rationale behind
the American policy.13 His examination of the progressive vein in American
policy, which threatened the vested interests of conservative employers, leads
him to see “social-democratic elements” in the Marshall Plan. However, he
concludes that these elements were defeated by the resistance of Western
European elites.14
Anthony Carew has analyzed the politics of productivity as a successful
means of strengthening moderate forces in the labor movement, and as such
judges it quite successful. However, he is skeptical about the manner in
which the political and social stabilization of Western Europe took place. No
matter how sincere the American insistence on improved labor-management
relations was, it was not the real purpose of the policy. While labor’s
influence on productivity policies always remained marginal, these policies
managed to encourage ideological revisionism and thereby de-radicalize labor
movements.15 Carew is, moreover, the author who has devoted most
attention to the EPA, chiefly as seen from the angle of labor-management
relations.16
Maier, Hogan and Carew have all focused on the American origins of the
politics of productivity. Others have stressed its European roots. While David
Ellwood does highlight the role of the US, he also stresses that large
segments of the population expected increased standards of living and that
the political elites saw “politics of growth” as a necessity if political and social
stability was to be established.17 Matthias Kipping has gone one step further
Reichlin, “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered,” in: Barry Eichengreen (ed.), Europe’s
Postwar Recovery, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 39-67.)
18 Matthias Kipping and Jean-Pierre Nioche, “Le meilleur élève de la classe? Productivity
Drive and Management Training in France (1946-1955),” paper presented at the seminar
“The Development of Business Schools in Europe. The Impact of the European Pro-
ductivity Agency and its ‘Satellites’ on Management Education in Europe,” Bertinoro,
June 2-3, 1995.
19 Alan S. Milward: “Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?,” in: Diplomatic History, vol. 13,
no. 2, spring 1989, pp. 231-53.
20 What can be found are mainly publications by international (OEEC/OECD) or national
institutions (indications will be given in the footnotes). See also footnote 9 and references
given in Chapter IX.
21 Luc Boltanski, “America, America... Le plan Marshall et l’importation du manage-
ment,” in: Actes de la Recherche en sciences sociales, no. 38, May 1981, pp. 19-41; Pierre
Louis Mathieu and Philippe Leduc, “La politique française de la productivité depuis la
guerre,” master’s thesis, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1961; Richard Kuisel,
Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization, Berkeley, 1993; Kipping and
Nioche, “Le meilleur élève.”
22 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention; Tiratsoo and
Tomlinson, The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, 1951-64; Jonathan Zeitlin,
“Americanization and its Limits: Theory and Practice in the Reconstruction of Britain’s
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in minimizing American responsibility for the European productivity in-
creases in the 1950s, emphasizing the importance of the micro economic
factors, and in particular the market forces and competition between in-
dustrial actors.18
Alan Milward has criticized Maier’s and Hogan’s idea that American politics
of productivity played an important role in shaping the political and social
stability of Western Europe after World War II. He does not question the
major role of the concept of productivity in American policy, but he argues
that the roots of stability were European, i.e., that they were the result of
shifts in political power which took place in Western Europe in the imme-
diate postwar period. In his view, Western European governments accepted
the ideology of productivity only in the mid- or even late fifties. Their stand
was thus merely the ideological reflection of and justification for develop-
ments already taking place.19 While this book does not claim to discuss the
overall reasons for postwar stability in Western Europe, it will attempt to
shed some light on the responsiveness of Western European governments to
the productivity ideology in the 1950s.
The Western European productivity policy as formulated in and implemen-
ted by the EPA has not as yet been the focus of a scholarly study.20 However,
many national productivity policies have been at least partly investigated.
Aspects of the French,21 British,22 Italian,23 Danish,24 Dutch,25 German26
Engineering Industries, 1945-55,” in: Business and Economic History, vol. 24, no. 1, fall
1995, pp. 277-86.
23 Chillé, “Il ‘Productivity and Technical Assistance Program’;” D’Attore, “ERP Aid and
the Politics of Productivity in Italy;” Romero, The United States and the European Trade
Union Movement; Giuliana Gemelli, “The Ford Foundation and the Development of
Social and Political Sciences in Italy (1954-1973). Some Case Studies,” in Giuliana
Gemelli (ed.), Big Culture. Intellectual Cooperation in Large-Scale Cultural and Technical
Systems. An Historical Approach, Bologna, 1994; Luciano Segreto, “Sceptics and
Ungrateful Friends v. Dreaming Social Engineers: the Italian Business Community, the
Italian Government, the United States and the Comitato Nazionale per la Produttività,”
in: Gourvish and Tiratsoo (eds.), Missionaries and Managers, pp. 77-94; Giuliana Gemelli,
“International strategies and National Issues: the Comitato Nazionale per la Produttività
and its Networks,” in: Ibid., pp. 95-120.
24 Vibeke Sørensen, Denmark’s Social Democratic Government and the Marshall Plan 1947-
1950, Copenhagen, 2001; Peter Kjær, “Produktivitetspolitik i Danmark 1945-1960,” in:
Marianne Rostgaard and Michael Wagner (eds.), Lederskab i dansk industri og samfund
1880-1960, Aalborg, 2000; Carsten Holst-Jensen, Anne Kirstine Johansen, Johannes
Thomsen, “Boom! Industriudvikling og industriborgerskab i Danmark 1950-1965,”
master’s thesis, Copenhagen University, 1981; Peter Knoop Christensen et al.,
Amerikaniseringen af det danske kulturliv i perioden 1945-58, Aalborg, 1983.
25 Erik Bloemen, “Hard Work! Ideology and Interest in Dutch Economic Policy at Home
and Abroad Between 1945 and 1951,” in: Economic and Social History in the Netherlands,
vol. 2, 1991, pp. 135-48; Erik Bloemen, “Technical Assistance and Productivity in the
Netherlands 1945-52,” in: Girault and Lévy-Leboyer (eds.), Le Plan Marshall et le
relèvement économique de l’Europe, pp. 503-13; Marja Roholl, “Uncle Sam: An Example
for All? The Dutch Orientation Towards America in the Social and Cultural Field, 1945-
1965” in: Hans Loeber (ed.), Dutch-American Relations 1945-1969, Maastricht, 1992, pp.
105-52; Mel van Elteren, “Psychology and Sociology of Work Within the Anglo-Ameri-
can Orbit,” in: Ibid., pp. 153-78.
26 Christoph Thüer, “Der Einfluss des Marshallplans auf die Interne Diskussion und die
Praxis der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften (1948 bis 1952),” master’s thesis, University
of Bochum, 1989.
27 Rolv Petter Amdam and Gunnar Yttri, “The European Productivity Agency, the
Norwegian Productivity Institute and Management Education,” in: Gourvish and
Tiratsoo (eds.), Missionaries and Managers, pp. 120-39; Gunnar Yttri, “From a
Norwegian Rationalization Law to an American Productivity Institute,” in: Scandinavian
Journal of History, vol. 20, 1995, pp. 231-58; Kai R. Pedersen, “Norwegian Business and
the Marshall Plan, 1947-1952,” in: Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 21, 1996, pp.
285-301.
28 Kurt K. Tweraser, “The Politics of Productivity and Corporatism: The Late Marshall
Plan in Austria, 1950-54,” in: Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds.), Austria in the
Nineteen Fifties, New Brunswick and London, 1995, pp. 91-115.
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Norwegian27 and Austrian28 policies have been more or less extensively
researched. However, as noted earlier, these inquiries generally concentrate
on the period prior to 1952. Since the EPA was the main institutional result
of the American politics of productivity on a European level, its history
should add to our understanding of this policy during the 1950s.
29 See Chapter IX.
30 For a more detailed discussion, see: Bent Boel, “‘Americanization’: Uses and Misuses
of a Concept,” in: Csaba Szaló (ed.), On European Identity: Nationalism, Culture and
History, Brno, 1998, pp. 217-35.
31 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 436 (for Western Europe) and D’Attore, “ERP Aid and
the Politics of Productivity in Italy”, p. 37 (for Italy) both use the expression “half-
Americanization.” While concluding that a partial “Americanization” took place, Kuisel
(Seducing the French, pp. 231-32) underlines the limits of this process (for France),




The impact of the productivity policies on productivity levels has only been
discussed in a limited way, probably because of the difficulties inherent in
such a discussion.29 A concept which has been used in connection with
American-Western European relations since World War II, and which in
particular has been used in discussing the outcome of the American policies
to educate Western Europeans to the American way of doing things, is that
of “Americanization.” This concept is problematic, and has indeed been
much criticized.30 One may define it as the process through which tech-
niques, products, consumer patterns, ideas, attitudes etc., have been trans-
ferred from the US to Western Europe. Such a definition is obviously very
broad. It does not take into consideration the debate about the “American”
character of the features imported by the Europeans from the US and the
transformations occuring during the transfer. It does not imply a one-way
influence, since the “Americanization” of Western Europe does not rule out
a possible “Europeanization” of the US. Vague though it may be, the
expression “Americanization” has provided a fruitful starting point for the
discussion of one aspect of the outcome of the politics of productivity in
Western Europe. It indeed raises the following question: to what extent did
this policy result in the transfer of American methods of production,
management and distribution to Western Europe? Answering this is difficult
since it involves counterfactual analysis (i.e., had the Americans not been
there, would the Europeans have invented the “American” management
techniques by themselves?). Some authors have nevertheless tried to provide
an answer to this question. Most of them conclude that a partial “America-
nization” took place. However, there is no consensus of opinion on how
strongly such an influence made itself felt. Some scholars emphasize it, others
stress the limits of the phenomenon. The idea of a partial “Americanization”
is notably to be found in the works of Richard Kuisel, Michael Hogan, Pier
Paolo D’Attore and Volker Berghahn. However, these authors do not agree
on the extent to which Western Europe became “Americanized.”31 The idea
32 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 236.
33 Søren Schou, “The Charisma of the Liberators. The Americanization of Postwar
Denmark,” in: Roger de la Garde, William Gilsdorf and Ilja Wechselmann (eds.), Small
Nations, Big Neighbour: Denmark and Quebec/Canada Compare Notes on American Popular
Culture, London, Paris and Rome, 1993, pp. 77-78 (concerning the Danish case).
34 Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg: die Kulturmission der USA in
Österreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Wien, 1991.
35 Schou, “The Charisma of the Liberators.”
36 See for example: J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, “The Marshall Plan:
History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program,” in: Rüdiger Dornbusch,
Wilhelm Nölling and Richard Layard (eds.), Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons
for the East Today, London, 1993, p. 221.
37 Zeitlin, “Americanization and its Limits.” For the view that the Americans in some
ways knew better, see Zamagni, “The Marshall Plan: An Overview of its Impact on
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of partial “Americanization” is shared by Ellwood, who insists that the
Europeans were able to take what they wanted from the American shelves
and leave what they did not want.32 The picture painted by these scholars is
that of a success and also of a partial failure. The success is ascribed to a
variety of factors. Some authors tend to see the “Americanization” of
Western Europe as inevitable after May 1945, given the power of the US and
the intrinsic appeal which the American way of life would necessarily have on
defeated and/or war-stricken European populations.33 Others, while not de-
nying this appeal, emphasize the role played by the deliberate American
efforts to “Americanize” Western Europe.34 The partial failure of these en-
deavors is notably explained by the considerable reluctance to accept Ameri-
can management methods both among labor and management. American
policy goals were judged too progressive by some, reactionary by others.
There has been a tendency in the literature to contrast cultural and
technological “Americanization.” The cultural “Americanization” was met
with ambivalent feelings, ranging from enthusiasm for American mass culture
by the youth and the “masses” in general, to fear or contempt by the
intellectual elites.35 The technological “Americanization” on the other hand
was allegedly welcomed. This distinction has come under attack by Jonathan
Zeitlin, who has argued that the Europeans also resisted American methods
on economic and technological grounds. The debate on the “Americaniza-
tion” of Western Europe has often been interpreted as a debate on
“modernization.” In this perspective, resistance to “Americanization” or an
unsuccessful “Americanization” has been understood as resistance to
modernization and thereby as an explanatory factor for later economic
problems or industrial decline.36 Zeitlin argues that British industrialists had
sound economic and technological reasons to resist an indiscriminate ac-
ceptance of American production methods.37
National Economies.”
38 Maier, “The Politics of Productivity”, p 148.
39 See Chapter IX; ICA, European Productivity, p. 5.
40 Clemens Wurm, “Early European Integration as a Research Field: Perspectives,
Debates, Problems,” in: Clemens Wurm (ed.), Western Europe and Germany. The
Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960, Oxford and Washington DC, 1995, pp. 9-
25.
41 On the surprising lack of historical research concerning the OEEC, see: Vibeke
Sørensen, “Atlantic Interdependence and European Integration – Two Different But
Related Institutional Frameworks for International Cooperation?,” paper presented at the
conference “Beyond the Cold War: The United States and the Renewal of Postwar
Europe,” Florence and Bologna, 26.10.-29.10. 1994, pp. 14-15. See however: Richard
Griffiths (ed.), Explorations in OEEC History, Paris, 1997.
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Another way to evaluate the outcome of the productivity policy is in terms
of the goals it set for itself. Many of the aims of the Marshall Plan (and of the
politics of productivity) were achieved. After 1948, Western European
societies experienced a period of unparallelled and prolonged growth in
production and productivity, which created a foundation for their political
and social stabilization and for a transatlantic relationship characterized by
what Maier has termed a “consensual American hegemony.”38 Some funda-
mental goals were attained, but to establish a firm link of causality between
the politics of productivity (or the American aid policy in general) and these
achievements is an arduous, next to impossible, task.39
The EPA was explicitly created with a view to transferring techniques, know-
how, ideas from the United States to Western Europe. This book will discuss
this “Americanizing” role, and in particular it will analyze how this role was
perceived by Europeans and Americans.
3. European Integration
The historical literature about the early period of European integration may
be divided into three different schools: the American-centered perspective,
the federalist view and the “national interest” approach.40 In the case of the
EPA, the US is placed at center stage. At the same time, the agency’s history
gives considerable support to the “national interest” approach. The EPA was
part of the OEEC, which was an instrument of cooperation rather than
integration.41 Decisions concerning projects were taken by majority vote
within the EPA, but supervision by the OEEC Council ensured that the EPA
remained an intergovernmental organization. The agency moreover operated
within the sphere of “low politics,” thereby hardly affecting fundamental
issues of national interest. Nevertheless, there were numerous conflicts
42 Richard Griffiths, “The European Integration Experience,” in: Keith Middlemas,
Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of European Union 1973-1995, London, 1995,
p. 3.
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involving questions of national sovereignty between the EPA secretariat and
the member countries. Thus, the history of the EPA illustrates the very
different attitudes towards European integration in the OEEC countries and
in particular it reveals the strength of the member countries’ susceptibilities
whenever their sovereignty seemed infringed upon.
4. The American “Empire”: US-European Relations in the 1950s
The nature of the relationship between the US and Western Europe has been
a key issue on the research agenda of Cold War historians as well as of
scholars of European integration. While traditionalists and revisionists
strongly disagree about motives and driving forces, they converge in their
view of the United States being very influential and largely successful in
obtaining European agreement to its policies, whether by coercion or by
consensus. The recent literature has stressed the European input into the
American policy and the European successes in resisting American views
which they disagreed with. Cold War historians like Geir Lundestad and
John Lewis Gaddis have put forward the concept of “Empire by invitation”
to characterize the nature of the US-European relationship in the postwar
period. Amongst scholars of European integration, there has been an
increasing tendency to focus on the persistence and vitality of European
nation states and their ability to defend their own interests, even when
confronted with the seemingly omnipotent influence of the United States.42
The productivity drive in the early postwar period is relevant to this debate
in several ways. It was largely an American idea, which became a controver-
sial matter in transatlantic relations. Moreover, the drive led to the creation
of an organization for European cooperation, the EPA, which was strongly
encouraged by the Americans, but ambivalently viewed by the Europeans.
The book will address the issue of conflict and cooperation in US-European
relations in the area of productivity as well as in the area of European co-
operation.
43 The archival remains are kept at the European Community Historical Archives,
Florence.
44 Cf. Bibliography: Unpublished Sources.
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C. Sources
The sources concerning the EPA are numerous. Those of the agency itself
are the least rewarding since most of its archives have vanished. A few
published reports and some unpublished documents have been preserved.
However, very little material from the internal workings of the agency’s
secretariat seems to have survived. This obviously handicaps any attempt to
analyze the latter’s role in the EPA’s programming and policy, and attempts
to understand the conflicts at work within the EPA.43 The minutes of the
OEEC Council meetings relating to the EPA and EPA documents turned
into Council documents can be found in the European Community
Historical Archives in Florence. Many EPA documents have been located in
the archives of member countries, but no country seems to have a complete
collection.
The most important source material is to be found in the governmental
archives of a large number of EPA/OEEC member countries and of the
United States. The latter has very rich archival holdings, especially for the
first years of the EPA. For the purpose of this book, the governmental
archives of the following countries have been investigated: Denmark, France,
Germany, Holland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States.44 Most of the European archives have a substantial
amount of material on the EPA with the notable exception of those in France
and Italy. Since France played a central role in the EPA, the lack of
documents from this country is particularly disappointing and surprising.
The scarcity of public Italian archives concerning the EPA is to some extent
made up for by the quality of the archives of the Italian Industrial Federa-
tion, Confindustria. In addition, a few organizational archives have been
investigated. Documents concerning the Council of European Industrial
Federations (CEIF) have been found in the employers’ organizations’
archives in Denmark, Sweden and Italy. Materials concerning the trade
union side were investigated in the archives of the Trade Union Advisory
Committee (TUAC). These records have been supplemented with interviews
with several officials from the EPA and the national productivity centers, as
well as with a number of participants in the Sardinian pilot project.
1 See Introduction. Concerning the different dimensions of the Marshall Plan, see:
Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration
and the Cold War, Stanford, 1992, pp. 157-64.
2 Fitzgerald to the Sub-Committee on Mutual Security Appropriations on 6.7. 1953, in:
Mutual Security Appropriations for 1954. Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, 1953, p. 506.
3 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDE), Manuscripts, Clarence Francis Papers 1933-
1973, box 3, f. “European Productivity Agency. January 1954,” memo, Todd to Stassen
and Rand, 25.1. 1954, “General Objectives of US Economic Policy in Western Europe.”
See also: Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 418.
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I. AMERICAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TO WESTERN EUROPE, 1948-53
A. American Initiatives
1. Politics of Productivity
Charles Maier has coined the term “politics of productivity” as a key to the
understanding of American policy after World War II. During the war, the
US developed a strategy of social engineering which it tried to implement in
Western Europe through the Marshall Plan. Social problems were sought
depoliticized and turned into technical problems. Productivity, which was
low in Europe compared with America, should be enhanced through co-
operation between workers and management, and the increased benefits
resulting from this effort should be shared equitably between labor, stock-
holders and consumers. Growth would make conflicts over distribution of
wealth superfluous, since it would allow everyone to enjoy rising living
standards. Thereby it could be hoped that “old-fashioned” traditions of
class-struggle, still deep-rooted in many European labor movements, would
die away.1 The American policy was thus also the product of a certain vision
of Western Europe, and particularly of countries such as France, Italy or
Western Germany, where the production and distribution system was
“antiquated”2 and where management was perceived as impregnated with
“feudal economic thinking,”3 while the labor movement seemed dangerously
dominated by leftist ideologies. Modernization in these countries could only
be achieved by their conversion to the American version of free market
economy. The economic and social-engineering motives behind the Ameri-
can politics of productivity were closely linked to American Cold War policy.
On a general level, economic prosperity would hopefully provide social and
4 ICA, European Productivity, pp. 10-11; Ministère des Affaires étrangères (MAE), DE-
CE, 1945-1960, vol. 355, f. “3-5,” note (JPB), 24.12. 1948, “Productivité.”
5 American aid to Western Europe in the 1950s was successively administered by the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA, 1948-51), the Mutual Security Agency
(MSA, 1951-53), the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA, 1953-55) and the
International Cooperation Administration (ICA, 1955-61).
6 Harriman, quoted in: Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 161.
7 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 414-15.
8 Ibid., pp. 206, 415; Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 155.
9 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London, 1992, p. 124; S.N.
Broadberry and N.F.R. Crafts, “European Productivity in the Twentieth Century:
Introduction,” in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 52, no. 4, November
1990, p. 332. According to Hogan, in 1951, labor productivity was nearly three times
greater in the US than it was in Western Europe (excluding the UK), cf. Hogan, The
Marshall Plan, p. 417. Contemporary observers thought the gap even greater: in some
cases manufacturing productivity in Europe was estimated at one-fourth of the US level
whereas productivity in agriculture was estimated at one-sixth, cf. Harry S. Truman
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political stabilization, turning social conflicts into harmonious cooperation
which would undermine socialist ideologies. A more specific element of this
strategy was the strengthening of the so-called free, i.e., non-communist
trade unions. The politics of productivity thus also served the strategical
purpose of fortifying a “free world” united by common ideals – those em-
bodied by the American way of life – and weakening its enemies.4
The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which was established
in 1948 to administer American aid to Western Europe, had no ready-made
plan for increasing productivity.5 The US policy developed incrementally, in
response to economic and political developments in Western Europe, and as
the result of intra-bureaucratic battles. The Marshall Plan started as a “fire-
fighting operation”6 aimed at the political, social and economic stabilization
of Western Europe. A massive transfer of resources – both consumer and
capital goods – should ensure the recovery of Western Europe after the war.
Most of the American aid helped OEEC countries finance essential imports
of goods such as fuel, food, feed, fertilizers, raw materials, semi-manufac-
tured products and machines.7 The Marshall Plan counterpart funds were
used to enhance production in the immediate aftermath of the war through
massive investments in new productive capital equipment: sixty percent of
these funds were earmarked for industrial modernization projects.8 As early
as 1948, however, the Americans found that the main obstacle to the
attainment of the Marshall Plan’s goal of achieving Western European
economic viability by 1952 was the productivity gap between Western
Europe and the US. After World War II, manufacturing productivity in the
US was more than twice as high as in some Western European countries.9
Library (HSTL), Papers of Everett H. Bellows, f. “Bellows, Material on Productivity
Program,” box 1, note, The Snack Bar Policy Board, 13.6. 1949 (reproduced in
Washington 10.7. 1951), “Productivity – the ‘Ninth Principle’;” Archives nationales
(AN), 80AJ80, f. “Visites Silbermann,” letter (ltr.), Monnet to Queuille, 16.9. 1948; AN,
SC, F60 ter, box 517, Présidence du conseil, Commissariat général du Plan, Groupe de
travail de la productivité, February 1949, “Programme d’accroissement de la productivité
française par utilisation de l’expérience étrangère.”
10 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, pp. 14 and 139; Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 208-209.
While the official US policy towards increasing European productivity was clearly posi-
tive, an opposition did exist, and private attitudes were ambiguous. The Marshall Plan
in general had always encountered opposition from conservatives in the Congress who
among other things feared the revival of European competition (cf. Hogan, The Marshall
Plan, p. 190). Anthony Rowley suggests a possible reluctance on the part of the Ameri-
cans to make their most modern technology known to the Europeans, without giving any
precise information corroborating such hypothesis (Anthony Rowley, “Les missions de
productivité aux Etats-Unis,” in: La France en voie de modernisation 1944-1952, Paris,
1981, p. 12). McGlade has found more substantial evidence for a rapidly emerging
reluctance towards the productivity drive on the part of some American firms (McGlade,
“The Illusion of Consensus,” pp. 402-3). In 1954, a report by Nichols Hall, chief of the
Productivity and Technical Assistance Division, noted that “[s]ome US businessmen
(although surprisingly few) of the hundreds who have been involved in it have opposed
the program because they saw in it only increased competition through lowered costs
abroad” (cf. Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Record Group (RG) 469,
United States Operating Missions (USOM), Mission to Austria, Productivity and
Technical Assistance Division (PTAD), Subject Files (SF) 1952-58, box 4, f. “Briefing
Materials,” memo, Hall to Russell, 23.9. 1954, “The FOA Productivity Program”). Fear
of Western Europe as a competitor and ensuing governmental skepticism towards US
assistance to a European productivity program, emerged more strongly towards the end
of the fifties, and played a role in the winding up of the EPA (see Chapter II).
11 On Paul Hoffman’s position in 1949, see: AN, SC, F60 ter, box 517, Présidence du
conseil, Commissariat général du Plan, Groupe de travail de la productivité, February
1949, “Programme d’accroissement de la productivité française par utilisation de
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This productivity gap created a major economic problem. The US was for
Western Europe the primary source of raw materials, industrial goods and
of the liquidity necessary for buying such goods. But the lack of competitivity
of these countries impeded a successful overcoming of their balance of
payment problems. Moreover, without significantly increased productivity,
Western Europe would not be able to achieve the growth rates required to
reach the degree of economic prosperity which had now become a major
objective for governments in all Western European countries.10
In 1949, Western Europe’s worsening trade and payments deficit with the
US made it clear that without increased productivity the old continent would
be indefinitely dependent on American aid. The urgency of the problem was
underlined by the fact that the Marshall aid was supposed to bear fruit within
four years. Enhancing productivity thus became a key element in the Ameri-
can policy towards Western Europe.11 In June 1949, the ECA’s Special
l’expérience étrangère.”
12 HSTL, Papers of Everett H. Bellows, box 1, f. “Bellows, material on Productivity
Program”, note, The Snack Bar Policy Board, 13.6. 1949, “Productivity – the ‘Ninth
Principle”.
13 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 207-209, 273-74; Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, pp. 93-94,
158-59.
14 Quoted in McGlade, “The Illusion of Consensus,” p. 433.
15 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 227.
16 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 207, 414-15; WNRC, RG 469, Special Representative
in Europe (SRE), Office of the Director of Administration (ODA), Office of the Director
(OD), SF, 1948-53, box 11, f. “PTAD – General,” memo, 7.11. 1952, “Interrelationship
of Requirements for Technical Assistance (TA) Dollars, 10 % Counterpart, and Moody
Local Currency;” ICA, European Productivity, p. 4.
17 See footnote 5.
18 ICA, European Productivity, p. 3; WNRC, RG 469, United States Mission to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (USRO), Office of
the Executive Secretariat (OES), SF 1952-55, box 19, f. “Fifth Session of Annual
Conference,” report, MacPhail, “FOA, Annual Conference of US Operations Mission
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Representative in Europe (SRE), Averell Harriman, insisted that “the
program of trade and financial stability must be accompanied by a program
for greatly increasing productivity.”12 In his speech to the OEEC ministerial
council in October 1949, the ECA administrator, Paul Hoffman, stated that
creating a single Western European market would encourage the creation of
large-scale, low-cost industries and thereby set in motion a rapid growth in
productivity in the OEEC countries.13 In December 1949, William C. Foster,
Harriman’s deputy, stated that it was the ECA’s intention to spur “a
complete mental revolution in European managers and laborers” with
“Uncle Sam as the consulting and management engineer.”14
The “productivity ideology” played a key role in the American rhetoric which
aimed at selling the Marshall Plan to the Europeans and at convincing them
that: “You too can be like us.”15 A major vehicle for this ideology was the
Technical Assistance Program (TAP), which developed from 1948 onwards.
Expenses for this program were comparatively modest. All in all, the
American productivity and technical assistance programs amounted to less
than 1.5 percent of the thirteen billion dollars in aid under the Marshall
Plan.16 The gap between theory (which made “productivity” a key concept
for the American aid policy) and practice (which only earmarked modest
funds to the productivity drive) may not be as big as it seems. In 1958, an
official of the US International Cooperation Administration17 stated to the
House Foreign Affairs Committee that these programs had “probably done
more to promote American interests per dollar spent, than any other type of
aid program in Europe.”18 As Michael Hogan has pointed out, the signifi-
Directors, 19.11. 1954.”
19 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 415.
20 WNRC, RG 469, Office of European Operations (OEO), Regional Organizations Staff
(ROS), SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390,
15.12. 1954, “Report on the European Productivity Program.”
21 HSTL, Papers of Everett H. Bellows, box 1, f. “Bellows, Material on Productivity
Program,” note, The Snack Bar Policy Board, 13.6. 1949, “Productivity – the ‘Ninth
Principle’.”
22 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
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cance of the TAP is not quantifiable and cannot be measured by the sums
allocated to it. Technical assistance was indeed a “low-overhead item,” in
that it involved the transfer of know-how, ideas, attitudes, with a low cost but
a strong impact.19 However, these statements beg the question: if this money
was so well spent, why didn’t the US give the TAP higher priority?
In fact, while American officials could agree on a diagnosis of the European
problem, they were at odds with each other as to the most appropriate cure.
As the so-called Gulick report stated in 1954, “[t]he technical assistance pro-
gram has probably been the most controversial element in the overall Euro-
pean aid program,” not only in the relations between the US and its Euro-
pean allies but also within the American administration.20 Even though there
was a general consensus in favor of making increasing productivity a central
goal, very few activities were developed by the ECA with that specific pur-
pose inmind.In June1949,agroupofECAofficialscomplainedthat “[e]very-
body talks about productivity, but nobody has done much about it” and that
the “ECA has paid surprisingly little attention to practical measures to in-
crease Europe’s productivity.”21 The American administration was divided
over the means to be used to obtain productivity growth. A minority favored
a “physical” or a “plant level” approach. It felt that the necessary changes in
labor-management relations, price and wage structure, marketing and
distribution could best be accomplished by technical and economic aid at the
individual plant level. The proponents of this approach advocated using large
sums specifically aimed at increasing productivity through technical assist-
ance projects. A majority favored the broader and more indirect “financial
approach” – or “balance of payments” approach – based on the belief that
trade liberalization and governmental action on financial policy and the over-
all investment pattern could accomplish the same purpose. According to the
latter, the productivity gap between the US and Western Europe was mainly
due to the size of the American market which allowed American manufac-
turing to achieve lower costs, lower prices and higher competitivity through
economies of scale. It could be reduced if Europe trusted the market
mechanisms and pursued its economic and political integration.22
Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954; Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan, pp.
158-59.
23 HSTL, Papers of Harry B. Price. Oral History Interviews on the Marshall Plan
conducted by Harry B. Price, box 1, f. “May 1953,” Interview with Bob Oshins, 4.5.
1953.
24 Ibid.
25 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 274.
26 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954.
27 Dutch National Archives (NLRA), 2.06.061, Ministerie van Economische Zaken
(MEZ), Afdeling Produktiviteitsbevordering (AP), Inv.nr. 587, ltr., no. 19612, Beugel
to Albregts, 21.3. 1951, attachment (att.): note, “De Plaats van de productiviteitsbevor-
dering in het Europese Herstelprogramma.”
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The conflict between proponents of the “financial approach” and those of
the “physical approach” was a “major and continuing difference within
ECA,”23 with the former clearly dominating the contest:
The financial people were at all times dominant in ECA, as symbolized by Dick
Bissell. Often we would get in Hoffman’s speeches a go-ahead on what I have
called the “physical” approach only to find that in practice Hoffman’s views were
negated by Bissell in the programming function. Ironically, in the last days of ECA
Bissell changed his mind on this matter but it was then too late. This was the real
fundamental tension within ECA.24
In October 1949, when Hoffman stated that productivity growth was a
central goal of the American policy, he made it clear that this would first of
all be achieved through trade liberalization and economic integration which
would produce a “massive change in the economic environment” in Western
Europe.25 At the same time, the “physical approach” was given a higher
priority through the expansion of the TAP. However, reflecting the policy
disagreements within the administration, the TAP would be programmed
largely independently and without coordination with the total economic aid
program.26
2. The US Technical Assistance Program
Technical assistance was one of the means foreseen by the Foreign Assist-
ance Act adopted in June 1948: “[t]he Administrator may, from time to time,
furnish assistance to any participating country by providing for [...] the
procurement of and furnishing technical information and assistance.”27 The
ECA started the TAP, aimed at improving productivity in Western Europe,
towards the end of 1948. The sums allocated to the TAP rose in the period
28 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 143. From 1948 to August 1952, 7,000 European
“missionaries” had travelled to the US, 800 American experts had been sent to Europe
(WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity Program
(3 of 3),” note, Bellows, 8.8. 1952, “The Productivity Program.”
29 The idea that the productivity gap was due less to technological than managerial
problems was expressed again and again by US officials during the period 1950-55, just
as was their opinion that emphasis ought to be put on the latter rather than the former.
Many European aid recipients begged to differ, however, since they still found
technological projects quite attractive. The initial activities of the EPA, in 1953-54, were
largely “vertical” rather than “horizontal” in nature, i.e., dealt with diffusion of technical
knowledge and mainly American production techniques (see for example: HSTL, Papers
of Everett H. Bellows, “Bellows – Correspondance. General,” box 1, memo, Bellows, 8.3.
1953, “The US Approach to the European Productivity Program;” NLRA, 2.06.061,
MEZ, AP, Inv.nr. 587, ltr., no. 19612, Beugel to Albregts, 21.3. 1951, att.: note, “De
Plaats van de productiviteitsbevordering in het Europese Herstelprogramma.”)
30 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (3 of 3),” note, Bellows, 8.8. 1952, “The Productivity Program.” See also:
HSTL, Papers of Everett H. Bellows, f. “Bellows – Correspondance. General,” box 1,
memo, Bellows, 8.3. 1953, “The US Approach to the European Productivity Program.”
27
1948-51 from less than two million to thirteen million dollars and further to
a still modest twenty million dollars in 1952. From 1949 onwards, a growing
number of “missionaries,” usually in mixed labor-management teams, went
to the US to study American industrial and agricultural production methods.
As it gained momentum, it took the form of a “crusade,” with missionaries
going to the American Holy Land and on their return spreading the gospel
of productivity which would hopefully save Europe from backwardness and
communism. It was supplemented by tours in Western Europe for American
experts lecturing about methods to improve productivity.28
The TAP was intended to help the Europeans overcome the numerous
obstacles to increasing productivity. Initially, the productivity gap was often
seen as the result of a partly war-time induced technological gap, the rich
natural resources of the US and the size of the American domestic market.
Very soon, however, it was concluded that low productivity was not only,
and in fact not mainly, due to technological lagging behind, but rather to
problems relating to management and labor.29 Four factors were singled out.
One was the low labor costs, which meant that the incentive for entrepre-
neurs to adopt labor-saving capital equipment and industrial techniques was
weak. Another was the inherited ownership of much industry which inhibited
dynamism. A third important factor was the deep gulf between workers and
management. Lastly, the US denounced the lack of governmental will to
attack restrictive business practices and encourage competition.30
31 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, Mission to Austria, PTAD, SF 1952-58, box 4, f. “Briefing
Materials,” memo, Hall to Russell, 23.9. 1954, “The FOA Productivity Program.”
32 See footnote 5.
33 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, Mission to France (MF), OD, General Subject files (GSF)
1948-55, box 40, f. “7. Productivity – Meetings and Conferences. 1952-1953,” “Excerpts
from the Minutes of the Productivity and Technical Assistance Regional Conference,
Paris, 1.10.-4.10. 1952,” p. 58.
34 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954.
35 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, Mission to Austria, PTAD, SF 1952-58, box 4, f. “Briefing
Materials,” memo, Hall to Russell, 23.9. 1954, “The FOA Productivity Program.” See
also: WNRC, RG 469, USRO, OES, SF 1952-55, box 19, f. “Fifth Session of Annual
Conference,” report, MacPhail, “FOA, Annual Conference of US Operations Mission
Directors;” WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 106, f. “OEEC: Senior
Economic Officers Meeting 1955 (2 of 5),” “Summary Record. Second Session:
Monday, 19.9. 1955;” HSTL, Papers of Everett H. Bellows, f. “Bellows – Correspon-
dence. General,” box 1, memo, Bellows, 8.3. 1953, “The US Approach to the European
Productivity Program;” WNRC, RG 469, SRE, Office of the General Counsel (OGC),
SF 1948-53, box 58, f. “Productivity: Program and Planning Papers,” memo, Bellows,
8.8. 1952, “The Productivity program.”
36 NLRA, 2.06.061, MEZ, AP, Inv.nr. 587, ltr., no. 19612, Beugel to Albregts, 21.3.
1951, att.: note, “De Plaats van de productiviteitsbevordering in het Europese Herstel-
programma.”
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The TAP intimately mixed culture and technology. Its purpose was not only
to transfer American production and management techniques and know-how
to Europe but also to export the American productivity spirit: “[w]hat we are
trying to do is to implant in Europeans, as an alternative to that revolutionary
faith in communism which is at the base of Russian foreign policy, a
revolutionary (to Europeans) faith in free enterprise.”31 Deputy Director
Fitzgerald of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA)32 summed it up in 1952:
“what we are basically trying to do [...] is to change attitudes of mind and
thinking of 250 million people”33 thereby overcoming all “restrictive business
practices” impeding economic growth in Western Europe. As other
government officials stated, Europe needed the US if it was to “move from
moribund to dynamic capitalism”34 because “the US is the only source of the
ideas that we are trying to get across. [... O]nly here do we really believe in
and practice dynamic competitive capitalism on a national scale.”35
The first report from a productivity mission, the British steel mission report,
was published in October 1949. The missionaries found that US successes
were due to the “productivity consciousness” in American firms, namely
their psychological readiness to consider all factors likely to increase pro-
ductivity. This conclusion was widely publicized in the UK and in other
European countries.36 Other reports pointed to a variety of explanations such
37 ICA, European Productivity.
38 Interview with G.L.G. de Milly, 31.5. 1995. The shift in emphasis from interest in
techniques towards management methods should not be exaggerated. From the very
beginning there were reports which stressed that the high American productivity was best
explained by the management methods applied in American industry (cf. AN, 80AJ80,
f. “Visites Silbermann,” note, Noël Pouderoux (director of the Centre d’études générales
d’organisation scientifique), “Les principaux facteurs de la productivité américaine.
Incidences sur l’industrie française.” The CEGOS mission to the US took place during
the period 23.4.-1.6. 1948). See also footnote 29.
39 NLRA, 2.06.061, MEZ, AP, Inv.nr. 587, ltr., no. 19612, Beugel to Albregts, 21.3.
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Herstelprogramma;” Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv (ABA), Arbejderbevægel-
sens Erhvervsråd, arkivnr. 516, box 83, f. “C.1.,” note, “Udkast: Beretning afgivet af
Handelsministeriets Produktivitetsudvalg vedrørende industri og håndværk om udvalgets
virksomhed i tiden fra 1.12. 1949 – 31.12. 1953.”
40 AN, 81AJ206, ltr., Monnet to ministre de l’économie nationale et des finances, 12.12.
1949, “Budget pour 1950 du programme français pour l’accroissement de la productivité
du travail dans l’industrie, le commerce et l’agriculture” (unless otherwise indicated, all
translations are my own).
41 Ibid.
42 German National Archives (BRDBA), B 146/315, III/1 e, note, 3.11. 1950, “Technical
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as protectionism, restrictive business practices, production based on high
prices and low wages and a lack of understanding between labor and
management.37 Subsequently, the emphasis of the productivity missions was
increasingly put on managerial projects, and on promoting more efficient
uses of existing material and human resources.38 The publicity given to the
first British productivity missions resulted in the organization of further
missions from France and other OEEC countries to the US. Intra-European
missions were also organized.39 In December 1949, after the Americans had
announced a strong increase in their allocations for technical assistance, Jean
Monnet, France’s Planning Commissioner, concluded that “the US ad-
ministration obviously [considered] technical assistance to be the most effi-
cient and economic method to increase the prosperity of a nation.”40
As indicated earlier, it would be an exaggeration to state that the US
administration was wholeheartedly behind this new productivity drive.
However, in January 1950, the Office of the Special Representative in
Europe, the ECA’s Paris branch, proposed the launching of a productivity
campaign in Western Europe.41 A special productivity section in the ECA,
the Productivity and Technical Assistance Division (PTAD), was created
and a program was prepared to serve as a general guide for the TAP. The
first point on this program was the creation in every OEEC country of a
productivity center as a body responsible for coordinating the different
productivity activities.42
Assistance – Finanzierung und Organisation der Produktivitätszentrale zur Durchführung
des 13-Punkte-Programms;” NLRA, 2.06.061, MEZ, AP, Inv.nr. 587, ltr., no. 19612,
Beugel to Albregts, 21.3. 1951, att.: note, “De Plaats van de productiviteitsbevordering
in het Europese Herstelprogramma.”
43 Cf. for example: WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF, 1948-53, box 60, f. “Productivity
general 1953,” DB/76, 10.7. 1951; WNRC, RG 469, Assistant Administrator for
Production (AAP), PTAD, Records Relating to (RRt) US Advisory Group on European
Productivity (AGEP), 1952-1953, f. “AGEP, Meeting no. 1,” AGEP/RA-1, 3.1. 1952.
44 Archivi Storici della Confindustria (ASCONF), box 70/19.1, f. “Assistenza tecnica.
Parte generale. Elaborazione dei programmi di assistenza tecnica. Corrispondenza con le
amministrazioni. Appunti. Circolari,” OEEC, Direzione dei Servizi Tecnici, Divisione
Centrale, Sezione Assistenza Tecnica, DT/C/TA/1016, 5.2. 1952, note, “Criteri da
adottare in materia di progetti di assistenza tecnica;” AN, SC, F60 ter, box 522, f.
“6813,” f. “80,” ltr. AF/1581, 27.7. 1951, attaché financier, ambassade de France à
Washington (FrEmb) to ministère des finances et des affaires économiques (MFAE),
“Elargissement du programme d’assistance technique de l’ECA;” AN, SC, F60 ter, box
522, f. “Assistance technique 682-683, crédits ouverts 1949-50; 684-1, 1950-54,” f.
“Politique de productivité,” ltr. no. 473, Richard to secrétaire d’Etat aux affaires
économiques, 29.8. 1951.
45 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.
“History: 115K,” report, “History of Negotiations under Section 115K of the ECA Act”
(s.d., probably from June 1953).
30
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 made increased productivity
an even more desirable goal. In September 1950, the American administra-
tion decided to give rearmament priority over recovery. Improved productivi-
ty appeared to offer a cheap way to save the economic recovery in Western
Europe, since the resources diverted from civilian investments would be
made up for through productivity gains.43 While economic non-military aid
was reduced, there seemed to be a strong rationale for increasing the portion
of this assistance which was devoted to productivity enhancement.44
Dissatisfaction with the economic and political fruits of the TAP also played
a role in prompting the administration’s decision to carry out a Production
Assistance Drive (PAD). While the initial impact of the productivity missions
seemed great and while in particular the early reports of the Anglo American
Council for Productivity were bestsellers, follow-up studies indicated that the
overall impact had been limited. The conclusion drawn was that not only was
more forceful action needed, but that it would have to be of a different kind,
enabling firms in the OEEC countries to produce “a European demonstra-
tion that American managerial concepts were valid.”45 A renewed effort was,
moreover, felt necessary to counter both social and political dangers
threatening Western Europe. Reports gathered by the Americans showed an
increasing dissatisfaction among workers in continental Europe, particularly
in France and Italy. There seemed to be a strong feeling that previous widely
publicized productivity drives solely had resulted in increased profits for the
46 Trade Union Advisory Committee archives (TUAC), box “TUAC History,” ERP-
TUAC, 12/6.3, note, 18.10. 1951.
47 WNRC, RG 469, OD, SF of the Director 1948-55, box 27, f. “ Productivity (2 of 2),”
memo, Bissell to Porter, Joyce and Oliver, 28.2. 1951, “ECA’s Productivity Program;”
WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.
“History: 115K,” report, “History of Negotiations under Section 115K of the ECA Act;”
WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity Program
(2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954.
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capitalists without producing any improvement for the workers.46 That such
a view was widespread was apparently confirmed by the summer of 1951 in
elections in both France and Italy, which showed that, contrary to earlier
expectations, the communist parties were not losing popular support. The
Americans, therefore, thought it essential that workers be encouraged to
identify with the capitalist society through a share-out policy, ensuring that
they would get their fair share of the prosperity of their countries. A first draft
for such a plan had already been devised by the sections of the administration
involved with technical assistance and with labor relations. Some in the
administration spoke about using very large sums for the productivity pro-
gram in Europe. In October 1949, a memorandum had proposed a three-
year program to modernize 75,000 European plants using 1.1 billion dollars
in US aid, 2.25 billion dollars in counterpart and a further 4.1 billion dollars
equivalent in local capital. In 1950, the proposed amount was lowered to 500
million dollars for the productivity program in Europe. But these proposals
were not accepted and no noticeable financial means were alloted to the
drive. The target sum for the fiscal year 1952 for the PAD was eighty million
dollars and 250 million dollars in counterpart but not even this more modest
goal was achieved.47
The administration’s passivity angered the Congress and prompted the
adoption in May 1951 of the so-called Benton Amendment, which added
section 516(a) to the Mutual Security act of 1951. This section declared it
to be:
the policy of the Congress that this Act shall be administered in such a way as (1)
to eliminate the barriers to, and provide the incentives for, a steadily increased
participation of free private enterprises in developing the resources of foreign
countries consistent with the policies of this Act, (2) to the extent that it is feasible
and does not interfere with the achievement of the purposes set forth in this Act,
to discourage the cartel and monopolistic business practices prevailing in certain
countries receiving aid under this Act which result in restricting production and
increasing prices, and to encourage where suitable competition and productivity,
and (3) to encourage where suitable the development and strenghtening of the free
48 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF 1948-53, box 59, f. “Productivity – Moody
Amendment, Basic Documents (Sec. 115K).”
49 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF 1950-1956, box 2, f. “Plans and Policy No. 1,”
memo, Bellows to Porter, 30.7. 1952, “Briefing for Ambassador Draper’s Staff Meeting,
30.7. 1952.”
50 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.
“History: 115K,” report, “History of Negotiations under Section 115K of the ECA Act.”
51 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954; WNRC, RG 469, OD, SF of the Director
1948-55, box 27, f. “Productivity (2 of 2),” memo, Bissell to Porter, Joyce and Oliver,
28.2. 1951, “ECA’s Productivity Program.”
52 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF 1948-53, box 60, f. “Productivity, General 1953,”
ECA, DB/76, 10.7. 1951.
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labor union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor within such
countries.48
The Benton Amendment thus placed the whole American economic aid
policy towards Western Europe under the sign of the politics of pro-
ductivity.49 It was very ambitious, since it required a direct and forceful
American intervention in domestic economic and social conditions in the
aid-receiving countries. American aid was to be used not only to enhance
productivity, but also to promote free private enterprise, discourage re-
strictive business practices and back non-communist trade unions. European
businessmen had to see markets as elastic and increased productivity as the
key to higher market shares. Workers on the other side had to be shown that
productivity increases would benefit everybody. This could notably be
demonstrated through share-out agreements in pilot plants which would state
that the gains resulting from the higher productivity were to be redistributed
between management, labor and consumers.50
The Benton Amendment together with the administration’s own resolve gave
a certain impetus to the PAD, though the sums allocated to this program
were considerably lower than initially envisaged.51 The new PAD was
announced as the new ECA policy at a mission chiefs meeting convened in
Copenhagen in June 1951. William C. Foster, who had succeeded Hoffman
as the head of the ECA in 1950, stated that the aim of the American aid
policy was to maintain economic strength while increasing military strength,
and that in order to achieve this all the resources of the ECA would have to
“be devoted to changing the state of mind in Europe to accept and effect
efficient production methods.”52 The new program differed from the
previous one by its broader and more interventionist character, namely its
emphasis on “direct action.” Previously, ECA’s efforts to promote producti-
vity had focused on changing governmental policies. The “direct action”
53 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 415-18; WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box
4, f. “Economics: Productivity Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954.
54 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 3, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (1 of 3),” torep 1651, MSA (Oshins) to AmEmb Paris, 9.10. 1952.
55 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.
“History: 115K,” report, “History of Negotiations under Section 115K of the ECA Act.”
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policy was based on the assumption that in the case of productivity the
important decisions were made by individuals rather than by governments.
It was, therefore, designed to influence individual decisions, seeking contacts
with industrialists and plants instead of relying solely on national governmen-
tal actions. It involved such activities as visit exchanges, training, trial and
demonstration projects, information services, conferences, etc. It was thus
stressed more than ever that the program should not only deal with
technological questions but should also further new ways of thinking and new
attitudes in Western European societies.53 While it was initiated by the ECA
it was hoped that the Europeans would take over responsibility for it after
two-three years. Such transfer of responsibility was deemed desirable for
financial reasons, since the reduction of American aid was inevitable, but also
for political reasons, as the US was anxious not to have the program per-
ceived as an American interference in the domestic affairs of its allies.54
In fact, discussions about the PAD went on inside the ECA throughout
1951, and in the summer of 1952 the PAD had only started being implemen-
ted in France, Italy, Austria and Denmark.55 Although all American aid was
supposed to further the Benton Amendment purposes, few actions specifical-
ly aimed at furthering its aims had been started. Some new sums were
allocated to the productivity program, but they remained considerably below
those which had once been suggested within the ECA. The majority in the
Senate was strongly dissatisfied with the failure of the US government to
carry out the pledge that had been given in the previous year to devote 250
million dollars in counterpart to the support of the productivity program. In
May 1952, therefore, Congress adopted the Moody Amendment to the
Mutual Security Act. Its purpose was to commit the administration to secure
the objectives of the Benton Amendment through the addition of a section
115(k) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948:
Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 101(a)(2) of the Mutual Security
Act of 1951, as amended (1) $100,000,000 shall, to the maximum extent
practicable consistent with the accomplishment of the policies and purposes of the
mutual security act of 1951, as amended, be expended in such manner and subject
to such agreements as may be necessary to assure that the amounts of local
currencies deposited under subsection (b)(6) as a result of such expenditure shall
56 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF 1948-53, box 59, f. “Productivity – Moody
Amendment, Basic Documents (Sec. 115K).”
57 Within the US administration, the Benton-Moody program was often referred to as the
115(k) program. The two amendments were sometimes called “the free enterprise and
productivity amendments” (cf. WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MF, OD, Communications &
Records Unit (CRU), SF, Central Files (CtF), 1948-56, box 171, f. 4, “Productivity
Program – Benton Moody, July 1953,” ltr., Stassen to Thye, 1.7. 1953).
58 See footnote 5.
59 WNRC, RG 469, USRO, OES, SF 1952-55, box 19, f. “5th Session of Annual
Conference,” report, MacPhail, “FOA, Annual Conference of US Operations Mission
Directors, 19.11. 1954.”
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be used exclusively, in accordance with principles developed by the Administrator,
to establish revolving funds which shall be available for making loans, and
otherwise to carry out programs in furtherance of the objectives of section 516 of
the Mutual Security Act of 1951, with a view to stimulating free enterprise and the
expansion of the economies of those countries with equitable sharing of the
benefits of increased production and productivity between consumers, workers,
and owners; and (2) the Director for Mutual Security is authorized to transfer not
exceeding $2,500,000 to the OEEC, to be used on terms and conditions to be
specified by the Director in order to promote the objectives of section 516 of the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.56
To some extent Congress accepted the failure of the administration to carry
out the Benton Amendment, since nothing was done to make the whole US
aid conform to its stipulations. However, it put the administration under
much greater pressure than before by earmarking part of the aid for specific
purposes. The Moody aid thus also came to be known as Conditional Aid.57
In its first version the Moody Amendment was mandatory, since there was
considerable suspicion concerning the administration’s will to carry it out. In
its final version an escape clause was inserted, making the amendment
acceptable to the administration. It nonetheless created a strong pressure in
favor of getting tough in the negotiations with the Europeans.
As a later FOA58 report somewhat ironically stated, the TAP reached its
“hey-day” when the Moody Amendment was passed and “with a great deal
of enthusiasm counterpart of 100 million dollars was set aside to bring some
kind of psychological economic revolution on the continent of Europe.”59
The congressional initiative gave a considerable boost to the PAD at a time
when drastic cuts in non-military aid seemed to threaten its future. Thanks
to the Moody Amendment the productivity drive was suddenly endowed
with a sum which was small compared to the total American aid, but which
was considerably higher than anything previously placed at its disposal. The
amendment also provided for an important novelty, the emphasis on
60 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p 433; Danish Foreign Office archives (UMA), j.nr.
106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/2, 31.8. 1956, “Memo by the Italian Delegation on the
Aims and Action of the EPA;” Service des archives économiques et financières (SAEF),
5 A 156, f. “IV Plan,” AFAP, “Rapport d’activités 1961-1962,” November 1962; AN,
80AJ80, f. “Visites Silbermann,” Monnet to Queuille, 16.9. 1948.
61 Charles S. Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the
Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s,” in: Journal of Contemporary History, vol.
5, no. 2, 1970, pp. 27-61.
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35
European cooperation in the field of productivity improvement. But the
conditional character of the Moody aid was to generate some very strained
negotiations between the US and the OEEC countries concerning the terms
on which it should be given. These difficulties highlighted some fundamental
differences in approach between Americans and Europeans in the productivi-
ty area.
B. European policies
Though the main impetus for the productivity drive came from America,
there was a genuine European awareness of productivity identified as a key
problem in several Western European countries after World War II.60
European productivity policies had their roots in the interwar period and the
American-inspired debate about rationalization following World War I.61
After World War II the situation varied widely from one country to another.
While French decision-makers such as Monnet were strongly preoccupied
with the relatively low French productivity and the need for modernizing the
French economy, and while the British Labour government initiated
productivity enhancing activities as early as 1947,62 such concerns loomed
less large in a country like Belgium.63 Among the central figures active in the
attempts to increase governmental action in this field after World War II
were Jean Fourastié in France and Laszlo Rostas and Alexander King in the
United Kingdom. In many countries the response of politicians to these
efforts by productivity experts was slow, while the reactions of private
enterprises were contradictory. As a political-social project and as a weapon
in the Cold War, the politics of productivity encountered strong Communist
opposition. The latter could build on a widespread feeling among labor that
productivity improvement was a means to improve profits through the
64 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program,” memo, PAB/D-126, Brown to Public Advisory Board (PAB), 14.4. 1952,
“The European Case Against Productivity.”
65 Ellwood, Building Europe, pp. 24-25.
66 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 209
67 AN, SC, F60 ter, box 517, f. “Productivité. Textes de base 1949-1957. (68),” Comité
National de la Productivité (CNP), “Mémorandum sur la politique française de
productivité et d’assistance technique,” July 1951.
68 FRUS 1951, vol. IV, pp. 54-57.
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increased exploitation of workers while at the same time adding to the un-
employment queues. All this made the productivity drive a politically delicate
matter for governments, particularly in France and Italy, which for Cold War
reasons were the two main targets of the American PAD. There were in other
words numerous cultural and political obstacles to a productivity drive, many
of which the Americans – at least some of them – were aware of.64
Many Western European governments wanted to achieve not only economic
reconstruction but also a social and economic modernization which would
allow for the creation of a more solid foundation for a political consensus in
the different countries. The so-called “revolution of rising expectations”65
meant that economic growth was perceived as a necessity if political
stabilization was to be achieved. Both on the governmental level and at the
firm level there was a desire to learn from the US. The American offer to
grant technical assistance and organize missions for interested managers,
trade unionists, engineers and others to the US was, therefore, generally
welcomed. The consensus on the need to rapidly increase production was
expressed in the OEEC’s Interim Report of December 1948, which identified
a fifteen percent increase in output per man hour by 1952 as the most
important condition for European recovery. The United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe’s “Economic Survey of Europe in 1948” defined the
increase of productivity as the sole way to achieve better standards of living
for all. The determination of enhanced productivity as a central goal for
Europe was endorsed by the OEEC countries in their Plan of Action for
1949.66 In March 1951, the French prime minister, Henri Queuille, stated
that the rearmament effort only emphasized the need for improving pro-
ductivity in order to compensate for the loss of resources being redirected
into the defense industries.67 This commitment by the OEEC countries to
productivity enhancement was confirmed by their signing of the “European
Manifesto” in August 1951, calling for a twenty-five percent increase in
production in five years. This rise in production was to be achieved by
improved labor productivity coupled with the so-called share-out principle,
namely the redistribution of the benefits resulting from this increase.68
69 The AACP was a non-governmental committee comprising representatives from
managers and employers from both US and UK and with secretariats in both London and
New York. The ECA provided the dollars and the British government created funds for
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MAE, 25.9. 1948; ABA, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, arkivnr. 516, box 83, f.
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The productivity missions undoubtedly had an impact on certain decision-
makers, sharpening their awareness of the existence of a productivity gap
between the US and Western Europe. In the UK they were organized by the
Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) which was created in the
fall of 1948 as a follow-up of a discussion between Chancellor of the
Exchequer Stafford Cripps and Hoffman a few months earlier.69 Later, partly
inspired by this example, and partly on US prompting, other OEEC
countries followed suit.70 As early as 1949, the US had pressed with some
success for the creation of national productivity centers (NPCs) with
representatives from the state, management and labor.71 In March 1950,
upon renewed American exhortations, the Council of the OEEC urged the
creation of such centers.72
However, the American calls for a productivity drive did not arouse
unmitigated enthusiasm in Western European countries. The “productivity
crusade” indeed met with widespread resistance in many European circles
for various reasons. These included governmental fears that the campaign
would have destabilizing social or political consequences, skepticism on the
part of management, and in some cases also trade unions, towards govern-
mental interference in the life of private enterprises, and fears among trade
unions that enhanced productivity was simply a code word for increased
exploitation of labor. There was, moreover, a reluctance to accept what was
perceived as patronizing attitudes on the part of the Americans. This was
particularly the case in France and Italy where the presence of strong
communist parties meant that the governments were often accused of being
73 See for example AN, 80AJ80, f. “Visites Silbermann,” tel. no. 326/DET, FrEmb. to
MAE, 25.9. 1948.
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19612, Beugel to Albregts, 21.3. 1951, att.: note, “De Plaats van de productiviteitsbevor-
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mere servants of American imperialism. Even though these countries did
wish to acquire American techniques and know-how, it was imperative for
them that such initiatives did not appear to have been “dictated” by the
US.73 No wonder, therefore, that the Americans often felt that there was a
discrepancy between European words and deeds. In September 1949, for
example, Hoffman bluntly told Robert Schuman, Maurice Petsche and
Hervé Alphand that he was disappointed with the French technical assistance
program: even though this country’s program in theory was the largest and
most well thought-out imaginable, in practice it had amounted to next to
nothing.74 Likewise, American proposals to create NPCs met with procrasti-
nation in Italy and the Netherlands.75 However, at the end of 1952 a
productivity center had been created in eleven OEEC countries.76
The Western European view of the American attempts to change basic
structural patterns and industrial practices as unwelcome interference in their
domestic affairs was highlighted by several episodes in 1951. William H.
Joyce, who was assistant administrator for production in ECA/Washington
and responsible for the new productivity drive, held several speeches in which
he strongly criticized the conservatism of European and particularly French
and Italian management practices.77 Moreover, the leak to The New York
Times during the summer of 1951 of the ECA’s instructions for implemen-
ting the PAD through a “direct action” program, created the impresssion in
Western Europe that the ECA intended to by-pass governments and appeal
78 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
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directly to the populations concerned. Eight OEEC countries protested to
the US and considerable suspicions about the whole program arose.78
Whereas purely technical assistance was generally welcomed by the Euro-
peans,79 problems arose as soon as the American assistance had to do with
more politically, socially or culturally sensitive questions such as restrictive
business practices, labor-management relations, the strengthening of the
“free” trade unions, or the share-out principle.80 The divergent approach of
Americans and Western Europeans to productivity was clearly demonstrated
by the Moody negotiations.
C. The Moody Negotiations
The initiative to the Moody aid was Congressional, but the responsibility for
implementing the new legislation was assigned to the Mutual Security
Agency and more specifically to the Productivity and Technical Assistance
Division.81 The MSA had no ready-made plan for the use of the 100 million
dollars the Congress earmarked for Benton Amendment purposes. While
high figures had earlier circulated as proposals within the MSA, they had
never been accepted at the top level of the agency. It was clear that the
administration on its own would not have contemplated such generous
expenditures for the productivity drive. The following months, therefore,
witnessed intensive battles on the implementation of the Moody Amend-
ment.
The Moody aid could only be extended to countries having presented a
productivity program accepted by the Americans as contributing to fulfilling
the aims of the Moody Amendment. Negotiations were accordingly initiated
with all OEEC countries interested in receiving Moody aid. In the course of
these discussions there were strong disagreements within the administration
82 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.






as to how tough the US should be with its allies. The general mood in
Congress and in several divisions in MSA/Washington was tougher than in
the State Department and in many MSA country missions.82 Among the
most contentious issues were: the identity of the aid recipients, the creation
of new national institutions and the share-out clauses. The MSA initially
considered limiting Moody aid to France, Italy, Germany and Austria, which
for different reasons were considered to be key countries for the program.
France and Italy were seen as the most important targets, because of the
strength of their communist parties. There, as well as in Austria, obstacles to
increasing productivity were perceived as strong, due in particular to the
mentality of management. Lastly, American officials thought that Austria and
West Berlin could be used as a show place for the West: “A telling demon-
stration of the ideas and practices of American productivity would be of great
importance in the Cold War.”83 Nevertheless, it was decided to offer Moody
aid to all OEEC countries. This decision was notably due to the US objective
of strengthening the role of OEEC in the productivity field, through the
creation of a European Productivity Agency. Such an objective could best be
attained if as many OEEC countries as possible received American assist-
ance. Another contentious issue was the establishment of new national
institutions. MSA in Washington felt that the productivity centers which had
been created on US prompting were too weak to carry out the ambitious in-
tentions of the Moody program. The MSA missions were, however, reluctant
to exert further pressure in this matter. In the end, it was decided to leave it
to the local MSA mission to choose whether to press or not for the creation
of a new and stronger NPC.84
The so-called share-out principle was the most controversial element of the
entire program. Whereas some “zealots within the MSA were insisting upon
a universal and rigid formula for share-out,” others were less enthusiastic
about it.85 A share-out agreement would normally require employers
participating in the program to bargain collectively with “free” trade unions
to ensure that productivity increases would result in wage increases. Even
though firms were only required to bargain in good faith, and not necessarily
to reach an agreement, this clause was intensely disliked by many of them as
an undue interference in management’s prerogatives. The share-out clauses
86 MAE, DE-CE, 1945-1960, vol. 356, note, Wormser to Président, 27.5. 1953; WNRC,
RG 469, Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), OEO, Program Staff (PS), RRt
Productivity Program Policy, 1949-55, box 4, f. “Policy – Europe – General,” draft ltr.,
Stassen to Batt, 22.5. 1953.
87 WNRC, RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Program and Planning (ODDPP)
1953-1961, SF of the Deputy Director (DD), 1951-58, box 7, memo, Eichholz to Ohly,
11.9. 1952, “Moody Amendment.”
88 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.
“History: 115K,” report, “History of Negotiations under Section 115K of the Foreign
Assistance Act.”
89 Public Records Office (PRO), CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52) 6th Meeting (M), 26.8.
1952, Sub-Committee on Technical Assistance (SCTA), “Minutes of Meeting of the
Sub-Committee Held at the Board of Trade (BOT) on 19.8. 1952.”
90 PRO, CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52)34, SCTA, memo by BOT, 22.7. 1952, “Conditio-
nal Aid.”
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thus met with widespread reluctance in Western European countries.86 This
situation caused an American official to conclude that “[o]ne of the
difficulties we are going to have is that the countries which least require
Moody money (e.g. Denmark) are most eager to get some, and those which
most need it (e.g. France and Italy) are most reluctant.”87 The share-out
provision in its crude form appeared only in the agreements with France,
Italy, Germany and Belgium, while other countries got away with a “softer”
version.88
Closely related to the question of share-out was the problem of restrictive
business practices (RBP), which met with forceful resistance in many
European circles. The UK Board of Trade found the American stance in this
field aggressive and noted that “[t]he purpose of the Benton Amendment
[appears] to be quite incompatible with the policy of H[er] M[ajesty’s]
G[overnment]”89). One of the reasons why the UK was hostile to the idea of
central loan funds for the Moody aid, was the British fear that the US would
make loans to individual enterprises conditional on their giving up any RBP
and accept share-out clauses, because “they can think of no other method of
blackmailing or otherwise persuading individual European employers into
accepting these admirable principles.”90
It was finally decided not to insist on a European commitment to undertake
a direct attack on RBP, since it was thought that no European country was
politically ripe for such a policy. But each aid recipient country was pressed
to go as far as was deemed possible to fight RBP, and most agreements
included a tactfully phrased reference to this problem.91 In general the US
92 Ibid.
93 Swiss National Archives (CHBA), 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 16, f. “1952/54 (Jan.-Sept.
1952), EE.20.90. Comité pour la productivité et la recherche appliquée (PRA),” Service
de la coopération économique européenne (SCEE), note, Morand, 19.9. 1952, “Rapport
sur la 5ème session du Comité de la productivité et de la recherche appliquée (PRA) de
l’OECE tenue à Paris les 11.9.-12.9. 1952.”
94 ICA, European Productivity, p. 3. For the allocation of the Moody aid among the OEEC
countries, see Appendixes: Table A-1.
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was aware of the desirability of avoiding any appearance of dictating its will
to its allies. The wording in the US-Danish Moody agreement was typical:
Recipients of loans will agree in writing to share significant benefits resulting from
such loans with the Danish community in the most expedient form, either higher
wages or lower prices, or both. Such recipients will also agree not to enter into any
agreement inconsistent with this subpara[graph].92
All these problems caused the Moody negotiations to be lengthy. The OEEC
countries had been told that in case no agreement could be reached for the
expenditure of all the bilateral Moody aid, unalloted sums would be used to
back the OEEC’s efforts to increase productivity. It could thus not be taken
for granted that American aid would be obtained. Moreover, a clear limit had
been set for the negotiations, since the aid had to be allotted at the latest by
June 30, 1953.93 In the end, agreements stipulating the use of Moody aid to
carry out national productivity programs were reached with eleven countries.
Smaller sums were subsequently allocated for technical assistance programs
in Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden. The only OEEC country with
which no agreement whatsoever was concluded was Switzerland. The Moody
agreements provided for some 110 million dollars in local currencies. Taking
into account the provisions of the bilateral agreements according to which
ten percent of counterpart deposited were reserved for use by the US, this
meant that in fact some 100 million dollars were allotted. Including different
technical assistance programs related to the 115k program, the Moody
Amendment provided over the following years some 136 million dollars in
aid to Western Europe.94
D. Europeanization of the Productivity Drive: Creation of the EPA
During its bilateral negotiations, the US had made it clear that eight percent
of the Moody counterpart funds should be given to a European Productivity
Agency (EPA) to be established by the OEEC. This request was the result
of American endeavors undertaken since 1949, when the US had encouraged
95 AN, 81AJ206, ltr., Monnet to ministère de l’économie nationale et des finances, 12.12.
1949, “Budget pour 1950 du programme français pour l’accroissement de la productivité
du travail dans l’industrie, le commerce et l’agriculture.”
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credit the British for the initiative, a French document claims paternity for the French and
requests the chairmanship for Jean Fourastié. But to no avail, since Alexander King was
nominated for the post (AN, 81AJ209, ltr., Chéreau to Fourastié, 18.7. 1949.
97 PRO, CAB134/709, T.A.(L)(51)38, SCTA, note by the Treasury, 10.4. 1951, “The
Handling of Technical Assistance in OEEC.”
98 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 587, note, no. 74405, MBZ, DGEM, 21.5. 1953, “Het
Europese Productiviteitscentrum;” WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 92, f.
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l’industrie et du commerce.
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the creation of an OEEC group to discuss productivity questions. The
Americans likewise had encouraged the dispatch by the OEEC of multina-
tional transatlantic productivity missions.95 This met the desires of a small
but active group of European specialists in applied research and productivity
who wished to see the OEEC play a more active role in this field. Though the
initial productivity missions to the US were mostly organized on a bilateral
basis, from 1949 onwards, a growing number of them were arranged through
the OEEC. The situation created by the many various committees of the
OEEC sending different uncoordinated missions to the US, soon threatened
to degenerate into chaos. On British initiative, therefore, a small coordinating
group of experts, Working Party no. 3 was set up in June 1949, with in-
structions to study means for promoting cooperation between member
countries and the US concerning scientific and technical information.96 From
birth, this group had a problematic existence, since it was based on a mis-
understanding. It had been established for very practical reasons, as a
necessity for dealing with the administration of technical assistance missions
spontaneously “springing into life.”97 Several experts, however, envisioned
it as the embryo of an organization responsible for a more active and com-
prehensive European productivity policy. The working party indeed adopted
a very broad approach, covering problems of productivity and technical
assistance, thus going clearly further than intended by the Council.98 It was
on the proposal of this committee, as well as on US prompting, that the
Council in March 1950 recommended the establishment of NPCs in all
99 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
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général du Plan. It thus reflected the general conflict existing between the planning agency
and the ministry of finance. When the EPA was created, the ministry of finance had
reasserted its authority on the CGP and had thus lost an important motivation to resist
an OEEC activity in the field of productivity enhancement (interview with King).
101 Interview with King, 3.2. 1996.
102 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 92, f. “Committees – OEEC (4 of 6),”
C(59)215, 31.7. 1959.
103 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
104 Among these experts were Alexander King, Laszlo Rostas, Jean Fourastié. They were
members of the OEEC’s Working Party no. 3, many of them had been senior representa-
tives of the national research organizations and several of them were later to be found in
the EPA’s Committee for Applied Research (CAR) and were engaged in those EPA
activities in the field of science and research which were carried over in the OECD in
1961 (PRO, CAB134/709, T.A.(L)(51)38, note by the Treasury, 10.4. 1951, “The
Handling of Technical Assistance in OEEC;” interview with King, 3.2. 1996; CHBA,
7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 16, f. “1952/54 (Jan.-Sept. 1952), EE.20.90. Comité PRA,”
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member countries.99 Working Party no. 3 further proposed the creation of a
more powerful OEEC committee to deal with productivity matters. This
proposal, however, met with French resistance.100 Possibly in the hope of
defeating such ambitions,101 officially because Working Party no. 3 dealt with
too broad a field,102 it was decided to split the existing group into two
specialized committees: the Committee for Scientific and Technical Matters
and the Technical Assistance Group. The former was responsible for the
technical information service whereas the latter was to be in charge of all
technical assistance activities, including the productivity missions.103 But with
the new American emphasis on the TAP adopted during the summer of
1951, the insistence on a better organization of the multi-country missions
grew in the US, just as did the wish to see Europeans take over the whole
productivity effort. In addition, a small group of experts active in the two
committees actively tried to further the project of a more comprehensive
European productivity policy.104 In December 1951, OEEC mission no. 100
toured the US and met with numerous American officials to discuss the
future organization of the European productivity drive. In the course of these
conversations, the Americans expressed their wish to strengthen the role of
105 One should not forget that while the Europeans were ready to cooperate when it served
their interest, they were at the same time competing for access to American technical
assistance funds (cf. AN, F60 bis, box 518, f. “Assistance technique. Productivite. 6812.
1949-1950-1951,” MAE, DGAEF, SCE, note, 19.12. 1951, “Mission OECE d’assi-
stance technique no. 100.”
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CE(52)14, 7.4. 1952, “Nouvelle structure des organes s’occupant de la productivité.” For
early proposals concerning the reorganization of the Committee for Scientific and
Technical Matters and the Technical Assistance Group: PRO, CAB134/709, T.A.(L)
(51)38, note by the Treasury, 10.4. 1951.
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the OEEC.105 In January 1952, American representatives informally sug-
gested the creation of a European productivity organization. This idea met
with mixed feelings among the European particpants, the British being
particularly skeptical. Others were more positive, perhaps because they
expected a large American contribution to such a body.106 The Americans
kept the pot boiling, and in March 1952 a MSA official stated that “[t]he
MSA aim is to leave in Europe, as a heritage, useful Productivity Centers
which will strive for industrial progress, and from it a strong and worthwhile
peace,” and that it would also “be happy to give attention to helping OEEC
to set up a European Productivity Technical Center” to further that aim.107
It was informally concluded during an American-European symposium that
the final decision on any European organization for productivity matters
would have to be made in connection with the upcoming discussions con-
cerning a streamlining of the OEEC.108 Soon afterwards, a report by Olivier
Wormser and Eyvind Bartels suggested, as a device to reduce costs and to
make increasing productivity a more central goal, the merging of the
Committee for Scientific and Technical Matters and the Technical Assist-
ance Group into a common body.109 This proposal, actively backed and
influenced by the US,110 was accepted by the member countries, and in May
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1952 the OEEC established the Productivity and Applied Research (PRA)
Committee to study “the improvement of methods of production and
distribution with a view to raising standards of living.”111 The British hoped
that the creation of this committee would finally silence the advocates of a
European Productivity Center. They could take comfort from American
assurances that the national centers ought to be strengthened before a
European one could be created.112 But it soon turned out that there was
widespread dissatisfaction with the new organizational arrangement. Criti-
cisms focused on the committee’s secretariat, which some found inefficient,
and others found too ambitious.113 The Americans pointed out that there was
a discrepancy between the ambitious goals which the PRA Committee had
set for itself and the modest sums which had been allotted to its activities,
since the creation of the committee had been concomitant with the reduction
of the personnel available for the OEEC’s productivity work.114 While all this
created pressure for doing something, there were also forces which clearly
would have preferred a dormant committee and thus favored the status quo.
The UK Government was not happy with the active role played by its
delegate, Alexander King. Basically there was a widespread feeling in the UK
115 PRO, CAB134/1010, MAC(52)9th Meeting. 4.2. 1952, “Minutes of a Meeting Held
on 31.1. 1952.”
116 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 1, f. “1469,” note, de Milly to
Hirschfeld, 20.6. 1952.
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Beugel, 5.1. 1953.
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Scientific and Technical Matters an van de Technical Assistance Group.”
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that it did not have anything to learn from the other member countries in
matters of productivity policy and that European cooperation should there-
fore be kept as limited as could decently be advocated. Limits to the British
resistance were set by their strong feeling of isolation: “because of their
dependence on US aid, many of the European countries [were] likely to
share [the Americans’] enthusiasm” for further cooperation in the productivi-
ty field.115 An important feature of the British policy was, therefore, to keep
any activity undertaken as practical as possible and in this way oppose the
American and the secretariat’s predilection for “bold imaginative plans.”116
A similar mood prevailed among the Swiss, the Dutch and the Swedes.117
But while the British strategy was merely one of containment, the Dutch and
the Swiss hoped that the functions of the intergovernmental PRA Committee
would soon be taken over by a private committee.118 The Swiss policy was
based on a fundamental hostility to any governmental (and thus even more
to any inter governmental) interference in the affairs of private firms.119 But
the Swiss were aware of the strength of the American feelings about the new
impetus to the productivity drive, emphasizing its political-economical-social
rather than its technological aspect, and encouraging it at a European level:
“outright opposition to such a policy might put us in an extremely difficult
position.”120 The Swiss also had the impression that the initiatives to
Europeanize the productivity drive were “the expression of deeply felt and
fully respectable aspirations of many European countries which moreover feel
strongly encouraged by the United States.”121
In fact, it is hard to detect strong views at this stage among the other par-
ticipating countries. During the fall of 1952, France certainly gave strong
support to the idea of creating a European Productivity Agency, but this
vigorous stand largely coincided with the announcement by the US that it
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wanted to give such a project palpable support. There were undoubtedly
some, among the experts in the PRA Committee and in the secretariat, who
supported the idea. They felt that mere discussions on cooperation in
research and on the factors in economic growth were of limited effect and
that if the OEEC was to make any progress it would have to equip itself with
an operational branch which could organize practical activities by way of
experimentation and demonstration.122 Left to themselves, without American
help, these individuals would hardly have been able to create the momentum
needed for the creation of a specialized productivity agency. The Moody
Amendment changed the whole picture.
Ever since 1949, the American administration had favored a greater OEEC
involvement in the field of productivity enhancement, but without having
precise ideas about the institutional arrangements for such a role. When the
PRA Committee was created, the Americans hoped that it would deal with
a broader field than the one handled until then by the OEEC, and optimisti-
cally viewed it as “a strong and active group which [could] provide leadership
and assistance to the efforts of individual countries in the broad as well as the
merely technical aspects of productivity.”123 Apart from a slightly increased
budget – it was raised to 150 million francs yearly124 – the PRA Committee
failed to live up to the American expectations, mainly because it remained
subject to the general rules of the OEEC, which provided for “a maximum
of discussion and a modicum of action.”125 Decisions required unanimous
agreement, procedures were cumbersome, sub-committees proliferated,126
all of which made the PRA Committee too slow and inefficient to play the
role of an operational branch working on enhancing productivity.127
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The Moody Amendment conveniently provided the financial means to
implement the policy of the American administration since it set aside a grant
of 2.5 million dollars to the OEEC.128 It was this clause which paved the way
for the creation of the European Productivity Agency as a semi-autonomous
organization within the framework of the OEEC. The American administra-
tion finally settled for this option because it offered a way to further three
major policy goals in Western Europe: increase productivity, promote
European integration and develop labor-management cooperation. As
William Draper, Harriman’s successor as the US Special Representative in
Europe, stated in October 1952, the “primary motive behind this proposal
is to develop and strengthen OEEC leadership” in the field of productivity
enhancement.129 It was indeed
highly desirable that movement towards higher productivity evolve in [a] European
context and not [be] confined within national boundaries. [To] [d]evelop these
activities [is] also important to basic US policy of strengthening [the] OEEC as [a]
force towards European integration.130
The Americans further hoped that the new agency could play an important
role in promoting labor-management cooperation on the European level.
They thought in terms of creating an organization governed by personalities
coming from labor, management and governments, all chosen on the basis
of their attachment to the share-out principle.131 Such a corporate organiza-
tion would at the same time help Europeanize the productivity drive, which
would be useful because a “progressive-minded agency [could] stimulate
country efforts and help overcome disadvantages ‘US’ tag in countries
[which are] particularly sensitive [to] close American identification with
program.”132
Those were the three major policy goals which the EPA was created to
promote. In order to achieve them, the EPA should be established within the
133 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF 1948-53, box 58, f. “Productivity – OEEC,” repto
1144, SRE (Porter) to SecState (Kenney), 3.10. 1952.
134 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 3, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (1 of 3)”, repto 1444, Paris to London, 27.10. 1952.
135 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF 1948-53, box 58, f. “Productivity – OEEC,” memo,
Bellows to Porter, 24.9. 1952, “Proposal for the Establishment of a Council for Pro-
ductivity in Europe.”
136 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program,” memo, Ozer to Cruikshank and Oliver, 7.7. 1952, “A Proposed Cable on the
Moody Amendment as a Basis for Discussion.”
137 PRO, CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52)34, 22.7. 1952, SCTA, memo by BOT,
“Conditional Aid;” CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52) 5th Meeting (M), SCTA, 24.7. 1952,
“Minutes of Meeting of the Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 24.7. 1952.”
138 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, OGC, SF 1948-53, box 58, f. “Productivity – OEEC,” memo,
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framework of the OEEC because of the Moody Amendment (which stipu-
lated that 2.5 million dollars should be granted to the OEEC) and because
the US government wanted to strengthen this organization. The US, how-
ever, wished the EPA to be as autonomous as possible, partly for reasons of
principle (since it was the established US policy to avoid contributing directly
to the OEEC, American aid could not be merged with the normal OEEC
budget),133 but also because only a strong agency with a forceful leadeship
would be able to play the ambitious role which the Americans envisioned for
it, which was to be the “operating arm [of the] OEEC” and “to identify
principal structural obstacles (social and pscychological) to productivity, to
develop knowledge as to [the] causes [of] these obstacles, and to work out
with various countries [the] best means [to] overcoming obstacles.”134 In
addition, the creation of an autonomous agency would have a psychological
dimension: it was hoped that the publicity effect of such an event would ease
the mobilization of financial resources in the member countries.135
It took some months before the EPA emerged as a clear project from the
discussions within the US administration. Initially the OEEC grant and the
bilateral grants contemplated by the Moody Amendment seemed closely
connected. It was anticipated that an OEEC committee, called Central
Production Assistance Board, would be created as the depositary of the
counterpart funds generated by the Moody aid, and that it would be
responsible for a comprehensive European policy to expand the economies
of Western European countries.136 According to this plan, the US would
suggest the general types of activities to be pursued but would rely on the
OEEC to supervise and approve individual country proposals. It soon
became clear that European governments were hostile to such American-
European supervision of their counterpart funds.137 Instead, it was proposed
by the MSA Paris mission to create a Council for Productivity in Europe138
Bellows to Porter, 24.9. 1952. The name was later changed to “European Productivity
Bureau” (cf. MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 1, f. “1469,” note, de Milly
to van der Beugel, 12.8. 1952; PRO, CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52)62, SCTA, note by the
BOT, 6.12. 1952, “Policy of the European Productivity Bureau”) and finally to the
“European Productivity Agency.”
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which should more modestly be in charge of the 2.5 million dollars grant plus
contributions from the member countries. It was considered whether to ask
the aid recipients to allot twenty percent of their Moody counterpart funds
to the new organization,139 but the US finally settled for much less, eight
percent. This meant that the initial European contribution to what became
the EPA would match the American donation on a three to one basis, and
would total about 7.5 million dollars.140 Although officials within the MSA
regretted that the organization envisioned was neither “a very vital organiza-
tion [n]or one that [was] to spend a very large proportion of the Moody
money,”141 it was agreed to submit the proposal to the OEEC countries. This
occurred in October 1952.142
From an early stage, the negotiations on the creation of a European
organization were dissociated from the negotiations on bilateral agreements
in order to ease their conclusion. It was decided that the 2.5 million dollars
allocation to the OEEC would be made dependent on the successful
conclusion of all the bilateral negotiations.143 Although this was not clear at
the beginning, the American administration finally decided not to make any
bilateral Moody aid conditional on the contribution of counterpart funds to
the new productivity agency. However, this probably never dawned on the
European negotiators. In any case, they were left in no doubt as to the strong
American desire to see the establishment of an OEEC productivity organiza-
tion.144 No bilateral agreement was concluded before the OEEC countries
had accepted the creation of the EPA.145
Productivity.
146 See above.
147 PRO, CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52)60, SCTA, note by the BOT, 2.12. 1952, “Proposal
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152 ABA, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, arkivnr. 516, box 79, note, PU, 30.1. 1953,
“Referat af møde i OEECs produktivitetskomite d. 26.1. og 27.1. 1953.” See also: MBZ,
DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” 4.2. 1953, “Verslag van de
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The American proposal was disliked by the British and the Swiss who wanted
to strictly limit the activity of the OEEC in the productivity field.146 However,
other OEEC countries welcomed it, and they certainly also appreciated the
prospect of additional American aid. Under these circumstances, the UK and
Switzerland preferred to accept the principle of a new agency and concentra-
te on limiting the practical implications of this step. In November 1952, the
OEEC Council endorsed the idea that a European Productivity Agency was
needed in order to enhance the efficiency of the work done in this field and
to obtain American funding.147 During the following months, the British
became the main opponents of the American project of creating a strong
“independent organisation liberally financed and carrying out a very wide
program,”148 which would become “the keystone of the work of [the]
OEEC.”149 They were backed consistently by the Swiss and more occasional-
ly by the Dutch, the Danes and the Swedes. The most adamant supporters
of the US position were the French, whose main allies were the Italians, the
Austrians and the Germans. All other member countries were ready to go
along with the project, though without much enthusiasm.150 Since the UK
was in a minority, the Board of Trade concluded that it was “going to be
extremely difficult for H[er] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] to take a too negative
and costive a line” and that it was “very important therefore, for our relations
with the rest of Europe as well as with MSA,” to show willingness to
compromise.151
Disagreements among the OEEC countries affected the new agency’s
organization, its financing and program. The American vision of a fairly
independent agency within the OEEC framework was backed by most other
OEEC countries.152 The two poles in the debate were represented by France
and the UK, while the US preferred to keep a low profile. France was very
outspoken in its support for a strong autonomous organization, and had
153 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 3, f. “Economics: Productivity
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more ambitious views on the new agency than other OEEC members.153 The
French indeed went one step further than the US, and suggested a so-called
external solution, namely that the new agency should be an independent
international body, acting under the control of an autonomous authority
nominated and elected by the NPCs and that its decisions should be binding
on these centers.154 The basic concern of the British was to avoid any
supranational tendency in the field of productivity which could prove
contagious in other sectors of European cooperation.155 They also feared that
an autonomous EPA director would be overly exposed to American
pressure.156 In order to tame any interventionist tendency on part of the new
agency, they persistently argued that it should be closely integrated with the
existing OEEC structure.157 This “internal solution” implied that the EPA
would form part of the OEEC, that its autonomy would be strictly limited,
its director remain subject to the authority of the secretary general of the
OEEC, and that the whole agency would act under the supervision of the
Council.158
The British largely won their case. The PRA Committee (which consisted of
low government officials and experts) had been autonomist, but once the
matter was referred to the Council, the balance shifted in favor of the internal
solution. France remained sole proponent of an independent organization,
159UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 1, OEEC del. (Bartels) to Udenrigsministeriet (UM), no.
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1953, “Rapport angående möte i OEEC PRA Committee, 26.1.-27.1. 1953;” NLRA,
2.06.061, Inv.nr. 587, MBZ, DGEM, no. 74405, 21.5. 1953, “Het Europese
Productiviteitscentrum;” MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,”
desp. no. 20.049, OEEC del. (Gelderman) to MBZ, 12.2. 1953; MBZ, DGEM-Archief
66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” note, de Milly to van der Beugel, 5.1. 1953.
160 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 1, desp. OEEC del. to UM, no. 14, 20.1. 1953; UMA,
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and Switzerland, which would have preferred a purely private organization,
finally abstained.159 While France got some support from the US and Italy,
the UK was now backed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark and
Germany.160 The result of the negotiations was a compromise very much to
the British taste, one which the UK clearly considered to be a “success.”161
While the UK accepted the creation of the European Productivity Agency,
it was agreed that the Council of the OEEC would remain the final authority
of the new agency and was to approve the annual program and budget of the
agency. Informally, it was agreed that though the director would be acting on
behalf of the secretary general, he would in practice be granted a large degree
of autonomy.162 Once the integrationist solution had been adopted, many
member countries indeed favored giving the director of the agency a strong
position, i.e., independent from the secretariat of the OEEC and solely
responsible to the Council and the PRA Committee. This was due to the
past inefficiency of the OEEC secretariat in matters of productivity
improvement. It was also hoped that a powerful and autonomous position
would attract highly qualified candidates.163
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The EPA was thus created as an “operating arm”164 of the OEEC and was
composed of three main elements, performing respectively an executive, a
legislative and a consultative role. The director of the agency, assisted by a
secretariat, was responsible for preparing the program, first submitting it to
the PRA Committee, then to the Council, and for implementing it once it
had been approved by both bodies. The PRA Committee was made up of
representatives of the member countries. It fixed the rules and methods of
work, approved most projects and supervised the activities of the director.
Finally, an advisory board was established, consisting of members appointed
in a personal quality and not as representatives of their respective organiza-
tions, namely trade unions, industrial and agricultural federations. It was to
provide advice on the EPA’s work and particularly on its public relations
aspect, thereby establishing an informal contact between the EPA and non-
governmental organizations influential in productivity questions.165
A major controversy arose concerning the financing of the agency. The UK
insisted that its contribution (i.e., eight percent of its share of the Moody
counterpart funds) to the new agency should be non-convertible and totally
expended in the UK. Obviously, this amounted to a severe limitation of the
financial means at the free disposal of the agency.166 The Americans insisted
on convertibility and in any case on the agency’s control over national
contributions whether convertible or not.167 British officials labelled this a
“distasteful proposal” which the US was trying to force the Europeans to
accept.168 In the end, an American-British agreement, subsequently endorsed
by the other OEEC countries, led to a compromise whereby one third of the
national contribution would be convertible, while the rest would gradually
become so.169
170 PRO, CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52)62, SCTA, note by the BOT, 6.12. 1952.
171 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-54. box 48, f. “Productivity (EPA),”
ecoto 1332, Paris (Todd) to FOA (Rand and Ringer), 2.4. 1954. See also: WNRC, RG
469, SRE, PTAD, SF 1950-1956, box 8, f. “Program 3,” memo, MacPhail to Tank,
15.1. 1954, att.: memo, Robinson, 15.1. 1954, “Semi-Annual Report of the Productivity
and Technical Assistance Division.”
172 PRO, CAB134/1181, T.A.(L)(52)62, SCTA, note by the BOT, 6.12. 1952.
173 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2, OEEC del to UM, 29.6. 1953; European Community
Historical Archives (ECHA), EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. Direction Technique.
PRA (A),” note, Igonet to Corbasson, 22.12. 1952. The Moody Amendment was in fact
repealed in July 1953 and replaced by the Thye Amendment. However, by that time the
Moody agreements had been concluded and the aid funds committed.
174 WNRC; RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 3, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (1 of 3),” repto circ. 144, Paris to MSA, 25.3. 1953.
175 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 12, pp. 91-93.
56
Lastly, the discussions in the PRA Committee concerning the program of the
new agency were a foretaste of the difficulties which lay ahead. On the one
hand, the French, the Italians, and the Americans wanted the EPA to initiate
an ambitious program of research concerning among other things human
factors in industry. On the other hand, the UK and the Swiss wanted “to
keep the program down to smaller and severely practical proposals.”170 The
latter concern was shared by the Dutch and the Scandinavian countries. For
the UK and Switzerland, however, limiting the activity of the agency to
projects of practical use seemed to be a code word for doing as little as
possible, since neither of these countries expected the EPA to be able to do
anything useful. And the Americans indeed considered that the British in
reality wanted to transform the agency into a purely “academic forum for
discussion”171 without any operational role worth mentioning. The UK,
however, “found it extremely difficult to maintain [its] point of view and
embarrassing to press it too far.”172
The following protracted discussions conceivably were brought to a
conclusion by a fear that the new Congress would repeal the Benton-Moody
Amendment, and with it the 2.5 million dollars grant to the OEEC.173 On
March 24, 1953 the Council decided to establish a European Productivity
Agency as of May 1, 1953.174 Its purpose was to:
seek, develop and promote the most suitable and effective methods for increasing
productivity in individual enterprises, in the various sectors of economic activitiy
in the Member countries, and over the whole field of their economies. To this end
it shall undertake, and promote measures tending to the acceptance and adoption
of the best and most modern techniques and to the removal of factors limiting
their adoption.175
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Soon afterwards, the Americans realized that the new agency’s “Constitu-
tion” did not in their view satisfactorily fulfill the requirement for aid
formulated by the Moody Amendment. Despite some reluctance on the part
of the European countries, they managed to have it amended in June 1953.
A further goal, directly inspired from clauses in the bilateral Moody
agreements, was then added:
In carrying out these purposes the agency shall be guided by the principles that
competition should be encouraged while any business practices which result in
decreased production and higher prices should be discouraged; that the benefit
obtained through an increase in productivity should be shared to the mutual
benefit of consumers, owners and workers; and that cooperation of management
and labour organisations, where there is goodwill on both sides, will promote these
purposes.176
The creation of the EPA was certainly viewed as the culmination of their
tenacious efforts by the few very active experts in the field. But it was first of
all the result of an American initiative which had made it financially possible,
and which had silenced those who would have preferred to see no agency at
all. The EPA was, as an MSA official stated, “an American brainchild de-
signed to facilitate integration and permit withdrawal of direct US dollar
aid.”177 This basically American idea was accepted by feet-dragging Euro-
peans.178 “[T]he creation of the agency was not entirely a matter of free will”
as the British OEEC ambassador, Hugh Ellis-Rees, put it.179 It was viewed
by many member countries as a simple device to channel American technical
assistance to Europe and by quite a few as a body imposed upon them and
merely “set up for the purposes of carrying out U.S. legislation.”180 For that
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same reason, the agency was only granted a short three-year lease of life. In
1956, the member countries would have to decide whether to continue it or
not. The definition of the EPA as an “experiment”181 was a compromise
between those who could see no use whatsoever for it once the American aid
was exhausted and those, in particular the Americans, who hoped to see it
transformed into a more lasting institution.182
E. Conclusion
The EPA was both a logical and an accidental result of American postwar
policy in Western Europe. It was a result of the fusing of two major goals in
the US postwar policy in Western Europe: increasing productivity and
fostering European integration. At the same time, it was a very late product
of the US Technical Assistance Program, which makes it seem an almost
accidental, casual result of a congressional attempt to force the administra-
tion to get tough with the Europeans. In fact, the productivity drive never
constituted a ready-made program of action prepared by the US administa-
tion for the postwar period. It developed incrementally, in response to
economic developments in Western Europe and to the unfolding of the Cold
War in Europe and in Asia. And one of its major features was the gap
existing between words and deeds. While the US rhetoric made productivity
enhancement a key element in its European policy, the sums devoted to the
productivity drive were modest. This may have reflected both the low cost
of the drive and the limited institutional capacities of aid recipient countries
to absorb what the Americans had to offer. However, it also mirrored the
divisions within the administration and the fact that those who wholehearted-
ly supported a strong productivity drive were in a minority,
The Moody aid represented a very large sum compared to anything the
productivity drive had been endowed with before. It was both too much and
not enough. As Everett Bellows, chief of the PTAD, put it: “[t]he total
183 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF 1950-1956, box 2, f. “Plans and Policy No. 1,”
memo, Bellows to Porter, 30.7. 1952, “Briefing for Ambassador Draper’s Staff Meeting.”
59
amount of money [allotted by the Moody Amendment] exceeds what could
be usefully spent on mere projects on the one hand, and falls considerably
short of buying a social revolution on the other.”183 It was to give the
productivity drive a considerable boost in the individual member countries
as well as at the European level through the establishment of the EPA. But
the sums put at the disposal of the new agency were modest compared to the
tasks given to it. The EPA was thus not born under a lucky star: it was an
American idea, rather reluctantly accepted by those Europeans who were
supposed to be its main beneficiaries, with ambitious goals but halfhearted
support from its American sponsors. And it was only experiencing its first
trials.

1 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-54, box 48, f. “Productivity (EPA),” ltr.,
Watson to Francis, 25.2. 1954.
2 Handelsministeriet (HM), j.nr. 88-5-56, note, no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955,
“EPA’s hidtidige virksomhed og fremtidsmuligheder.”
3 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, no. 136391, van Blokland
to Kruisheer, 29.10. 1954, att.: note by King, 27.10. 1954, “Future Operation of the
European Productivity Agency.”
4 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 587, note (MBZ), no. 74405, 21.5. 1953, “Het Europese
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II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EPA,
1953-61
Reluctantly accepted by some as a temporary experiment, ambitiously viewed
by others as the embryo of a comprehensive European productivity policy-
making body, the EPA suffered from its very birth from the problems which
such an ambiguous identity inevitably produced. It was never allowed to take
its own existence or working methods for granted, and its history is to a large
extent the story of continuous battles for survival. Its congenital afflictions
were responsible for its stormy, uncertain and brief existence.
A. A Chaotic Start (1953-54)
The EPA was born with a handicap. As an American official said in 1954:
“There is no ready-made market for EPA. It must be sold.”1 Few OEEC
countries sincerely wished to “draw up and promote a European Productivity
Programme” as proclaimed by the EPA’s constitution. In fact, their main
preoccupation was to secure as large a chunk of the EPA’s funds for
themselves as possible.2 Since the US funding would inevitably decline
during the following years and since the EPA had only been granted a three-
year lease of life, it was from the very start confronted with an urgent need
to market itself, by making the EPA known and if possible useful to the
member countries.3
The first necessary step in this direction was to get the newborn organization
going. This proved easier to decree than to do. The EPA was created by the
Council of the ministers of the OEEC on March 24, and officially came into
existence on May 1, 1953. This decision remained mere theory though, since
the agency had no director or staff of its own. There was a general agreement
that the director should play a central role and that it was therefore crucial
to make the right choice for this post.4 The Americans wanted to give the
Produktiviteitscentrum.”
5 Interview with King, 23.6. 1995.
6 BRDBA, B 146/1104, Rocholl to Möller, 17.4. 1953, “Stellenbesetzung der EPZ;”
BRDBA, B 102/37052, note, Haselbeck to Albrecht, 20.3. 1953; CHBA, 7111(A) Lf.
bzw. 1, box 17, f. “1952 et 1er semestre 1953. AEP,” memo, s.d.
7 CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1 Bd. 16, f. “1er semestre 1953. EE-20.90. Comité PRA,”
note, SCEE (Morand) to Office fédéral de l’industrie, des arts et métiers du travail
(OFIAMT), 15.5. 1953.
8 Interview with King, 23.6. 1995. See also: ABA, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd,
arkivnr. 516, box 80, f. “Produktivitetsudvalget. 1953. C1,” note no. 308, HMPU, 15.3.
1953, “Referat af plenarmøde i PRA d 28.4.-30.4. 1953;” MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA
Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” note, 4.2. 1953, “Verslag van de vergadering van het PRA
Committee op 25.1.-26.1. 1953.”
9 BRDBA, B 146/1104, Werkmeister to Blücher, 20.5. 1953.
10 BRDBA, B 146/1104 , ltr., Werkmeister to Blücher, 26.6. 1953; NOUD, 44.25/1 t,
box 3, OEEC del. (Koht) to HD, 11.6. 1953.
11 It would actually give Germany its first high-level position in an international
organization since World War II.
12 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2, note, UM to PU, 9.6. 1953; BRDBA, B 146/1104,
note, 29.5. 1953.
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EPA a prestigious role, and sought to appoint a prominent European
personality as director of the agency. Their first choice was Harold Wilson,
former President of the UK Board of Trade and a prominent Labour Party
leader, who for that very reason was unacceptable to the British Conservative
government. The Americans then thought of Sir Oliver Franks, who turned
down the offer.5 Among those subsequently considered were the Swede Axel
Iveroth and the British Alexander King.6 Rumors circulated that the OEEC
secretariat wanted to place one of its own in the post, thereby ensuring its
firm control of the new agency.7 To counter this, many delegates joined
forces to back Alexander King, but his candidacy was squelched by the
British government which resented his active role in the OEEC’s productivity
work, where he had gone much further than instructed.8 Finally, Robert
Marjolin, secretary general of the OEEC, opted for a German national, Karl
P. Harten. Harten was the director of the German Iron and Steel Institute,
a member of the German productivity center and had participated actively
in previous productivity endeavors of the OEEC. Marjolin’s choice was
chiefly motivated by his desire to assuage the Germans who were very
dissatisfied with their poor representation among the personnel of the OEEC
and total absence at the top-level.9 Once he had gotten the green light from
the US, Marjolin set about obtaining the concurrence of the EPA’s member
countries.10 His main selling arguments were that Harten’s appointment
would link West Germany more closely to the OEEC,11 and that it would
establish a natural link with European employers.12 There was a snag,
13 Harten himself seemed to be rather proud of his past (see: UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box
2, note, 9.6. 1953, UM to PU; BRDBA, B 146/1104, ltr., Harten to Albrecht, 11.7.
1953). But he insisted that he had only met Hermann Göring twice (BRDBA, B
146/1104, note, 10.7. 1953, “Hauptabteilungsleiter”).
14 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2, note, UM to PU, 9.6. 1953; UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i,
box 2, OEEC del. to UM, 29.6. 1953.
15 BRDBA, B 146/1104 , ltr., Werkmeister to Blücher, 26.6. 1953. As the state
department refused to grant Harten a visa of entry, King had to travel to the US in his
stead on several occasions (interview with King).
16 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 12, p 210.
17 PRO, CAB134/1014, MAC(53)27th Meeting. “Minutes of a Meeting Held on 9.7.
1953;” HM, j.nr. 88-5-56, note, no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955; ASCONF, box 18.1,
f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della Confederazione. Interventi del
CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note, “Allocution de M. Grégoire à
l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956.”
18 PRO, CAB134/1182, T.A.(L)(53)59, 29.9. 1953, SCTA, note, “Meeting Held at the
BOT on 18.9. 1953, to Discuss Dr. Harten’s Plans for the EPA;” ASCONF, box
70/18.1, f. “EPA. Atti constitutivi. Consiglio Consultativo sull’AEP,” Karl Peter Harten,
23.4. 1954, “Obiettivi e funzioni dell’Agenzia Europea per la Produttività.”
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however. The French, Belgians, Danes, British and Dutch were not too
happy about Harten’s past as a chairman of the committee for production
and rationalization of the German Luftwaffe during World War II.13 The
Danes, moreover, found him too inflexible to be suitable for a job where
considerable diplomatic skills would be needed. However, Marjolin and the
Americans clearly favored Harten, to whose nomination the member
countries finally resigned themselves. After France had given up its
reservation, allegedly because of his high qualifications and because he had
never been a member of the NSDAP, other countries, like Denmark, felt that
they could not decently keep up their own reservations.14 The Dutch were
the last to give in after receiving assurances that Harten would abstain from
making public appearances in the Netherlands during his first year in office.15
On July 15, 1953, Harten became the first director of the EPA.16
The new director then proceeded to put together a secretariat. This task
proved arduous and time-consuming. While still having no complete staff at
his disposal, he rapidly found himself inundated by proposals stemming from
the MSA mission in Paris, as well as from the various OEEC committees and
the member countries, which were attracted by the sums at the disposal of
the new agency.17 With limited experience in the field and an untrained and
insufficient staff, Harten found it difficult to resist the many requests with
which he was confronted.18 Disorder ensued, with the EPA accepting a large
number of unrelated and half-baked projects, which it lacked the means to
handle efficiently. Within a brief period, the agency had started sixty new
projects, which prompted the leader of the Dutch productivity council,
19 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and de
Milly, 9.11. 1954, att.: note, 9.11. 1954, “Toelichting op EPA-programma voor het jaar
1954-1955, De Voorgeschiedenis van de EPA.”
20 PRO, LAB13/713, ltr., Stewart (UK del. to OEEC) to Hancox (BOT), 26.4. 1954. See
also: MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, de Milly to van der
Beugel, 20.5. 1954; MBZ, DGEM-Archief 6630/EPA Advisory Board, f. “1478,” note,
de Milly to van der Beugel, 3.5. 1954; MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f.
“1477,” ltr., no. 41.135, de Milly to King, 3.4. 1954; MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA
Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, van der Beugel to Kruisheer, 26.4. 1954; MBZ, DGES-
Archief, f. “996.26, OEES/EPA/Alg., Governing Body. EPA Structuur,” ltr., de Milly to
Rasmussen, 24.1. 1957.
21 PRO, LAB13/713, ltr., Stewart (UK del. to OEEC) to Hancox (BOT), 26.4. 1954;
MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, de Milly to Blokland, 26.10.
1954; MBZ, DGEM-Archief 6630/EPA Advisory Board, f. “1478,” note, de Milly to
Kruisheer, 8.12. 1954.
22 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 3, desp. no. 4259, OEEC del., 22.12. 1953. Cf. also
PRO, T.A.(L)(54)3, SCTA, note, 12.1. 1954, “Programme and Budget of the EPA.”
The French had pointed out that the director was German, and that the chairman of the
PRA Committee was British. They therefore claimed an assistant directorship for
themselves... which they got (cf. MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 5, f.
“1473,” note, King, 2.12. 1953, “Notes on a Conversation Between Marjolin and King
on 26.11. 1953.”
23 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 5, f. “1473,” note, King, 2.12. 1953.
24 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, CE/M(54)26(Prov.), 5.8. 1954, “Minutes of the 283rd
Meeting Held on 22.7. 1954.”
25 PRO, CAB134/1182, T.A.(L)(53)72, SCTA, note by BOT, 11.11. 1953, “Summary
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Wilhelmus Hendrik van Leeuwen, to warn of impending chaos.19 By spring
1954 the secretariat of the agency was “in a hopeless muddle.”20 The
Advisory Board was quick to criticize the mangement of the agency by the
director, and it was joined by most national delegations in the OEEC. At this
stage, the reputation of the EPA was at its lowest and the professional
organizations in many countries were extremely hostile to whatever emanated
from it. As its capital moreover rapidly dwindled, the future of the EPA
looked bleak.21
B. EPA Back On Track (1954-56)
Most member countries at this time would doubtlessly have been happy to
see Harten leave. In December 1953, as a corrective measure to the
director’s shortcomings, and “to unburden him,” a deputy director, Roger
Grégoire, was appointed.22 At the same time, Marjolin asked King to step in
and help Harten.23 These palliatives failed to bear visible fruit. The secretari-
at’s preparation of the second annual program was severely criticized,24 and
in November 1954 Nicolaides resigned from his post as chairman of the PRA
Committee to protest against the way the agency was being administered.25
of Note by the UK Del. to the Meeting of PRA Committee, 20.10.-21.10. 1953.”
26 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 5, note, PRA Committee to the Council, s.d. (probably
from November 1954); MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note,
27.10. 1954, de Milly to Beugel, “EPA;” MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen deel I,
DEA/T.P., note, no. 111501, 25.11. 1954.
27 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, CE/M(54)26(Prov.), 5.8. 1954. See also: MBZ,
DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, de Milly to van der Beugel, 20.5.
1954.
28 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, desp. no. 56, OEEC del. (Tabor) to UM, 4.1. 1955. It
wasn’t self-evident that Grégoire should succeed Harten. At first, consensus among the
member countries was that Harten should be succeeded by another German, since
Germany remained underrepresented in the OEEC. The German candidate, Haverback,
however, declined the offer, because he could not be granted leave from his firm (cf.
BRDBA, B 102/37413, ltr., Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (Westrick, BMW), to
Hamberbacher (Präsidenten des Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages), 25.6. 1955.
29 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 22, f. “Technical Cooperation, April
1955,” ecoto circ. A-237, 16.4. 1955.
30 Ibid.
31 Fletcher was nominated as deputy director in June 1955. Since 1950 he had been the
secretary of the TUC’s Production Department (cf. WNRC, RG 469, Office of Labor
Affairs (OLA), Labor Programs Division (LPD), RRt the EPA Programs, 1955-59, box
1, f. “EPA- Administration-Staffing,” ecoto circ. A-299, USRO Paris, “Appointment of
EPA Deputy Director”).
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This situation prompted a reaction from the member countries, first through
the PRA Committee, and later through the Council asking the secretariat of
the EPA to streamline its organization and insisting on a concentration of the
program, a more efficient staff and improved relationships between the EPA
and the national productivity centers (NPC).26 As a consequence of the
general dissatisfaction with his management, Harten let Grégoire take over
a greater part of the responsibility for directing the EPA.27 In April 1955, he
finally resigned and Grégoire was nominated as his successor.28 When
Grégoire took over, the climate in the EPA (in the PRA Committee) was
marked by “considerable bitterness and bickering.”29 According to an Ameri-
can analysis:
[w]hile great hopes [were] held for Grégoire’s ability to revitalize the agency staff
and provide new directions to the agency’s program it [was] evident that he face[d]
a major challenge in taking over the reins from the [...] hands of the previous
director. Many of the issues taking up the time of the PRA Committee could be
traced to poor staff work by agency personnel who have not yet been welded into
an effective team by the new director.30
The reactions to the nomination of Grégoire were positive. The appointment
of Edwin Fletcher, an official from the Trades Union Congress (TUC), as
deputy director in June 1955 was likewise well received.31 Already in No-
32 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and de
Milly, 9.11. 1954, att: note, 9.11. 1954.
33 PRO, BT64/4790, note, Wright to Perryman, 28.4. 1956, att: “Draft Paper About the
EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, desp. no. 222, OEEC del., 13.1. 1955. See also:
MBZ, f. “996.26, EPA/Algemeen deel I, DEA/T.P.,” note, no. 1454, de Milly to van der
Beugel, 13.7. 1955.
34 WNRC, RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations (ODDO), OAEO, SF
1955-59, box 23, f. “Technical Cooperation, Dec. 1955,” ecoto circ. A-68, 9.12. 1955.
Olav Skogen’s remark is less far-reaching than it might appear, since it does not specify
which “Norwegian circles” were referred to. The EPA’s fame, moreover, certainly varied
from one country to another. In 1956, The Economist called the EPA “a little known child
of the OEEC” (cf. The Economist, 4.8. 1956).
35 PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)19, SCTA, 15.2. 1954, att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to Strath,
2.2. 1954; PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54) 1st Meeting (M), SCTA, 17.2. 1954,
“Minutes of Meeting of the Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 5.2. 1954;” PRO,
BT64/4790, “Draft Brief for the Minister of State on NPACI” (probably from Feb.-
March 1954); PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)22, SCTA, note by the BOT, 22.2.
1954, “Preparation of EPA Programme 1954/55.”
36 PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54) 1st Meeting (M), SCTA, 17.2. 1954. King later
became deputy director of the EPA (1957-61).
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vember 1954, a Dutch observer noted that although the EPA during its first
year had been “an ugly duckling,” there was now reason to hope that it could
be turned into a “swan.”32 Even for the British, matters had improved con-
siderably under Grégoire and Fletcher. Notably, a more restrained budgetary
policy was introduced.33 In 1955, the EPA began making a name for itself.
In December 1955, the director of the Norwegian Productivity Institute even
went as far as to enthusiastically assert that the EPA had become “a better
known institution in Norwegian circles than the United Nations.”34
Several member countries began realizing that the EPA in addition to being
responsible for the distribution of more than ten million dollars, was a
channel for the dissemination of ideas and technology throughout Europe.
The latter function could make it an important instrument not only for
European integration but also for furthering specific economic national
interests. This potential role was certainly taken into consideration both in
the British and in the German debate about the EPA. The head of the British
OEEC delegation and chairman of the OEEC Council, Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees,
urged the UK to fill out the perceived power vacuum in the EPA, before the
US or Germany managed to do so. He moreover felt there was a strong
interest in Western Europe, particularly in the less developed countries, to
see the UK take the technological leadership.35 A step in that direction was
taken in December 1954 when King was elected chairman of the PRA
Committee.36 This British-German competition “to take over leadership of
37 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, Mission to Austria, PTAD, SF 1952-58, box 4, f. “Briefing
Materials,” memo, Hall to Russell, 23.9. 1954, “The FOA Productivity Program.”
38 PRO, BT64/4768, ltr., Fletcher to Hancox, s.d. (October or November 1955).
39 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, C(55)5(Final), 2.2. 1955.
40 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, CE/M(54)26(Prov.), 5.8. 1954.
41 HM, j.nr. 88-5-56, note, no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955.
42 PRO, BT64/4768, note by the BOT, 7.2. 1956, “The future of the EPA.”
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the EPA”37 at least demonstrated that these two countries considered the
agency of some potential use.
While the reputation of the EPA was improving, its capital fund was running
out and a decision about its future became pressing. Much of the secretariat’s
energy was thus spent on financial matters. In 1955, the UK, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany had made all their contributions
transferable. The latter did not stand to lose anything since the EPA spent
large sums in Germany. Others were less amenable. Italy withheld its
contribution to the EPA for more than two years, forcing the agency to buy
lire for francs and dollars.38 The Council therefore requested all member
countries to make their contribution transferable in order to ensure that the
agency would not be “limited by considerations of currency availability in its
choice of the place and the means for the implementation of its projects.”39
Another problem for the EPA was that the national participation in its
projects often was hindered because the NPCs lacked the funds required to
meet the cost of such participation. This was a problem particularly in Italy
and Germany. The Council therefore twice appealed to the member
countries, asking them to provide their NPC with sufficient funds for
participating in EPA projects.40
Even more fundamental for the future of the EPA was the question of US
willingness to assist the agency. In November 1955, King and Grégoire went
to the US on a public relations trip. The purpose of their visit was to brief
their contacts within the administration, the business community, universi-
ties, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, and trade unions, about the
achievements of the EPA and to lobby for continued American support. Both
the Ford and the Rockefeller foundations pledged support for the agency’s
activities.41 More importantly, the American administration’s response was
positive. It reiterated that it attached great importance to increasing Europe’s
productivity as a means to promote economic integration and trade liber-
alization and that it saw the agency as the best suited instrument for
American-European collaboration in this field.42 The EPA would remain a
channel for American aid, but the European share of the financial burden
43 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C(56)40, 20.2. 1956; PRO, BT64/4790, note, Wright to
Perryman, 28.4. 1956, att.: “Draft Paper About the EPA;” SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP
42, 43, von Sydow to Swärd, 8.3. 1956; ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “EPA Programmi
1956-1957,” note (s.l. , s.d.), “AEP;” MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel
I, EPA/D/1222, ltr., Grégoire to de Milly, 30.12. 1955.
44 PRO, BT64/4768, ltr., Fletcher to Hancox, s.d. (October or November 1955);
ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della Con-
federazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note, “Allocution
de M. Grégoire.” De Milly saw things sligthly differently. In his view the political and
economic arguments were “all in favour of continuing the EPA,” whereas financial
considerations pulled the other way (cf. MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel
I, note, de Milly to Grégoire, Fletcher and King, 15.2. 1956.
45 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, desp. no. 3899, OEEC del. to UM, “EPA’s fremtid.”
46 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, C(56)127(Final), 9.7. 1956, “Resolution of the Council
on the Future of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, note, 20.3. 1956, UM to
Regeringens økonomiudvalg, “Det europæiske produktivitetscentrums fortsættelse;”
UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956, “Draft Report by the Committee
on the Objectives and Methods of Work of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, no.
2330, OEEC del., 29.5. 1956, “EPA’s forlængelse.”
47 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th
Meeting Held on 11.5. 1956.”
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would have to be increased. The US would continue contributing to the
agency if the Europeans committed themselves to do the same.43 As a result,
the Europeans were faced with a difficult question, namely whether they
genuinely considered the EPA useful and worth paying for. In 1955, both
King and Grégoire thought that it was too early to put forward suggestions
for the permanent or long-term future of the agency since its record did not
yet seem conducive to any positive decision. The agency therefore should try
to “buy time” with a temporary solution. In the absence of any proof that it
was economically essential, the EPA should sell itself to the OEEC Council
as something politically useful.44
C. The Swiss Crisis (1956-57)
In 1956, the EPA’s three-year experimental period was running out. The
OEEC countries had to decide on the agency’s future and the Council set up
a working party to discuss the matter. In June 1956, it decided, on the
recommendation of the working party, that the agency should be continued
at least until 1960.45 This decision, however, was not unanimous.46 Swit-
zerland took exception, stating its unwillingness to contribute financially to
the EPA. This was hardly surprising, since this country had considered the
whole concept of the EPA “fundamentally wrong from the beginning.”47 Had
swiss membership in the EPA been the sole problem, it would not have
48 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, f. “EPA Advisory Board
through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail (Director, PTAD) to Little (ICA/W), 6.12. 1956.
49 Ibid.
50 Concerning the EPA’s finances, see chapter III.
51 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th
Meeting Held on 11.5. 1956.”
52 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, 1955 t/m Dec. 1957, ltr., de Milly
to Hausberger (Austrian del. OEEC), 19.11. 1956.
53 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, 1955 t/m Dec. 1957, ltr., de Milly
to Grégoire, 15.11. 1956.
54 Ibid.
55 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1972/159, box 39, f. “PRA. Participation
suisse,” ltr., Homberger and Wehrli to SCEE, 18.12. 1956.
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mattered much. But if the swiss position was tolerated, other member
countries – and in particular the UK – might follow suit, which in practice
would amount to terminating the EPA. This created an extremely uncomfor-
table and almost paralyzing situation for the agency and its staff throughout
the second half of 1956. For six months, the officials of the agency were
“completely tied up and partially demoralized.”48 Grégoire and other EPA
staff members spent most of their time drafting papers and meeting various
delegations trying to work out a compromise. During the second half of
1956, virtually no new activities were undertaken by the agency, since the
Swiss were systematically voicing their reserve and the US refused to commit
any funds as long as the matter had not been settled.49 From the onset of the
“Swiss crisis,” the US stated that the future of the EPA was a matter which
needed to be decided by the member countries themselves. They emphasized
that any future American support was conditional on the OEEC countries
being ready to contribute substantially to the agency.50 At the same time
though, the Americans actively encouraged the continuation of the agency
and strongly disapproved of the Swiss attitude.51 In November 1956 there
was widespread exasperation with the “ignorant”52 Swiss and their “silly
ideas.”53 Therefore, the Dutch delegate to the PRA Committee argued that
there was a need to
change our tactics completely. Until now we were friendly, humble and admitting
a number of errors in the past, nearly to the point where EPA plus all the other
countries had a role of the accused in front of the one wise judge. This should
end.54
Finally, American pressure and the total isolation of Switzerland within the
OEEC ended “the cruel game about the Swiss participation”55 when Switzer-
56 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA/General
Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957, att.: “Decision of the Council Concerning the
Future of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 541, OEEC del., 1.2. 1957, “EPA’s
forlængelse;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, C(57)19, 30.1. 1957, “Decision of the Council
concerning the Future of the EPA.” The problem for the Swiss, which they had already
experienced in 1953 when they had unsuccessfully tried to make use of article 14 of the
OEEC convention, was that for political reasons it was next to impossible to stay out of
the agency, let alone to leave it once it had been created. Such a move would indeed
threaten the very existence of the organization since other countries might follow suit.
Sven Åsbrink complained that this made the member countries captive clients of the
agency, which had little incentive to react to their complaints (cf. HM, j.nr. 86 (1960),
f. “86-9-60,” Sekretariatet for Danmarks Erhvervsfond, 3.3. 1961, “Direktør Sven H.
Åsbrinks personlige tilføjelser til det fællesskandinaviske memo om det fremtidige
produktivitetsarbejde under OECD”).
57 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th
Meeting Held on 11.5. 1956.”
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land capitulated in January 1957 and acquiesced in contributing to the EPA
on the same terms as other members.56
The generally positive atttitude towards continuing the EPA had both
political and economic motivations. The US found that the agency had
played a positive role in promoting European cooperation in the field of
productivity, and clearly favored its continuation. An appraisal of what would
be politic in regard to US-European relations certainly influenced the stance
taken by the member countries.57 Yet another factor was developments in the
cooperation among Europeans. The decision about the agency’s future had
to be made at a time when the OEEC was being split between those
countries – France, UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem-
burg – engaged in the so-called Messina process and those chosing to stay
outside. In June 1955, the six foreign ministers of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) had met in Messina, where they had decided to
establish the Spaak Committee to study and discuss the possibility of creating
a common market and an atomic energy community. Less than two years
later, in March 1957, these talks would lead to the signing of the Treaties of
Rome and the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC)
and Euratom. While the UK refused to join a common market, and in
November 1955 withdrew from the Spaak Committee, it could not afford to
ignore these developments. Faced with the threatening prospect of a suc-
cessful negotiation on the establishment of a customs union between the six
ECSC countries, the UK decided in May 1956 to push for the creation of an
all-European free trade area (FTA), which it formally proposed in November
1956. But to no avail, since this proposal proved unsuccessful as a device for
blocking the talks between the Six, who went ahead with their plans, and
since the FTA proposal was definitively vetoed by France in November
58 Richard T. Griffiths, “‘An Act of Creative Leadership’: The End of the OEEC and the
Birth of the OEEC,” in: Griffiths, Explorations in OEEC History, pp. 237-39.
59 NOUD, box 122, f. “3,” note, Juel, 21.2. 1956; ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “EPA
Programmi 1956-1957,” note (s.l. , s.d.), “AEP.”
60 PRO, CAB134/2202, MAC(58)14(Final), note by the Foreign Office (FO), 10.9.
1958, “Future of the EPA.”
61 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, no. 2330, OEEC del., 29.5. 1956; NOUD, box 122, f. “3,” note,
Juel, 21.2. 1956.
62 Auswärtiges Amt (BRDAA), Politisches Archiv (PA), Bestand Referat (BR) 401, Bd.
91 AZ: 88.129, ltr., Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zussammenarbeit (Dahlgrün,
BWZ) to Auswärtiges Amt (Hallstein, AA), 9.4. 1956, “Zukunft der EPA.”
63 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, note, 11.2. 1956, “Draft Note on the Future Financing
of EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956.
64 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956. For further details about the
JTUAC and the CEIF and their attitudes towards the EPA see Chapter VI.
65 In 1955-56, the British contributions to the OEEC budget represented 25.3 percent of
all member countries’ contributions (cf. OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 16, p. 827).
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1958.58 The division appearing between the Six and the Non-Six militated
against dealing the OEEC a further blow, which terminating the EPA
undoubtedly would be. There was in any case a wish among many member
countries not to take any negative step as long as no decision had been taken
on the FTA proposal.59
However, the positive assessments of the EPA were not merely due to
“external” considerations such as the need to secure American benevolence
or apprehension over a widening rift between Europeans. Indeed, by 1956
the EPA had achieved a certain amount of goodwill. As a British report later
summed up, in 1956 the EPA was “a going concern, from which many
European countries considered that they derived considerable benefit.”60
Among the most positive were the Norwegians, but also the Germans and
the Italians enlisted themselves among the agency’s supporters.61 The
German ministry for economic cooperation considered that the EPA had
become “one of the most effective means to promote European inte-
gration.”62 The PRA Committee, which largely had come to represent the
NPCs, proposed that the EPA be guaranteed a further ten years existence as
of August 1957.63 The Joint Trade Union Advisory Council (JTUAC)
likewise favored a continuation of the EPA, as did, albeit without enthusi-
asm, the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF).64
The main stumbling block was, in addition to Switzerland, the UK, which
the scale of contributions to the OEEC would make the biggest contributer
to the EPA.65 The British reluctance to accept a continuation of the agency
was basically due to the lack of perceived usefulness of its activities for the
66 PRO, BT64/4768, ltr., November, (TI 19/179/01), Maude to Preston; PRO,
CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)19, SCTA, 15.2. 1954, att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to Strath, 2.2.
1954.
67 PRO, CAB134/2202, MAC(58)14(Final), note by the FO, 10.9. 1958.
68 Ibid.; PRO, BT64/4790, note, Wright to Perryman, 28.4. 1956, att.: “Draft Paper
About the EPA.”
69 PRO, CAB134/2202, MAC(58)14(Final), note by the FO, 10.9. 1958.
70 PRO, BT64/4768, note by the BOT, 7.2. 1956.
71 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 44, “Productivity January Thru May
1956,” tel. 2057, 29.5. 1956, State Dept/ICA to AmEmb Bern; WNRC, RG 469,
OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA: General, box 1, f.
“EPA Advisory Board Through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail to Little, 6.12. 1956; OEEC, Acts
of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 39-47.
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UK. It was felt that “[t]here [was] a good deal that might be said in favor of
withdrawal of UK support, which [...] would in practice amount to the
abolition of EPA.”66 The UK nevertheless opted for continued support to the
EPA “on the grounds that it was highly regarded by other members of OEEC
and supported by the Americans.”67 If it was to be held responsible for
wrecking the agency, doubts could arise as to how sincere the proclaimed
British support for the OEEC was, which in turn could endanger objectives
in other more important fields of cooperation with the OEEC countries.68
Further, it would seem awkward, in view of the UK leadership in the OEEC
generally, for it to refuse to support “one of the more important and more
highly publicized spheres of the Organisation’s work.”69 One official regretted
that the UK had originally opposed the EPA being set up as an independent
international body operating outside the OEEC, since such a solution would
have depoliticized the whole issue. By now, all the UK could do was to hope
that the continuation of the EPA would be on the cheapest and most in-
nocuous terms possible, without saying so explicitly. The British, therefore,
were ready to accept contributing to the EPA on the basis of the OEEC
quotas. But they favored a downscaling of the activities of the agency and, as
a means to control its expenditure, a closer integration into the OEEC
structure, merging its budget with that of the OEEC and ensuring a tight and
close supervision of its activities through the Council.70
In January 1957, it was unanimously decided to continue the EPA for at least
another three-year period starting in 1957.71 Coupled with this decision, the
Council requested an improvement of the operational efficiency of the
agency, mainly as a result of the Swiss objections to continue contributing to
an agency which they considered a waste of money. The Danes and the
Swedes made their continued support contingent on an improvement of the
72 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., Centralkomiten för Produktivitetsfrågor (CKFP,
Iveroth and Seth) to Utrikesdepartementet (UD), 4.5. 1956, “Memorandum on the
Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National Productivity Center;” UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th Meeting Held
on 11.5. 1956.”
73 See Chapter III.
74 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 335-49.
75 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 81, f. “Productivity April – September
1958,” ltr., RS-1682, Sergent to Heads of National Delegations, 11.7. 1958.
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EPA’s administration.72 Several member countries further wished to streng-
then the links between the agency and member countries and with the
international professional organisations. Finally, it was stated that the agency
should act both as a clearing house for the NPCs and as a centre for study
and discussion.73 The ensuing lengthy negotiations were concluded in July
1957, when the Council adopted the amended Constitution for the EPA.74
D. In Search of a Role (1958-60)
The laborious compromise reached in 1957 lasted merely one year. In July
1958, the secretary general of the OEEC, René Sergent, wrote to the country
delegations that he could not “with good conscience” recommend a
continuation of the EPA after 1960, if it did not undergo a radical reform.
During the previous years, the agency had changed character, as it was
dealing with a field much broader than the original goal of enhancing
productivity. It ought therefore, so Sergent concluded, to be transformed
into a European Development Agency, which would be the “operational
branch” of the OEEC.75 With Sergent’s letter the OEEC embarked on a
bitter discussion which would not cease until the agency was wound up.
Basically the question was whether the EPA should continue concentrating
on the so-called traditional activities, which were those pertaining to
productivity in industry, commerce and agriculture, or whether it should
concentrate on its new tasks, namely aid to less developed areas and
problems relating to science and technology, notably the training of scientific
and technical personnel (STP). Roughly speaking, this debate provoked a
North-South divide. Generally the Northern European countries favored
focusing on the traditional activities whereas the Southern European
countries favored the new ones.
While it is not clear who got Sergent to take the initiative, the main forces
behind it are identifiable: the US as well as the OEEC and the EPA
76 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 1.6. 1959, “Besuch von Wilgress;”
PRO, CAB134/2202, MAC(58)14(Final), note by the FO, 10.9. 1958. See also: CHBA,
7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box 307, f. “1960. EE. 801. AEP – programme d’action et
problèmes généraux,” “Notes sur la conférence du 17.10. 1959 à l’OFIAMT relative à
l’avenir de l’AEP.”
77 A recurrent theme in the discussions concerning the need for improving Western
European productivity were the allegedly impressive Soviet economic advances and the
advantages which the planning economy could give the Soviet Union in allowing it to
concentrate resources on one specific sector and achieve greater advances than the West
in that field (cf. for example: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7450 (General
Introduction), 12.1. 1960; BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 12.12. 1958;
SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 54, note, Velander, 27.6. 1960; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f.
“CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., CIFE/1125, 10.12.
1958, Leali to CGII; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, C(58)8, 16.1. 1958, “Revised
Program and Part I Budget of EPA for 1957-58;” MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA
OEEC/deel I, ltr., Hendrickx (Directeur, OBAP) to de Milly, 24.2. 1956, att.: note, 24.2.
1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, note, no. 2926, OEEC del., 20.6. 1959. Concerning
the shortage of scientific and technical personnel, see OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol.
13 (p. 88), vol. 14 (p. 93), and vol. 16 (p. 185).
78 PRO, CAB134/2215, MAC(CS)(58)99, 31.12. 1958, note by Ellis-Rees, 18.12. 1958;
BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 1.6. 1959. See also Chapter VIII. For
a comparison of the NATO and the EPA science programs, cf. PRO, FO371/150088,
M551/202, E.Q.(E.O.)(60)4, note by the Treasury, 30.3. 1960, “The Extent of
Duplication of Scientific Work in NATO and OEEC.” See also: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 1, no. 4712, OEEC del. to UM, 20.10. 1958; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE.
Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., Morelli to Valletta, 22.12.
1958, att.: note, 19.12. 1958; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per
l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” note, 22.1. 1959, “Avvenire dell’AEP.”
74
secretariats. Some suspected the US of having the main responsibility.76 In
any case, by 1958, both the US and the OEEC and EPA secretariats favored
a broader approach to operational activities by the OEEC than the one which
the EPA had hitherto represented. The US had decided to give a high
priority to scientific and technological development and aid to underdevelo-
ped areas, both because of a beginning shortage of scientific and technical
personnel, and because of the Soviet advances towards the non-aligned
countries. The “Sputnik shock” was a potent catalysator for these endeavors.
In American eyes the launching of the world’s first artificial satellite
demonstrated that the Soviet Union had achieved impressive economic
results with potentially dangerous consequences.77 It increased the attractive-
ness of the Soviet model, particularly in third world countries, and opened
threatening military prospects. This situation led to strong American pressure
on its European allies to devote greater sums to the development of their
science and technology research programs.78 The EPA did have a Committee
for Applied Research (CAR) which promoted cooperation among the
member countries. However, in 1958 the US preferred to have the OEEC
create a new organization within its orbit, the Office for Scientific and
79 This may have been a sign of American distrust towards the EPA (as hinted by Sergent,
cf. WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59. box 81, f. “Productivity April – Sept. 1958,”
ltr. Sergent, RS-1682, 11.7. 1958; see also PRO, CAB134/2203, MAC(59)6th Meeting,
att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to Figgures, 29.4. 1959) and confidence in its deputy director,
Alexander King. Since 1953, King had advocated concentrating international cooperative
efforts on applied research (ABA, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, arkivnr. 516, box 80,
f. “Produktivitetsudvalget. 1953. C1,” note 308, HMPU, 15.3. 1953). In December
1956, he had advocated the creation of an OEEC Committee of Directors of the
European Research organisations which would play a role similar to the one the PRA
Committee played for the NPCs. He wondered whether such an organization would fit
into the EPA structure. However, he stated that, considering the problem of “continuing
shortage of research workers” and the efforts to further European integration, “a research
body of the highest level will become necessary” (MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.26, f.
“OEES/EPA/Alg., GB, EPA Structuur,” ltr., King to de Milly, 27.12. 1956).
80 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 81, f. “Productivity April – Sept. 1958,”
ecoto A-71, USRO Paris, 25.7. 1958, to ICA/W, “Structure of OEEC (Operational
Programs and the Future of the EPA);” CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw.
1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir de l’AEP,” note, “Some Comments by the
US Delegation on the Subject of the Proposed Reorganization of the Operational
Activities of the OEEC.” See also: PRO, CAB134/2203, MAC(59)6th Meeting, att.: ltr.,
Ellis-Rees to Figgures, 29.4. 1959.
81 In December 1958, convertibility was restored in the UK, France and Germany, and
the European Payments Union (EPU) was abolished (Paul M. Pitman, “The French
Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union, 1956-1958,” in: Griffiths,
Explorations in OEEC History, pp. 223-24).
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Technical Personnel (OSTP), to boost European efforts to improve scientific
and technical education.79 Very soon, however, it appeared that the
separation between the CAR’s work and that of the OSTP was illogical and
impractical. The reorganization of the EPA into the sole operational branch
of the OEEC seemed to offer a solution to an awkward situation. Such a
branch would include not only the existing operational agencies of the OEEC
but also any future ones: the EPA’s projects in the field of industry,
commerce and agriculture, those in favor of areas in the process of economic
development (APED), the European Nuclear Energy Agency, the OSTP. It
would be headed by a director who would simultaneously act as deputy
secretary general for the OEEC’s operational activities.80
The OEEC and the EPA secretariats had largely convergent interests. Both
had to find new tasks if they wanted to survive. The OEEC seemed well on
its way to have exhausted its role in the monetary field and the French
vigorously opposed British proposals to have it discuss trade matters arising
from the establishment of the EEC.81 As far as the EPA was concerned, to
the extent that the main raison d’être of the agency had been to carry on
propaganda for productivity, its task could be said to have been succesfully
82 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., CIFE/1125, Leali to CGII, 10.12. 1958; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo
di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., Arnaud, circ. 480, 13.11. 1958, att.: ltr.,
van Leeuwen to Arnaud, 27.10. 1958.
83 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Leali to CGII, CIFE/1103, 3.12. 1958, att.: note, “Gruppo di lavoro del CIFE sulla
produttività;” ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno
1958-59,” ltr., Arnaud, circ. 480, 13.11. 1958, att.: ltr., van Leeuwen to Arnaud, 27.10.
1958; BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), note, 6.8. 1958; ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP,” ltr.,
Valletta to de Micheli, 24.1. 1959; Riksarkivet (NORA), HD, Avd. for Utenrikshandel
1948-1961 II, box 122, f. “5,” note, Birch, 28.2. 1957; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE.
Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., Morelli to Valletta, 9.12. 1958,
att.: note, 9.12. 1958.
84 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
note, CIFE/1103, Leali to CGII, 3.12. 1958.
85 WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA Administration,” ecoto A-71,
USRO Paris, 25.7. 1958. See also: DDE, Manuscripts, Clarence Francis Papers 1933-
1973, box 3, f. “EPA. 1958,” ltr., van Dyke to Francis, 28.3. 1958.
86 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
note, CIFE/1103, Leali to CGII, 3.12. 1958.
87 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 12.12. 1958, “Zukunft der EPZ.”
88 Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SVAF), P0021, ltr., Lund to Bergenström, 14.10.
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performed... and finished.82 It was, therefore, not surprising that its
secretariat was looking for a new job. A more complete integration into the
OEEC would help make it a permanent institution.83 Furthermore, the STP
program was strongly backed by the US as well as by several European
countries. It was seen as a useful endeavor to help Europe keep its place in
the economic race between the West and the East.84 The APED program had
strong support in the Southern European countries. Aid to less developed
areas in Western Europe was justified as a prerequisite for further economic
integration. Without such assistance some Southern countries’ readiness to
accept further trade liberalization might be jeopardized. It could therefore be
sold as a program “designed to facilitate general acceptance of a free trade
area.”85 During a public relations tour in December 1958, Grégoire cam-
paigned for Sergent’s proposal, emphasizing its ambitious nature and the
need to secure the backing of top-level people, just as had been the case with
the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom.86 However, such support was not
forthcoming.87
The proposal was not mere empire-building on the part of the OEEC. It was
also designed to meet the desire, shared by many member countries, to
strengthen the OEEC as a link between all Western European countries, and
notably between the Six and the Non-Six.88 More specifically, Sergent’s
89 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, note, 10.9. 1958, “Møde i UM d. 9.9. 1958 vedr. EPA’s
fremtid.”
90 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, note, 9.9. 1958, “Drøftelser med Ellis-Rees. EPA’s
fremtid;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, CES/9.055 Annex II, 30.5. 1959, “Swiss Memo
on the Interim Report of Working Party No. 26 of the Council (Future of the EPA).”
91 BRDBA, B 102/37412, ltr., Werkmeister to BWZ, 3.9. 1957, “Struktur der EPZ:
Zusammensetzung des Beirats. Ratssistzung vom 26.7. 1957.”
92 See above. For further details see Chapter III.
93 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2) , note, Kalkhorst, 2.9. 1958, “Zukunft der EPZ;” BRDBA,
B 102/37395 (2), no. 1420, OEEC del. to BMW, 29.9. 1958, “Zukunft der EPZ.”
94 PRO, CAB134/2202, MAC(58)14(Final), note by the FO, 10.9. 1958; UMA, j.nr.
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proposal may have been motivated by a wish to tie the six EEC countries to
long-term cooperation with the other OEEC countries in the field of
development policy and at the same time prevent these countries from
establishing close cooperation among themselves in this field.89
While Sergent put forward his proposal in July 1958, it took some time
before the lines of division among the member countries emerged. Many felt
that the secretariat’s intentions were not clear. Moreover, the FTA negotia-
tions and the divisions between the Six and the Non-Six were considered to
be more pressing matters which would largely determine the fate of the EPA.
The first reaction to Sergent’s letter was one of surprise. That still another
reorganization of the EPA should be requested just a year after the 1957
reform seemed puzzling to many.90 One year earlier, the members of the
Council had been relieved to finally get rid of the question of the EPA’s
structure which they had argued about “ad nauseam”91 for months. Sergent’s
proposal to transform the EPA into an ambitious operational agency of the
OEEC apparently pointed in the exact opposite direction as the one con-
firmed the previous year, namely that the EPA should be a clearing house for
information about productivity questions.92 In fact, the clearing house
function had been given a prominent position because many member
countries strongly favored it – not because the secretariat had resigned itself
to playing a more modest role. Many were not convinced by the reasons put
forth, and felt that the newly adopted structure for the agency should be
given a chance to prove its worth before any new organizational reshuffle be
initiated. Some also found that if the secretary general had a problem with
his conscience about recommending the continuation of the EPA, then
“something must be wrong” with the agency.93 Moreover, many member
countries thought it would be appropriate to await the outcome of the Free
Trade Area (FTA) negotiations. As long as the future of the OEEC and the
FTA was uncertain, it seemed unwise to make any definitive decisions about
the future of the EPA.94 This mixture of suspicions about the secret motives
106.O.21, box 1, no. 4167, OEEC del. to UM, 18.9. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box
1, note, 9.9. 1958.
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UM, 29.9. 1958. Concerning the membership of Working Party no. 26, see: OEEC, Acts
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no. 4712, OEEC del. to UM, 20.10. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 2926,
OEEC del., 20.6. 1959; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività
EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., Morelli to Valletta, 22.12. 1958, att.: note, 19.12. 1958.
98 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 92, f. “Committees – OEEC (4 of 6),”
ecoto A-232, 24.10. 1959, “Heads of Delegations Discussion of EPA/STP Reorganiza-
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behind the proposal, of intense dislike of its substance and of a strong feeling
that the timing was totally wrong made for some ill-tempered debates. Since
Sergent’s proposal met with little enthusiasm, Working Party no. 26 was
asked to make suggestions for a reorganization.95 Its report, completed in July
1959, suggested setting up four committees, responsible for the main sectors
of work of the agency – industry, agriculture, APED and applied research/
scientific and technical personnel – and acting under the direct supervision
of the Council of the OEEC. One of the report’s main ideas was that
henceforth emphasis should be laid on STP and APED programs and that
traditional activities in industry, commerce and agriculture should be re-
legated to a secondary role and possibly given up.96
The ensuing discussion about Working Party no. 26’s report centered on two
main questions, namely that of the respective role of the traditional and of
the new activities and the institutional arrangements for what was being
called “the new agency.” The Nordic group – which included the Nether-
lands, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and to a certain
extent Belgium – favored the narrow productivity concept, which implied a
continuation of the EPA’s activities more or less along the lines already
followed. These countries found it difficult to see why the creation of a new
agency was necessary, the reasons given by Working Party no. 26 and the
secretariat appearing to be “weak.”97 Their main point was that while it
might be necessary to enlarge the concept of productivity somewhat, the time
was not yet ripe for giving up the traditional EPA activities in favor of a more
general development policy. Morever, they did not believe that the Council
would be able to take over the coordinating role hitherto played by the
Governing Body, and they therefore advocated the creation of a “Super-
Governing Body.”98 The Swiss disliked the idea of merging a “healthy”
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organization (the OSTP) with an “unhealthy” one (the EPA), since such
“dangerous liaisons” might corrupt the OSTP, even though the presence of
Alexander King at the head of the OSTP, was reassuring.99 Some among the
critics of the secretariat’s proposal saw in it a scheme to save the EPA.100
Conversely, it could be seen as a maneuver to grant the OEEC a new lease
on life, since it would be given a new and important function which could
justify its survival. Finally, suspicions were voiced that the secretariat was
simply plotting to get rid of an irritating and talkative entity, the Governing
Body, in order to take over its coordinating functions.101 Several skeptics saw
Grégoire’s hand and his “ambitious aspirations”102 behind the reform
proposals.
The Southern group, which in this case included the French, the Italian, the
Greek and the Yugoslav delegates, found that future EPA activities should
be based on a broader concept of productivity. France saw little advantage
for itself in the industrial and agricultural work of the EPA and supported
giving higher priority to the OSTP/CAR programs and also to the APED
program. The Italians, the Greeks and the Yugoslavs were mainly interested
in the latter. The Southern group was thus endorsing the secretariat’s
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proposals.103 In 1959, the UK was very skeptical of the traditional activities,
which was hardly surprising since it had never been among the agency’s sup-
porters. At the same time, however, it was tempted to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude as long as its relations with the EEC countries remained unclear.104
The debate about the EPA’s future was quite heated. The Danes where
shocked by how adamantly the UK and France tried to get rid of the
traditional EPA activities.105 Both countries actually considered liquidating
the EPA altogether. By the fall of 1959 France was ready to see the EPA
dissolved and to concentrate on the only two activities worthy of being
continued: aid to underveloped areas and the OSTP activities.106 In February
1960, Ellis-Rees had to return to London to dissuade the British government
from announcing its withdrawal from the EPA in case the industry-related
activities were not given up.107 Apart from France and the UK there was in
1959 a more positive attitude towards the EPA among the member countries
than ever before, and a readiness to accept it being made a permanent
institution under a strengthened OEEC Council supervision.108
The “war for the EPA”109 went on for several months,110 until “the smaller-
scale plans for the reform of EPA were overtaken by the larger-scale projects
for the reorganization of the OEEC as a whole.”111 Since 1956, the question
of the division between the Six and the Non-Six, and the role of the OEEC
as a link between them had been an ever more essential factor in the
112 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, C(58)8, 16.1. 1958.
113 Mikael af Malmborg and Johnny Laursen, “The Creation of EFTA,” in: Thorsten B.
Olesen (ed.), Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe,
1945-1960, Odense, 1995, p. 201.
114 Griffiths, “‘An Act of Creative Leadership’,” p. 242.
115 The Group of Four was composed of W. Randolph Burgess, Bernard Clappier, Sir
Paul Gore-Booth, and Xenophon Zolotas (see Griffiths, “‘An Act of Creative Leaders-
hip’,” p. 246).
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discussions about the EPA’s future.112 The FTA negotiations had failed in
November 1958 and the Seven – the UK, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Swit-
zerland Austria and Portugal – had had to resign themselves to the creation
of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in November 1959, while the
“peripherals,” i.e., the least industrialised OEEC countries, were left out.113
The OEEC thus remained the main bridge linking the Western European
countries together, and it was appreciated as such – except by the French,
who argued that the OEEC’s activities and usefulness should be judged on
their own merits. In the summer of 1959, there was growing support in the
US for the reorganization of the OEEC into an Atlantic organization, of
which the US and Canada would become members. While the idea of
encouraging transatlantic coordination of economic policies was not new,
several factors combined in 1959 to make such a collaboration desirable.
First, the perceived Soviet threat in third world countries focused the mind
of Western decision-makers on the potential political advantages to be
derived from aiding less developed countries. Second, the preliminary moves
of President Charles de Gaulle to increase French autonomy within the
Atlantic alliance highlighted the fact that Western unity should not be taken
for granted. A reorganized OEEC would provide a forum to discuss the
common economic problems of the Western countries as well as aid to
underdeveloped countries.114 In December 1959, it was decided to start
negotiations on a reorganization of the OEEC, which would enable the US
and Canada to become members. The following month a group of “Four
Wise Men” was appointed to discuss plans for such a reorganization.115
E. The Winding Up of the EPA (1960-61)
Despite the plans for a reorganization of the OEEC, Working Party no. 26,
which apparently had the backing of the OEEC’s secretariat, wished to
proceed with the reform of the EPA as originally contemplated, i.e., to create
a single operational agency for the OEEC. This was only sustainable on the
assumption that the Group of Four and all future members of the reorgani-
zed OEEC would support such a development. However, in March 1960,
116 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 92, “Committees – OEEC (4 of 6),” ecoto
A-232, Paris to Washington, 24.10. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box. 4, note, OEEC del.
(Riis), 21.3. 1960.
117 PRO, FO371/150073, M361/7, ltr., Ellis-Rees to Holliday, 27.1. 1960 (sic), att.: ltr.,
McCarthy to Ellis-Rees, 28.1. 1960.
118 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, OEEC del. (Riis), note, 21.3. 1960, “Delegationschef-
mødet d. 18.3. 1960 om EPA’s fremtid;” PRO, FO371/150114, M557/3, ltr., Maddocks
to Goodfellow, 3.2. 1960.
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the Americans requested that the discussions on the EPA and the OSTP be
suspended until the report from the Group of Four was known.116 They
argued that any reform of the EPA would be dependent on the resolution of
the wider issue of a reorganization of the OEEC. A less overt, but more
fundamental, motive was the fact that they had decided that they themselves
would not want to participate in the traditional activities of the EPA, and that
it was, therefore, highly probable that the EPA would eventually be
dissolved.117 Their adjournment proposal was backed by the French, and
accepted without enthusiasm by the EPA member countries. The Belgian
delegate expressed displeasure with what he called an American “diktat.”118
The Group of Four started its work in January 1960, and four months later
it published its report, with recommendations for a reorganization of the
OEEC. During these months it held hearings and informed itself of the
position of the individual member countries about the reorganization of the
OEEC and in particular about the activities they wished to see taken care of
by the new organization. Both France and the US preferred a weak organ-
ization, whereas most other participants wanted to retain significant roles for
the OEEC. The main themes of discussion related to the competence of the
new organization in trade matters and the degree of continuity between the
OEEC and the future organization. The fate of the EPA was an aspect of the
latter question, but it remained a secondary issue. The views of the par-
ticipating countries on the EPA were highly dependent on their more general
views on the future of the OEEC and their willingness to compromise with
the Americans and the French. The main difference of approach among the
Europeans arose, according to a UK report:
over the extent to which we should try [to] meet American susceptibilities. [...]
The Swedes, Norwegians and Swiss and to a lesser extent the Danes think that we
should take a tougher line; that we should retain more of the features of the
present organisation, particularly its power to take decisions, and that we should
not unduly weaken it to get the Americans in.119
120 PRO, FO371/150080, M551/105, desp. no. 53 to Berne, “Conversation Between the
Secretary of State and Daeniker (Swiss Ambassador) on the Reorganisation of OEEC,
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Switzerland stressed that it wanted to see the existing functions of the OEEC
retained as they feared that any fiddling with them might transform the
OEEC into “a purely consultative body.”120 The Swiss in fact suspected the
French of plotting to get rid of the OEEC altogether. Belgium also had a
maximalist view in the sense that in its opinion the reconstituted organization
ought to do everything done by OEEC.121 The Dutch government equally
insisted that the new organization should not be a weaker version of the
OEEC, and reacted with anxiety to any proposal to alter existing activities.122
Obviously, these views had consequences for the attitudes towards the
EPA.123 Generally, comments about the continuation of the EPA as an
organization were few, vague and and uncommittal. To the extent that the
position papers of the different countries mentioned the OEEC’s productivity
work, the general tone of their comments was rather positive. France, in the
beginning of 1960, seemed to consider such a continuation desirable, and
was even considering an autonomous European set-up if the Americans
decided not to participate in the EPA activities.124 The UK expressed its
desire to see the EPA continued “on the lines recommended by Working
Party no. 26.”125 Norway wished to see the tasks performed by the OEEC in
the fields of productivity and STP continued by the new organization,
without specifying under what organizational arrangements.126 Ireland was
grateful for the EPA’s past achievements and hoped that they would be
continued and even strengthened by the new organization.127 Germany
simply stuck to the recommendations of Working Party no. 26.128 Belgium
favored a continuation of the EPA but acknowledged that some changes had
to occur in its program and that an improved connection to the general
129 PRO, FO371/150079, M551/80, ltr., Ockrent to Burgess, 8.2. 1960, att.: “Draft Reply
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policy of the OEEC was necessary.129 The Netherlands merely saw the EPA
as “a useful means of associating labour and management with the work of
the organisation,” without being more specific about the agency’s future.130
Switzerland appeared to favor the approach of Working Party no. 26, and
thus in fact accept the continuation of the EPA, though with increased
emphasis on the scientific and APED programs, and praising in particular the
achievements of the OEEC’s STP projects.131 Canada did not want to
commit itself as far as the EPA was concerned but expressed its willingness
to continue contributing to the work in the scientific field.132 The Joint Trade
Union Advisory Council (JTUAC) considered the EPA’s productivity work
important because much educational effort was still needed among trade
unions.133 The countries with areas in the process of development unsurpri-
singly favored the continuation of programs benefiting such areas. This was
the case in particular of Greece, which strongly appreciated the work of the
EPA and “firmly believe[d] that it must be maintained and reinforced within
the reconstituted OEEC.”134 It also applied to Italy, which praised the
usefulness of the EPA’s work for underdeveloped regions and hoped that
future EPA activities would concentrate on these regions and on science.”135
The views of Yugoslavia were similar.136 Most member countries thus wished
the EPA’s activities to be continued in some form or another.137 However,
the differences between those favoring giving priority to the STP and the
APED programs and those insisting on the continuation of the traditional
productivity activities persisted.138
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The US position, however, proved decisive. In retrospect, it seems that, once
the reorganization of the OEEC had been decided, in December 1959, the
days of the EPA were numbered. It was clear that the US would not
participate in the traditional productivity enhancing projects. In December,
Douglas Dillon, the US undersecretary of state, expressed his support for a
continued OEEC program in the fields of science and underdeveloped areas.
However, he found that neither of these activities belonged properly to a
specialized productivity agency such as the EPA. He could see no reason
whatsoever for continuing to support the projects of the Industry-Labor
sectors or the Food and Agriculture sectors beyond 1961, except to the
extent that they concerned themselves directly with underdeveloped areas.
On the other hand, a brutal interruption of US assistance to such programs
would annoy several OEEC countries. He, therefore, proposed to keep such
activities “at the minimal possible level.”139 The US views were communica-
ted to the Group of Four in February 1960.140
There were many pressures on the administration to change its stand. Both
King and Grégoire protested, the US representative on the Advisory Board,
Clarence Francis, did so too, and communicated his views to President
Eisenhower (to whom he was both a personal adviser and a friend).141 In
February 1960, trying to avoid the total demise of the classical EPA
activities, King went to the US to negotiate with a large number of American
officials.142 The reactions of all these contacts were positive.143 The main
stumbling block was the state department. In meeting its officials, chiefly
John Tuthill and his aides, King advocated Atlantic cooperation in the field
of productivity enhancement in industry, insisting on the usefulness of such
cooperation with regard to the less developed areas and on the benefit which
small and medium-sized firms in America could derive from it. However, an
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influential group in the American administration, led by John Leddy, one of
Dillon’s main advisers, feared an economically strong Europe at the very
moment when the situation of the American balance of payments was
worsening. This group thought that it would be “untactical” to help Europe
increase its productivity, and it was in particular not keen to encourage the
traditional EPA activities which they thought would help the Western
European competitors more than the US.144 For this reason the Americans
not only were unwilling to participate in any OEEC program for industrial
productivity, but they would have opposed such a program even if it were to
be a purely European one.145
The US position that the activities in the industrial and commercial field
should be eliminated was backed by France and to a lesser degree by the
UK. When this became clear, it had a devastating effect on the morale of the
top-level staff, and led the director, Grégoire, and his deputy, King, to
recommend a dissolution.146 Faced simultaneously with the insistent Ameri-
can demand that the agency’s expenditures on STP programs be in-
creased,147 with no prospect for any increase in the member countries’
148 PRO, FO371/150073, M361/8/G. 1960, Ellis-Rees to Holliday, 18.2. 1960, “Future
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Grégoire was obviously not happy with this conclusion, which implied winding up an
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contributions to the agency, and with an uncooperative Governing Board,
Grégoire felt that it would be impossible to continue the agency in any
meaningful way. The activities supporting science and APED could be
undertaken by other appropriate bodies in the OEEC and the rest would
have to be given up. This view was shared by King.148 During a discussion
between Grégoire, Ellis-Rees and the Group of Four, it was concluded that
the EPA was deficient in two main respects, one formal and one more
substantial. First of all “[e]ffective control of EPA had eluded the Council of
OEEC and EPA had the appearance of a body pursuing its own objectives
under the influence of technicians independently of the general policy of the
organisation.”149 Secondly, neither the tasks nor the structure of the EPA was
any longer adapted to the economic needs of its member countries, they were
“out of date.” Worse, most NPCs had proven deficient and had not been
able properly to represent the EPA in the member countries.150
The report of the Group of Four was made public in April 1960. It proposed
the reorganization of the OEEC into the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which the US and Canada
would become members. As far as the EPA was concerned, it recommended,
as did Working Party no. 26, that the traditional activities of the EPA should
play a less important role compared to those concerning science and the less
developed areas.151 Otherwise, it discarded the proposals of Working Party
no. 26, namely the amalgamation of the EPA and OSTP, the division of the
new agency into four sectors, and its close supervision by a working party
under the Council. Working Party no. 26 had left the door open for the
survival of the EPA, probably under a new name. Instead, the Group of Four
opted for a more radical solution which consisted in dissolving the EPA and
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Gore-Booth. His initial instructions from the group did not foresee the winding up of the
EPA but rather its re-naming as Technical Problems Section, cf. PRO, FO371/150081,
M551/116, GF/CR/35, 3.3. 1960. It seems that it was the American attitude which was
decisive for the final wording (cf. NOUD, 44.25/38, box 3, Emb. London to UD, 16.4.
1960, “Firemaktsgruppens rapport” (sic). The only EPA-related institution which the
GOFEO wanted to keep was the Advisory Board as a means to keep a channel of
communication open with both trade unions and private firms.
153 A Remodelled Economic Organisation. In fact budgetary reasons had played a very minor
role in the original American decision to back the creation of the EPA and in subsequent
decisions to continue subsidizing it.
154 A Remodelled Economic Organisation.
155 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-
1961,” ltr., CIFE/2924, Leali to CGII, 3.2. 1960, att.: note, 2.2. 1960.
156 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, CES/60.34, 27.4. 1960, “Questions Concerning the EPA
and the OSTP.” In September 1960, the Dutch still believed that the recommendations
of Working Party no. 26 were valid (cf. NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590, note, Berger, 8.9.
1960.
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distributing its various activities among the different divisions of the
reorganized OEEC.152 Several reasons were given for this. First of all, the
existence of a separate agency with its own budget was allegedly due to the
fact “that the EPA has been financed as to fifty percent from the USA, which
as an Associate of the OEEC does not contribute to the general budget,”153
and that with the US joining the new organization, the need for such a
separate agency had been removed. Secondly, it was hoped that a merging
of the EPA into the reorganized OEEC would allow some economies to be
made. Thirdly, the broadened concept of productivity made it ever harder
to justify such diverse projects being handled by one single body. And
fourthly, the group felt the need for a closer assocation between the opera-
tional activities of the EPA and other aspects of the organization’s work.154
Although the demise of the EPA was foretold by the GOFEO report, it took
time before this dawned upon everybody. For very long, many took the
continuation of the EPA for granted. In the beginning of February 1960,
Arnaud, president of the Council of European Industrial Federations
(CEIF), had clear though unofficial indications that the reorganization of the
OEEC would not in any way endanger the EPA.155 When the report was
published, it seemed open enough to interpretations, since the chairman of
the OEEC Council thought that it was in tune with the conclusions reached
by Working Party no. 26 which clearly would have allowed a continuation of
the EPA in a new guise.156 Generally, there were only few reactions on the
part of the OEEC countries to the recommandations of the Group of Four
as far as the EPA was concerned. The Norwegians disagreed with the idea
that the EPA should be wound up and found the report “very unsatisfac-
157 NOUD, 44.25/38, box 4, note, 7.5. 1960, “Reorganiseringen av OEEC. Uttalelse fra
frihandelsutvalgets embetsmannsgruppe om ‘De fire vises’ rapport;” PRO,
FO371/150073, M361/15, ltr., Maddocks to Goodfellow, 25.4. 1960.
158 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590, note, 25.8. 1960, “Resoluties van de Advisory Board
en het Internationale Bedrijfsleven;” NOUD, 44.25/38, box 4, note, 7.5. 1960.
159 NOUD, 44.25/38, box 4, note, 27.5. 1960.
160 PRO, FO371/150096, M551/320, Minutes by Rich, 24.5. 1960.
161 Ibid.
162 PRO, BT258/560, BT/EPA(60)M, 23rd Meeting, 28.6. 1960.
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tory,” but they did not find much comfort in the attitude of other member
countries.157 This was most probably due to the fact that the negotiations
concerning the reorganization of the OEEC involved some more fundamen-
tal questions.158 In May 1960, Wormser polemized against those who wished
to keep important elements of the previous work of the OEEC in the new
organization while at the same time creating this organization with the US
and Canada who did not want to continue these activities. As he put it: “You
cannot eat your cake and have it too.”159
The involvement of the US in the new organization was indeed deemed
essential by the Europeans, and the negative American view of the future of
the EPA made it inconceivable for any country to stand up to a real fight for
the survival of the agency. The negotiations on the reorganization of the
OEEC were already difficult due to disagreements concerning the functions
of the future organization and in particular about its competence in trade
matters. The British position was that more secondary questions, notably
those concerning the fate of the EPA, “should not get in the way of achieving
a satisfactory and agreed program for working out the shape and the
details.”160 It was, therefore, a question which was best left to be solved at a
later stage, once a new secretary general had been appointed to supervise the
transition to the new organization.161 In July 1960, a draft of the convention
for the OECD was initialed and the former Danish minister of finances,
Thorkil Kristensen, was appointed the new secretary general. In September
1960, negotiations on the new organization started within the Preparatory
Committee. It quite soon became clear that most countries accepted the
recommendations of the Group of Four, namely that the operational
emphasis of the OECD should be put upon assistance for underdeveloped
member countries and the development of scientific resources, and that the
EPA should be wound up. Many OEEC countries were indeed “anxious to
meet the US desire to spend more on OSTP.”162 The two issues which
remained unclear were the fate of the EPA’s traditional activities and the
choice of the organizational framework within which to continue the OEEC’s
operational activities. Most member countries wished to keep the industrial
163 DDE, Manuscripts, Clarence Francis Papers 1933-1973, box 3, f. “EPA. 1960,”
memo, Alexander King, 10.8. 1960, “Operational Activities of OECD in Relation to US
Participation.”
164 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-
1961,” ltr., circ. 669, Arnaud, 21.12. 1960.
165 PRO, FO371/150096, M551/320, ltr., Bretherton to Owen, 20.5. 1960. Concerning
the view that one single agency was a prerequisite for checking the upward drift of
operational expenditures, cf. PRO, FO371/150073, M361/15, ltr., Maddocks to
Goodfellow, 25.4. 1960.
166 PRO, FO371/150073, M361/30, ltr., Hankey (UK del to OEEC) to Jackling (FO),
1.11. 1960. Both France and the US wished to get rid of the EPA (cf. SVUD, Afd. H,
grupp 77, PP 54, no. 179, OEEC del. (Hägglöff) to UD, 20.3. 1961; SVUD, Afd. H,
grupp 77, PP 55, tel. no. 167, Hägglöff to UD, 3.7. 1961).
167 UM, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, EPA/D/9550, 15.6. 1961.
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and agricultural activities.163 Even the UK was now supporting this solution,
mainly because it thought that its good relations to the other EFTA
countries, which were generally positive towards the EPA’s work, might be
served by such an attitude. The US, however, remained adamant that they
should be terminated.164 With regard to the second question, the situation
was more peculiar. Somewhat paradoxically, considering its past record, the
UK waged a rearguard battle to ensure a central control of the surviving EPA
activities. Its motivation was mainly financial, as it considered that a body
responsible for all operational programs was needed to keep an eye on the
expenses. Accordingly, the British delegate proposed the creation of a Tech-
nical Cooperation Committee directly responsible to the OEEC Council, to
control and coordinate the operational budget of the four or five different
sectors of the work.165 This looked like an attempt to bring back to life the
ideas of Working Party no. 26, and was opposed by the other delegations.
They thought that such a committee would be the Governing Body under
another name and that the whole proposal amounted to a continuation of the
EPA, the demise of which most of them now considered inevitable.166
The ministerial meeting held on December 13-14, 1960 accepted the
recommendation made by the Preparatory Committee that some of the EPA
activities – namely those especially designed for member countries in the
process of economic development and those in the field of applied research
– should be maintained by the OECD. For the rest, a general review took
place, following which it was decided to distribute those EPA projects to be
continued among the competent sections of the OECD. The EPA officially
ceased to exist as the OEEC gave way to the OECD, on September 30,
1961.167 On the institutional level though, it was decided, on a French
168 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 55, tel. no. 167, Hägglöff to UD, 3.7. 1961.
169 PRO, BT258/560, BT/EPA(62)M, 25th Meeting.
170 UM, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, ltr., Sekretariatet for Danmarks Erhvervsfond to UM,
“OECD’s produktivitetsarbejde,” handwritten comment by Poul Jensen, 26.2. 1962.
171 UM, j.nr. 106.O.21, box. 5, C(60)115, 17.6. 1960, att.: “Resolution of the Advisory
Board Taken at its Meeting on 1.6. 1960.”
172 NLRA, box 2.06.061, MEZ, AP, Inv.nr. 590, EPA/AB/M(60)2, 2.6. 1960, “Re-
solution Adopted on 1.6. by the Representatives of the Council of European Industrial
Federations, the European Council of Crafts and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
the Joint Trade Union Advisory Committee and the Agricultural Organisations on the
Occasion of the Meeting of the Advisory Board of the European Productivity Agency.”
However, the General Council of the CEIF at its meeting of 5.7. 1960 refused to endorse
the stance taken by its representatives. It simply expressed its hope that “[t]he work of
promoting productivity in the field of industry and commerce should be continued within
the OECD,” see: ECHA, microfilm no. 547 (“OCDE 29.05.79. S.G., Conference on the
Reorganisation of OEEC, 1960”), Addendum to OECD/WP/26, 8.7. 1960, ltr., Arnaud
to Hjort Nielsen, 7.7. 1960.
173 WNRC, RG 469, ODDTS, OPS, PADiv, FEEB, RRt EPA 1954-60, box 1, f.
“Europe. OEEC,” EPA/GB/M(60)3, 4.8. 1960, “Minutes of the 14th Session Held on
2.6.-3.6. 1960;” NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590. note, Berger, 8.9. 1960.
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proposal, that the OECD should still offer a forum where the NPC re-
presentatives could meet.168
Few seriously mourned the agency. According to a British analysis, the more
technically-advanced countries were inclined to believe that EPA activities
had no future under OECD.169 The Danes, however, consistently tried to
persuade their OECD partners to continue all former EPA activities. In the
end they had to give up, faced with the atttitude of most of the larger
member countries which considered that the EPA and its projects were no
longer tailored to their needs.170 The strongest supporting reactions for the
EPA came from those most active in productivity matters linked to the EPA,
especially from the trade unions. In June 1960, the Advisory Board deplored
the reduction of agricultural and industrial activities in the program of the
agency for 1960/61, denouncing it as “inexcusable in the face of the
economic expansion of the Eastern bloc.”171 At the same time the representa-
tives of the Council of European Industrial Federations, the European
Council of Craft and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, the Joint Trade
Union Advisory Council and the agricultural organizations criticized the
GOFEO report, and in particular its proposal that the EPA should be wound
up.172 A number of delegates in the Governing Body were anxious to endorse
these resolutions. This was, however, vetoed by the delegates from the UK,
France, Italy and Switzerland.173
174 SVUD, UD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 54, note, Velander, 27.6. 1960, “Redegörelse för
samtal med ambassadör Hägglöf lördagen den 4 juni 1960.” See also: ASCONF, box
58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59”, ltr., Arnaud to
Mattei, 6.2. 1959, att.: note, Angelkort, “Quelques idées sur un programme européen
pour le développement de l’industrie et du commerce.”
175 MBZ, DGES-Archief, f. “996.26, OEES/EPA/Alg., GB, EPA Structuur,” ltr., de
Milly to Rasmussen, 24.1. 1957.
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F. Conclusion
During its eight years of existence, the EPA remained constantly exposed to
reform proposals and termination threats. It lived, as a Swedish official put
it, “under the star of uncertainty.”174 The first two and a half years were
marked by a very bad start which was at least partly due to bad management
and a period of paralysis caused by the Swiss policy of obstruction.175
Afterwards the standing of the agency itself improved, but it was not helped
by general developments in Europe. Productivity was growing at high rates
in many OEEC countries, and the need for governmental action therefore
seemed to fade. As the Moody funds were running out, many NPCs likewise
lost steam. Without a network of strong NPCs which could serve as the
agency’s local sponsors, the EPA was in a weak position. Instead, those
economic problems which were coming to the forefront – the role of science
and technology and aid to less developed countries – were only remotely
related to the EPA’s original field of activities. In 1959, the EPA’s main
sponsor turned against it. While quite a few Europeans thought that the
agency should survive, the US was adamant that it should not. It did not
want to engage in activities which were no longer seen to be in its own
interests, even though they might serve the interests of the OEEC countries.
During the OEEC reorganization discussions in 1960, the EPA was a mere
pawn in the European “high politics” involving the relations between the Six
and the Seven as well as between the US and Western Europe. But its
winding up was not accidental. It was desired both by the US and by France.
The fact that it could be liquidated so easily and be forgotten so fast, was a
reflection of the fact that its story was to a large extent one of conflicts and
problems. These conflicts will be further explored in the following chapters.
1 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 3, f. “Economics: Productivity Program
(1 of 3),” repto 1444, Paris to London, 27.10. 1952. It was also labelled “executive arm”
(MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” 4.2. 1953, “Verslag van de
vergadering van het PRA Committee op 25.1.-26.1. 1953) and “executive body” (MBZ,
DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” note, de Milly to van der Beugel,
5.1. 1953).
2 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957, “Results
Obtained and Future Prospects. Report on the Agency’s First Phase of Activity (1st May
1953 – 30th June 1957) and on its Situation at 1st July 1957.” A slightly modified version
of this comprehensive report was subsequently published: OEEC, The European
Productivity Agency. Activities and Achievements. A Summary of the Work Done by E.P.A.
During Four Years of Operational Activities, Paris, 1958.
3 See Chapter I.
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III. AN OPERATIONAL BRANCH
OF THE OEEC
Much of the EPA’s existence was plagued by discussions about what it
actually was or ought to be. Some defined it as an operational branch of the
OEEC, others chiefly saw it as an American aid agency, still others envi-
sioned it as a European federation of national productivity centers (NPCs),
and some, finally, hoped that it could evolve into a tripartite organization.
While not necessarily exclusive of each other, these four definitions do reflect
different political ambitions, which will be discussed in the following four
chapters. First of all, the EPA was created as an “operating arm”1 of the
OEEC. However, discussions about the status of the EPA as an operational
branch caused numerous conflicts among the member countries. These
conflicts concerned the official role of the agency, its place within the OEEC,
its working procedures and its administration.
A. An Operational Body
The fundamental raison d’être of the EPA was to be an operational branch of
the OEEC with the purpose of enhancing productivity. Its aim was to change
attitudes and practices through seminars, conferences, missions, pilot pro-
jects, etc.2 From the beginning, however, the member countries had very
different views about how outgoing the new agency should be.3 That did not
deter the EPA secretariat from launching an ambitious program, based on
the belief that the agency “should above all initiate dramatic actions creating
psychological jolts and addressing a large public by way of exhibitions, press
4 AN, SC, F60 ter, box 523, f. “AEP Cl. 6823,” EPA(54)81, 25.10. 1954, “Rapport
annuel, Partie I.”
5 HM, j.nr. 88-5-56, note no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955; MBZ, DGEM-Archief
663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and de Milly, 9.11. 1954, att.:
note, 9.11. 1954.
6 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956, “Minutes of the 7th
Session Held in Paris on 31.5. and 1.6. 1956.”
7 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 92, f. “Committees – OEEC (4 of 6),”
C(59)215, 31.7. 1959.
8 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 39-47.
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or radio campaigns as well as propaganda conferences.”4 These rather costly
activities apparently had limited effects, and were soon criticized as wasteful
by many member countries.5 The secretariat willingly pledged to concentrate
its activities, but that hardly solved all problems, since the countries
disagreed about which subjects should be given priority. In December 1956,
Grégoire emphasized that it:
represent[ed] an inevitable compromise between the 3 main conceptions of the
EPA’s role. In fact one group of countries held that the EPA should be a service
for the supply of consultants and the organisations of missions at small cost to the
participating countries. Others believe that the EPA should be essentially a clearing
house for the exchange of experiences and information, whereas a third group held
that the agency should be a centre for study and research of the effect of pro-
ductivity and give guidance for the formulation of national policies on such matters
as the rate of technological inovation, sociological research, economic analysis etc.
It was evident that a more clear-cut policy and more specific agreement as to the
agency’s role was required.6
In January 1957, the Council seemed to solve the problem when it stated
that the agency had two complementary functions to fulfill. On the on hand,
it was supposed:
[t]o act as a “clearing house” designed to provide the national productivity bodies
and, where appropriate, the international industrial organisations, with information
and other services enabling them better to fulfil their mission;7
On the other hand, it should:
act as a centre for study and discussion designed to guide European efforts for a
continuing improvement in productivity, particularly in the study of the social and
economic consequences of technological development, including human factors.8
9 That was perhaps not surprising, since the Council, in its definition of the agency’s
clearing house function, had lumped together the first two roles enumerated by Grégoire.
As de Milly pointed out, “‘clearing house’ activities were more a means of action than a
policy objective” and in fact an impressive amount of discussion within the EPA centered
on questions of procedure rather than on policy (cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4,
PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957, “Minutes of the 54th Session Held on 6.-7.5. 1957”).
10 NORA, HD, Avd. for Utenrikshandel 1948-1961 II, box 122, f. “3,” note, Traagstad,
18.2. 1956; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno
1958-59,” ltr., Morelli to Valletta, 9.12. 1958, att.: note, 9.12. 1958.
11 See for example: UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957; ASCONF,
box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della Confederazione.
Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note, Arnaud, “Structure et rôle
de l’AEP. Synthèse des avis formulés par les Fédérations industrielles.”
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This attempt at bridging over conflicting views on the agency’s role was not
a complete success. Most member countries, and especially the Northern
European ones, agreed on the principle that the agency’s main role was to be
a clearing house. But when it came to practice, views differed.9 The British
and the Swiss preferred a modest agency, which confined itself to be a center
for exchange of views and information in practical matters pertaining to
productivity. They were reluctant to see any governmental, and even less
intergovernmental, interference in affairs which they considered to be the
reponsibility of managers and workers themselves. In their version, the EPA
as a clearing house appears to have been a code word for an agency reduced
to the most minimal size possible. Most other countries, however, wanted the
EPA to provide services, even though some of them insisted that it should
only do so on their demand. Those most ambitious on the agency’s behalf
were the southern Europeans. They generally envisioned a more broadly
defined task for the EPA, encompassing not only productivity but factors of
economic growth and development and also research into these questions.
The main proponents of the thesis that the EPA should act as a guide and as
a research center were France and the agency’s own secretariat.10 Simplifying
somewhat, and making an exception for the French case, one may say that
the more the member countries felt that they needed external assistance, the
broader a role they were ready to accept for the EPA. There was thus a gap
between the more developed northern European countries which either felt
that they did not have much to learn from the EPA or were interested in very
practical projects, and the less developed ones, whose needs were greater and
who were interested in a wide range of different kinds of assistance.11
In spite of the diverging views on the priorities of the EPA, it did perform a
wide range of roles, namely as service-provider, institution-builder and study
center. Its main operational function was to act as a provider of services,
offering the aid of consultants, facilities, financial aid to missions, seminars,
12 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7952, ltr., Hall to Grégoire, 27.4. 1960; UMA,
j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957.
13 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, note, Friis, 6.1. 1960.
14 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7450 – Sector I (1st Revision), 12.3. 1960,
“Revised 1960-61 Programme for Sector I: Industry and Commerce;” UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7952, ltr., Hall to Grégoire, 27.4. 1960.
15 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 81, f. “Productivity April – Sept. 1958,”
ecoto A-71, USRO Paris to ICA/W, 25.7. 1958; OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 16,
p. 533.
16 CHBA, E 2200 Paris, Lf. bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir de
l’AEP,” note, 7.4. 1959, att.: note, Klönne to Grégoire, 3.2. 1959, “Éléments d’un
programme d’‘activités opérationelles’ pour l’OECE;” OEEC, Acts of the Organisation,
vol. 17, p. 533.
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bursaries etc., to the member countries. This role was supplemented by the
creation of institutions which would afterwards be able to survive on their
own and continue whatever activities the EPA had wished to promote. The
“institution building role”12 of the agency was given even higher priority in
1959. At that time it became clear that a larger share of the agency’s
resources was to be diverted to the new priority sectors (STP and APED)
and that less would be available for industry and commerce. This provided
a strong incentive for the EPA to adopt more cost-efficient methods.13 In the
sector of business management alone, about thirty different national and
international associations were created at least partially on EPA initiative.
Among them were: the European Organisation for Quality Control, the
European Work Study Association, the International Association of
Ergonomics (established in 1959 in Zürich), the Mediterranean Centre for
Post-graduate Education in Agriculture and Food, a European Centre for the
Translation and Diffusion of Russian Technical Literature (set up in 1960).14
Lastly, the EPA acted as a study center in different fields. It financed surveys
and fostered cooperation among research institutes in the member countries.
B. A Branch of the OEEC
1. Existing Within the OEEC
a) Bureaucratic Conflicts
The EPA was the first operational agency of the OEEC. But it was not the
only one. In 1958, two other OEEC agencies were created with operational
functions: the European Nuclear Energy Agency and the Office for Scientific
and Technical Personnel (OSTP).15 Moreover, the vertical committees also
implemented some projects.16 But the EPA was the main operational agency
17 In April 1960, the Group of Four wrote that the EPA “now embraces most of the
activities of the Organisation described as ‘operational’ – that is, involving action in the
field and direct contact with businessmen, trade unionists, farmers, universities etc., as
well as government officials” (OEEC, A Remodelled Economic Organisation).
18 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vols. 19 and 20; Appendixes: Table A-3.
19 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EQ/M(55)1, 24.2. 1955, att.: “Statement by Grégoire,
Deputy Director of the EPA on the Present Policy of the Agency;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 4, EPA/D/7952, ltr., Hall to Grégoire, 27.4. 1960.
20 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 106, f. “OEEC: Senior Economic
Officers Meeting 1955 (2 of 5),” note, 19.9. 1955.
21 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, note, 13.11. 1953, “Samtale d. 13.11. 1953 mellem den
danske OEEC delegation repræsenteret ved hr. Tabor og hr. Ussing og EPA’s direktør
Dr. Harten angående det europæiske produktivitetscenters virksomhed.”
22 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, 136391, van Blokland to
Kruisheer, 29.10. 1954, att.: note by King, 27.10. 1954, “Future Operation of the EPA.”
See also: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 15, pp. 206-207.
23 PRO, CAB 134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)(9), 29.1. 1954, SCTA, note by the BOT, att.:
EPA/D/19, 19.1. 1954, “EPA. the Second Annual Programme of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956.
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of the OEEC.17 Its budget represented on average more than forty percent
of all expenses by the OEEC. The agency’s share of the total OEEC/EPA
staff only made up about twenty percent (in 1959/60 and 1960/61).18 This
reflected the fact that the EPA tried to act as a catalyst of activities to be
continued by others.19
The EPA got involved in several bureaucratic skirmishes within the OEEC.
In the mid-fifties, the OEEC had fifteen vertical committees dealing with
technical questions such as non-ferrous metals, chemicals, iron and steel, etc.
As the American aid was militarized, these committees were left with little
else to do than to produce annual status reports on their respective sectors.
At the end of 1953, the OEEC’s executive committee gave them a new
mandate which included advising the horizontal committees on the barriers
in their respective sectors to trade liberalization and economic integration.
They were also to advise the EPA on the introduction of new technologies.20
From the very beginning, a certain degree of rivalry existed between the EPA
and the vertical committees. Some delegations wished to ensure the agency’s
independence, fearing that continuous consultations with other bodies would
have a stiffling effect. The Danes in particular hoped that Harten would
ignore “the more or less irrelevant proposals which the technical committee
secretariats could be expected to put forward, partly to defend their own
interests.”21 On the other hand, the EPA was being admonished when it
failed to coordinate its activities with those of the vertical committees.22
During the following years, the EPA secretariat, therefore, tried to maintain
close relationships with these committees, but without much success.23 In
24 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11; box 1, EQ/M(55)1, 24.2. 1955, att.: “Statement by Grégoire,
Deputy Director of the EPA on the Present Policy of the Agency;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11,
box 3, no. 67, UM (Boel) to OEEC del., 29.1. 1957, “Den danske interesse i EPA’s
virksomhed.”
25 OEEC, The European Productivity Agency. Activities and Achievements.
26 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, C(58)166, 25.6. 1958, “Programme of the EPA for 1958-
59.”
27 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Arnaud to Mattei, 6.2. 1959, att.: note, Angelkort, “Quelques idées sur un
programme européen pour le développement de l’industrie et du commerce.”
98
January 1955, Grégoire, who was at that time deputy director of the EPA,
declared to the OEEC machinery committee that the EPA’s policy would
henceforth be changed to exclude technological projects and concentrate on
three categories of activities: the general organization of firms, human
relations, distribution and marketing problems. He insisted, however, that
this still offered an “immense scope” for cooperation between the vertical
committees and the EPA. In fact, the EPA gradually gave up its vertical
activities since it evolved towards the view that the most central productivity
problems, concerning for example production planning, accounting control,
market research, etc., were common for all industrial fields and thus required
horizontal activities. Only in exceptional cases were problems specific to
particular branches taken up and in those cases cooperation with the vertical
committees was considered desirable although it was far from always
achieved.24 There was no formalized means of contact between the EPA and
the vertical committees, but there were close contacts between their
respective secretariats and in some cases the vertical committees placed a
project with the EPA which was asked to implement it.25 In 1958, a new
nomenclature for the EPA’s activities was adopted. One of the major changes
introduced on this occasion was the virtual elimination of all vertical
activities, which further loosened the ties between the EPA and the vertical
committees and enhanced the autonomy of the EPA’s secretariat.26
In 1959, a scramble developed between the EPA secretariat and the
Technical Services of the OEEC directed by Klönne. The plans to create one
single operational agency of the OEEC implied the merger of the EPA and
of the OEEC’s Direction of Technical Services.27 Grégoire hoped to turn the
EPA into the sole operational branch of the OEEC. As Klönne wrote to
Grégoire in February 1959, he could not accept that the EPA considered
itself exclusively responsible for the OEEC’s operational activities since:
the expression ‘operational activities’ [...], defined broadly, does not belong to one
particular organization within the OEEC. In fact, ever since the OEEC was
28 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir
de l’AEP,” note, 7.4. 1959, att.: note, Klönne to Grégoire, 3.2. 1959.
29 Ibid. See also: ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP.
Anno 1960-1961,” “10ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux
de l’AEP (1.2. -2.2. 1960). Compte rendu des décisions.”
30 See Chapter I.
31 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, no. 3417, OEEC del., 18.7. 1957.
32 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 5, f. “1473,” note, King, 2.12. 1953,
“Notes on a Conversation between M. Marjolin and Dr. King on 26.11. 1953.”
33 See Chapter VI.
34 See Chapter II.
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established, a large number of ‘operational activities’ have been initiated by its
different branches and in particular by the Direction of Technical Services.28
In April 1959, Grégoire was apparently hoping that the EPA could take over
the forecasting of medium and long term industrial development and other
tasks which had until then been the responsibility of the vertical committees.
This was strongly opposed by Klönne.29 Such rivalries were exacerbated by
the OEEC reorganization discussions.
b) Supervision by the OEEC
The EPA’s position within the OEEC was the result of a compromise
between the Franco-American vision of a strong operational agency and the
British wish to strictly limit the powers of the new agency. The choice of the
UK’s internal solution meant that the director of the EPA was subject to the
authority of the secretary general of the OEEC. But, as part of the deal, the
secretary general had made it clear that a large autonomy would be left to the
director.30 This promise was kept, since the OEEC secretariat’s interventions
were few and limited to some crucial moments. It mainly tried to make its
influence felt during the constitutional debates about the EPA, in 1953
(when it favored the internal solution), in 1957, and again in 1958-59.31 It
was also involved in the nomination of top officials to the agency. The choice
of Harten was largely due to Marjolin, who soon afterwards encouraged the
hiring of Grégoire as a deputy director. Marjolin also asked Alexander King
to assist Harten.32 In 1955, the secretariat of the OEEC further had a role in
the decision to open up for increased trade unionist participation in the
agency’s work.33 In July 1958, René Sergent, secretary general of the OEEC,
proposed the transformation of the EPA into a European Development
Agency. This initiative, however, seems to have been to some extent inspired
by Grégoire, King and the Americans.34 Apart from these interventions, there
is little evidence of any strong influence on the part of the OEEC secretariat
35 Griffiths, “An Act of Creative Leadership,” p. 245.
36 OECD, ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “Ré-organisation de l’OECE: Notes diverses
d’information pour le Groupe des Quatre sur le travail de l’OECE,” f. “23. Mr. Sergent
(Work of the O.E.E.C.) OEEC – Record of Discussions With GOFEO. Meeting No. 8:
Activities of EPA and OSTP, Grégoire, 22.2. 1960;” CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf.
bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir de l’AEP,” note, “Some Comments
by the US Delegation on the Subject of the Proposed Reorganization of the Operational
Activities of the OEEC.”
37 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, C(57)31(2nd Revision), 28.6. 1957, “Report by Working
Party No. 16 of the Council.”
38 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, CE/M(54)26(Prov.), 5.8. 1954.
39 See Chapter II.
40 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.26, OEES/EPA/Alg., Inv.nr. 416, ltr., de Milly to
Rasmussen, 24.1. 1957. See also: MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,”
ltr., 85.129, de Milly to King, 12.7. 1954; MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel II, ltr., de Milly
to King, 26.11. 1956; BRDBA, B 102/37396 (2), note, 10.7. 1959, “Notizen betr. die
Organisation der AEP ab Sommer 1960.”
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on the work of the EPA. The OEEC secretariat, in particular, was left out of
the reorganization talks which led to the establishment of the OECD.35
According to the EPA’s constitution, the OEEC Council was to supervise the
agency’s activities, and to adopt its budget and program. Nevertheless, there
were recurrent complaints about the lack of coordination between the EPA
and the OEEC.36 Formally there was no problem. As prescribed by the rules,
the EPA’s budget and program of activities were each year presented to the
Council for approval.37 But the Council hardly ever amended the program.
This was not surprising since the member countries were involved in its
preparation through their representatives to the agency. Nevertheless,
murmurs of dissatisfaction could often be heard in the Council. The main
reason for such discontent was the feeling among the OEEC delegates that
they were too often kept in the dark. In August 1954, Hugh Ellis-Rees stated
that “the Council might have had the feeling that it had not been too well
informed about what the Agency was doing.”38 According to him, this
problem had been overcome and the situation had become entirely
satisfactory. In fact, the Council’s dissatisfaction never totally vanished. It
reemerged towards the end of EPA’s existence, when the agency was
criticized for having acted too independently and without coordinating its
activities with those of the OEEC.39
The EPA reciprocated the Council’s negative feelings, although as a junior
partner in the relationship it had to utter them sotto voce. Within the EPA,
andamong the national experts, there was generally little respect for the com-
petence of the “rather ignorant”40 Council members. According to a Dutch
41 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590, note, Berger, 8.9. 1960.
42 NORA, HD, Avd. for Utenrikshandel 1948-1961 II, box 122, f. “5,” note no. 1061,
OEEC del. (Halvorsen) to UD, 28.3. 1957. On earlier difficulties in stimulating
governmental interest in productivity matters such as those relating to standardization,
see: NOUD, 44.25/1 t, box 2, HD to UD, 14.1. 1953, “Kort rapport fra måtet d. 28.11.
1952 i Paris i OEEC’s PRA’s underkomite for standardisering;” ASCONF, box 70/18.2,
f. “EPA Programmi 1956-1957,” note (s.l. , s.d.), “AEP.”
43 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-54, box 53, f. “Technical Assistance:
June-July 1954 (1 of 2),” ecoto A-71, USRO to FOA/Washington, 27.7. 1954, “OEEC
Council Approval of Second Annual Program of EPA.” See also: Archivo Centrale dello
Stato (ACS), Inv. 29/5, box 41, f. “AEP. Vario 1953 e 1954,” C(54)204, 2.8. 1954;
MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel I, note, no. 111501, 25.11. 1954; MBZ, DGES-Archief,
996.256 EPA OEEC/ deel I, note, de Milly to Grégoire, Fletcher and King, 15.2. 1956.
44 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-54, box 53, f. “Technical Assistance:
June-July 1954 (1 of 2),” ecoto A-71, USRO to FOA/Washington, 27.7. 1954.
45 PRO, BT64/4768, ltr., Fletcher to Hancox, s.d. (October or November 1955); MBZ,
996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel II, ltr., de Milly to King, 26.11. 1956.
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note, the members of the Council had “no clue of questions relating to pro-
ductivity.”41 Anyhow, they never displayed any great interest in matters con-
cerning the EPA, except when constitutional or political questions were dis-
cussed.42 In July 1954, Marjolin did express his support for the EPA, when
he stated that “the basic, the truly European, problem of this decade” was:
not trade liberalization or balance of payments, or currency convertibility, or
expansion of production – although these were important matters and had a
bearing on the basic problem. A measure of success in dealing with these popular
issues had already been achieved and more might be expected reasonably soon.
But the continuing European problem essentially was that of increasing productivi-
ty and it called for a cooperative European approach.43
Marjolin’s statement was backed by many country representatives. Ockrent,
the Belgian ambassador, stated that:
[l]ast year the decision had been to create the EPA within the OEEC framework.
Now the Council could see that the EPA was about to absorb the OEEC. This
development was a healthy one and Marjolin was correct in his statement as to
what constituted the basic European problem.44
Despite these rather enthusiastic endorsements, the EPA was left to deal with
its own business. However, there was an acute awareness of the necessity to
present the agency in as positive a way as possible in order not to endanger
continued funding by the member countries. From the EPA point of view,
therefore, the recurring question throughout its existence, was how to sell
itself to the Council.45
46 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 22, f. “Technical Cooperation, April
1955,” ecoto circ. A-237, 16.4. 1955, “Report on the PRA Meeting 4.4.-6.4. 1955.”
47 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 12, pp. 90-95.
48 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, desp. no. 23, OEEC del, 3.1. 1955; ACS, Inv. 29/5, box 41, f.
“AEP. Vario ‘55,” tel. no. 0676/294, OEEC del. to Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 25.2.
1955.
49 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, C(54)229, 21.7. 1954, “Observations by a Group of
Heads of Delegations on the Draft Program and Budget of EPA for 1954-55;” UMA,
j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/5, 24.10. 1956, “Memo by the Austrian Delegation on
the Objectives and Future Work of the EPA.”
50 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 335-49.
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Everybody agreed that the OEEC’s interest in the EPA’s activities should be
encouraged, but views differed as to how this could be achieved. There were
several attempts, notably on the part of the UK, to reinforce the supervisory
role of the OEEC Council, but they remained unsuccessful.46 According to
the EPA’s first constitution, programs involving a cost superior to fifteen
million French francs or whose cost exceeded seventy percent of the total
amount allotted to activities within the same field (whichever represented the
larger amount) had to be approved individually by the Council.47 By January
1955, no project had reached those limits, and accordingly no project had
been presented to the Council. The UK delegation, therefore, made a
forceful attempt to amend the EPA constitution in order to increase the
number of projects which had to be submitted to the OEEC Council for
approval. It was backed by the Dutch and Belgians, and to some extent the
Italians, but opposed vehemently by the Americans, the Scandinavians, the
French and the Greeks. They simply doubted the competence and the
interest of the Council in detailed examination of EPA projects. Such a
procedure would be bothersome for the OEEC delegations and slow down
the agency’s work. Finally, a compromise was found which stipulated that a
working party under the PRA Committee, once every three months, should
choose a certain number of projects to be presented for approval by the
Council.48 There were also many attempts simply to strengthen the OEEC
Council’s interest in EPA affairs, either by urging it to follow EPA affairs
more closely, or by asking the EPA to inform the Council about its
achievements.49 However, in 1957, with the adoption of an amended
Constitution for the EPA, the Council was definitively freed from any close
project discussion, since it merely had to adopt the overall program and
budget of the EPA.50 This reform did nothing to ensure a greater conformity
between the EPA’s program and the general objectives of the OEEC.
51 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 16, p. 259.
52 MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel I, note no. 1454, de Milly to van der Beugel, 13.7. 1955;
ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Bergenström to Arnaud, 13.2. 1959; See also: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol.
14 (p. 44) and vol. 15 (p. 159).
53 CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 17, f. “1953/1954. EE.20.90.3. Relations du comité
PRA avec d’autres organisations internationales,” ltr., Morand to OFIAMT, 15.4. 1952.
54 HM, j.nr. 88-5-56, note no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955; BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd.
91 AZ: 88.129, note, 12.12. 1958, “Zukunft der EPZ.”
55 HM, j.nr. 88-5-56, note no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955.
56 Ibid. According to de Milly the European trade unions contributed 1.2 million dollars
to this housing project (cf. MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/ deel I, ltr., de
Milly to Grégoire, 15.11. 1956.)
57 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956, “Memo by the Swiss
Delegation on the Objectives and Activities of the EPA.”
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2. The EPA’s Diplomacy
The EPA operated in a large number of fields, which inevitably raised fears
that its activities would overlap with those of other national or international
organizations. From the very start, the member countries insisted that the
agency should avoid any duplication of the activities of other international
organizations. In order to achieve this, it established relations with interna-
tional organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC)51 and the International Labour Organisation (ILO).52 As far as the
ILO was concerned, contacts with the OEEC had existed since 1952. The
two organizations had agreed on an exchange of information concerning their
activities in the field of productivity promotion.53 After 1953, the EPA
secretariat argued that there was no danger of duplication because the ILO
and the EPA were not rivals but rather complementary to each another. As
Grégoire put it, the ILO’s tasks were mainly of a normative character and
because of its broad membership (counting both Soviet bloc, western and
developing countries) it was narrowly limited in its endeavors, whereas the
EPA’s tasks were operational and its membership was purely European. In
several cases, the ILO asked the EPA to act on its behalf (namely when it
dealt with matters in which only European countries had an interest).54
Cooperation was also established between the EPA and the UN’s Economic
Commission for Europe which could sponsor research but had no possibility
of turning the results into practical actions.55 On the other hand, the EPA
agreed with the ECSC that the latter should test a program established by
the EPA to build workers housing.56 As a general rule, the EPA was supposed
to refrain from taking initiatives in fields where other organizations were
active. However, in those cases where it deemed the existing organizations
unsatisfactory it would maintain its own activities.57
58 See Chapter II.
59 The liaison committee was presided over by F. Verlinden, deputy director of the OBAP
(the Belgian NPC), cf. ASCONF, 70/14.1, f. “Comitato di Collegamento dei Centri di
produttività dei sei Paesi del MEC ‘A’,” Report, 31.1. 1963, “Comité de liaison des CNP
des pays membres du Marché Commun.”
60 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Morelli to Valletta, 22.12. 1958, att.: note, 19.12. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box
2, no. 5595, OEEC del., 15.12. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, ltr., RS-1839,
Sergent to Rey, 24.10. 1958; BRDBA, B 102/37395, no. 1606, OEEC del. (Werkmeister)
to BMW, 12.11. 1958; BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 12.12. 1958.
61 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, EPA/D/7152, note, Muynck, 9.10. 1959, “Comments by
the European Economic Community (EEC) on the EPA Programme for 1959-60.”
62 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7515, 26.1. 1960, “Contact between EPA and
the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Productivity Centres of the 6 Common Market
Countries.”
63 See Chapter II.
64 CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box nr 307, f “1960. EE. 801. AEP – programme
d’action et problèmes généraux,” OEEC del. to SCEE, 22.4. 1960, att.: note, 5.4. 1960,
“Scientific Cooperation in the Six.”
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The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC)58 presented the
EPA with a major test of its diplomatic skills. The NPCs of the six EEC
countries immediately started coordinating their efforts. In 1957, a first
French-Belgian meeting took place. The following year Germany, Italy and
Luxemburg joined, and it was decided to establish a liaison committee for
the NPCs in the EEC which would meet three to four times a year.59 This
development raised fears within the OEEC secretariat that the EEC intended
to establish its own productivity center. The EEC Commission denied that
it had any such plans. However, in case the EPA was wound up, it did not
rule out arranging for some replacement solution within the EEC.60 In 1959,
formal links were established between the EPA and the EEC productivity
group to ensure that there would be no duplication between the work of the
two organizations.61 In fact, the activities of the EEC group remained limited
and concentrated on interfirm comparisons, training of management con-
sultants, standardization and accounting.62
The creation of Euratom63 also gave cause for some concern among the non-
EEC members of the EPA. As the Swiss OEEC delegation noted: “the
activities of the Euratom, clearly and vigorously announced, are of consi-
derable concern to us because of the increasing probability that the Six will
be able to move very much faster in scientific collaboration than the larger
European organizations.”64 These concerns were not vindicated, since the
OECD would not only retain but expand its activities in the field of science
and technology.
65 ABA, LO-arkiv, box 1185, PU, 179, note, 17.1. 1953, “Oprettelse af et europæisk
productivitetscenter;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, CKFP (Iveroth and Seth), 14.2.
1957, “PM förtrolig angående EPA’s organisation.” In 1954, majority voting was
introduced for certain resolutions of the Vertical Committees, cf. OEEC, Acts of the
Organisation, vol. 20, p. 299.
66 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), OEEC del. (Werkmeister), “Über die 6. Sitzung des GB
der EPA am 9.10. und 10.10. 1958;” OEEC, The European Productivity Agency. Activities
and Achievements; UMA, j. nr. 106 P 5, no. 3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958.
67 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, C(58)8, 16.1. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1,
C(58)166, 25.6. 1958, “Programme of the EPA for 1958-59. Procedure for Adoption of
the Programme and of Projects;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 1221, OEEC del. to
UM, 13.3. 1957.
68 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “AEP. Avenir de l’agence. Groupe de travail no. 26,”
C/WP26/W/12, 1.6. 1959, memo, “Financial Aspects of the Continuation of an
Operational Agency;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8340, 3.11. 1960/23.11.
1960, “Programme of Action of the EPA and Part I Budget for 1960-61.”
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C. Working Procedures
The EPA had been granted a high degree of autonomy so that it could act
more swiftly, flexibly and efficiently than the rest of the OEEC. One major
difference was that decisions were taken by majority voting. The member
countries generally found this acceptable because the agency dealt with
rather technical questions.65 However, the desire for quick and flexible de-
cision-making sometimes collided with the member countries’ insistence on
retaining control over the activities of the agency. The tension between these
two objectives underlay many of the discussions about the EPA’s working
procedures.
The program was considered by the PRA Committee (after 1957: the
Governing Body) and by the Council in two stages, in June and in Decem-
ber. This was due to the fact that the financial years of the OEEC/EPA and
of the US government differed. The former ran from July to June while the
latter coincided with the calendar year. In June, the EPA knew part of its
resources, but it had to wait until December before it knew the US
contribution and thus the total amount at its disposal. 66 As a result, two
stages were required. In June, a preliminary program was adopted by the
Council. During the fall projects were prepared by the secretariat and in
December a final program was agreed upon by the PRA Committee. The
total budget and the allocation between the chapters would then be approved
by the Council.67 In 1960, the US decided to make the amount of its
contribution known in June thereby allowing a speedier decision-making
procedure.68
69 The definition of respectively Part I and Part II of the budget was altered during the
EPA’s lifetime. Until 1960, expenses for permanent staff responsible for specific projects
was considered as “operational” (i.e., Part I) expenses. From 1960, all such costs were
defined as Part II expenses. In Table A-3 (see Appendixes), this procedure has been
adopted already for the budget 1959-60 (cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8340,
3.11. 1960/23.11. 1960).
70 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
71 The nomenclature of the EPA underwent several changes. A general idea of the
different chapters, as well as of their share of the operational budget throughout the years,
is given in Table A-8 and A-9 (see Appendixes).
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The budget of the agency was divided into two parts. Part I covered
operational expenditures, that is the amount allocated for the implementation
of the annual program. The activities planned in that program had to be
started before the end of the financial year, but could continue through
several subsequent financial years. Part I was, in other words, a budget for
the (maximum) amount of expenses which could be committed, but not
necessarily spent, during the financial year. Part II covered the fixed
expenditure of the agency itself, ie., mainly the cost of the administrative
services, rents and maintenance.69 Such a system had certain disadvantages,
such as encouraging excessive commitments (the pressure for making a
decision before the end of the year was not necessarily matched by a well-
thought-out plan). Its advantage was to allow medium term planning and to
guarantee that the implementation of projects undertaken by the EPA would
not be endangered for financial reasons by the winding up of the agency,
since funds would already have been committed.70
The program of the EPA comprised different “chapters,” each of which
consisted of a certain category of project.71 Projects could be proposed either
by a member country, by the secretariat of the EPA or by an OEEC
committee. Each had to be adopted individually. The budget procedure
allowed the director of the EPA to use the period between July and
December to draw up a list of projects which fitted into the annual program.
Before any could be implemented, it had to be adopted by the director, the
PRA Committee (by majority vote) or the Council (where the unanimity rule
applied), depending on its cost (the higher the cost, the higher the authority
responsible for adopting it). From 1957 onwards, projects were adopted by
the director or the Governing Body, depending on their cost. In addition, a
project had to be backed by a declaration of either participation or interest
from a minimum number of countries before it could be implemented. The
former was necessary when a physical participation of the member countries
was involved, in which case a financial contribution was requested.
72 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957; ASCONF, box
58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,” PRA(57)29, 30.4.
1957, “Application des règles financières au programme pour les régions en voie de
développement;” BRDBA, B 102/37396 (2), II D 1, note, 20.7. 1959, “Finanzierung von
EPZ-Projekten.” Until 1957 there were also “limited projects” which were projects in
which fewer than five countries participated, initiated on request of one or more countries
and organized by the agency, but whose costs to a larger extent were being covered by the
sole participating countries (UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, note, 15.7. 1958).
73 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956.
74 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 5, desp. no. 5068, OEEC del. to UM, 2.12. 1954,
“OEEC. Vedtagelse af fællesprojekter.” See also: CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1 box 17, f.
“2d semestre 1954. EE.20.90.4,” ltr., OEEC del. to SCEE, 10.11. 1954.
75 PRO, BT64/4768, T.A.(L)(55) 1st Meeting, 23.5. 1955, “Minutes of Meeting of the
Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 4.5. 1955;” MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA
Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, de Milly to van der Beugel, 20.5. 1954; MBZ, DGEM-
Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, van der Beugel to Kruisheer, 26.4. 1954;
MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel I, note, de Milly to van der Beugel, 13.7. 1955; MBZ,
DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/ deel I, ltr., de Milly to Grégoire, 15.11. 1956;
UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956. According to the agency’s rules
the burden-sharing depended on the type of project. Certain types (surveys for example)
were initially entirely covered by the EPA. The so-called B-teams had to be partially
financed by the receiving countries (they had to pay the per diem of the experts during
their stay in the country). Often the national governments could recover such costs from
interested groups. In those cases where costs could not be recovered the projects were
subsidized, generally through Moody financed funds (MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel I,
ltr., de Milly to Pray (FOA, The Hague), 1.4. 1955.
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Otherwise, an expression of interest was sufficient. The minimum number
required for adoption of a project was originally set at five, later raised to
seven in those cases where no financial participation in the project was
required on the part of the member countries. The so-called five-country rule
did not apply to the chapter relating to underdeveloped areas, which by its
very nature was only of interest to a limited number of countries.72
One of the unanticipated consequences of these rules was that member
countries often backed initiatives they were not really interested in, in order
to obtain support for projects they themselves wished to see adopted.73 This
tactical behavior was encouraged by the fact that a declaration of interest in
a project whose expenses were all covered by the EPA did not involve any
financial participation on the part of the member countries. The result,
according to a Danish report, was that quite a few projects had been
implemented even though there was fewer than five countries sincerely
interested.74 One recurrent feature of the organizational discussions was that
certain countries advocated raising the member countries’ share in the
financial burden of the EPA projects.75 This theme was taken up again and
again, especially by EPA-skeptical countries such as Switzerland and the UK,
76 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box
1, no. 4712, OEEC del. to UM, 20.10. 1958.
77 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Bergenström to Arnaud, 13.2. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8340,
3.11. 1960/23.11. 1960; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, C(60)115, 17.6. 1960, “Draft
Programme of Action and Operational Budget (Part I) for 1960-1961.” There were no
clear rules for those projects where the costs were to be shared between the agency and
the participating countries as to how big the respective shares should be. These shares
were being agreed upon for each project individually (cf. BRDBA, B 102/37396 (2), note,
20.7. 1959, “Finanzierung von EPZ-Projekten”).
78 See Chapter II
79 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, CES/9.124, 30.9. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3,
C/WP26/W/16, ltr., Swedish OEEC del. (Hägglöf) to Ellis-Rees, 27.7. 1959, att.: note
by the Swedish Productivity Council, July 1959.
80 PRO, BT258/96, ltr., Dakin to King, 28.9. 1954; WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-
59, box 22, f. “Technical Cooperation, April 1955,” ecoto circ. A-237, 16.4. 1955,
“Report on the PRA Meeting 4.4.-6.4. 1955;” HM, j.nr. 88-17-56, HMPU to HM, 20.3.
1956.
81 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Åsbrink to UD, 30.10. 1959, “Rapport angående
sammanträde med EPA’s Governing Board i Paris d. 26.10. og 27.10. 1959.”
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but it was resisted by those who argued that much of the EPA’s activity was
pioneering work, which it could be difficult to request payment for.76 In
1959, Grégoire himself considered it desirable that a larger part of the
expenses be covered by the participating countries, a goal which was
achieved the following year.77
D. Administration
The EPA had been created to ensure greater efficiency of the OEEC’s
productivity work. However, its efficiency was regularly questioned. The
administration of the first director was widely criticized.78 His resignation was
followed by administrative improvements, but it did not silence the critics.
In 1956-57 and again in 1958-59, when the future of the agency was being
debated, Sweden and Switzerland insisted that a continuation should be
conditional on improved administration.79 Both countries were among the
most consistent and vocal critics but they were not the sole ones.80 Their
views carried a certain weight. The Swiss managed to paralyze the EPA’s
activities for half a year. The Swedes, while having no strong productivity
center of their own, played an important role in the agency for two long
periods, i.e., when Axel Iveroth was chairman of the Advisory Board (1954-
56) and when Sven Åsbrink was chairman of the Governing Board (1957-
1959).81
82 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, C(57)31(2nd Revision), 28.6. 1957, “Report by Working
Party No. 16 of the Council.”
83 ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “Agenzia Europea Produttività. Consiglio Consultativo,” ltr.,
Valletta to De Micheli, 24.1. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, CES/9.124, 30.9. 1959.
84 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, no. 6084, OEEC del. to UM, 10.12. 1955; UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 2, no. 2700, OEEC del, 18.6. 1956.
85 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4,
PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957; MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., de
Milly to King, 3.4. 1954; MBZ, DGEM-Archief 6630/EPA Advisory Board, f. “1478,”
note, de Milly to Kruisheer, 8.12. 1954.
86 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CKFP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956 ,
att.: “Memo on the Future of the EPA Submitted by the Swedish National Productivity
Center”; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 46, ltr., Von Sydow to Hägglöf, 1.11. 1956,
“Grégoire’s besøg i Stockholm.”
87 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, C(58)237, 16.10. 1958, “Report on the Activities of the
EPA for FY 1957-58;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956; UMA,
j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, C(58)8, 16.1. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, PRA/M(57)4,
29.5. 1957.
88 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956; SVUD, j.nr. 106.P.11, box
4, CKFP (Iveroth and Seth), 14.2. 1957, “PM angående EPA’s organisation;” UMA,
j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, no. 6960, OEEC del., 22.12. 1956.
89 HM, j.nr 86 (1960), f. “86-9-60,” Sekretariatet for Danmarks Erhvervsfond, note, 3.3.
1961; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, f. “TA-resor, Sept. 1956 – Feb. 1957. 46.,” ltr., UD
(Von Sydow) to Hägglöf, 1.11. 1956, “Grégoire’s besøg i Stockholm.”
90 BRDBA, B 102/71113, box 1, note, Feurer, 27.9. 1961, “Industry and Commerce in
OECD, Ideas and Proposals,” 27.9. 1961; BRDBA, B 102/37397 (1), no. 120, OEEC
del., “39th Meeting of PRA Committee, 7.11.-9.11. 1955.” See also Chapter VII.
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Both the constitution of the EPA and its practice conferred a certain degree
of autonomy on the director and the secretariat.82 Questions of personality,
therefore, inevitably came to play an important role. Many corridor dis-
cussions about the EPA thus concerned the qualifications or lack of the same
of the director of the EPA. While Grégoire, director of the EPA, and King,
deputy director, were respected, criticisms of the top level of the EPA, and
particularly of its administrative skills, were voiced throughout the agency’s
lifetime.83 Among the complaints were: the overwhelming number of
documents emanating from the EPA,84 the low quality of these documents,
which were too vague, rich on procedural details but poor on substantial
information about the projects themselves, thus inadequate or propagan-
distic,85 and of a length which stood “in no reasonable proportion to the
results achieved,”86 the lack of precise and transparent financial data about
projects under way or implemented,87 the “extremely cumbersome” admin-
istration,88 a huge and heavy bureaucracy,89 the lack of coordination between
the different fiefdoms operating largely autonomously within the agency,90
badly prepared meetings which caused qualified high-level representatives to
stay away from the EPA meetings, especially when they had to make long
91 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, note, 4.11. 1955, “Referat af møde i PRA Committee,
3.10.-5.10. 1955.”
92 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, van der Beugel to
Kruisheer, 26.4. 1954.
93 CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box 306, Ryffel (OFIAMT) to OEEC del., 23.7.
1959.
94 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956. See also: SVUD, Afd. H,
grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CKFP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956 , att.: “Memo on the
Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National Productivity Center”; SVUD,
Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 46, ltr., Von Sydow to Hägglöf, 1.11. 1956, “Grégoire’s besøg i
Stockholm.”
95 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, note, 20.3. 1956, “Notat fra UM til regeringens
økonomiudvalg vedr. det europæiske produktivitetscentrums fortsættelse.”
96 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, note, 4.11. 1955, “Referat af møde i PRA Committeee,
3.10.-5.10. 1955;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity
Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960. Joint Document from Denmark,
Norway and Sweden;” ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività
EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., Bergenström to Arnaud, 13.2. 1959; HM, j.nr 86 (1960), f.
“86-9-60,” note, Sekretariatet for Danmarks Erhvervsfond, 3.3. 1961.
97 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, ltr., HMPU to UM, 25.9. 1959, “EPA’s fremtid.”
98 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 401-88-129/59, 22.12. 1959,
“Verlängerug des Tätigkeit der EPZ in der OEEC.”
99 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Åsbrink to UD, 30.10. 1959.
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journeys,91 ill-prepared projects,92 bad consultants...93 Consequently, many
felt that there was a “disproportion between expenditure and results.”94 In
1956, the Danes considered that a rationalization of the EPA’s work would
allow for a reduction in the annual budget by about thirty-six percent.95 The
rudimentary equipment of the EPA’s headquarters was also critiziced by
some who found that a productivity agency ought to be a model of producti-
vity and efficiency itself. Others, however, found that the limited funds ought
to be used on projects rather than on the agency’s own offices.96
While the critics of the EPA were outspoken and loud, there were also kinder
voices. They generally spoke softer, insisting on the improvements which had
taken place continuously throughout the years and the difficulties inherent
in an international operational agency. In 1959, the Danish productivity
center – which stood in no particular debt to the EPA – in an internal docu-
ment stated that the EPA’s administration on the whole had worked satis-
factorily.97 An internal note by the German ministry of foreign affairs likewise
found that much of the criticism directed at the EPA was “unjustified.”98
The fiercest critic of the EPA, Sven Åsbrink, failed to be reelected as chair-
man of the Governing Board in 1959.99
100 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 6630/EPA Advisory Board, f. “1478,” note, de Milly to
Kruisheer, 8.12. 1954.
101 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, C(55)5(Final), 2.2. 1955; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1,
memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6.
1960.” See also: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 15, p. 145.
102 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, de Milly to van der
Beugel, 14.12. 1954; HM, j.nr 86 (1960), f. “86-9-60,” note, Sekretariatet for Danmarks
Erhvervsfond, 3.3. 1961.
103 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Åsbrink to UD, 30.10. 1959; MBZ, 996.26,
EPA/Alg., deel II, ltr., de Milly to King, 22.2. 1956.
104 BRDBA, B 102/37397 (1), ltr., Turowski to BMW and RKW, 4.9. 1956, “Zukunft
der EPA;” BRDBA, B 102/37413, note, 2.5. 1956, “Besetzung des Postens eines Leiters
der Management Division der EPA;” ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro
per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., Arnaud to Mattei, 6.2. 1959, att.: note,
Angelkort, “Quelques idées sur un programme européen pour le développement de
l’industrie et du commerce;” MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr.,
Hijmans to Berger and de Milly, 9.11. 1954, att.: note, 9.11. 1954.
105 No figures concerning the salaries offered by the EPA have been found. These salaries
(which were identical to those offered within the rest of the OEEC) seem to have been
substantially below those offered by other comparable international institutions (CHBA,
E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir de l’AEP,”
note, “Some Comments by the US delegation on the Subject of the Proposed Reorganiza-
tion of the Operational Activities of the OEEC;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3,
C/WP26/W/16, 27.7. 1959, ltr., Swedish OEEC del. (Hägglöf) to Ellis-Rees, July 1959,
att.: note by the Swedish Productivity Council, July 1959, “Need for Administrative
Improvements in EPA;” HM, j.nr 86 (1960), f. “86-9-60,” note, Sekretariatet for
Danmarks erhvervsfond, 3.3. 1961.
106 PRO, BT258/96, ltr., Dakin to King, 28.9. 1954.
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Two major explanations given for the EPA’s administrative shortcomings
were its provisional and intergovernmental features, which had consequences
for the staffing of the agency. It was stressed repeatedly that its efficiency
depended mainly on the quality of its staff. The EPA was even once defined
as “the so much needed [...] medium for using the best brains of Europe and
the US for economic and social progress.”100 In fact, according to both critics
and supporters, the EPA had problems attracting “first-class candidates” for
vacant positions.101 The most frequent general complaint was that the staff
of the agency was too theoretically oriented, that it lacked practical
experience.102 A somewhat different criticism was that the “productivity-
enthusiasts” of the EPA were not particularly well-suited to communicate
their gospel to their less illuminated citizens.103 This perceived failure to
attract adequate personnel was generally explained by the uncertain career
prospects offered by an agency whose existence remained experimental
throughout its lifespan.104 It was also often pointed out that the salaries
offered by the EPA were too low to attract the best qualified.105 Furthermore,
the system of “national log rolling”106 inherent in many international
107 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1960, “Productivity Promoting Activities
Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, C(55)5(Final), 2.2.
1955.
108 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” “Allocution
de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956.” Van Leeuwen’s
statement should probably not be taken too literally, since it is hard to imagine how he
would have calculated the profitability of the agency (see Chapter IX). See also: MBZ,
996.26, EPA/Alg., note, no. 111501, 25.11. 1954, “Enige Aspecten van de EPA.”
109 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir
de l’AEP,” ltr., Soldati, 24.6. 1959, att.: “Les aspects financiers d’une nouvelle branche
opérationelle de l’OECE et leurs liens avec le choix des activités de celle-ci.”
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organizations meant that questions of nationality rather than of qualifications
often played a decisive role when a post was filled.107
Even the critics of the EPA conceded that, given its nature as an interna-
tional organization, the agency would inevitably be confronted with diffi-
culties. The head of the Dutch productivity center, van Leeuwen, stated that
international organizations always had a low output, and that “if the agency
[yielded] a return of twenty-five percent we should be satisfied.”108 A fre-
quently mentioned deficiency of the EPA, the lack of concentration of its
efforts, could also to some extent be ascribed to its international character.
A large part of the discussions within the EPA were indeed devoted to
finding compromises and choosing between activities desired by the different
member countries. Since the preferences were extremely varied from one
country to another and since it could be very difficult to renounce projects
strongly desired by a few members, the temptation was great to add new
types of projects rather than to eliminate any and thus concentrate the
efforts.109
The lack of transparency of the decision-making may also have contributed
to some administrative deficiencies. The EPA was chiefly composed of three
elements: the secretariat, a body representing the member countries (in
1953-57 the PRA Committee, from 1957 onwards the Governing Board)
and the Advisory Board. But during the agency’s first years, there was a
number of other bodies, working parties and subcommittees, which
discussed and presented projects. Projects which had been accepted by a
working party were rarely rejected by the secretariat or the PRA Committee.
In late 1954, it was decided to abolish all permanent working parties within
the EPA, because their proliferation had reduced the authority of the director
and the efficiency of the agency’s work. Some of them were kept and
transformed into purely advisory groups concerned with long-term
110 PRO, BT64/4768 , T.A.(L)(55) 1st Meeting, 23.5. 1955, “Minutes of Meeting of the
Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 4.5. 1955;” MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA
Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, no. 136391, van Blokland to Kruisheer, 29.10. 1954, att.:
note, King, 27.10. 1954, “Future Operation of the EPA.”
111 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1960, “Productivity Promoting Activities
Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960.”
112 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, CKFP (Iveroth and Seth), 14.2. 1957, “PM förtrolig
angående EPA’s organisation;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1960,
“Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960.”
113 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (E),” Statement by Åsbrink, 19.6. 1959.
114 CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box 306, ltr., Ryffel (OFIAMT) to OEEC del.,
23.7. 1959, “Reorganisation der AEP.”
115 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (E),” Statement by Åsbrink, 19.6. 1959.
The Whitehead report has not been located in any of the visited archives.
116 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Åsbrink to UD, 30.10. 1959.
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planing.110 But soon afterwards they proliferated again. This development
was to some extent explained by the size of the PRA Committee which was
“too large to be able to work efficiently.”111 While each country had one vote,
there was no limit on the number of delegates it could send to the PRA
Committee. Some countries, plagued by strong internal disagreements
concerning their productivity policy, and unable to strike the necessary
compromises within the national bureaucracies, tended to send several, often
as many as five delegates to the PRA Committee’s meetings. Moreover, the
different committees under the EPA consisted mostly of persons who had
duties elsewhere and who could only devote little time to the agency. The
creation in 1957 of the Governing Body was intended to eliminate these
problems by defining clearer lines of authority. However, it was only partially
successful in this respect.112
On the insistence of the Governing Body, a consulting firm, Whitehead,
carried out over a one-year period, from 1957-58, an analysis of the agency’s
working methods, “investigating all the aspects of the Secretariats work and
part of the work of OEEC’s Secretariat, from the top down to the
bottom.”113 The Whitehead report, which resulted from this examination,
contained “devastating”114 criticism of the secretariat’s working methods.
The director dismissed the report as merely discussing subordinate practical
questions without any substantial bearing.115 Nevertheless, in 1959 the
secretariat did start implementing a certain number of administrative reforms
inspired by the Whitehead report and aimed at achieving a higher degree of
efficiency.116
The misgivings which some countries or individuals had about the efficiency
of the agency were often difficult to separate from cultural or political
117 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 3, ltr., Bartels to Paldam, 15.2. 1954. Åsbrink shared this
concern about the “latin”, “southern” or “catholic” influence and thought that the agency
would have been better off with a British director.
118 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/ deel I, note, de Milly to
Grégoire, Fletcher and King, 15.2. 1956.
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questions. The Danish OEEC delegate for instance ascribed the administrati-
ve problems of the EPA to the French dominance in the agency.117 More-
over, those countries criticizing the EPA’s operational deficiencies and
suspecting its secretariat of empire-building118 were often the same as those
which from the very start had been dismissive of the whole idea of creating
the EPA. They could hardly be expected to behave as neutral observers.
E. Conclusion
The EPA was designed with a view to making it an efficient operational
body. It indeed became the first and main operational body of the OEEC.
However, it was continuously plagued by conflicts concerning its proper role.
Further, it was often criticized for its numerous administrative shortcomings.
Those very countries which opposed the idea of an active agency, were also
the harshest critics of its alleged lack of efficiency. However, critics and
supporters alike agreed that several factors combined to handicap the
efficiency of the agency. The main one was its provisional character, which
severely limited its ability to recruit adequate staff.
1 See Chapter I.
2 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and de
Milly, att.: note, 9.11. 1954.
3 ICA, European Productivity, p. 3.
4 See Appendixes: Table A-12.
5 The American assistance to the EPA is obviously bigger if the indirect contributions are
taken into account (see below, footnote 27).
6 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and de
Milly, 9.11. 1954, att.: note, 9.11. 1954.
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IV. AN AMERICAN AID AGENCY
The EPA was created as a result of American ideas, actions and money.1
During its initial period it remained chiefly a body through which European
countries could receive US technical assistance. The EPA was a channel for
US aid and influence in several ways. Most obviously as a conveyer of US
assistance to the OEEC countries. More subtly through the influence which
the Americans had on the formulation of the EPA’s program of activities.
A. The US and the Financial Resources of the EPA
1. The Initial Funding
The productivity movement in Western Europe after the war was to a large
extent American-financed.2 Until 1957, the European productivity program
represented an investment of more than 300 million dollars, approximately
two thirds of which were directly or indirectly financed by the United States.
The rest, the equivalent of about hundred million dollars, consisted of
European expenditures from non-counterpart sources.3 Compared with the
total Marshall aid – almost thirteen billion dollars during the period 1948-51
– the sums earmarked for the European productivity drive may seem
modest.4 Moreover, the direct American contributions to the EPA only
represented a small part of the American aid to productivity programs in the
OEEC countries.5 However, the US deemed it important as a means to
Europeanize the productivity drive and secure its continuation.6 The initial
capital of the EPA was provided by the US directly through a contribution
foreseen in the Moody Amendment of 2.5 million dollars to further
European cooperative action in the field of productivity. Moreover, OEEC
countries receiving Benton-Moody aid paid eight percent of the counterpart
funds of this aid into the agency, the total of which amounted to 7.52 million
7 See Appendixes: Table A-1 and A-4.
8 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 1, desp. no. 468, OEEC del. to UM, 28.5. 1953; UMA,
j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2, desp. no. 1648, OEEC del., 16.6. 1953.
9 ICA, European Productivity.
10 Burton I. Kaufman: Trade and Aid. Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961,
Baltimore and London, 1982.
11 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF Relating to Benton-Moody Program, box 1, f.
“History: 115K,” Report (s.d., probably from June 1953), “History of Negotiations under
Section 115 K of the ECA Act”; DDE, Manuscripts, Fitzgerald Papers 1945-69, box 20,
f. “Telephone Conversations,” memo, Fitzgerald to Batt, 29.4. 1953.
12 DDE, Manuscripts, Fitzgerald Papers 1945-69, box 20, f. “Telephone Conversations,”
memo, Oshins to Fitzgerald, 5.12. 1952.
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dollars. This capital fund, ten million dollars, constituted the main source of
financing of the EPA’s programs during its first years of existence.7 It was
furthermore decided that the OEEC each financial year should pay 150
million French francs into the EPA funds. This sum represented the part of
the OEEC budget which had previously been spent on productivity
enhancing work by the organization. It was thus intended to ensure that the
American aid given to the OEEC would be used on activities which the
organization would not otherwise have financed. Over a three year period
this sum – i.e., 450 million francs – furthermore represented approximately
half of the American initial contribution of 2.5 million dollars.8 At the
beginning, most payments in national currency were only partially conver-
tible, the non-convertible part being necessarily spent in the national
currency. This restriction was progressively lifted and in July 1957, all
national payments had been made convertible.9
2. American Aid after 1953
With Eisenhower’s victory at the presidential elections in November 1952,
a new administration took over. Eisenhower, in his inaugural speech,
reaffirmed that improving productivity of its allies was a major US policy
goal, and initially he opposed drastic cuts in foreign aid.10 However, even
though no new policy was officially formulated, there was a general feeling
that the new administration did not share its predecessor’s somewhat
lukewarm commitment to the Moody program. Already in December 1952,
the State Department tried to put “productivity enthusiasts”11 in the Mutual
Security Agency in their place, stating that they should “[u]nder no
circumstances let Moody nonsense cause any ripple in relations between
France and US.”12 The new MSA ambassador in Europe, William H.
Draper, was skeptical of the whole productivity program and considered
13 DDE, Manuscripts, Fitzgerald Papers 1945-69, box 20, f. “Telephone Conversations,”
memo, Sheppard to Fitzgerald, 8.4. 1953.
14 WNRC, RG 469, USRO, OES, SF 1952-55, box 19, f. “5th Session of Annual
Conference,” Report by MacPhail, “Annual Conference of US Operations Mission
Directors, 19.11. 1954.”
15 The Office of European Affairs in the FOA (cf. WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF
1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12.
1954.
16 Ibid.; MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., Hendrickx to de Milly,
24.2. 1956, att.: note, OBAP, 24.2. 1956.
17 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (2 of 3)”, note no. 390, 15.12. 1954.
18 Ibid.
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terminating it altogether.13 However, Harold Stassen, the new director of the
MSA, was more appreciative of the program. Anyhow, there could be no
question of giving up the Moody aid, since negotiations on bilateral agree-
ments and on the creation of the EPA were by now well under way. In 1953,
the State Department favored skipping all technical assistance but it had to
change its position after vehement protests from the MSA.14 The new ad-
ministration thus maintained its support for the productivity drive and still
considered the EPA a useful means to promote European cooperation. How-
ever, it did not share the Moody Amendment’s enthusiasm for share-out
clauses or strengthening trade unions. Detrimental to the EPA was also the
fact that technical assistance funds were segregated from the rest of the
American aid and thus lacked powerful sponsors within the administration.
In February 1954, responsibility for the European technical assistance and
productivity programs was transferred to one single division,15 thus making
possible a more integrated planning of the assistance programs. But the
transfer took place at a time when there was little left to coordinate.16 In
1954, on Stassen’s demand, the whole American policy towards the Euro-
pean Productivity program was reviewed, and the ensuing report, the so-
called Gulick report concluded that continued US support of the EPA “con-
stitutes one of the few remaining [...] programs in Europe through which [the
NSC basic policy guidelines] can be implemented.”17 The latter guidelines
directed US agencies to encourage regional economic actions and groupings
to promote increased trade, technical cooperation and investment, to build
an “integrated European community” and to sustain the “confidence of the
free world in the ability of its basic ideas and institutions to provide a way of
life superior to communism.”18 Partly as a result of the Gulick report, the
1955 program was reconsidered and the sum earmarked for technical
assistance was raised to 6.4 million dollars, including assistance to the EPA.
In September 1955, John B. Hollister, Stassen’s successor as the head of the
19 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 106, f. “OEEC: Senior Economic
Officers Meeting 1955 (2 of 5),” “Summary Record. Second Session: Monday, 19.9.
1955.”
20 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (E),” ltr., RS 1833, Sergent to Dillon,
24.10. 1958, att.: note, 24.10. 1958, “United States Contributions to the EPA and the
OSTP;” ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (E),” note, Cesi to Sergent, 13.10.
1958; ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (E),” note, GC-1194, Cesi to
Sergent, 10.10. 1958.
21 See: Chapter II.
22 The ECA was replaced by the MSA in December 1951. The MSA gave way to the
FOA in August 1953. In June 1955, the FOA was abolished and its functions transferred
to a new semi-autonomous agency within the State Department, the ICA (see: Chapter
I, footnote 5; WNRC, RG 469, ODDO (1953-61), OAEO (1955-61), ROS, SF 1948-57,
box 160, f. “OEEC: Senior Economic Officers Meeting 1955 (3 of 5),” Hagerty to the
President, 9.5. 1955).
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Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), wondered whether it would not
be better to terminate all technical exchange programs, including the con-
tributions to the EPA.19 The program approved in 1956 was reduced to
about 4 million dollars but it provided continuing support to the EPA as well
as other multilateral projects, and limited technical assistance programs for
Austria, Iceland, Italy, France and Germany. Also in the following years
legislative authority was obtained for direct grants to the EPA. Since Con-
gress was reluctant to approve economic (non-military) aid to Western
Europe, the administration often had to fight for such appropriations. This
was due to its commitment to European integration rather than any per-
ception of continued need for technical assistance to the OEEC countries.
In the administration itself, doubts as to advisability of continued US
financial support for the EPA were strengthening. In the fall of 1958, rumors
reached the EPA that the American administration was considering stopping
all US aid to the EPA. Protests from Sergent and backing from other
influential members of the American administration were then instrumental
in securing its continuation.20 Despite its limitations, the EPA was still seen
as a useful instrument of European integration. However, with the US’
increasing balance of payments problems, this program encountered ever
stronger resistance both within the administration and in Congress. In the
end, this movement led to a change of US policy which was the decisive
factor behind the winding up of the EPA in 1960/61.21
The result of this policy development was a steady decline in US aid to the
EPA. Shortly after the conclusion of the Moody aid agreements, it had been
decided to reduce technical assistance funds. Most technical assistance
programs to OEEC countries were discontinued after 1955. As the bilateral
aid was phased out, the different country missions of FOA/ICA22 were closed
23 ICA, European Productivity; MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr.,
Hendrickx to de Milly, 24.2. 1956, att.: note, OBAP, 24.2. 1956.
24 See Appendixes: Table A-4.
25 In 1958/59, the EPA budgetary expenses were financed by the US (thirty-one percent),
the OEEC member and associated countries (forty-three percent) and by drawing on the
EPA’s capital (twenty-six percent), cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, EPA/D/5750(Final),
14.4. 1959, “Detailed Programme of Action of the EPA for FY 1958-1959.” See also:
UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, no. 5695, OEEC del. (Agerup), 7.12. 1959; WNRC, RG
469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA Administration,” ecoto A-71, USRO Paris
to ICA/W, 25.7. 1958; WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRT EPA, box 1, f. “EPA –
Administration – Governing Body,” ecoto circ. A-4, Paris to ICA/W, 20.12. 1958; UMA,
j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, C(60)120, 18.6. 1960, “US Contribution to the Assets of the EPA
for 1960-61;” WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 45, f. “Productivity June Thru
October 1956,” ecoto circ. A-31, Paris to ICA/W, 10.10. 1956. From 1957 onwards the
OEEC countries contributed to the EPA according to the same scale of contributions
used for the OEEC, see for example: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 19, p. 351.
26 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, Cables, Letters and Memoranda (CLM), 1950-57, box
4, f. “ROS: Chronological File, May 1957,” note, Little, 16.5. 1957, “EPA: Host-country
Contributions;” ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (D),” f. “Fondation Ford,”
ltr., Lindeman to Sergent, 18.3. 1955; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, C(61)147, 25.9.
1961, “Special Aid for the Programme for Areas in the Process of Development.”
27 See Appendixes: Table A-6. This figure does not include the considerable supplemen-
tary expenses incurred by member countries to cover travel expenses, reimbursements to
the EPA for the use of its consultant services, etc. During the years 1955, 1956 and 1957
these contributions amounted to respectively 2, 2.9 and 2.6 million dollars. Figures for
the subsequent years have not been found. However, the trend was to increase the share
of the participating countries. The total cost of the EPA’s activities thus substantially
exceeded forty million dollars. (see WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, CLM. 1950-57, box
4, f. “ROS: Chron. File, May 1957,” note, Little, 16.5. 1957; WNRC, RG 469, OLA,
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down. From then on, the EPA was practically the sole channel through
which American technical assistance was given to OEEC countries. Further-
more, it was one of the few remnants of the American civilian postwar
assistance program to Western Europe.23 While the initial assets of the EPA
were overwhelmingly of American origin, American aid subsequently di-
minished. Until 1956, the US paid an average of 1.8 million dollars annually
to different EPA projects. In the following years the contribution was
gradually reduced from 1.5 million dollars in 1956/57 to 0.7 million dollars
in 1960/61.24 During these years, the American grant amounted to approxi-
mately one third of the EPA budget, the rest being financed by capital
withdrawals and European contributions.25 While the American governmen-
tal aid was reduced from 1956 onwards, the Ford Foundation stepped in
during 1955 and financed EPA projects concerning trade union training and
later also projects dealing with management education and underdeveloped
areas.26 During the whole period 1953-61, (direct or indirect) American
funding represented two thirds of the about thirty million dollars contributed
to the EPA.27
LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA administration,” ecoto A-71, USRO Paris to ICA/W,
25.7. 1958. It may be argued that EPA related expenses were in fact much higher because
a sizeable number of purely national productivity enhancing activities were induced by
its existence. Indeed, several NPCs were only established in order to have a national
counterpart to the European organization.
28 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 43, no. 763, OEEC del (Hägglöf) to UD, 31.3. 1956,
att.: note, Traagstad, 24.3. 1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, no. 1493, OEEC del.
(Hjorth-Nielsen), 5.4. 1956; NORA, HD, Avd. for Utenrikshandel 1948-1961 II, box
122, f. “3,” note, Traagstad, 20.2. 1956; NOUD, 44.25/1 t, box 3, ltr., Colonna to
Heads of Delegations, 3.6. 1953.
29 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, H.C. Hansen/Boel to Folketingets finansudvalg, 22.2.
1957; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 42, no. 445, OEEC del. (Hägglöf) to UD, 27.2.
1956; MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, EPA/D/1222, ltr., Grégoire to
de Milly, 30.12. 1955.
30 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, CES/60.24, 9.3. 1960, “United States Comments on Re-
organisation of OEEC Operational Activities (C(60)58) and on Support of the 1960-61
EPA and OSTP Programmes;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, 18.6. 1960, C(60)120, “US
Contribution to the Assets of the EPA for 1960-61.” The expenses for the operational
program of the EPA for 1960-61 were covered by member countries (forty-four percent),
contributions from the US (twenty-two percent) and drawing on capital (thirty-four
percent), cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8340, 3.11. 1960/23.11. 1960.
31 See: Chapter I.
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US aid was always a fundamental element in discussions on the continuation
of the EPA and on European contributions to the agency. In particular, the
fact that American assistance to the EPA was conditioned on contributions
from the member countries, was a strong motivation for the Europeans to
share a part of the financial burden.28 In 1956, the US stated that if the
OEEC countries decided to continue the EPA, they would be ready to pay
up to half of the amount needed for the financing of the agency.29 When the
US granted its last contribution to the EPA, for the financial year 1960/61,
it was given with the proviso that the American grant should be matched in
a proportion two to one by the Europeans – which it was.30
3. The EPA as Coordinator of American Technical Assistance to the OEEC
Countries
One of the central motives behind the creation of the EPA was the American
policy goal of strengthening the OEEC as a means to further European
integration.31 This might have seemed an overly ambitious goal, since the
OEEC had not proved to be an efficient integration instrument. The initial
French and American ambitions for the EPA were defeated by the British,
but the Americans did not give up so easily. They may have considered it an
asset that the EPA was dealing with a “low politics” area, since that could
32 HSTL, Papers of Everett H. Bellows, “Bellows – Correspondence. General,” box 1,
memo, Bellows, 8.3. 1953, “The US Approach to the European Productivity Program.”
33 DDE, Manuscripts, Fitzgerald Papers 1945-69, box 20, f. “Telephone Conversations,”
memo, Norton to Holmgreen, 6.2. 1953; DDE, Manuscripts, Fitzgerald Papers 1945-69,
box 20, f. “Telephone Conversations,” memo, Green to Fitzgerald, 10.3. 1953; DDE,
Manuscripts, Fitzgerald Papers 1945-69, box 20, f. “Telephone Conversations,” memo,
Sheppard to Fitzgerald, 8.4. 1953.
34 ICA, European Productivity, p. 37.
35 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54)48, 5.4. 1954, note by the BOT, “FOA
Suggestions on the Coordination of the EPA Program with National productivity
programmes,” att.: ltr., Fobes (USRO) to Harten, 12.3. 1954.
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mean that the resistance to integrative endeavors would be weaker. In order
to let the EPA provide “leadership”32 to the European productivity effort,
and further European cooperation, the Americans considered letting the EPA
take over the coordination of all American technical assistance to the OEEC
countries. However, this idea was shelved, awaiting the maturation of the
new agency.33 One year later, the moment apparently was considered ripe
since the Americans now found that the EPA ought to play a coordinating
role in matters of US technical assistance to the individual OEEC member
countries. In March 1954, Stassen stated that:
We must strengthen the OEEC, work for European economic integration through
it, seek ways to give the OEEC continuing action programs. We should strengthen
the EPA as an operating arm of the OEEC. We should channel more of our
productivity aid through the EPA. We should use our productivity aid at both the
regional and national levels, so as to increase the competence and strength of the
productivity institutions as centers for continuing European efforts for expanded
production, wider markets, higher wages, lower prices, stronger free trade
unions.34
Accordingly, the Americans wrote to Harten to present “on an exploratory
basis certain preliminary US ideas and thoughts on the future development
of EPA’s program and on its role in providing leadership and coordination
to the European productivity effort.” The letter further stated:
Now, it seems to us, the time has come for the EPA to provide [...] leadership and
coordination to the total European productivity effort. This would involve not only
its own program but that of the individual countries as well. [...] The EPA review
would be directed towards maximizing intra-European assistance on a mutual and
self-help basis, minimizing the needs for US assistance, and presenting those
minimum needs on a coordinated basis for Europe as a whole. This coordinated
approach would also enable better judgment to be reached on the kinds of
activities to be carried out internationally by the EPA vis-à-vis those to be carried
out nationally by the countries.35
36 Ibid.
37 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54) 4th Meeting, 29.5. 1954.
38 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “Ré-organisation de l’OECE: Notes diverses d’information
pour le Groupe des Quatre sur le travail de l’OECE,” f. “23. Mr. Sergent (Work of the
OEEC) OEEC – Record of Discussions With GOFEO. Meeting No. 8: Activities of EPA
and OSTP, Grégoire, 22.2. 1960.”
39 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-54, box 48, f. “Productivity,” toeco A-
470, 27.12. 1954, FOA/W (Stassen/Urschel Jr.) to Paris, “Draft Circular Airgram on
FOA Policy With Respect to EPA.” See also: WNRC, RG 469, USRO, OES, SF 1952-
55, box 19, f. “5th Session of Annual Conference,” Report by MacPhail, “Annual
Conference of US Operations Mission Directors, 19.11. 1954.”
40 See for example: MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel I, note, no. 528, de Milly to van
Blokland, 4.3. 1955.
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The US was in other words considering letting the EPA play for the technical
assistance the role which it had tried to convince Western European
countries to let the OEEC play for Marshall Aid:
The EPA could then propose to the US a coordinated plan for US assistance to
the European productivity effort both at the national and international level. [...]
The process, itself, would be similar but on a far smaller scale to that performed
by the OEEC in the early Marshall Plan days when it recommended to the US the
allocation to be made of available US aid funds among the various European
countries.36
The European reaction to this proposal was cool. The UK thought that if
“coordination meant control, even moral control, by the agency over national
programs, this should be resisted.”37 This view was largely shared by the
other member countries. Subsequent discussions about the American
proposal were fruitless and merely resulted in an exchange of information
between the member countries on their national productivity campaigns.38
However, the EPA was apparently still given high priority by the FOA, and
in December 1954 it was stated that “[t]he US looks upon the EPA as the
principal long term instrument for strengthening the European productivity
movement” and that “every effort will be made to make the agency into a
strong and efficient operating body.”39 In February 1955, a new proposal was
made to the OEEC secretary general, Robert Marjolin, that the EPA
coordinate the activities of the NPCs and the American technical assistance
to the OEEC countries. The purpose was both one of simplication within the
US administration and one of strengthening the position of the EPA. But the
Europeans were unmoved. As the Dutch saw it, the proposal was an artifice
designed to strengthen an agency which was still weak and whose secretariat
might be overstretched by such a new task.40 This finally ended US proposals
41 MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Alg., deel I, desp., 178.474, de Milly to Hijmans, 29.12. 1955.
42 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, Mission to Austria, PTAD, SF 1952-58, box 4, f. “Briefing
Materials,” memo, Hall to Russell, 23.9. 1954, “The FOA Productivity Program.”
43 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Arnaud to Mattei, 6.2. 1959, att.: note, Angelkort, “Quelques idées sur un
programme européen pour le développement de l’industrie et du commerce;” UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 1, no. 3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958.
44 See: Chapter I.
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for the EPA to act as a coordinating body for the overall American technical
assistance to individual OEEC countries. That it did so was perhaps not
surprising, since this aid was by then being drastically reduced. The very
limited coordinating role which the EPA came to play in matters of US
assistance to individual countries thus mainly took the form of discussions
about the use of the Moody aid in the member countries.41
B. The US and the EPA’s Program
The productivity campaign was seen by some American officials as “an
important weapon of psychological warfare [...] in competing for the political
and economic leadership of the free world,” since:
the program offers the US, especially in those areas where other economic aid
programs have ceased, a unique and inexpensive vehicle through which it can exert
political influence at the grass roots, and demonstrate directly to the people its
interest in their welfare. 42
The Europeans were reluctant to accept the missionary uses which the US
made of the productivity program. The goal of this policy was to reform
Western European societies, but the sums involved were hardly of an amount
warranting their use as an instrument of pressure. Worse, some countries
(e.g., the UK) were less interested in the EPA’s survival than was the US.
Nevertheless, since the Americans contributed a major part of the EPA’s
funding, they had a considerable amount of leverage on the program of the
agency throughout its lifetime.43
On several occasions, the productivity program became a bitter bone of
contention between the US and its European allies, because the Europeans
felt that the Americans became too “interventionist.”44 The Moody nego-
tiations helped to create a keen awareness among the American decision-
makers that there were strict limits to what the Europeans could accept. The
fact that the EPA counted neutral countries among its members set some
supplementary limits to what could be asked from this organization. The
45 HSTL, Papers of Everett H. Bellows, “Bellows – Correspondence. General,” box 1,
memo, Bellows, 8.3. 1953, “The US Approach to the European Productivity Program.”
46 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th
Meeting Held on 11.5. 1956.”
47 See: Chapter I, footnote 173.
48 WNRC, RG 469, USRO, OES, SF 1952-55, box 20, f. “MCM, August 1953 (2 of 2),”
“Background Paper on the Thye Amendment.”
49 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note, de Milly to Grégoire,
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more controversial elements of American policy in Western Europe, namely
military aid and aggressive initiatives to subvert the influence of communists
within the labor movement, were kept out of the EPA. The American
decision-makers were thus well aware of the need to be cautious in dealing
with the Europeans. As Everett H. Bellows, chief of the Productivity and
Technical Assistance Division, stated in March 1953:
To achieve any success in this direction, we must constantly be aware that we are
working in cultures different from our own. This means that attitudes cannot be
changed by imposing American ideas on these cultures directly or from above. The
job is one rather of transferring American ideas to Europe for adaptation and use
here by Europeans. In other words, the characteristically American attitudes
towards industry and business must be translated into the particular idiom of the
culture in which they will be used. Our failure to recognize this would only result
in enhancing resistance to change.45
The Americans claimed that they had no intention in dealing with the EPA
“to dictate its terms.”46 In July 1953, the Benton-Moody Amendments were
replaced by the Thye Amendment as the new section 516(a) of the Mutual
Security Act.47 The repeal of the Benton-Moody Amendments was due to
the widespread feeling in Europe that they implied “interference in the
internal affairs of other countries through attempting to impose economic
policies on other governments as a condition of US aid.”48 The Americans
hoped to assuage the bad feelings which had been aroused during the Moody
negotiations. At the same time, the new amendment represented a weakening
of the “progressive” message of the former amendments, through the eli-
mination of any reference to two goals which had been particularly contro-
versial during the Moody negotiations: the share-out principle and the
strengthening of “free” trade unions as collective bargaining agencies of
labor. Despite this move, the Europeans remained on their guard. As a
Dutch official noted in connection with the discussion in 1956 on the
continuation of the EPA: “Too great pressure for very early Council decision
will certainly provoke irritation and possibly even suspicion (of another
American coup).”49
Fletcher and King, 15.2. 1956.
50 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto A-523,
ICA/W, 13.11. 1957; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, no. 2710, OEEC del., 20.6. 1956;
WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 81, f. “Productivity. January – March 1958,”
ltr., Van Dyke to Francis, 28.3. 1958; OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 18, pp. 69-73;
WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 45, f. “Productivity June Thru October
1956,” ecoto circ. A-31, Paris to ICA/W, 10.10. 1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no.
3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958; WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 91, f.
“Committees – OEEC (2 of 6),” toeco A-468, ICA to Paris, 19.5. 1959; WNRC, RG
469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, 1955-59, box 1, f. “EPA – Administration- Governing
Body,” ICA/W to Paris, toeco A-420, 20.4. 1959; WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRt
EPA, 1955-59, box 1, f. “EPA-Administration-Governing Body,” toeco 304, State
Dept./ICA to Paris, 3.2. 1959.
51 WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA – Administration- Governing
Body,” ecoto circ. A-4, Paris to ICA/W, 20.12. 1958. See also: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 5, C(60)120, 18.6. 1960; OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 20, pp. 271-75.
52 WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRT EPA, box 1, f. “EPA – Administration- Governing
Body,” ecoto circ. A-4, Paris to ICA/W, 20.12. 1958.
53 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, note, 15.7. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 3899,
OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958; PRO, FO371/150114, M557/11, note, Ellis-Rees to
Owen, 28.3. 1960; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C(56)40, 20.2. 1956; WNRC, RG 469,
OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA Administration,” ecoto A-71, USRO Paris to
ICA/W, 25.7. 1958.
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The US exerted its influence in various ways. The American annual
payments from 1953 to 1957 were tied to specific EPA projects, either in
Europe or in the US. The latter, the so-called Type A missions, were study
trips by Europeans to the US. As it was gradually reduced, aid was given on
more liberal terms. After 1957, the American contribution was paid directly
into the accounts of the EPA but it was allocated to specific activities which
the Americans wished to encourage, notably the trade union program and
the APED program.50 In 1959, the US renounced earmarking any part of its
aid. But it stressed that it presumed that the EPA program previously
presented would not be altered by the Governing Body, as such action
“might affect the US attitude toward continuing the practice of not
earmarking funds with respect to future programs.”51 The strings were done
away with mainly because the EPA anyhow did implement such activities for
which the US might have approved funds.52
The US also helped shape the program in other and more discreet ways. It
participated in the planning and originally also in the implementation of the
program. Many American experts were employed by the EPA to assist it in
connection with individual projects. These often involved trips to the US or
visits by American consultants to Europe, and their implementation involved
US-EPA negotiations concerning the coverage of the dollar expenses
incurred by the project.53 The first phase of the EPA’s life was very “Ameri-
54 WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA Administration,” ecoto A-71,
USRO Paris to ICA/W, 25.7. 1958.
55 WNRC, RG 469, USRO, OES, SF 1952-55, box 19, f. “5th Session of Annual
Conference,” Report by MacPhail, “Annual Conference of US Operations Mission
Directors, 19.11. 1954.”
56 Ibid.
57 MBZ, box 106, DGEM-Archief 66/EPA Algemeen deel 5, f. “1473,” note, King, 2.12.
1953, “Notes on a Conversation Between Marjolin and King on 26.11. 1953;” see also:
MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and Milly, 9.11. 1954.
58 PRO, CAB134/1014, MAC(53)27th Meeting, “Minutes of a Meeting Held on 9.7.
1953.”
59 PRO, CAB134/1182, SCTA, T.A.(L)(53)79, 15.12. 1953, att.: E.R.(P)(53)11, 12.12.
1953, “Programme of the EPA.” See also: UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19j, box 1, desp. no.
5340, OEEC del., 18.12. 1954.
60 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO; ROS; RRt the EPA (EPA), 1953-1957, box 2, f.
“Miscellaneous: Grégoire-King Visit,” memo (draft), Van Dyke to Sage, 28.11. 1955;
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can” with a great importance attached to transatlantic missions and the
recruitment of US experts.54 As an American official recalled in 1954, the
Americans were largely responsible for the first activities of the agency:
What the US did to the Agency last year should not happen to any agency, but the
results nevertheless are beginning to show up. [The US] deliberately put to them
15 or 16 projects involving American skills and resources in the most common
fields that the mission programs seemed to reflect. We did this in the way of
“forced feeding” because it [...] has put them in an operating position if you will,
much against their will.55
The US had come to the conclusion that pressure was needed if the EPA was
“to assume leadership” of the European productivity effort since too many
Europeans “thought that leadership consisted of publishing a bibliography
of universities that had management courses.”56 The powerful American
influence that was exerted on the agency in its beginnings was partly due to
the weakness of a new and inexperienced secretariat which felt that it had to
show quick results.57 It was worsened by the dearth of proposals from
member countries, since this meant that the main source of proposals was
the US.58 The Americans on their side did not hide their interest in shaping
the program and in participating in its implementation. An official at one
stage even asserted that “there would be no US financial contribution unless
US experts [were] employed” by the EPA.59
Many American-inspired programs were either welcomed by the Europeans,
viewed as inoffensive, or greeted with irony and slight irritation when
enthusiasm about the blessings of productivity became too lyrical.60 The
SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 43, Swedish Embassy, Washington (von Sydow) to Swärd
(OEEC del.), 8.3. 1956. See also: MBZ, box 106, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen
deel 5, f. “1473,” note, King, 2.12. 1953, “Notes on a Conversation Between Marjolin
and King, 26.11. 1953.”
61 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 91, f. “Committees – OEEC (2 of 6),”
toeco A-468, ICA to Paris, 19.5. 1959.
62 MBZ, box 106, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 5, f. 1473, note, King, 2.12.
1953; see also: MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663, f. 1477, ltr., Hijmans to Berger and Milly,
9.11. 1954.
63 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54)19, 15.2. 1954, att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to Strath,
2.2. 1954.
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American wish to increasingly focus on management-labor problems, aid to
underdeveloped areas and problems relating to science and technology was
generally accepted, though not without some reluctance here and there.
During the first half of the 1950s, the Americans often stressed that labor-
management problems rather than technological lagging behind were at the
heart of the productivity gap between the US and Western Europe.
Consequently, in 1955 the US decided to stop supporting projects which
solely dealt with technological matters (save exceptional cases). The reason
why the Americans had to repeat themselves ad nauseaum was of course that
the European interest in getting access to American techniques persisted.
Among the most controversial American projects were the fight against
restrictive business practices and the strengthening of the “free” trade unions.
Both programs were among those activities which the EPA countries were
expected to pursue, if the Americans were to continue backing the agency
financially.61 In both cases the agency’s programs were often excused by
officials from the secretariat as unavoidable tributes to the Americans.
The Europeans were quick to manifest qualms about the massive American
influence. As early as November 1953, King warned Marjolin that the
program of the agency was about to be “too much dominated by American
projects.”62 A similar criticism was voiced by Ellis-Rees:
The Americans, having put up most of the money for the agency, were obviously
in a favoured position to influence the director and at a late stage of the prepara-
tions we discovered that they had persuaded him to include in the program a large
number of grandiose, ill-considered and expensive projects costing something like
£ 300,000, which is a large slice of the available funds. But a point of special
interest was that these projects provided for the employment of between 40 and
50 American experts travelling round Europe lecturing on Management, labour
relations and distribution. Furtunately, and after a great effort, we have done
something to reduce the size of this invasion and we hope that some at least of
these projects will develop on sound European lines.63
64 Ibid.
65 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), no. 1149, OEEC del. (Werkmeister), 1.8. 1958. The
quality of the American consultants does seem to have been uneven, since this expression
of dissatisfaction was far from the only one (for contrasting views on American
consultants in 1952, see: NLNA, Inv.nr. 593-601, f. “594”, ltr., no. 24984, de Milly to
Pen, 8.2. 1952, att.: note by de Milly, 7.2. 1952).
66 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Arnaud to Mattei, 6.2. 1959, att.: note, Angelkort, “Quelques idées sur un
programme européen pour le développement de l’industrie et du commerce.”
67 ASCONF, box 70/18.5, f. “Progetto EPA 175/3/4: programma sindacale, CFIE/CEIF.
Assemblée générale du 8.11. 1957.”
68 BRDBA, B 102/37052, EPA/D/19, 19.1. 1954, “The Second Annual Programme of
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Resentment was fed by an overpowering American presence which was not
always felt necessary and therefore created suspicions of Americans pursuing
selfish interests:
The Americans have no inhibitions about trying to sell their goods: for example the
Technical Assistance mission no. 142 – a team of [Americans] travelling round
Europe training retailers in modern methods of food distribution – is accompanied
by a large caravan full of the latest types of American refrigerating equipment, and
since last June they have been doing it at the agency’s expense.64
While many European industrialists in principle welcomed American as-
sistance, the ways in which it was dispensed did not always raise enthusiasm.
Looking back on the achievements of the EPA in 1958, Dr. Beutler, secretary
general of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), said that
German employers as a consequence of EPA’s activities had “observed a
stream of American consultants, most of whom left a rather negative im-
pression with his industries.”65 As Peter Angelkort, head of the EPA’s
Business Management Division, stated in February 1959, the strong Ameri-
can influence was one of the explanations for the “rather lukewarm” attitude
towards the agency among European industrialists.66 The Swedes also made
it clear that they did not share the American ideas which were being pro-
pagated during some seminars and conferences organized by the EPA. In
November 1957, Folke Haldén declared:
as far as industrial relations are concerned, the differences between [the] US and
Europe are so big that no real comparison can be made: the sytems are so far apart
from each another that they can hardly be seen as part of the same civilization.67
As early as December 1953, to counteract this American influence, King
urged the member countries to put forward their own proposals to comple-
ment the American projects in the second annual program.68 Three months
EPA. Declaration by Dr. King at the Administrative Session on 18.12. 1953.”
69 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54) 4th Meeting, 29.5. 1954, “Minutes of the
Meeting of the Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 10.5. 1954.”
70 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54)48, 5.4. 1954, note by the BOT, “FOA
Suggestions on the Coordination of the EPA Programme with National Productivity
Programmes”, att.: PRA 954/23, ltr., Fobes (USRO) to Harten, 12.3. 1954; PRO,
CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54) 4th Meeting, 29.5. 1954; UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i,
box 4, desp. no. 1240, OEEC del., 23.3. 1954.
71 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477”, note, no. 136391, van Blokland
to Kruisheer, 29.10. 1954, att.: note by King, 27.10. 1954, “Future Operation of the
EPA.” In the same note King wrote that “[w]ith the diminution in American Technical
Assistance it is essential to cultivate a truly European attitude which combines a
recognition of the need for rapid economic development with that of social responsibili-
ty.” The EPA, he thought, was well placed to play such a role.
72 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, desp. no. 1240, OEEC del., 23.3. 1954; see Chapter
VIII.
73 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54)19, 15.2. 1954, att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to Strath,
2.2. 1954. See also: NLNA, 2.06.061, box 587, note, no. 74405, MBZ/DGEM, 21.5.
1953, “Het Europese Productiviteitscentrum.”
74 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54)19, 15.2. 1954, att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to Strath,
2.2. 1954; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box, PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957. In 1957, about half of
all EPA consultants were still Americans (WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, CLM. 1950-57,
box 4, f. “ROS: Chron. File, May 1957,” note, Little, 16.5. 1957).
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later, he called for Europe to “stand on its own feet.”69 More specifically, he
wanted the EPA to develop a “European program providing for European
self-help and limiting European requests for American assistance to those
matters in which the US possessed special skills, techniques or experience
beyond those available in Europe.”70 In October 1954, he reiterated his
point, and argued that the EPA could “not only contribute to a general
improvement in the European economy but [could] lead in the creation of
a new and characteristically European industrial spirit.”71 This call for a
Europeanization of the program of the EPA was backed by Prince Guido
Colonna, deputy secretary general of the OEEC.72 As an example of the
more “sound European lines” along which the EPA’s program should be
developed, Ellis-Rees mentioned that it was “absurd that Europeans should
go to the US, as they have done in the past, to learn about banking methods
or cost accounting.”73 Such considerations were obviously not devoid of
national self-interest. Believing that trade followed consultants, the UK
advocated a greater use of European (preferably British) ones.74 Ellis-Rees
in particular urged the Britons to consider the economic advantages which
could be reaped if the EPA member countries could be persuaded to look
more to the UK for technical leadership. According to Ellis-Rees, the main
rivals of the UK, the Americans and the Germans, threatened taking over
leadership in the EPA. He therefore urged the UK to play a more active role
75 PRO, CAB134/1183, SCTA, T.A.(L)(54)19, 15.2. 1954, att.: ltr., Ellis-Rees to
Strath, 2.2. 1954.
76 NORA, Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt 1289.1/11, box 118, f. “EPA Struktur og
organisasjon, EPA’s fremtid etc. 1954-1955,” note, Nygaard, 28.5. 1954, “Europeiske
produktivitetsprosjekter og den britiske innflytelse på disse prosjekter.”
77 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 2926, OEEC del., 20.6. 1959; MBZ, box 345,
DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note, de Milly to Grégoire, 15.2. 1956.
78 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 4712, OEEC del til UM, 20.10. 1958; HM, j.nr. 88-
5-56, no. 3255, Embassy in Washington (Hoelgaard), 19.12. 1955.
79 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note, de Milly to
Grégoire, 15.2. 1956. De Milly was, at that time, vice-chairman of the PRA Committee.
80 ASCONF, box 70/18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
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in the agency, using it as a means to penetrate European markets and assert
British influence over technical development in Europe. Ellis-Rees thought
for instance that “if the wool industry were ready to expose its latest
techniques through [the EPA], orders for British textile machinery would
increase.”75 Not all member countries welcomed this British strategy. The
Norwegians for instance remained interested in getting access to American
know-how and saw no reason in principle to favor European rather than
American projects.76 More strategic motives also played a role, namely the
fear that Europe was being left behind by the two superpowers. Europeans
would have to stand on their own feet if their continent was to play any
major political and economic role in the world.77
The Europeanization argument was considerably strengthened after 1956,
when the European contributions to the EPA were increased and the
American contribution reduced. It was further strengthened by improved
knowledge in productivity matters, i.e., the achievements of the productivity
drive. Some Europeans also argued that awareness of the availability or non-
availability of American funding unduly influenced the productivity
enhancing projects in Western Europe, and that the US aid was counterpro-
ductive since it in some cases led to the adoption not of the most promising
or efficient projects but of the ones most likely to receive US support.78 The
American connection had further been a liability for many NPCs. Admitted-
ly, these centers would not have been created without US prompting. Once
established, however, many of them had been “handicapped in prestige,
finances, staffing, etc., because they [were] considered as (postwar)
temporary phenomena for spending US money and not worth incorporating
in national institutional structure.”79
Given the perverse effects of the American aid, a Europeanization of the
agency was not only necessary but, as Grégoire stated in 1956, also healthy.80
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note,
“Allocution de Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CEIF, 22.2. 1956.” One may of
course suspect that there is some degree of subsequent rationalization in these
considerations.
81 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. XIV, p. 184.
82 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities
Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960.”
83 During the period 1949-54 approximately 13,000 “missionaries” went to the US (cf.
WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity Program
(2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954). See also: ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo
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du 29.1. 1960, point 4d de l’ordre du jour, 9ème réunion du groupe de travail restreint
institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP, 15.12. 1959;” AN, 5 A 156. f. “IV Plan,”
AFAP, “Rapport d’activités 1961-1962,” November 1962.
84 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 12.12. 1958.
85 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 4, f. “Economics: Productivity
Program (2 of 3),” note no. 390, 15.12. 1954; ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09
Agence. (E),” ltr., RS 1833, Sergent to Dillon, 24.10. 1958, att.: note, 24.10. 1958,
“United States Contributions to the EPA and the OSTP;” MBZ, box 345, DGES-
Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note, de Milly to Grégoire, Fletcher and King, 15.2.
1956; ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” “Allocution
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It should of course be stressed that this development was encouraged by the
US, since the whole point of creating the EPA was to Europeanize the
productivity drive. After 1953 the US indeed transferred to the EPA the
responsibility for a certain number of services hitherto provided bilaterally to
the OEEC countries.81 On US prompting, the EPA took over the MSA’s film
program, factory performance reports, the European technical digests, and
the Question and Answer service.82 Moreover, while there was a decline in
the number of transatlantic missions organized by the EPA, the number of
intra-European missions increased.83
One of the signs of the increasing self-reliance of the Europeans were the
early calls for an Atlantic partnership in the productivity field. In 1954, the
idea was formulated that the technical assistance program needed not be a
one-way relationship, that America could learn from Europe too. This idea
gained acceptance during the following years because of the European
economic successes, the Soviet advances and the perceived American
setbacks.84 Although the EPA continued to play a role as a channel for US
technical assistance to Western Europe, there were examples of know-how
or ideas flowing in the opposite direction across the Atlantic, thereby making
the EPA a mutual technical assistance agency.85 Whereas in 1957 a majority
of the visiting teams came to the US to learn some new technique, the
86 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7601, 17.2. 1960, “Report on the Activities of the
EPA Unit of the OEEC Washington Office.”
87 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO; ROS; RRt the EPA (EPA), 1953-1957, box 2, f.
“Miscellaneous: Grégoire-King Visit,” memo (draft), Van Dyke to Sage, 28.11. 1955.
88 WNRC, RG 469, OEO; ROS, CLM. 1950-57, box 4, f. “ROS: Chron. File, Feb.
1957,” note (draft), Lachman, 19.2. 1957, “Reasons Militating Against Full US
Membership in EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, no. 3214, OEEC del., 5.7. 1957.
89 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd 91 AZ: 88.129, note, Emmel, 1.6. 1959; UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 2, no. 2926, OEEC del., 20.6. 1959. See also: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box
1, no. 4167, 18.9. 1958; BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), note (Müller), 9.7. 1958; UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 1, no. 4167, 18.9. 1958.
90 See: Chapter II.
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situation had changed in 1959, when the majority came to participate in joint
European-American conferences aiming at an exchange of ideas and
experiences. According to the EPA’s Washington office, these teams had
“played an important role in familiarizing very large numbers of Americans
with European ideas and methods.” Therefore, it argued, “[i]t may be
truthfully claimed that the program of EPA missions to the US has been to
the advantage of both sides of the Atlantic.”86 During their visit to the US in
November 1955, Grégoire and King invited the US to join the EPA as a full
member. This would allow the transformation of the EPA into an instrument
for joint European-American productivity promotion.87 In 1957, the OEEC’s
Working Party no. 16 reiterated the proposal that the US and Canada
become full members of the EPA (though not of the OEEC) with full voting
rights. Both offers were politely declined by the Americans, who thought
their influence on the EPA might be greater outside than if they became
members of the EPA and thus only one out of 18 or 19.88 In 1958, just a year
later, the idea of US membership of the EPA was revived and in June 1959,
the Americans seemed at last to be seriously considering this proposal.89
Ironically, the end of the story was to be quite different. In 1961, the US
became a member of a reorganized OEEC, but at the cost of the winding up
of the EPA.90 In the meantime, the agency had served not only as a channel
for American assistance to Western Europe, but also as a forum for an
increasingly self-confident examination by the Europeans of their own needs.
However, even though the program was increasingly Europeanized towards
the end of the EPA’s existence, many projects were still in some way or
another American-inspired. Moreover, throughout the EPA’s existence, the
US played a decisive role in setting priorities for the agency. This was
obvious during the initial “American phase.” It remained clear during the
following “Europeanization phase.” The US strongly encouraged the
Europeans to take over the programming of the EPA’s activities while at the
91 See Bent Boel, “The European Productivity Agency: A Faithful Prophet of the
American Model?”, in: Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar (eds.), The Americanisation of
European Business. The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models, London,
Routledge, 1998, pp. 37-54.
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same time ensuring that the EPA focused on activities which the US found
desirable, especially those concerning trade unions, management, underdeve-
loped areas and the training of scientific and technical personnel.
C. Conclusion
The EPA was an American product. Both its creation and its initial activities
were the result of vigorous American prompting. The Europeans were
pressured into undertaking cooperative efforts in the field of productivity
enhancement, which they would not have accepted if they had been left to
themselves. The Americans retained a powerful influence on the agency’s
activities throughout the 1950s. They had many ideas about what ought to
be changed in Western European countries, notably in areas such as
management education or labor-management cooperation. They also had
their own views on which efforts should be undertaken to strengthen the
OEEC and the West as a whole, notably in the field of science and technolo-
gy or aid to underdeveloped countries. But there was no ready-made master
plan behind the European productivity drive. It developed incrementally, to
serve some very general American policy goals. Rather than a neatly
packaged American model, the US was offering a long shopping list, from
which the Europeans were prompted to chose.91 While the concept of
“politics of productivity” appears to be an adequate description of the
underlying motive of the American policy, it should not induce us into an
overly simplified vision of the American decision-making, giving it a co-
herence of vision and action which it actually lacked. The EPA was in
principle a prime means to implement the politics of productivity in Europe.
However, it also illustrated many of the Americans’ hesitations on both the
goals and means of this policy. While they had rather radical views on the
changes which would be desirable in Europe, they disagreed on the means
to achieve them. The US administration was notably halfhearted in its
support of the EPA as a vehicle for the implementation of the American
policy. It was also reluctant to risk alienating much European goodwill in an
attempt to achieve something as vague as a drastic change of European
attitudes and minds.
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The American influence was viewed with ambivalent feelings by the
Europeans. On the one hand they welcomed much of the American input.
In that sense, the EPA is yet another example of the American “empire”
coming about by invitation. On the other hand, they complained that the
Americans were sometimes too interventionist or naive and that American
solutions were not always adapted to European needs. The greater European
countries further wanted to protect their own economic interests. National
sensitivities, economic interests and a wish to achieve a greater and more
adequate impact combined to prompt a Europeanization of the agency’s
activities.
1 See: Chapter II.
2 See: Chapter III.
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PRA/P/2, 14.11. 1953, “The Operation of PRA Committee and its Sub-Committees in
Relation to the Work of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, ltr., Jensen to Grégoire,
28.3. 1957; ABA, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, arkivnr. 516, box 79, PU, note,
30.1. 1953; ABA, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, arkivnr. 516, box 80 , f. “Produkti-
vitetsudvalget. 1953. C1,” note, s.d., “Møde i PU vedr. handel d. 4.11. 1953.”
4 Interview with Gaston Deurinck, 14.8. 1995; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3,
PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956, “Memo by the Swiss Delegation on the Objectives and
Activities of the EPA”; OEEC, The European Productivity Agency. Activities and
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V. A EUROPEAN FEDERATOR
The relationship between the EPA and the member countries was always
problematic. The agency was to federate and guide the national productivity
centers (NPC), as well as to service them. The inevitable tension between
these functions caused numerous conflicts. The EPA was heavily dependent
on the member countries’ goodwill, and since their benevolence could never
be taken for granted, the agency was forced to spend a considerable amount
of energy on staying alive.1 At the same time, however, the agency enjoyed
a large degree of freedom. The balance between autonomy and member
country control was an uneasy one, both as far as the input (the kind of
programs chosen by the agency) and as far as the output (the way the agency
tried to implement these projects) were concerned .
Once the general orientations had been defined, the Council usually ignored
the agency.2 The question of the EPA’s relationship with the member
countries thus to a large degree became one of the agency’s relationship with
the NPCs. The NPCs played an important role in discussing the EPA’s
program. Moreover, from the outset it had been agreed that the EPA should
act through the intermediary of the NPC.3
The EPA was often defined as a “Federation of National Productivity
Centers.”4 Not everybody was keen on using that term, because of its
ambitious connotations. Those who did use it, interpreted the label in
different ways. For some, it expressed an ambition, namely the idea that the
EPA should play a federating and perhaps even a leading role in relation to
the NPC. For others, it merely meant that the EPA ought to be a clearing
5 MBZ, DGEM-Archief, 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., Hijmans to Berger and de
Milly, 9.11. 1954, att.: note, 9.11. 1954. See also: Chapter III.
6 ASCONF, box 70/18.1, f. “AEP,” PRA(52)41, 21.10. 1952, “Annuaire provisoire des
centres de productivité des pays membres;” OEEC, The European Productivity Agency.
Activities and Achievements. A Summary of the Work Done by E.P.A. During Four Years of
Operational Activities. While official documents reckoned that national productivity bodies
had been created in eleven OEEC countries (namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom) the status of these centers varied greatly, as explained below.
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house for the NPCs.5 These two uses had divergent implications, since the
first one put the emphasis on expanding the role of the agency, whereas the
second implicitly aimed at confining its activity within more or less narrow
limits. The tension between these positions was partly an American-
European one. Whereas the Americans wanted the EPA to act as a means to
foster European integration, the OEEC countries generally looked for more
practical advantages. However, the Europeans were not in agreement
amongst themselves. The ambivalence surrounding the term “Federation of
NPCs” demonstrated one of the fundamental problems which plagued the
EPA: its conflict-ridden relationship with the NPC. Before this relationship
is further explored, the NPCs will be briefly presented.
A. The National Productivity Centers
Ever since 1949 and the initial success of the Anglo-American Council on
Productivity, the Americans had strongly encouraged the creation of NPCs
in the OEEC countries. Such centers were to discuss, prepare, finance and
implement projects in various spheres of the national economy aimed at
improving productivity. The goal was to nationalize, socialize and perpetuate
the productivity drive. In countries such as France and Italy, with a strong
communist party, it was important that the productivity drive appeared to be
a national endeavor rather than one imposed by the US. That the financing
would generally originate from Marshall Plan counterpart funds would then
matter less than the fact that the drive would be instigated by national
authorities. The Americans, moreover, hoped that the NPCs would be
created as tripartite centers, within which labor, management and govern-
ment officials would cooperate. Lastly, the productivity drive would not
endure without efficient institutions to carry it through.
The result of the American promptings was a partial success. Between 1949
and 1952, eleven productivity centers were created in the OEEC countries.6
However, many of them were weak and played only a modest role. During
7 WNRC, RG 469, SRE, PTAD, SF relating to Benton-Moody Program, 1952-1953, box
1, f. “History: 115K,” report, “History of Negotiations under Section 115K.”
8 MBZ, DGEM-Archief, 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, no. 136391, van Blokland
to Kruisheer, 29.10. 1954, att.: note, King, 27.10. 1954.
9 SVUD, UD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956,
att.: “Memo on the Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National Productivity
Center.”
10 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note, Arnaud.
“Structure et rôle de l’AEP. Synthèse des avis formulés par les Fédérations industrielles.”
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the Moody negotiations, the US again insisted on the creation of strong and
effective productivity centers in the aid-receiving countries.7 As a result,
several of the existing centers, which were deemed unsatisfactory by the
Americans, were reorganized. In other countries, which did not have any
NPC in the first place, such centers were created as a result of US urging.
Some countries remained very reluctant to set up a NPC, and thus either
abstained from creating a real NPC serving as contact point for the EPA in
that country, or did so only at a very late stage. In the beginning of 1953
most NPCs were “new and immature,” but only one and a half years later
Alexander King stated that “some of them [were] now strong and influen-
tial, while the Conditional Aid funds in many of the countries [had] added
to their resources on a formidable scale.”8
However, the situation remained one of extreme contrasts among the EPA
member countries. The NPCs differed widely in status, strength and policy.
The EPA’s secretariat considered many of them unsatisfactory because they
neither functioned properly as an intermediary between the agency and
private firms, nor did they play any productivity enhancing role worth
mentioning. Just a few were found to be clearly satisfactory. One may
distinguish between countries having a NPC implementing a national
productivity campaign while at the same time serving as an intermediary
body for the EPA and countries where this, for various reasons, was not the
case. The first group comprised Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany (after 1955), Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The second
group comprised the UK, Sweden, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, Turkey, and
Switzerland. In Sweden the productivity center was “mainly a clearing
institution between EPA and various organizations dealing with productivity
in specific fields.”9 In the UK, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal and Turkey there
was no official productivity center. The British Productivity Council did not
have status as a NPC, the contact with the EPA was taken care of by the
Board of Trade.10 In Luxemburg the NPC was created at a very late stage,
11 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, OEEC, The European Productivity Agency. Activities and
Achievements.
12 ICA, European Productivity.
13 CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box 306, Ryffel (OFIAMT) to OEEC del., 23.7.
1959.
14 ICA, European Productivity.
15 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 92, f. “Committees – OEEC (4 of 6),”
C(59)215, 31.7. 1959, “Report of Working Party No. 26 of the Council.”
16 In the French case, for example, the Fonds national de la Productivité operated on
Marshall Plan counterpart funds until 31.12. 1960, after which French authorities took
over funding (cf. AN, 5 A 156. f. “IV Plan,” AFAP, “Rapport d’activités 1961-1962,”
November 1962). See also: NOUD, 44.25/1 t, box 14, “Rapport fra møte i EPA’s
produktivitetskomite i Paris 18.1. og 19.1. 1960.”
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while in Switzerland it enjoyed only a brief existence.11 The first group
included those countries where the productivity campaign was given a
comparatively high priority, while in the second group the productivity drive
attained more modest proportions.12
The NPCs’ role was dependent not only on their structure, strength and
policy priorities, but also on their place within the national decision-making
structures. In some countries, the NPC was the focal point of the national
policy making in matters of productivity either because it was part of the
governmental decision-making framework and largely the place where the
official policy was being formulated (e.g., Denmark) or because it was under
firm governmental control (e.g., France). In other countries, the NPC’s role
was less central and sometimes suffered from a strained relationship with the
governmental decision-makers (e.g., Belgium)13. In some cases, it was a
tripartite body, in others it was not.14 Furthermore, the NPCs had widely
differing fields of activity. Whereas some had very general goals and covered
practically all sectors of the economy, others acted only within very specific
limits or confined themselves to certain types of action, such as the
dissemination of management techniques. They, therefore, had very diverse
expectations of the EPA.15
The degree of legitimacy of the NPC was highly variable depending on
whether or not it was seen as corresponding to a genuine national need and
purpose. While all NPCs to varying degrees owed their existence to
American aid, and while most of them were financed by Moody counterpart
funds until approximately 1960, some of them became success stories, as
they managed to be seen as useful by firms, trade unions and other economic
actors in their countries, and thereby secured political support.16 However,
in most cases the legitimacy of the NPC mainly rested on being a “national
17 AN, 5 A 156. f. “IV Plan,” AFAP, “Rapport d’activités 1961-1962,” November 1962;
BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), Hinsch to Seibt and Luitjens, 12.9. 1958.
18 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, CE/M(54)26(Prov.), 5.8. 1954.
19 See Chapter IV.
20 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/2, 31.8. 1956, “Memo by the Italian
Delegation on the Aims and Action of the EPA.”
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correspondent” for the EPA.17 Many ministries of finance were skeptical
towards the NPC. This caused problems when the NPC did not have
sufficient means to contribute to the financing of their nationals’ participa-
tion in EPA projects. Since most projects required a financial contribution,
this was a severe limit on these countries’ ability to participate in the EPA’s
activities, and further strained the relationship between the agency and those
particular NPCs.18
B. 1953-57. Clash of Visions: Leader or Clearing House?
When the EPA was created, the Americans and members of the secretariat
wanted the agency to play a leading role in the European productivity drive.
This ambition clashed with many member countries’ wish to see the agency
confine itself to doing whatever they asked it to do.
The American ambition that the EPA should coordinate all technical
assistance to the OEEC countries, and thereby play a federating and leading
role in relation to the NPCs, was defeated.19 Nevertheless, the term
“Federation of the National Productivity Centers” survived. The secretariat
often used it to describe the agency’s role in relation to the NPCs. Some
member countries likewise referred to this definition. In August 1956, Italy
stated that “the EPA must aim more and more at becoming a ‘Federation’
of the national productivity centres in the member countries.”20 Italy,
however, was less concerned with having the agency playing a leading role,
than with improving its contacts with the NPCs. The latent conflict between
the EPA secretariat and the NPCs thus persisted.
Being an intergovernmental organization, acting in a “low politics” area, and
with an uncertain future, the secretariat was bound to adopt a humble
attitude in relation to representatives from the individual member countries,
most notably the OEEC Council delegates. Its main assets and bargaining
weapons in relation to the individual countries were the American money,
the prestige attached to an international organization, and the expertise,
American and European, which the agency could provide. It was often
21 See Chapter III.
22 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, HMPU to OEEC del. (Tuxen), 8.3. 1957.
23 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EPA/ABI/36, x.1. 1955, (mailed from Paris on 15.2.
1955), OEEC del. to UM, “Advisory Board, Draft Minutes of the 4th Session Held in
London on 3.12. 1954.”
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admitted by the secretariat that the EPA was there to serve the needs of the
individual member countries. However, the secretariat enjoyed a broad
autonomy.21 The supervisory control exercised by the OEEC Council and
the secretary general was remote and loose, the members of the PRA
Committee lacked either the technical knowledge, political punch, or self-
consciousness needed to challenge the secretariat’s proposals and decisions
could be taken by a simple majority vote. Moreover, the member countries
did not always have a very clear idea about what they wanted. When they
did, these ideas could be quite diverse. For all these reasons, the secretariat
had plenty of opportunities to reassert its own authority. The language used
in some EPA publications, where the EPA was presented as the leader of a
European productivity drive, and as having “satellites” in the member
countries, were like Freudian slips revealing the ambitions of at least some
members in the secretariat.22
The EPA and the member countries interacted mainly on three occasions:
during the preparation, the adoption and the implementation of the agency’s
program. The projects which together formed the agency’s program, could
be proposed by any member country, by the US, by the agency itself and in
some cases by professional organizations. In the latter case, they were to have
the project accepted by a working party or sub-committee of the EPA. The
field was thus wide open for extremely diverse proposals. In practice the
formulation of the program of the EPA was mostly made by the secretariat,
with, especially during the initial years, a large input from the US. In the first
year of its existence, the EPA initiated a considerable number of rather
unrelated activities. This created pressure from some member countries
which advocated that the EPA in preparing its annual program should only
take into account project proposals which had originated with the NPC. In
December 1954, van Leeuwen, chairman of the Dutch productivity center,
claimed that “the member countries which alone knew their real require-
ments should prepare the agency’s program instead of projects being initiated
by the agency.”23 The problem, however, was that such proposals were not
forthcoming. King complained that although:
the agency [...] had repeatedly requested information concerning member
countries experiences and future programs, there had however been practically no
24 Ibid.
25 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box. 2, HMPU (Egholm and Fisker) to UM, 20.3. 1956; see
also: ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,”
“Structure et rôle de l’AEP. Procès-verbal du comité du 1.4. 1955.”
26 See Chapter III.
27 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, note, UM, 11.2. 1956, att.: note, 7.2. 1956, “Draft Note
on the Future Financing of EPA.”
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response from the member countries, a fact which greatly added to the difficulties
of preparing a truly European program by the director.24
In 1956, the Danes repeated the complaint that most of the EPA projects
had been formulated by the its secretariat and, though often useful, they did
not always seem in touch with the needs of the member countries. They,
therefore, requested that the EPA play a more limited role of doing whatever
it was asked to do by the NPCs and nothing more.25 While no quantified
data exists concerning the origin of the agency’s projects, it does not seem
that such statements significantly altered the fact that the agency played an
essential role in preparing projects.
The member countries got a second chance to influence the EPA’s program
during the PRA Committee’s deliberations, when the secretariat presented
its program for adoption. This committee, which had been intended to
consist of high-ranking government officials, soon came to consist mainly of
representatives from the NPCs and low-ranking members of the national
OEEC delegation who were not always really aware of their government’s
policy in productivity matters. Because of its size and lack of detailed
technical competence, the PRA Committee could only to a limited extent
come to play a parliamentary, controlling role in relation to the secretariat.26
This was deemed unsatisfactory both by some member countries and by the
secretariat. The former found that the agency eluded their political control
while the latter feared that the low status of the PRA Committee weakened
the agency’s status in the member countries.
Most fundamental was the role of the NPCs when it came to implementing
the agency’s program. The EPA was supposed to act through the interme-
diary of the NPCs.27 Nevertheless, time and again it took direct contact with
firms, professional associations, trade unions, universities and other in-
stitutions in the member countries. It offered them services in the form of
materials, guest professors, consultants etc., often without informing the local
NPC about these demarches. This produced repeated complaints from some
NPCs. Many countries were extremely sensitive to any infringement of their
national sovereignty, and insisted that all contacts between the EPA and
28 MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel III, ltr., no. 24742, de Milly to King, 16.2. 1957,
“Communications EPA/Countries.”
29 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 111, UM (Boel) to OEEC del., 12.2. 1957; UMA,
j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, ltr., Jensen to Grégoire, 28.3. 1957.
30 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956, “Minutes of the 7th
Session Held in Paris on 31.5. and 1.6. 1956.” See also: CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1 box
17, f. “2d semestre 1954. EE 20.90.4. AEP,” ltr., SCEE to OFIAMT, 26.11. 1954.
31 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.26, OEES/EPA/Algemeen, Inv.nr. 416, ltr., King to de
Milly, 27.12. 1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, ltr., Jensen to Grégoire, 28.3. 1957.
32 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 46, ltr., UD (Von Sydow) to Hägglöf, 1.11. 1956.
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national bodies or individuals should go via the NPC. They protested
whenever the EPA tried to bypass them. In 1957, the Dutch complained.28
The Danes did so as well, ad nauseum. They insisted on the principle that the
NPC was the obligatory intermediary except in those few cases where
another procedure had been agreed upon. They also argued that such
contacts were counterproductive because they aroused irritation in the local
institutions.29 Confronted with this dissatisfaction, the EPA’s secretariat
invariably stated its respect for the national authorities. Notwithstanding
these pledges, it would in numerous cases go on bypassing the NPCs. To a
certain extent this attitude reflected the ambitions which many EPA officials
entertained to having a guiding role in a European productivity drive. But it
also reflected an exasperation with the NPCs. The secretariat indeed found
that quite a few among them did not function satisfactorily as channels for
the communication between the EPA and the member countries. In 1956,
Grégoire accused the NPCs of acting as a “bamboo curtain”30 between the
EPA and the potential users of EPA projets and thus being more of a
hindrance than an aid to the agency’s actions. Many NPCs found this
criticism hard to swallow since in their view the EPA had been established
to assist the member countries rather than the other way round.
C. The Amended Constitution of the EPA (1957):
An Illusory Compromise
Several factors combined to provoke a reform of the EPA in 1957. Most
important was the desire to ensure tighter government control over the
finances of the EPA. The decision of 1956 to continue the EPA implied that
from then on it would increasingly be financed by the member countries’
own resources. This strengthened the European interest in ensuring that the
agency’s money was well spent.31 Several OEEC countries believed that the
PRA Committee was unsuited to play such a supervisory role.32 This was in
particular the view of Belgium, which took the initiative in proposing that it
33 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 911, OEEC del., 25.2. 1957; WNRC, RG 469,
OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 64, f. “Technical Cooperation April 1957 (1 of 2),” ecoto A-
1071, 2.4. 1957, “Proposed Changes in Supervisory Structure of the EPA;” WNRC, RG
469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto A-78, 18.7. 1957.
34 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 46, ltr., UD (Von Sydow) to Hägglöf, 1.11. 1956.
35 NORA, HD, Avd. for Utenrikshandel 1948-1961 II, box 122, f. “5”, note, Birch, 28.2.
1957, att.: note, “EPA’s struktur og spørgsmål beslektet hermed.” A German note also
saw a continuity between the strengthened Governing Body in 1957 and the wish to
create a “conseil opérationnel” which emerged in 1958/59, cf. BRDBA, B 102/37396 (2),
note, 10.7. 1959.
36 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, OEEC del., no. 911, 25.2. 1957. This was to a certain
extent sought to be achieved through a changed status for the Advisory Board, cf. Chapter
VI.
37 MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel III, ltr., de Milly to Alhaique, 22.1. 1957; UMA,
j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 252, UM (Boel) to OEEC del., 21.3. 1957; MBZ, DGES-
Archief, 996.26, OEES/EPA/Algemeen, Inv.nr. 416, ltr., de Milly to Rasmussen, 24.1.
1957.
38 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 541, OEEC del., 1.2. 1957. Cf. also Chapter II.
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should be replaced by a governing body, composed of high-ranking govern-
mental officials from the member countries. In Belgium the relations were
strained between the government and the independent NPC, the Office
Belge pour l’Accroissement de la Productivité. Countries, on the other hand,
where the relationship between the NPC and the government was close did
not feel any need to tighten government control of the EPA finances. In
France and Denmark, for example, the NPC formed part of the governmen-
tal decision-making framework. These disagreements thus to a large degree
reflected the national peculiarities of the organizational framework in the
member countries.33 Another motive for reform was the secretariat’s wish to
exclude the NPCs from the decision-making and to establish more high-level
relations with the member countries.34 A prescient Norwegian observer
thought that the real objective of the secretariat’s reform proposals was not
only to establish more political and less technical relations with the member
countries, but also to integrate the agency more fully into the OEEC and to
transform it into an “operative servicing body for different OEEC interests
among which productivity.”35 Further factors were a widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the EPA’s administration, and a desire to improve the links with
international professional organizations.36 Some observers thought that the
Americans played a discreet but important role, because they wanted to
sidetrack the PRA Committee in order to strengthen the authority of the
director.37
The agreement reached in January 1957 to reform the structure of the EPA38
thus reflected rather various motivations, the Swiss and the Swedes hoping
39 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 43, no. 622, OEEC del., 17.3. 1956, att.: note, Hägglöf,
14.3. 1956. The Swedish stand was in fact that the expenses of the agency should be cut,
its activities and administration streamlined, and (provided the first had been achieved)
the authority of the director strengthened (cf. also: UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 252,
UM (Boel) to OEEC del., 21.3. 1957; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 46, ltr., UD (Von
Sydow) til Hägglöf, 1.11. 1956.
40 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 335-49; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no.
3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, C(57)31(2nd
Revision), 28.6. 1957, “Report by Working Party No. 16 of the Council;” UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 4, no. 911, OEEC del., 25.2. 1957.
41 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 911, OEEC del., 25.2. 1957.
42 Ibid. UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 1499, OEEC del., 28.3. 1957; UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 4, CKFP (Iveroth and Seth), note, 14.2. 1957; NORA, memo, CKFP
(Iveroth and Seth), “Constitution of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 252,
UM (Boel) to OEEC del., 21.3. 1957.
43 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, ltr., Jensen to Grégoire, 28.3. 1957.
44 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958; UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 5, no. 3214, OEEC del., 5.7. 1957.
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to limit the activities of the agency,39 the secretariat aiming at strengthening
its status. Working Party no. 16 was asked to prepare proposals for a
reorganization of the EPA, which resulted in the adoption of an amended
Constitution in July 1957.40 The alliance between the secretariat and those
countries where the NPC was either considered as being too independent
from government or simply too weak, ensured that the PRA Committee was
replaced in its policy-making role by a Governing Body composed of high-
level representatives from the member countries. This new body was to
approve all projects, save those involving modest expenditure.41 To make
sure that it would not include members from the NPCs, it was suggested that
the OEEC Council should be allowed to veto nominations and that no
representative from a NPC would be nominated. These proposals were
adamantly opposed by the Scandinavian countries who thought that the
Governing Body should consist of members of NPCs and who in any case
wanted to be free to nominate whoever they wished.42 According to the
Danes, the result of the proposed reform would be that “the EPA would be
managed by a Governing Body composed of a number of officials, no doubt
highly qualified, but not necessarily with a profound knowledge of producti-
vity work.”43
Despite the fact that they were fairly isolated and exposed to harsh pressure,
the Scandinavian countries partially won their case, since it was granted that
the member countries’ choice could not be vetoed by the Council.44
However, they could not prevent the implicit weakening of NPC influence
which the creation of the Productivity Committee implied. This committee,
45 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,” ltr.,
Delfini to CGII, att.: OECE/885, 2.10. 1957, “Struttura degli organi dell’AEP.” The
German productivity center (Rationalisierungs-Kuratorium der Wirtschaft) protested
against this weakening of the NPC position within the EPA (cf. B 102/37399 (1), ltr.,
Ziervogel (RKW) to BMW, 9.7. 1957, att.: EPA doc C(57)31, 11.7. 1957.
46 PRO, BT258/96, ltr., Dakin to King, 28.9. 1954, att.: note, Benjenk, 23.9. 1954, “EPA
Projects and the Role of US Consultants, Meeting Held on 22.9. 1954;” UMA, j.nr.
106.P.11, box 3, EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956.
47 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, no. 3214, OEEC del. to UM, 5.7. 1957.
48 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 335-49.
49 Ibid.; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 47, ltr., Åsbrink to Hägglöf, 18.7. 1957.
50 OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, pp. 335-49.
51 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590, note, 8.8. 1959; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 48, ltr.,
Åsbrink to Swärd, 2.10. 1957.
52 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 48, ltr., Åsbrink to Hägglöf, 24.9. 1957.
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which consisted of representatives from the NPCs, would take care of the
more technical exchange of information.45 Its creation was officially intended
to improve the often unsatisfactory relations between the EPA and the
national centers,46 and to live up to the EPA’s aim of being a Federation of
NPCs, understood as a clearing house.47 Moreover, a Committee for Applied
Research (CAR) was created. It consisted of representatives from the
national institutes for applied research, and was likewise designed to improve
contacts between the EPA and national institutions.48 The Council of the
OEEC retained the authority to approve the annual program and budget of
the EPA.49
D. 1957-61: The Battle Goes On
The adoption of the Amended Constitution of the EPA in July 1957 was a
compromise. On paper the secretariat and its allies looked like winners. The
NPCs had been exiled into the Productivity Committee, which had no
influence on decision-making in the EPA. Moreover, the framework of a
more satisfactory relationship between the agency and the member countries
had been established with the Governing Body. Lastly, it had been stated
that the EPA had several functions, since it was to be both a clearing house
and a study center.50 However, the resistance of the Scandinavians had
ensured that the member countries remained free to appoint whoever they
wanted to the Governing Body. While it comprised more high-level officials
than its predecessor, several of its members were NPC representatives.51 At
its first meeting, the director of the Swedish productivity center, Sven
Åsbrink, was elected chairman.52 During his two years as chairman, Åsbrink
turned into an increasingly acrimonious critic of the secretariat and of the
53 SVAF, P0021, box “EPA, Advisory Board, Möten 1-6, 1958-61,” “Gullmar
Bergenströms anteckningar (ofullständiga) från överläggningar i Paris före mötet samt
från själva mötet.”
54 WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA Administration,” ecoto A-71,
USRO Paris to ICA/W, 25.7. 1958.
55 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, note, 10.9. 1958, “Møde i UM 9.9. 1958 vedr. EPA’s
fremtid.”
56 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr 590, note, 8.8. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 5595,
OEEC del., 15.12. 1958; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 1935, OEEC del., 28.4. 1959.
57 Cf. Chapter II. See also: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, note, HMPU, 4.5. 1959. A
German note concluded that the Governing Body constituted a clear improvement on the
PRA Committee in terms of efficient decision-making, cf. BRDBA, B 102/37396 (2),
10.7. 1959, note.
58 See: Chapter II.
59 Ibid.
60 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “Ré-organisation de l’OECE: Notes diverses d’information
pour le Groupe des Quatre sur le travail de l’OECE,” f. “23: Mr. Sergent (Work of the
OEEC.) OEEC – Record of Discussions with GOFEO. Meeting No. 8: Activities of EPA
and OSTP from Grégoire, 22.2. 1960;” ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di
lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,” ltr., CIFE/2924, Leali to CGII, 3.2. 1960,
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director in particular.53 To the extent that its objective had been to silence
the critics of the secretariat, the reform was a failure since:
[t]here is ample evidence that the Governing Board [sic] of EPA represents the
Productivity center element of the program and, as such, is resisting increasingly
attempts by the US and the Agency to broaden its activities in fields beyond the
traditional productivity activities normally carried out by national productivity
centers.54
As far as the traditional activities were concerned (i.e., projects in the field
of industry, commerce, agriculture), the Governing Body generally simply
endorsed the proposals of the secretariat.55 But it was critical of the assistance
to underdeveloped areas as well as of the projects originating from the
Committee for Applied Research (CAR).56 This may well have strengthened
the resolve of the secretariat, in 1958, to request yet another reform.57 The
secretariat’s and Working Party no. 26’s proposals for a reorganization of the
EPA was seen by the critics of the secretariat as a way to reassert itself vis-à-
vis the Governing Body and to eliminate for good the influence of the NPC.58
The reform proposals were superseded by the negotiations on the reorganiza-
tion of the OEEC into the OECD.59 The secretariat, however, pursued its
fight until the end. In 1960, it stated in its program that it could not rely
solely on the NPCs to act as its intermediaries in the member countries. The
agency ought to establish direct relations with other national organizations
such as professional associations, universities, specialized institutes, etc.60
att.: note, 2.2. 1960, “Riunione del gruppo di lavoro del CIFE incaricato di seguire
l’attività dell’AEP.”
61 PRO, FO371/150079, M551/89, GF/CR/23, 22.2. 1960.
62 Grégoire did not mention Norway in his presentation to the Group of Four, but this
omission was most probably accidental since the Norwegian Productivity Institute had
a good reputation with the secretariat (see: UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 911, OEEC
del., 25.2. 1957.
63 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8540, 20.10. 1960.
64 NOUD, 44.25/1 t, box 14, “Rapport fra møte i EPA’s produktivitetskomite i Paris
18.1. og 19.1. 1960.”
65 AN, 5 A 156. f. “IV,” AFAP, “Rapport d’activités 1961-1962,” November 1962.
66 NOUD, 44.25/1 t, box 14, “Rapport fra møte i EPA’s produktivitetskomite i Pairs
18.1. og 19.1. 1960.”
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The point was reiterated by Grégoire in his presentation to the Group of
Four in February 1960 when he stated that “[t]he national productivity cen-
ters, apart from rare exceptions, had proved disappointing.”61 The exceptions
were Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.62
The EPA, nevertheless, continued to play the role of a Federation of
Productivity Centres through the medium of the Productivity Committee
which acted as a forum for exchanges of information and experience between
NPCs. This committee tried to establish a link beween the countries “in
order to promote the European programme for productivity.”63 In January
1960, the EPA issued a report which amounted to a “funeral speech”64 for
the agency’s productivity committee. In fact, within the OECD, a special
committee was created where the NPCs from the member countries could
meet. A modest version of the Federation of NPCs thus outlived the EPA.65
E. Conclusion
The EPA had been created to promote European cooperative efforts to
enhance productivity. As such it was expected to be a forum where the NPCs
could meet, exchange views, information, experiences. It was further ex-
pected to provide the NPCs with services and to inspire their activities.
However, the definition of the EPA as a Federation of NPCs to some extent
proved a handicap for the agency. Several countries did not have a proper
NPC. Those NPCs which did exist did not always enjoy widespread re-
cognition by industry, commerce, agriculture and trade unions. Quite a few
among them lacked financial resources other than the Moody funds, which
were almost used up in 1960.66 Further, while the EPA acted within an
67 Trade Union Advisory Council archives (TUAC), box “TUAC history,” note, 12.2.
1959, “Quelques vues sur le statut, les tâches et l’organisation de l’AEP après 1960.”
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extremely large field, most NPCs confined themselves within narrow limits.67
None of them dealt with the new problems in which the EPA took an interest
from the mid-fifties onwards: aid to underdeveloped areas and questions
relating to science and technology. The NPCs were, therefore, not always the
ideal partners for the EPA. However, many of them insisted on being the
agency’s sole intermediary, and they protested vehemently when they were
bypassed. From the EPA’s point of view, the NPCs thus increasingly became
part of its many problems, rather than part of any solution. Some NPCs, on
the other hand, thought that the EPA had embarked upon an empire-
building strategy which ought to be resisted. While the EPA and the NPCs
were strongly dependent on each other, their cooperation was often a source
of frustration for both parties.
1 A short version of this chapter has been published in: Arbejderhistorie, vol. 4, 1999.
2 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities
Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960.”
3 See Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy, New York, 1969,
pp. 304-47.
4 Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan, pp. 80-91.
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VI. EPA: A TRIPARTITE
ORGANIZATION?1
The EPA’s existence was largely due to the American policy of encouraging
“free” trade unionism in Western Europe during the Cold War. The Moody
Amendment was one of the more spectacular elements of this policy, which
had consequences both for the institutional framework of the EPA and for
its activities. Several attempts were made to transform the EPA into a
tripartite organization, and some indeed considered it a “joint ‘management-
labor-government’ organisation.”2 Moreover, an important part of its
program was devoted to strengthening non-communist trade unions.
A. America’s Labor Policy in the 1950s and the EPA
After World War II, the US devoted a great deal of energy on influencing
Western European trade unions. The aim was short-term political, to fight
communist and other radical influences in the labor movement through the
strengthening of the “free” trade unions. The long-term goal was to promote
attitudes among labor deemed more favorable to political and social
stabilization in Western Europe. The anticommunist purpose of the
American policy involved a wide range of activities such as covert CIA
financed attempts at splitting existing trade unions, excluding communists
from certain factories and assistance to non-communist trade unions.3 The
main targets of this policy were France and Italy, which both had strong
communist parties. American trade unions were closely associated with their
country’s policy towards European labor and came to play an important role
in backing non-communist factions in the European trade union movement.
They were integrated into the organizational framework of the ECA, through
the nomination of trade unionists as ECA officials, mostly labor attachés.4
Paul Hoffman paid tribute to their role when he declared that it had “been
due largely to the support of American labor that most European workers
5 WNRC, RG 469, OD, SF of the Director 1948-55, box 24, f. “Labor 1953”, note,
OLA, 6.2. 1953: “The Labor Program of MSA.”
6 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MF, OD, Office files of the Director 1951-55, box 7, f. “7.
Productivity: Moody (2 of 2),” memo, Bellows to Batt, 4.5. 1953, “Points to be Covered
With Labouisse on French Moody Program.”
7 See: Chapter I, footnote 173.
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[...] failed to respond to Communist charges that Marshall Plan is Wall
Street.”5
From 1950 onwards, with the outbreak of the Korean War and the aware-
ness that the communist parties in France and Italy continued to gather wide
support among workers, the Americans found it necessary to be more
aggressive in their support of non-communist trade unions. The Moody
Amendment represented a highlight of the American attempt to use the
productivity campaign to interfere with European labor politics. However,
many European governments refused to commit themselves to the main
Moody Amendment objectives. Trade union questions were considered
politically too sensitive and economically of marginal relevance. The French
government was particularly wary of encouraging criticisms of being a mere
instrument of the American Cold War policy. During the Moody negotia-
tions the share-out clauses and the commitment to back “free” trade unions
proved to be among the main stumbling blocks. When the French protested
that they could only accept an agreement which expressed support to trade
unions in general, the Americans found that they would be “better off to
eliminate any reference to it if it cannnot be restricted to free trade unions.”6
Most final Moody agreements were, therefore, more vague in their wording
than originally intended by the US legislators. The administration was later
successful in convincing Congress that the Moody Amendment was a
nuisance, because it made the US appear to force an unpopular policy upon
the Western Europeans. In 1954, the Moody Amendment was repealed and
replaced by the Thye Amendment which was more vague in the conditions
it put on the granting of American aid.7
The labor advisors advocated a more forceful approach to the European
governments, but the Eisenhower administration was far less responsive to
the American trade unions than the Democrats had been. While committing
itself to the same aim – the strengthening of “free” trade unions – it was not
prepared to put too much pressure on the mostly conservative European
governments and employers. Since share-out clauses were too controversial,
education of management and trade unions appeared to be more realistic and
8 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MF, OD, CRU, SF (CtF), 1948-56, box 168, f. “14.
Productivity: Meetings and Conferences 1953.”
9 WNRC, RG 469, OEO, ROS, SF 1948-53, box 3, f. “Economics: Productivity Program
(1 of 3),” repto circ. 144, Paris to MSA, 25.3. 1953; UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2,
C(53)81(Final), 17.6. 1953. See also: Chapter I.
10 WNRC, RG 469, ODDPP (1953-1961), SF of the DD, 1951-58, box 16, f. “Technical
Assistance – European Productivity,” Secretariat note 1, 3.7. 1956, “Current Problems
in the OEEC.”
11 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-1954, box 54, f. “TA, Jan.-April 1954
(1 of 2),” ecoto A-709, USRO Paris to FOA/W, 30.3. 1954, “TA 98-418-4-2 Local
Currency Project for Report on Communist Dominated Trade Unions.”
12 WNRC, RG 469, ODDTS, Office of Industrial Resources (OIR), OD, SF 1952-56,
box 2, f. “European Technical Exchange Program,” memo, Meskimen (S/LAF) to
Russell (DD/S), 18.10. 1954, “EPA Structure and Policies and FY 56 TE Plans.”
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probably more efficient in the long run.8 The Eisenhower administration,
nevertheless, continued to back “free” trade unionism in Western Europe.
On American insistence, the EPA’s constitution contained a reference to the
Moody Amendment’s goals. There was one major exception though. The
OEEC countries refused to mention the strengthening of “free” trade
unionism among the new agency’s objectives.9 However, in American and
European minds it was perfectly clear that this was an aim to be pursued by
the EPA.
Throughout the EPA’s existence, it remained a central American concern to
support anticommunist trade unions.10 In March 1954, a FOA document
stated that:
one of the chief objectives of the total productivity program is to strengthen free
unions as a force for building an expanding economy and for fighting against
communist propaganda, strikes and other activities. Recognizing this, one of the
chief targets of communist efforts is the productivity program itself, which is
attacked as a capitalist device for speed-up, unemployment, and higher profits.11
Since the EPA was an OEEC organization and several of its member
countries were neutrals, it could not be overtly used for Cold War purposes.
The Americans realized that:
[the] EPA would not be appropriate for programs with significant labor-political
implications, as in France and Italy, where these are directed at strengthening free
unions which are faced by dominant communist-led unions.12
The more “aggressive” elements of the US trade union policy thus remained
in the bilateral realm. But in 1954 it was decided to channel an increasing
13 WNRC, RG 469, ODDPP (1953-1961), SF of the DD, 1951-58, box 16, f. “Technical
Assistance – European Productivity,” Secretariat note 1, 3.7. 1956, “Current Problems
in the OEEC.”
14 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto A-523, 13.11.
1957, ICA/W, “Letter to OEEC on US FY 58 Grant to EPA.”
15 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958,” OECD, August 1965, “Répertoire des
activités de l’AEP (1953-1961).”
16 Interviews with Erik Hauerslev (21.3. 1995) and Preben Hansen (5.1. 1995).
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proportion of US technical assistance to Western Europe through the EPA.
The EPA was assigned a central role in US efforts to bolster “free” trade
unionism. The educational and training aspects of US labor policy could
easily be taken over by the EPA. In 1956, it was stated that:
[t]he basic fashion in which this objective [i.e.: of strengthening the “free” trade
unions] is pursued is through the development and support of activities within the
EPA which will be useful to trade unionists. [...] To too great an extent European
unions are dominated by ideology rather than ‘bread and butter’ concepts and the
mutual suspicion between labor and management has resulted in a situation in
which strikes are as often called for political purposes as for economic motives and
in which legitimate collective bargaining is difficult to pursue. The labor division
is responsible both for the contacts with the leaders of the trade unions and the
EPA to provide a program which will minimize these difficulties.13
Throughout the EPA’s existence, the US remained heavily involved in both
the preparation and the implementation of the EPA’s trade union program
(TUP). Sometimes, during conversations with employers, top EPA officials
“excused” the existence of the TUP with the fact that it had been part of the
original “deal” made with the Americans when the agency had been created.
A substantial part of the US contribution to the EPA was earmarked for this
program.14 American trade unionists were sent to Europe as consultants and
AFL-CIO leaders – the Reuther brothers, Irwing Brown and George Meany
– were involved in discussing the EPA’s programs. The questions relating to
the detailed preparation of and implementation of the training projects (both
national and international ones) were mainly taken care of by a group com-
prising three American, one British and one French expert. The questions
relating to intra-European missions were taken care of by two Americans and
one Swede, while the documentation and research unit was started by an
American. The Americans, in other words, were omnipresent.15 When Erik
Hauerslev, an official in the Trade Union Section (TUS), travelled to
“difficult” member countries, such as Greece, he was welcomed by local
American labor attachés who put him in contact with the right people.16
17 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MF, OD, CRU, SF (CtF), 1948-56, box 168, f. “14.
Productivity: Meetings and Conferences 1953,” ecoto circ. A-129, 3.11. 1953, USRO
Paris to FOA/W, “TU Productivity Conference 13.10.-15.10. 1953, London.”
18 WNRC; RG 469, OEO, ROS, CLM, 1950-57, box 4, f. “Regional Organizations Staff:
Chron. File, July 1957,” ltr., Little to Behoteguy, 16.7. 1957.
19 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto circ. A-21,
Moore to ICA/W, 27.12. 1957, “Summary Report on Second Meeting of GB of the
EPA.”
20 Concerning European interest for the Human Relations approach see: Mel van Elteren:
“Psychology and Sociology of Work Within the Anglo-American Orbit,” in: Hans Loeber
(ed.), Dutch-American Relations 1945-1969. A Partnership. Illusions and Facts, Assen/
Maastricht, 1992, p. 167.
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The American interest in the EPA’s trade union activities was strong.
However, labor often dissented when government officials painted too rosy
a picture of industrial relations in the US. During a conference of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in October
1953, the American trade union representative had to “[caution] against any
tendency to feel that American methods were automatically transferable as
such to other countries.” He added that:
[g]enerally [American trade unions] have no predisposition to accept joint
responsibility for improvement of production in a specific industry. They have
instead through their wage negotiations used their strength in such a manner as to
compel the adoption of improved industrial techniques as a compensation for
higher labor costs.17
In July 1957, the ICA discussed ways and means to give the US more
leverage on the EPA’s activities in the field of industrial relations. In
particular, it tried to encourage the agency’s officials to come to the United
States where they could “be exposed to the US brand of industrial
relations.”18 During his visit to the US in October 1957, Grégoire met AFL-
CIO leaders – notably Meany and Reuther – who assured him of their
support for the TUP.19 But they warned him heavily against any idealization
of American industrial relations and in particular against the whole human
relations movement. Grégoire dismissed this warning and put it down to a
misunderstanding, since “human relations” in Western Europe had nothing
to do with some American employers’ attempt to sidetrack trade unions.20
On other occasions the American trade unionists were less shy in trying to
convince the Europeans of the merits of their methods. This was notably the
case during the Berlin conference on collective bargaining in June 1957,
when they praised the American “bread and butter” approach as the best
way to press employers to raise productivity.
21 Ford Foundation Archives (FFA), microfilm C-917, November 1959, “A Joint United
States and European Research Program on ‘The Effects of Technological Change on the
Structure, Functions and Policies of Trade Unions’.”
22 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-
1961,” “11ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP.
11.3. 1960. Procès-verbal.”
23 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956.
24 TUAC, box “TUAC History”, TUAC/1968/8, “Report on Activities. Twenty Years
of Atlantic Cooperation.”
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The American labor unions themselves found that vis-à-vis the EPA their
role was important. The United Automobile Workers (UAW) stated in a
resolution passed at its convention in October 1959 in Atlantic City that “the
role of the American labor movement in the work of [...] the European
Productivity Agency has contributed significantly to the on-going attempt to
deal with major social and economic problems.”21 When the OEEC was
reorganized into the OECD, American trade union leaders backed the
European trade unionists in their attempt to save the EPA and particularly
to defend its trade union activities.22
B. The Advisory Board
According to the Americans, an increase in European productivity was
dependent on fruitful cooperation between governments, non-communist
trade unions and employers.23 For this reason they had encouraged the
creation of national productivity centers (NPCs) as tripartite organizations,
with participation from labor, management and government. By 1953, a
NPC existed in most OEEC countries. Some of these national bodies were
established on the basis of joint labor-management cooperation with the aim
of carrying out the objectives of the Moody agreements. Often, however, the
trade unions seemed to be there for mainly decorative purposes. And many
of these bodies were not particularly keen on furthering the Moody
Amendment’s goals.
From the inception of the OEEC, the US endeavored to further a similar
kind of labor-management cooperation on a European level. There seemed
to be little doubt that employers would manage to have their interests taken
into account. Therefore, priority was given to having labor representatives
associated with the OEEC’s work. In July 1948, Averell Harriman stated that
“[a]ll non-government groups and organizations – business, agriculture,
science, or education – can, of course, play a part in this work, but the
international labor movement can do the most.”24
25 Ibid. Concerning the break-up of the international trade union movement in 1948-49,
see: Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, pp. 114-37.
26 According to Walter Schevenels, the ICFTU represented about twenty-five million
trade unionists whereas the IFCTU counted about two and a half million members, cf.
TUAC, box “TUAC History,” Schevenels lecture in September 1960, “The Trade
unions and European Economic Cooperation.” Concerning the IFCTU, see: Patrick
Pasture, “The Fist of the Dwarf. Formation, Organization and Representation of the
Christian Trade Unions as a European Pressure Group (1945-1958),” in: Journal of
European Integration History, vol. 1, no. 2, 1995, pp. 5-26.
27 TUAC, box “TUAC history,” ERP-TUAC/Min.15, 20.5. 1954, TUAC Meeting with
OEEC, 4.3. 1954.
28 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” Schevenels lecture in September 1960, “The Trade
unions and European Economic Cooperation.”
29 TUAC, f. “Rapports d’activité CSC-ERP, CSCM-OECE,” JTUAC 5(57)2, 3.10.
1957, “Report of Activities for the Period of March 1955 to September 1957;” Labour
News Bulletin on European Economic Cooperation, no. 69/70, April 1955.
30 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” TUAC/1968/8; TUAC, “Report on Activities. Twenty
years of Atlantic Cooperation.” However, the CEIF was a much weaker organization than
the JTUAC, as the employers’ gave it a very low priority.
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In March 1948, the TUC had called a conference in London for all non-
communist trade unions, to discuss the Marshall Plan. This conference led
to the founding of the Trade Union Advisory Council (TUAC) which in
December 1948 was recognized by the OEEC as the only representative
voice of organized labor in the member countries.25 Divisions between the
socialist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and
the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) provoked
the departure of the latter from the TUAC in 1953. Several Christian
Democrat governments (France and Italy with some support from Germany)
tried to obtain the recognition of both organizations by the OEEC.26 This
was successfully opposed by the British government and the Scandinavians.27
In October 1954, the TUAC was reconstituted to include the Christian trade
unions and became the Joint Trade Union Advisory Committee (JTUAC),
comprising twelve ICFTU representatives, one representative from the
Confédération Générale des Cadres and five IFCTU representatives.28 As a
result, the OEEC in 1955 admitted the JTUAC to be represented at all
levels.29 The EPA rapidly became the main point of interest for the JTUAC.
These developments were echoed on the employers’ side with the foundation
in 1949 of the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF) which
came to play a similar liaison role with the OEEC.30
Just as they had done with many NPCs, the Americans hoped to make the
EPA a tripartite institution, i.e., an organization where both labor, manage-
ment and government would have a voice. This was fiercefully opposed by
31 MBZ, DGEM-Archief, 66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” note, de Milly to van der
Beugel, 5.1. 1953. On the American proposal to nominate a Labour leader, Harold
Wilson, as director of the EPA, see: Chapter II.
32 PRO, CAB134/1017, MAC(53)161, note by the BOT, 7.7. 1953, “The Advisory
Board of the EPA;” PRO, CAB134/1182, T.A.(L)(53) 2nd Meeting (M), 16.3. 1953,
SCTA, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 2.3. 1953.”
33 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2, 19.10. 1953, note, “Det europæiske produktivitetscen-
trum;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, C(57)31(2nd Revision), 28.6. 1957, Report by the
Working Party no. 16, “Structure of the EPA and Related Questions.”
34 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 2, no. 2303, OEEC del., 31.7. 1953; Interview with King,
3.2. 1996.
35 PRO, CAB134/1017, MAC(53)161, note by the BOT, 7.7. 1953.
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most European countries and the idea had to be given up.31 Many govern-
ments were reluctant to give trade unions a say and they could not accept
leaving decisions about the allocation of public funds to private organiza-
tions. Fundamentally, most Europeans wanted to create the EPA as an
intergovernmental body – only the Swiss and possibly the Dutch envisioned
an alternative model, namely an international private organization. A
compromise was found. The original American idea had been to place the
director and his secretariat under the authority of a Governing Board
consisting of representatives from professional organizations. This board
would have been responsible for the activities of the EPA, within the
framework of directives given by the PRA Committee. In the structure finally
adopted, these two groups switched position and the non-governmental
representatives lost any direct influence on the agency’s policy.32 The board
foreseen by the Americans was created, but with altered membership and
functions. It was decided that its members – chosen from industry,
agriculture and trade unions – should be nominated in a personal capacity,
not as representatives of their respective organizations. The role of the
Advisory Board would be to advise the agency on the general orientation of
its work, to establish links with professional and other bodies and to act as
ambassador of the agency in national and international circles.33
The compromise reached on the question of the Advisory Board – the
combination of high-level membership and vague attributions – contained
the seeds of conflicts still to come. The Americans indeed had not given up
all their ambitions on behalf of the new agency, and they, therefore,
encouraged the nomination of high-level individuals in the hope of boosting
the prestige of the agency.34 The UK opposed this, as it feared the potential
for conflict between an Advisory Board with prestigious members and a PRA
Committee which would have the real decision-making power.35 It was
worried that the Advisory Board members would be more subject to US
36 PRO, CAB134/1014. MAC(53)27th Meeting, “Minutes of a Meeting Held on 9.7.
1953.”
37 They were among the most influential industrialists in their respective countries, Italy,
Sweden and the Netherlands.
38 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, EPA(57)9, 23.7. 1957, “AB. Annual Report on the
Activities of the EPA.”
39 MBZ, DGEM-Archief, 6630/EPA Advisory Board, f. “1478,” note, de Milly to
Kruisheer, 8.12. 1954; MBZ, DGEM-Archief, 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” note, no.
136391, van Blokland to Kruisheer, 29.10. 1954, att.: note by King, 27.10. 1954; MBZ,
996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel I, note, no. 652, van Blokland to van der Beugel, 19.3.
1955.
40 See Chapter II.
41 PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)93, SCTA, note, King, 10.8. 1954, “The Role of the
EPA Advisory Board.”
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influence than the PRA Committee members.36 The British protests were to
no avail, but their gloomy forecast proved correct.
Among the members of the Advisory Board in 1954 were prestigious
European industrialists such as Vittorio Valletta, Axel Iveroth, Wilhelmus
Hendrik van Leeuwen.37 They expected to play a central role and thus chose
to interpret their mandate in its broadest sense. Their own self-perception
seems to have been enhanced by a certain contempt for the low-ranking
officials sitting on the PRA Committee, a feeling which in some cases also
applied to the EPA top officials. There was also a cultural difference: the
employers participating in the Advisory Board were used to business-like
methods uncommon in international organizations. As feared by the UK, the
Advisory Board would prove more prone to adopt enthusiastic calls for a
European productivity policy than the PRA Committee.38 From the outset,
the situation was ripe for a guerilla warfare to develop between the Advisory
Board on the one hand, the PRA Committee and the secretariat on the
other.39
The EPA started out very badly, with a chaotic program and an administrati-
ve mess.40 Within less than a year, the agency had managed to make itself
unpopular in many European circles. The first meeting of the Advisory
Board was only convened after the agency had started its activities and
decided on its first program. The following meetings of the Advisory Board
were marked by increasingly sharp criticism, and the fourth meeting, in
December 1954, resulted in an open crisis between the Advisory Board and
the EPA.41 The board’s criticisms were numerous. They dealt with the all too
modest role which it had been granted, administrative deficiencies, the lack
of contact between the agency and the member countries, etc. The Dutch
and the Belgians (employers and trade unionists alike) adopted an aggressive
42 MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel I, note, no. 652, van Blokland to van der Beugel,
19.3. 1955.
43 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-1954, box 48, f. “Productivity,” ecoto
circ., A-141, USRO (Macphail) to FOA/W, 23.12. 1954, “4th Meeting, EPA Advisory
Board;” TUAC, box “TUAC history,” note, JTUAC/Min.1, 16.5. 1955, “Summarized
Minutes of the Constitutive Meeting of the JTUAC to the OEEC, 29.3. 1955.”
44 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-1954, box 48, f. “Productivity,” ecoto
circ. A-141, USRO (Macphail) to FOA/W, 23.12. 1954.
45 Ibid.
46 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA Advisory Board
Through 1957,” ltr., Macphail (OAEO) to Little (ICA/W), 6.12. 1956.
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attitude. The Belgians went the furthest and proposed “that the agency be
granted a tremendous amount of autonomy from the OEEC, and that the
board of directors eventually be reconstituted into a tripartite board similar
to the ILO, representing labor, industry and governments.”42 This model
presupposed a considerable strengthening of the position and power of the
Advisory Board. In the event that this was not accomplished, the Belgians
were “talking in terms of withdrawing support from the Agency.”43 The rest
of the board was not ready to go that far, but it had sympathy for the idea of
transforming the EPA into a truly tripartite international body. It adopted a
recommendation in favor of the nomination of two assistant directors, one
from the employers’ organizations and one from the trade unions. Axel
Iveroth, the board’s chairman, subsequently went to Paris where he remained
for more than two weeks holding meetings with top OEEC officials, whom
he presented with a list of more or less ultimative demands which basically
aimed at increasing the board’s stature relative to that of the PRA Commit-
tee. All he obtained was Marjolin’s (and in March 1955 the Council’s)
acceptance of the Advisory Board’s right to report directly to the Council and
to follow all activities of the organization relating to productivity. Since the
EPA was responsible for the latter, the change was merely cosmetic.44
The US welcomed the new assertive stance of the Advisory Board all the
more as it was not the result of American pressure: “This is entirely reaction
of European leaders in the fields of industry, agriculture and labor.”45 The
Americans criticized the position of the secretariat which had failed to
understand the use it could make of the Advisory Board, namely “as a
machine for obtaining difficult decisions from PRA Committee and the
Council.”46 Even more dangerous was the secretariat’s cavalier treatment of
a board composed of top officials from European labor and management.
Such arrogance might endanger the whole productivity drive:
47 WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-1954, box 48, f. “Productivity,” USRO
(Macphail) to FOA/W, ecoto circ. A-141, 23.12. 1954.
48 Ibid.
49 BRDBA, B 102/37396 (2), note, 10.7. 1959, “Notizen betr. die Organisation der AEP
ab Sommer 1960.”
50 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, C(54)230, 22.7. 1954, “Report by the Chairman of the
Advisory Board to the Council;” PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)93, note by King,
SCTA, 10.8. 1954, “The Role of the EPA Advisory Board.”
51 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EPA/ABI/36, “Draft Minutes of the 4th Session Held in
London on 3.12. 1954.”
52 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, note, 4.11. 1955, “Referat af møde i PRA Committee,
3.10.-5.10. 1955.”
53 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956, “AB Minutes of the 7th
Session Held in Paris on 31.5. and 1.6. 1956.” It is unclear how the Advisory Board was
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The Board contains a number of top Europeans. Richard and Cool can exert
significant influence on the support accorded the Agency by European labor, while
men like Mittelsten-Scheid, Velter and Iveroth can swing [...] European
management groups for or against the Agency.47
But neither the secretariat nor the PRA Committee were in a mood to give
in. The Advisory Board’s attempt to infringe on the authority of other organs
of the EPA was met with outrage both by the PRA Committee and the
secretariat. The board was bluntly dismissed as a bothersome, useless and
talkative mechanism. It was accused of never reading any of the documents
submitted to it, of being unable to make up its mind about what it wanted to
do and of having “as many ideas as members.”48 Some of the board’s harsher
critics considered it to be a group of “[i]nternationalists living in a vacuum
and out of touch with realities in the member states.”49 Both the secretariat
and the PRA Committee invited the Advisory Board to stick to the role of
public relations agent for the EPA.50 But, as Axel Iveroth pointed out, the
members of the board could hardly be expected to act as ambassadors for a
policy on which they disagreed.51 Subsequently the situation improved
slightly, but the conflicts lingered on, since the Advisory Board members
never happily accepted their subordinate role. They wanted their advice to
be taken seriously, which it rarely was. At the end of 1955, the board again
made proposals which indicated its desire to take over responsibility from the
PRA Committee, but these were defeated.52
In this power struggle the Advisory Board was bound to lose. No European
country was ready to relinquish governmental control over the EPA’s funds.
Only on a few occasions did it appear to have any influence. It was the
Advisory Board which proposed the launching of activities in favor of the
underdeveloped areas of the member countries.53 Another of its achieve
persuaded to advance this proposal. Responsibility for this has been attributed to different
persons: Alexander King, Ottino Caracciolo di Forino and Philippe Lamour (interviews
with Alexander King, Ottino Caracciolo di Forino, and Nadine Ekserdjian).
54 PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54) 4th Meeting, 29.5. 1954, SCTA, “Minutes of
Meeting of the Sub-Committee Held at the BOT on 10.5. 1954;” PRO, CAB134/1183,
T.A.(L)(54)72, note by the BOT/SCTA, 26.5. 1954, “Policy Session of PRA Committee,
13.5.-14.5. 1954.”
55 PRO, BT64/4768, Maitland to McCann, extracts from ltr. dated 31.10. 1955.
56 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 3704, OEEC del (Dahlgaard) to UM, 8.8. 1957.
57 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956, att.:
“Memo on the Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National Productivity
Center;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, C(56)225, 5.10. 1956, att.: CEIF, 5.9. 1956, “The Task
and Structure of the EPA.” For later proposals to get rid of the Advisory Board: UMA,
j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, HMPU, note, 4.5. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3,
C/WP26/W/16, 27.7. 1959, ltr., Swedish OEEC del. (Hägglöf) to Ellis-Rees, July 1959.
58 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 2539, OEEC del. to UM, 2.6. 1959; UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 2, no. 2926, OEEC del. to UM, 20.6. 1959, “Referat af mødet d. 16.6.
1959 med Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees om rapporten fra rådets arbejdsudvalg nr. 26 vedr. EPA’s
fremtid.”
59 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 2539, OEEC del. to UM, 2.6. 1959.
60 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 5, C(57)31(2nd Revision), 28.6. 1957, Report by Working
Party no. 16 of the Council, “Structure of the EPA and Related Questions;” UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 1, no. 3575, OEEC del. to UM, 29.7. 1957; MAE, DE-CE, 1945-1960,
vol. 357, note to Wormser, 24.4. 1956.
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ments was to provoke a reorganization of the staff of the agency after
acrimonious criticisms of the secretariat’s efficiency.54 Otherwise, its opinions
mostly fell on deaf ears.55
In 1957, it was decided to change the EPA’s structure and to replace the
PRA Committee with a Governing Body composed of high-ranking officials.
This seemed a perfect opportunity to get rid of the Advisory Board.56 A
proposal to that end was formally put forward by the Swedes and the CEIF.57
But it was decided to keep it for reasons of “courtesy” and because it was
found that the Advisory Board was an important public relations device,
since it provided the agency with a progressive image.58 The alternative
suggested by the Swedes – that professional organizations be represented in
the Governing Body – was unacceptable to most other countries.59 However,
it was decided to change the Advisory Board’s composition and thereby to
redefine its role. Members of the Advisory Board, henceforth, should be
nominated not in their personal capacity but as official representatives of
European professional organizations. The aim was to strengthen the
relationship between the EPA and the international non-governmental
organizations.60
61 OEEC, The European Productivity Agency. Activities and Achievements.
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The relations between the new Advisory Board and the rest of the agency did
not become more cordial in the aftermath of this reform. In 1955, the EPA
had started its activities in favor of underdeveloped areas that required an
ever greater part of the agency’s resources. Later, the US proposed focusing
more on science and technology. While the Advisory Board itself had
advocated initiating a program in favor of underdeveloped areas, it became
skeptical when it turned out that this new orientation threatened to kill off
the so-called traditional activities, those concerning industry, commerce and
agriculture. The Advisory Board thus increasingly came to play a “conserva-
tive” role. It fought a rearguard battle but was not able to reverse the trend.
The history of the Advisory Board is far from being the complete story of the
EPA and labor-management relations in Western Europe in the 1950s. While
the Advisory Board was the main channel through which labor and
employers’ organizations could make their influence felt in the EPA, there
were other less official channels which were more important. Just like the
Advisory Board, they mainly owed their existence to the Americans.
C. “Dividing the Cake” Between Labor and Management
The EPA made it clear that “[p]roductivity can only be increased by efforts
and in the firms themselves, under the leadership of management.”61
However, since the beginning of the productivity drive in the OEEC
countries, it had been a recurrent trade union request that organized labor
should have a say and that individual workers should have a share in the
benefits deriving from increased productivity. When the EPA was created,
the TUAC raised the same demands at a European level. But the non-
communist trade unions suffered from the divisions between Christian and
socialist unions. Thanks to the Americans and the Scandinavians they were
nevertheless granted four out of sixteen places in the Advisory Board, though
these members were nominated (at least in principle) in their personal
capacity and not as representatives of their respective organizations. With the
creation of the JTUAC in 1954, the replacement of Harten, and the backing
of the Scandinavian countries and the US, they were in a much better
position to make their voice heard. They were successful on several accounts.
The most obvious channel through which labor could exert its influence was
the Advisory Board, which had been created with that very purpose in mind.
The JTUAC continuously complained about what it considered to be an
62 The trade unions regularly demanded greater access to the OEEC committees. Their
request was turned down with the argument that only governmental delegates could
participate. In fact, employers’ representatives often took part in the work of these
committees (see BRDBA, B 102/37412, ltr., Werkmeister to BWZ, 3.9. 1957).
63 The JTUAC got five places, the CEIF four, the European Council of Crafts and Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises one, and the agricultural organizations three (one of
which should represent the agricultural workers), cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no.
3575, OEEC del. to UM, 29.7. 1957.
64 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” memo, CF/CH, JTUAC to the OEEC, 3.5. 1960,
“Some Preliminary Observations on the Report of the Group of Four.”
65 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, no. 252, UM (Boel) to OEEC del., 21.3. 1957.
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underrepresentation of labor interests in this body.62 In 1957, with the reform
of the EPA, labor representation was raised to five out of thirteen members.63
However, the Advisory Board mostly came to its decisions by consensus, so
this minority status was not a fundamental problem. With the 1957 reform
the previously loose link became formalized, as the trade union members
were henceforth to be nominated as representatives of their organizations.
The JTUAC attached great importance to its recognition as a valid and
legitimate partner of the OEEC. When the OEEC was reorganized into the
OECD, one of its main requests was that the new organization should be
equipped with a board similar in membership and role to the Advisory Board
of the EPA.64
Another potential channel for labor influence was the PRA Committee and
later the Governing Body. Many of their members came from the NPCs. As
trade unions were represented in several NPCs, they could hope to make
themselves heard also in these bodies, at least in those countries where there
was good cooperation between labor, employers and the government on
productivity questions. The best examples of this were Denmark and
Norway.65 Supplementing these links, the TUAC had frequent bilateral
meetings with representatives from the EPA and the OEEC.
The most important channel had not been foreseen by any formal arrange-
ment. Labor managed to build a strong “empire” within the EPA. In 1955,
during discussions between the TUAC and the Liaison Group of the OEEC
Council (a group responsible for contacts with non-governmental organiza-
tions), it was agreed that the TUAC should be entitled to propose candidates
for certain positions in the secretariat. This right was extensively used. In
1955, Edwin Fletcher, who had previously been in charge of the TUC’s
Production Department, became the deputy director of the EPA. Moreover,
the EPA in 1955 created a Labor and Social Factors Division headed by the
66 TUAC, f. “Rapports d’activité CSC-ERP, CSCM-OECE,” JTUAC 5(57)2, JTUAC
to OEEC, 3.10. 1957, “Report of Activities for the Period of March 1955 to September
1957.”
67 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” TUAC/1968/8, TUAC, “Report on Activities. Twenty
Years of Atlantic Cooperation.”
68 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” Schevenels lecture, September 1960, “The Trade
unions and European Economic Cooperation;” TUAC, f. “ORE. Lettres, circulaires 1956
à ...,” ltr., Schevenels to the national centres affiliated to the European Regional
Organisation (ERO), 28.2. 1957, “Employers’ Campaign Against the EPA Projects;”
BRDBA, B 102/37397 (1), Turowski to BMW and RKW, 4.9. 1956, “Zukunft der
EPA.”
69 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956.
70 ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP. Consiglio Consultativo,” ltr., Valletta to De Micheli,
24.1. 1959; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno
1960-1961,” “10ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de
l’AEP (1.2. -2.2. 1960). Compte rendu des décisions.”
71 The group was chaired by Sir Harry Pilkington from the British Employers’ Confedera-
tion (cf. WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto circ. A-
21, Moore to ICA/W, 27.12. 1957).
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Dutch trade union leader Adrianus Vermeulen.66 It comprised three sections:
one for trade unions, one for manpower and one for social factors. Through-
out the EPA’s existence, the entire staff of the Trade Union Section (TUS)
was made up of trade unionists and for most of the time it was headed by
Robert Cottave, a leading French trade unionist.67 The programs which it
launched were subject to the endorsement of the JTUAC, which itself sug-
gested many of its activities.68
Employers also exerted influence on the agency’s activities. However, the
situation was not balanced, since the employers’ attitude towards the EPA
remained distant.69 The CEIF slowly developed an interest for the EPA’s
business management activities, but its strongest views were always voiced
on the matter of the TUP. In fact, the CEIF acted as if its main role was to
limit the damage which the EPA could do.70 This was in contrast to the
attitude of the trade unions, who saw the EPA as a way to acquire an
influence as well as to gain access to means which they otherwise would not
have had.
Just like the trade unions, the employers had different ways to make them-
selves heard. In the Advisory Board their numbers assured them the chair-
manship. Further, in the NPCs they often managed to obtain a stronger
representation than the trade unions. Finally, some national delegates in the
PRA Committee (after 1957 the Governing Body) were employers. In 1955,
the CEIF founded the so-called Pilkington Group to discuss EPA matters.71
This group sometimes met with EPA officials. Two things were noteworthy
72 SVAF, P0021, box “EPA, AB, Möten 1-6, 1958-61,” note, 13.1. 1960.
73 BRDBA, B 102/37397 (1), Turowski to BMW and RKW, 4.9. 1956, “Zukunft der
EPA;” WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board –
EPA: General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
74 BRDBA, B 102/37413, BMW (Westrick) to Hamberbacher , 25.6. 1955, “Besetzung
des Postens eines Stellvertretenden Direktors der EPZ bei der OEEC.”
75 BRDBA, B 102/37397 (1), Turowski to BMW, 4.9. 1956.
76 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
77 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., Arnaud to Mattei, 6.2. 1959, att.: note, Angelkort, “Quelques idées sur un
programme européen pour le développement de l’industrie et du commerce.”
78 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,”
ltr., CIFE/1103, Leali to CGII, 3.12. 1958, att.: note, “Gruppo di lavoro del CIFE sulla
produttività;” BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), note, Hinsch to Seibt and Luitjens, 12.9. 1958,
“Abteilungsleiterbesprechung am 15.9. 1958.”
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about these meetings. Firstly, they were much less frequent than those
between the JTUAC and the EPA, a sign of the lesser interest taken by the
employers in the EPA. Secondly, the level of representation on the EPA side
was much higher than was the case during the meetings with the JTUAC,
reflecting the high priority which the agency now felt obliged to give the
development of its relations with the employers. The EPA secretariat often
lamented its poor relationship with the employers. One official complained
that while trade unionists were constantly running around in the OEEC
building, employers were never to be seen.72 It therefore became an aim of
the OEEC and EPA to establish closer links with employers’ circles in
Europe through its staffing policy.73 An early result of this endeavor was the
nomination of Harten as the first director of the EPA, which was no success
since Harten’s actions in fact estranged the employers from the agency.
Other attemps were subsequently made to nominate employers for high-
ranking posts (first as a replacement for Harten, later as a deputy director),
but without much success.74 Several officials from the Business Management
Section (BMS) were former managers. However, this recruitment policy was
handicapped by the reluctance of most managers to give up their position for
an uncertain career in an experimental international organization.75 The
BMS’s efforts to establish close contacts with firms were to little avail
because of a widespread skepticism among European employers towards
intergovernmental action in the field of management.76 Many employers
could see no use but plenty of misuses for the EPA. They suspected that the
agency had a more or less hidden “dirigiste” agenda,77 and thought that trade
unionist circles used the EPA as a means to “diffuse socialist and dirigist
ideas.”78 This feeling remained widespread among employers throughout the
agency’s lifetime. In March 1960, the EPA still complained that contacts
79 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, OEEC/EPA, EPA/D/7450 – Sector I (1st Revision), 12.3.
1960, “Revised 1960-61 Programme for Sector I: Industry and Commerce.”
80 ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP. Consiglio Consultativo,” EPA/D/6364, 26.3. 1959.
Conseil Consultatif, 4ème session, “Resumé sommaire des opinions exprimées par les
organisations internationales non-gouvernementales représentées au Conseil Consultatif.”
81 See: Chapter VII.
82 SVAF, P0021, box “EPA, Advisory Board, Möten 1-6, 1958-61,” “AB, Meeting no.
2, 2.12.-3.12. 1958”; SVAF, P0021, box “EPA, AB, Möten 1-6, 1958-61,” note, 13.1.
1960; Sveriges Industriförbund (SVIF), Verkställande Direktörens Arkiv (VDA) 1956-62,
54, box 39, f. “VD 54 Iveroth-Kommittén,” note, CFIE, “Dix ans d’activité du Conseil
des Fédérations Industrielles d’Europe (1949-1959).”
83 August Lecoeur, “Pourquoi les travailleurs du textile connaissent-ils le chômage et la
misère?,” Paris, s.d. (1952); MAE, DE-CE, 1945-1960, vol. 355, note, MAE/SCE,
24.12. 1948, “Productivité.”
84 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. Direction Technique. PRA (A).” ltr.,
SCH/JC/MTV/1327, Schevenels to OEEC, 23.12. 1952, att.: “Résolution sur la
165
with management associations were less developed than those existing with
trade unions, universities and other educational bodies.79 The small circles
within the CEIF which dealt with productivity matters repeatedly expressed
their wish to see the EPA’s existence prolonged.80 This undoubtedly was due
to the fact that the agency devoted a large part of its efforts to management
activities.81 However, while the JTUAC was well organized, the CEIF was
rather weak. Moreover, the Pilkington Group suffered from the lack of
support given to it by the CEIF.82
D. Labor and the EPA’s Trade Union Policy
European labor organizations were divided in their attitude towards the
productivity drive just as they were by the Marshall Plan in general. In 1949
the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions was split, as
the non-communist trade unions broke away and founded the ICFTU. The
communist-controlled trade unions, which in some countries had previously
been in the vanguard of the “battle for production,” were now furiously
fighting the productivity drive.83 This could hardly have come as a surprise,
since the communists and their ideology were more (in the internal American
documents) or less (in the official American and in the European documents)
explicit targets of this policy. The non-communist trade unions were ambi-
valent. The American strategy of strengthening them and of pressing em-
ployers into accepting a greater degree of cooperation with labor had an
undeniable appeal in their eyes. But their practical experience with this policy
and with the obstructionist attitude adopted by many employers, had been
disappointing.84 There was a strong tendency to identify the productivity
productivité adoptée par la Conférence régionale européenne de la CISL.”
85 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
86 PRO, CAB134/1017, MAC(53)161, note by the BOT, 7.7. 1953,”The Advisory Board
of the EPA.”
87 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” ERP-TUAC/Min.13, 2.4. 1953.
88 Ibid.
89 ASCONF, box 70/18.1, f. “EPA. Atti constitutivi. Consiglio Consultativo sull’AEP,”
Harten, 23.4. 1954, “Obiettivi e funzioni dell’AEP.”
90 This non-notification led the American trade unionists Georg Reuther to protest to the
German Minister for Economic Cooperation, Franz Blücher, cf. BRDBA, B 146/1104,
note, 10.7. 1953, “Benennung von Harten als Direktor der EPZ.”
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drive with rationalizing measures causing increased unemployment. This
raised fears among the rank and file which trade union leaders had to take
into account. Particularly in poorer OEEC countries, a policy aimed at en-
hancing productivity threatened to worsen an already serious unemployment
problem.85 The British trade unions were initially antagonistic to the whole
concept of the EPA.86 During the conference which the European regional
organization of the ICFTU held in Lugano in October 1952, trade unions
warned that their support for the productivity drive was contingent on the
employers accepting a fairer deal on the distribution of the gains resulting
from the increased productivity. The Moody Amendment and the creation
of the EPA gave the trade unions new hope, since it promised a strong
American commitment to further collective bargaining and share-out clauses.
During a meeting of the TUAC, the American trade unionist Victor Reuther
noted that one of the major objectives of the Moody Amendment was the
strengthening of free trade unionism:
Thus if the OEEC wanted to pursue this aim, it could not do without the fullest
participation of Labor. This provided the trade unions with a strong bargaining
weapon which they had never had before.87
Overtures made to the TUAC by Prince Colonna, the deputy secretary
general of the OEEC, were also promising.88 However, the conclusion of the
bilateral Moody agreements, and the weakening of the Moody Amendment
principles which they represented, caused much disappointment. When the
EPA was created in 1953, the mood in the European labor movement was
gloomy.89 The trade unions were left in the dark during the initial develop-
ments within the EPA and they were shocked not to be consulted before the
nomination of Harten as director of the agency.90 During a meeting between
the TUAC and the MSA in August 1953, labor representatives expressed
their anger with many European governments’ attitudes. They also com-
91 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MF, OD, CRU, SF (CtF), 1948-56, box 168, f. “14.
Productivity: Meetings and Conferences 1953.”
92 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MF, OD, CRU, SF (CtF), 1948-56, box 168, f. “14.
Productivity: Meetings and Conferences 1953,” ecoto circ. A-129, USRO Paris to
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plained about the lack of support which they got from the newly elected
Eisenhower administration. Walter Schevenels, secretary general of the
JTUAC, stated that the ICFTU shared the US aims with respect to the
European productivity program, but that he was now receiving:
more and more bitter complaints as to the willingness of some governments and
some employers to accept US aid without accepting Moody and Benton
Amendment objectives. In France, Germany, Belgium and Austria the free trade
unions are being kept out of effective participation in the productivity programs.
Some labor unions have already pulled out of productivity centers, others are
threatening to do so.91
During a European trade union conference on productivity organized by the
ICFTU in October 1953, three different groups emerged among the par-
ticipants. The first group – consisting of delegations from Scandinavia, the
Netherlands, and the UK – included those countries where “free” trade
unions represented the bulk of the labor force and where their political
strength was such as to give them a certain leverage with both the govern-
ment and the employers. These trade unions were generally positive towards
the productivity drive. The second group comprised Austria, Germany and
Belgium. These were countries with strong trade unions which to some
extent were in conflict with their respective governments. Both the Austrian
and German trade unions complained about their national Moody programs,
which they found were being subverted by their respective governments and
managements. The Belgian trade union skepticism was due to the high level
of unemployment in their country and the fears which the productivity drive
aroused among their rank and file. The third group of countries was
represented by France and Italy, the two main targets of the Moody Amend-
ment. The trade union movements in these countries were weak, both vis-à-
vis their respective employers’ groups and with respect to their communist
rivals. They had no leverage with government and employers who were
generally more conservative than their Northern European counterparts and
they were moreover heavily exposed to criticisms from the left. Being too
weak to make it on their own, these trade unions were calling for a more
interventionist American stance. They complained that the US was being too
soft in its approach to the governments and that the Americans should use
their aid more aggressively as a leverage to obtain agreement on the Moody
Amendment’s objectives.92
FOA/W, 3.11. 1953, “TU Productivity Conference 13.10.-15.10. 1953, London.”
93 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 3, note, 13.11. 1953, “Samtale d. 13.11. 1953 mellem
den danske OEEC del. repræsenteret ved hr. Tabor og hr. Ussing og EPA’s direktør Dr.
Harten angående det europæiske produktivitetscenters virksomhed.”
94 Ibid.
95 Interview with a former EPA official.
96 TUAC, box “TUAC history,” JTUAC/Min.1, 16.5. 1955, “Summarized Minutes of
the Constitutive Meeting of the JTUAC to the OEEC, Brussels, 29.3. 1955.”
168
Despite their qualms, the ICFTU (during the October Conference) and the
IFCTU (during a subsequent conference in Brussels) renewed their support
for the productivity campaign.93 And they hoped for good news from the
EPA. However, the EPA’s trade union program was slow in getting started.
This was related to a more general reluctance towards accepting a European
productivity drive. Euro-skepticism was common in the UK and in the Scan-
dinavian countries. Moreover, the wish to limit the influence of trade unions
was widespread among employers as well as among many conservative politi-
cal leaders in Western Europe. Neither the French nor the Italian govern-
ments were keen on having an EPA trade union program, although according
to the Americans they were among the potentially greatest beneficiaries,
because of the weakness of their “free” trade unions. In addition, the
skepticism towards governmental interference in labor-management relations
was widespread among employers and among many Nordic trade unions.
The EPA secretariat showed no enthusiasm for trade union activities.
However, the Scandinavian countries were strong supporters of such a
program. The Danes were particularly adamant, telling Harten that no
positive results would come from the productivity campaign without the
active support of labor. Harten acknowledged that this question was of the
utmost importance. Nevertheless, nothing much happened, except that,
aware of the skepticism towards the productivity campaign among many
socialist trade unions, he proposed to launch an EPA-financed press
campaign in its favor.94 As an EPA official later commented, the agency
wanted to make workers “less stupid,”95 and to bring them to an understan-
ding of the benefits of increased productivity. However, the relations between
Harten and the trade unions were consistently bad. According to Schevenels,
“great difficulties were encountered because of continuous friction and
conflicts with the EPA director.”96 In July 1954, the Danes criticized the
inadequate effort of the agency and reiterated the need for close relations
between the agency and organized labor. In April 1955, Richard and Cool,
respectively French and Belgian trade union members of the Advisory Board,
complained about the lack of emphasis given to the labor program of the
agency. At this stage, the OEEC secretariat intervened. Already in 1954,
97 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, C(54)229, 21.7. 1954.
98 TUAC, box “TUAC history,” JTUAC/Min.1, 16.5. 1955.
99 PRO, LAB13/713, ltr., Stewart (UK del. to OEEC) to Hancox (BOT), 26.4. 1954.
100 Ibid; WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 22, f. “Technical Cooperation, April
1955,” USRO Paris to FOA/W, 27.4. 1955.
101 From 1955 till 1957 the trade union program was part of the agency’s human factors
program.
102 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EPA/HU/4728, 28.11. 1955, “Meeting of TU Editors
and Information Officers, Minutes of Meeting Held on 9.11.-10.11. 1955.”
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Robert Marjolin had stated that the improvement of relations between the
OEEC and trade unions was an important task.97 At the beginning of 1955,
Colonna decided to bypass Harten. During negotiations with the JTUAC he
agreed to several trade unionist demands. The appointment in April 1955 of
Roger Grégoire as new director of the EPA further improved the relations
between the JTUAC and the agency.98
At this stage, British trade unionists warned against the creation of a specific
trade union domain in the EPA. Edwin Fletcher (a TUC official who would
soon afterwards become deputy director of the EPA) was “most hostile to the
idea – [...] mooted by some of the European trade unionists – that there
should be a ‘Labour Department’ in the Agency.”99 Both Fletcher and Jack
Crawford, the TUC’s representative on the Advisory Board, thought that the
trade unions should be consulted about all EPA’s projects because all
questions relating to productivity enhancement affected both managers and
workers.100 However, it soon became clear that trade unions would be given
a division within which they would be allowed to prepare and implement
their own projects. The price was of course that they should leave the rest of
the agency alone.
In 1955, the EPA established a trade union program.101 It was developed in
close cooperation with the JTUAC. However, it was up against widespread
skepticism among organized European labor. In November 1955, a con-
ference of EPA officials and trade union representatives from EPA countries
tried to get an overview of the situation. The complaints from trade unionists
about the productivity drive were still numerous. The Belgian representative
said that:
until it received guarantees that workers would have their fair share in the benefits
resulting from productivity and that those who became unemployed as a result of
technological improvements would be reabsorbed, his union was not prepared to








The representative from the German DGB stated that:
until 2 years ago the workers in Germany had been willing to cooperate in the
drive for increased productivity, but when they asked for their share in the benefits
this was refused. There was at present a big demand for wage increases but the
Unions had been told that any increases in wages must depend upon increased
productivity in the future, not on past performance, and if he pleaded the cause of
productivity then he would be considered as pleading the employers’ cause.103
According to Erik Hauerslev the problem was mainly one of information.
The unions had to realize:
that the Agency’s work was not a propaganda campaign for increased productivity,
but an attempt to help the Unions, by means of information and training, to cope
with the problem raised by increasing productivity.104
The position of the JTUAC was explained by Schevenels, who stated that it:
had always given its full support to the organization and the agency in all its
efforts, provided that the workers’ interest had been respected. [...] Productivity
could only be ‘sold’ to the workers if they realised that they would benefit from it
and not be the victims as had so often been the case in the past.105
The french trade unionist Richard, a member of the Advisory Board, still saw
it as a fundamental task for the non-communist trade unions to “[help] the
agency” and to launch a “counterattack against the anti-productivity cam-
paigns which existed especially in Italy and France.”106 Fletcher, the EPA’s
deputy director, defined the EPA’s objective in the trade union field:
to help to create the technical, economic and social conditions necessary for a
healthy economic development of industry in the member countries. Its work
could only be successful in the context of a virile industrial democracy with strong
and healthy trade unions; reasonable trade union pressure for increased wages was
also pressure for increased productivity.107
108 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8540, 20.10. 1960.
109 WNRC, RG 469, USOM, MUK, OCM, SF of the Director, 1953-57, box 5, f.
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While industrial democracy still seemed a remote goal, the TUS was
successful in developing its activities during the following years.108 This
aroused the suspicion of employers. In June 1956, the secretary general of
the British Employers’ Confederation (BEC) stated that it found that:
the type of projects which caters primarily for the sectional interests of only certain
parties engaged in industry instead of the interests of industry as such, is wrong in
principle. [A]t the best the trade union training program is open to misuse for
sectional interests.109
The BEC, among other things, disliked that trade unionists participating in
the EPA’s projects could have the agency pay for their travelling expenses.
It indeed felt that most trade unions had the financial means required for
these expenses.110 As the JTUAC viewed it, “[e]mployers’ opposition to this
program is stiffening the more as the trade unions make it a full success.”111
The employers indeed increased their pressure on the EPA to stop the TUP
and lump it together with the business management program. As a second
best solution they requested that the TUP be closely supervised to hinder the
adoption of projects not directly linked to the furthering of productivity. In
1957, a circular letter was sent by the CEIF to its members, requesting them
to approach their governments to induce them to oppose the development
of the trade union activities of the agency. This campaign had some success.
In the PRA Committee, several delegates protested against the financing of
activities solely benefiting trade unions. It was proposed in particular that the
TUS should be merged with the Business Management Section. The
JTUAC immediately protested against this suggestion fearing that joint
management of the employers’ and trade unions’ projects would mean the
end of the latter. It did not oppose the business management program or
scientific and technical research projects and indeed found that “too little
[was] done to shake up the spirit of routine and inertia of the great majority
of the employers.”112 However, it was convinced that if the consent of the
employers was needed to implement projects “more specifically in the
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
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ab Sommer 1960.”
120 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/2, 31.8. 1956, “Memo by the Italian
Delegation on the Aims and Action of the EPA.”
121 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-
1961,” “10ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP (1.2.
-2.2. 1960). Compte rendu des décisions.”
172
interests of workers,”113 then very few such projects would be adopted. The
JTUAC, therefore, insisted that all trade union projects remained the
exclusive province of the TUS where they would be in safe hands. As
Schevenels, “the chief of this division and most of his colleagues are former
militant trade unionists who have our full confidence.”114
Quite a few governments shared the employers’ skepticism towards the TUP.
In some countries the EPA was confronted with more or less outright
obstruction. In Germany, for instance:
the official responsible for securing his country’s participation in EPA program
[was] hostile to the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) and [had] apparently
succeeded in discouraging its participation by misrepresenting the nature of the
EPA labor programs. When the DGB officials were approached independently by
the Mission in regard to this program, they indicated considerable interest and
were disappointed that their country had not participated.115
The Swiss representative on the Governing Board, who “intensely hated the
EPA,”116 was particularly critical of the TUP.117 Swiss and German officials
dismissed the TUP as “specialized tourism”118 or “industrial sight-seeing.”119
The Italian government shared their skepticism, and in that respect it
faithfully echoed the Confindustria’s position.120 Only a few employers would
from time to time complain about the systematically negative attitude of the
CEIF towards the agency’s program.121
To ward off the campaign against the EPA’s trade union projects, the
JTUAC launched:
122 TUAC, f. “ORE. Lettres, circulaires 1956 à ...,” ltr., Schevenels, 28.2. 1957,
“Employers’ Campaign Against the EPA Projects.”
123 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto A-11, Moore
to ICA/W, 5.10. 1957, “Summary Report of First Meeting of GB of the EPA.”
124 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), note, Hinsch to Seibt and Luitjens, 12.9. 1958,
“Abteilungsleiterbesprechung am 15.9. 1958.”
125 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
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a vigorous counteroffensive to prevent the employers’ intrigues from jeopardizing
the good collaboration established for the last year or two between the OEEC, the
EPA and our free trade union organizations. 122
The trade unions found an ally in the agency. When some member countries
criticized the TUP for encompassing all aspects of trade union activities
rather than concentrating on those strictly aimed at increasing productivity,
the director of the EPA, Roger Grégoire, countered by saying that:
since trade union suspicion of the goals of productivity were a major hindrance to
their acceptance of the productivity concept, it was not sufficient to confine EPA
activities in the trade union field to productivity techniques alone. It was necessary
to train trade union leaders in broader economic questions so as to reach an
understanding on their part of the necessity and purposes of productivity.123
Protected by the agency, and endowed with European and American
governmental funding, the JTUAC and trade unionists in the EPA over the
following years developed a wide range of activities, which went much further
than what employers understood as productivity enhancement.
E. The EPA’s Trade Union Activities
The EPA’s trade union activities were motivated by the perceived need to
win over the trade unions to the productivity campaign.124 The problems
which the EPA wanted to address in its dealings with labor were related to
competence and psychology. Trade unionists had to receive economic and
technical training so that they could contribute to increasing productivity and
help coping with the problems resulting from rapid technological progress.
Such training presupposed overcoming the widespread psychological
resistance to the productivity concept. This propaganda function was not too
widely advertised. On the contrary, it was stressed that the object of the TUP
was “not to influence the free trade unions but to provide them with facilities
to be used on their own responsibility.”125 As an EPA document put it, the
126 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958,” report, OECD, August 1965,
“Répertoire des activités de l’AEP (1953-1961).”
127 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 64, f. “Technical Cooperation June
1957,” ecoto circ. A-117, 20.6. 1957, “US Support of EPA Activities;” FFA, microfilm
C-917, November 1959, “A Joint United States and European Research Program on
‘The Effects of Technological Change on the Structure, Functions and Policies of Trade
Unions’;” WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA/General
Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
128 The employers, however, always suspected that these courses were being used for
inappropriate purposes, not directly related to the increasing of productivity, cf.
ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,”
“10ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP (1.2. -2.2.
1960). Compte rendu des décisions.”
129 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, C(61)119, 10.7. 1961; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5,
EPA/D/8540, 20.10. 1960.
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trade union area was “very sensitive,”126 the program could be attacked by
several groups: communists or leftist trade unionists on the one hand,
employers or conservative governments on the other. The hope to avoid
charges of manipulating labor was a major reason why the TUP was left in
the hands of trade unionists themselves.
The EPA’s trade union activities started as a series of small and rather
uncoordinated projects, but from 1955 onwards they were handled as one
large project. They were too numerous and the documentation available is
far too lacunary to allow for any complete and detailed presentation. The
following will just provide a summary overview. The TUP included five types
of activities: training, research, information, intra-European missions and
transatlantic missions.127 The training program first of all aimed at assisting
national efforts. A network was built up as the EPA established relations with
European experts concerned with trade union training and research. The
TUS helped organize courses on topics such as: the general problem of
productivity, productivity in the oil industry, the textile industry, automation,
work councils, the sharing of the benefits of productivity, work and time
studies, collective bargaining and productivity. It also distributed documenta-
tion, prepared case studies, lent out audio-visual materials and translation
aids. Within the training program, the EPA tried to keep the trade unions
abreast of the latest developments in technical progress and Europe’s
economic growth.128 In countries – notably France, Greece and Italy – where
the non-communist trade unions were faced with particular difficulties, the
agency organized special courses for instructors. In Greece, the agency’s
consultants organized courses and built up from scratch a trade union
training system. By 1961, about 200 Greek trade union leaders had thus
been trained.129 The EPA, likewise, laid the foundations for a trade union
130 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, C(61)119, 10.7. 1961; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE.
Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,” “10ème session du groupe de
travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP (1.2. -2.2. 1960). Compte rendu des
décisions.”
131 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, ltr., HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10.
1958,” att.: memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC
after 30.6. 1960.”
132 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8540, 20.10. 1960.
133 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958,” report, OECD, August 1965,
“Répertoire des activités de l’AEP (1953-1961).”
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training system in Ireland. During the first period of activities from 1955 to
1957, more than 180 consultants were sent by the agency to visit member
countries having requested such assistance.
A major failure of the labor movement in this area was the aborted plan to
create a European trade union college. This was a project repeatedly
advanced by the agency, supported by the unions, and which would have
seemed the logical outcome of the agency’s training efforts on a European
level. But it was vigorously opposed by the CEIF and never came to
fruition.130
Research-related activities were disliked by the Scandinavians who advocated
their discontinuance. Research in fields of particular interest to trade unions
should be ordered from outside institutions instead of being carried out by
the EPA itself.131 Nevertheless, the TUS did conduct or sponsor research
about topics such as “comparisons of working times in the European cotton
industry,” “spreading hours of work,” “the social consequences of the
replacement of conventional raw materials by plastics,” “international trade
and the improvement of working conditions” or “agricultural working
conditions.”132
The information service of the TUP mainly consisted of the fortnightly
publication of The Trade Union Information Bulletin, which was issued in
several languages. Other publications dealt with more detailed studies of
technical problems intended solely for trade union technicians. Finally, a
documentation service was set up to serve as a center for the exchange of
information for the benefit of “free” trade unions in the EPA countries.133
The intra-European missions consisted of the exchange of trade union
leaders between the EPA countries. Over 100 of such team exchanges, to-
talling more than 1,000 participants, took place on a great variety of subjects
suggested by the countries themselves. The visitors were received by the
134 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA/General
Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
135 FFA, microfilm C-917, November 1959, “A Joint United States and European
Research Program on ‘The Effects of Technological Change on the Structure, Functions
and Policies of Trade Unions’.”
136 FFA, R-0068, Gf PA no. 56-51, Section 4, Press/D(56)8, Paris 23.2. 1956, “European
Trade Unionists Attend Course at Harvard.”
137 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF, 1955-59, box 64, f. “Technical Cooperation June
1957,” ecoto circ. A-117, 20.6. 1957, “US Support of EPA Activities.”
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NPCs and local trade unions. In many cases the “missionaries” would be
from countries with weak non-communist trade unions and they would visit
(mostly Northern European) countries with strong social democratic trade
unions. This program was strongly criticized by the employers who were not
enthusiastic about the exchanges thus encouraged between trade union
movements. Several countries shared the employers’ views.134
In addition to the intra-European missions, the TUS conducted a program
of “Atlantic Cooperation” between European and mainly American
unions.135 More than 150 American and Canadian union specialists par-
ticipated in EPA seminars or wrote articles for the The Trade Union Infor-
mation Bulletin, and served as consultants to European trade unions. The
most important part of this program were the transatlantic missions. Thanks
to a grant from the Ford Foundation a certain number of young European
trade unionists took three-month courses at Harvard University.136 The
agency succeeded in obtaining a modification of the courses so that they
increasingly became a place where the aims and methods of American and
European trade unions were compared and discussed. The experience gained
at Harvard led to the organization of a course at Columbia University
reserved for European trade union technicians about modern business
management methods. Shorter missions to the US were organized on topics
such as: trade unions and collective bargaining, industrial health and safety
measures, automation in commerce and industry, wage payment systems and
the guaranteed annual wage. After each of these missions, reports were
submitted to the agency and circulated to national trade union centers, where
they were used for training courses. European and American trade unionists
also met at a number of other seminars, lectures or conferences organized by
the EPA, where they discussed their very different views about how best to
defend workers’ interests.137
The EPA tried to further cooperation between labor and management. It
notably invited trade unionists to participate in business management
programs and employers to participate in the trade union projects. This idea
138 Interviews with Erik Hauerslev (21.3. 1995) and Preben Hansen (5.1. 1995).
139 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA/General
Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957.
140 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, C(61)119, 10.7. 1961.
141 For the French case, cf. Michael Rose, Servants of Post-Industrial Power? Sociologie du
Travail in Modern France, London, 1979, p. 57.
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was strongly backed by the Scandinavian countries, which criticized the strict
segregation between these activities. However, such exchanges hardly ever
took place. In practice the TUS lived a secluded life, rather ignored by the
rest of the EPA,138 except for the employers who anxiously kept a controlling
eye on everything it did. The agency, therefore, provided few opportunities
for management and trade union representatives to meet. A tentative step
towards a joint labor-management program was taken in June 1957 when the
TUS organized a European-American trade union seminar on collective
bargaining and productivity in Berlin. The employers intensely disliked the
idea that the EPA should finance such activities and protested. The agency
did not give in, but countered by inviting the CEIF to send an observer to
the conference. The CEIF did send one, but this proved an isolated event.
In general, joint labor-management activities proved few and far between.
The main exception was the program called “Human sciences and their
application to industry,” which began in 1955.139 The EPA tried to en-
courage representatives of management circles, trade unions and researchers
to cooperate in a joint program. Its aim was to:
get both sides to participate in missions, studies and discussions on concrete
technical problems which can only be solved by joint efforts, to the exclusion of
any discussion of the regulative aspects of law, which is the matter for the ILO,
and of any conflict of economic interests (wages and auxiliary benefits).140
The idea was to put the emhasis on the study of problems the solution of
which could promote fruitful cooperation between employers and labor.
Scientific research seemed to offer a neutral ground on which management
and workers’ representatives could meet. The agency’s interest in the human
sciences was different from UNESCO’s, since it did not present itself as
purely scientific or cultural. The goal was to obtain better knowledge of
problems concerning human relations and thus of methods to improve labor-
management relations. The promotion of such applied research – and
particularly the idea that the social scientists should not just be neutral
observers but ought to intervene and improve labor-management relations
– was to have a strong impact on European industrial sociology.141
142 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, C(61)119, 10.7. 1961.
143 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note,
“Allocution de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956;” Michael
Rose, Servants of Post-Industrial Power, pp. 49-50.
144 About the conference, see for example: Marcel Bolle de Bal, Relations humaines et
relations industrielles, Bruxelles, 1969.
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However, the promotion of human sciences was a controversial matter. Some
countries (for example, the Scandinavian ones) found that the agency should
stay clear from research activities of any kind, others more specifically
distrusted human sciences. Nevertheless, thanks to the agency, innovative
studies were carried out.142 In order to stimulate particularly interest in in-
dustrial problems among the research institutes, it financed long-term socio-
logical research into the attitude of workers towards technological change in
the steel industry. This enquiry was carried out in six member countries by
institutes specializing in industrial sociology. Two of these institutes were
practically launched to participate in this project. As a pioneering effort it
played an important role in the development of industrial sociology in
France.143
The agency, moreover, financed studies on the manner in which questions
connected with human factors in industry were studied and taught in
European countries, and it tried to popularize some of the methods de-
veloped in US in the field of group psychology. One of the most spectacular
initiatives was a series of meetings held in Italy concerning human relations.
The first meeting, which mainly gathered researchers, was held in Florence
in 1955. It was followed up by a very large conference held in 1956 in Rome,
to which each of the member countries sent businessmen, trade union
officials and research specialists. This gathering was much criticized. Re-
presentatives of countries where cooperation between management and
workers’ representatives was effective felt that it had contributed nothing
new. Many southern Europeans found the ideas put forth at the conference
too new and daring. Nevertheless, the “spirit of Rome” survived. On the
initiative of the EPA, national joint committees – consisting of representatives
of labor, management and research institutions – were formed to discuss
labor problems and the use of social sciences applied to industry. According
to the agency itself, the Rome conference fostered a general acceptance in
Western Europe of “the need to carry out [such research] in close coopera-
tion with trade union and employers circles.”144 In 1958, the agency tried to
facilitate the efforts of the national committees by establishing the Interna-
tional Joint Committee for the Application of Human Sciences to Industry
and Professional Relations. This committee was to advise the director of the
145 TUAC, f. “Rapports d’activité CSC-ERP, CSCM-OECE,” JTUAC 9(59)3, 10.11.
1959, att.: report, 26.10. 1959, “Report of Activities, October 1957 to October 1959;”
TUAC, f. “Rapports d’activité CSC-ERP, CSCM-OECE,” TUAC/Conf/2, “Report on
Activities, October 1959 to August 1961.”
146 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958”, OECD, report, August 1965,
“Répertoire des activités de l’AEP (1953-1961).”
147 Ibid.
148 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA Advisory Board
Through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail to Francis, 4.12. 1956; WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS,
RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA Advisory Board through 1957,” ltr., Macphail
(OAEO) to Little (ICA/W), 6.12. 1956; WNRC, RG 469, DDO, OEO, OD, SF 1948-
1954, box 48, f. “Productivity,” ecoto circ. A-141, USRO/Paris to FOA/W, 23.12. 1954.
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agency and the national institutions on programs concerning the application
of the human sciences to industry.145 The agency hoped gradually to bring
about the preparation of a European research program to be divided up for
implementation between the various institutes, the results of which would be
put at the disposal of industry. The International Joint Committee among
other things took on responsibility for the coordination of research into
administrative automation, the final report on which was published in 1965
by the OECD.
In the field of adaptation of work to the worker (ergonomy) which involved
many different sciences and techniques (e.g., anatomy, psychology, physio-
logy, work medicine, design of machines and study of movements), the
agency carried out “pioneering work.”146 The ILO and the WHO had been
discussing questions related to work safety, hygiene and diseases, but they
had not dealt with the adaptation of the places of work as advocated by the
ergonomists. In 1959, the EPA’s efforts led to the creation of an Interna-
tional Association of Ergonomics based in Zürich, and they were instrumen-
tal in promoting a spectacular development in this field. When the OECD
and the new direction of Manpower and Social Affairs was created, most of
these programs were maintained and redirected towards the new objectives
of economic growth.147
The Americans were a driving force behind many of the EPA’s projects. But
they were less fortunate with their most ambitious ideas. Partly inspired by
an agreement which Belgian labor and employers’ organizations concluded
in 1954, partly stimulated by the Rome conference on human relations in
industry, the US suggested in 1956 that what was needed was a “Magna
Charta” under which management and labor could work toward higher
productivity on a European level.148 The Americans indeed found that:
149 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA Advisory Board
Through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail to Francis, 4.12. 1956.
150 Ibid.
151 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA AB, box 1, f. “EPA
Advisory Board Through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail to Francis, 4.12. 1956.
152 The idea that employers and labor on a European level should agree on a “Magna
Charta” was clearly rejected by the CEIF, cf. ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo
di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1958-59,” ltr., CIFE/1103, Leali to CGII, 3.12. 1958,
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153 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA AB, box 1, f. “EPA
Advisory Board Through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail to Francis, 4.12. 1956.
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[a]part from Belgium, comparatively little work [had] been done by productivity
institutions in Europe to stimulate recognition on the part of management and the
unions of their common economic interest in higher productivity or the benefits
resulting from an expanding economy.149
Considering the good working relations which the EPA had developed with
the JTUAC in 1955-56 and the improvement of EPA’s relations with the
CEIF, the Americans considered that:
the time has now come when (under sponsorship of EPA) a top-level tripartite
conference with representatives of management, labor and government could be
organized to discuss basic and common management-labor interests in improving
Europe’s productive base and raising the level of its economies.150
The Americans also kept in mind the role which the EPA could play in the
Cold War. They particularly favored the idea of organizing trade union
conferences in West Berlin since this city was “a window to Eastern Ger-
many and other satellite countries.”151 While the TUS did not succeed in
having European employers’ organizations agree on a “Magna Charta” or in
organizing a big labor-management meeting,152 it actually did hold a con-
ference that opened in West Berlin on June 17, 1957, the anniversary of the
East Berlin rising of 1953.153
F. Impact of the EPA’s Activities
No overall figures for the EPA’s trade union projects have been found.
However, they involved thousands of trade union leaders. In 1959-60 alone,
the TUP included the following activities: three international seminars, three
regional seminars, fifty-one national study sessions, exchange visits by 143
lecturers or experts, fifty-five intra-European missions, four international
missions, three to Europe and one to the United States, the publication of six
154 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8540, 20.10. 1960.
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issues of the Trade Union Information printed in four languages as well as of
nine technical studies. All in all, that year some 4,000 experts or trade union
leaders from the thirty-two national trade union organizations in the member
countries took an active part in the program.154
It is impossible to quantify the impact of a conference, a seminar, a mission,
a lecture, a publication. But at least one may attempt to find out what the
perceived impact was, i.e., to what extent the participants in the EPA’s trade
union activities felt that these activities had an impact.155 The trade union
activities were generally deemed a success by the participants, and they grew
more and more popular. The creation of this program met a demand from
the European trade union movement, which expected to get a part of the
EPA-cake. With the TUP it got it. However, in the beginning there was a
certain skepticism as to its usefulness. The Danish trade unions, for example,
initially appeared mistrustful but in 1956 they praised the EPA’s projects as
“very valuable.”156 In 1958, their attitude had become outrightly positive.157
This reflected a general trend. The trade unions’ reactions to the EPA’s
activities were increasingly supportive. On the opposite side, the negative
reactions from the CEIF intensified from 1956 onwards.158 The vehemence
manifested by the CEIF demonstrated that these projects in the employers’
eyes were not purely frivolous and had some impact, though not the one they
found desirable.
There were big geographical differences, and it seems that the training
courses were particularly welcomed in countries with weak non-communist
trade unions, namely Italy and Greece. An American analysis concluded that
“free” trade unions had been considerably strengthened by the productivity
159 ICA, European Productivity.
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and technical assistance programs in France and Italy, thereby achieving one
of the main goals of the Moody program.159 In 1961, the JTUAC stated that:
[i]t is beyond dispute that without the financial resources of the EPA, National
Trade Union centres would be very unlikely indeed to be able to finance similar
international activities. Thus if the work of EPA were to be discontinued it would
be a tangible loss for the trade union movement especially for less developed
countries such as Greece and Italy for whom the EPA has undertaken special
activities which have had the effect of greatly strengthening the trade union
movements in the countries concerned.160
In April 1960, the Group of Four, which had been set up to make proposals
for a reorganized OEEC, published its report. It proposed the winding up of
the EPA and the termination of most of its traditional activities (among
which were the business management program and the TUP). The reactions
to this proposal were extremely negative on the part of both industry and
labor. The trade unions were particularly angry and felt that they had the
most to lose because they had “the greatest interest in maintaining the
activities of the OEEC in the economic and social field and the trade union
projects of the EPA.”161
The CEIF’s working group on the EPA shared the JTUACs attachment to
the EPA. In May 1960, the Working Group of the CEIF, set up to follow the
proceedings of the EPA, protested that it viewed “with the greatest alarm”
the conclusions of the Report: “[t]he loss that would be suffered by the
discontinuance of direct contact with the employers and the trade unions
under this envisaged organisation would be incalculable.”162 But whereas the
JTUAC always seems to have had the backing of the ICFTU and of the
IFCTU in its statements, the CEIF working group concerning the EPA
found itself contradicted by the CEIF’s ensuing general assembly. The CEIF
accordingly abstained from officially protesting against the winding up of the
163 See Chapter II, footnote 172.
164 While the Advisory Board’s resolution doubtlessly expressed its members’ own
viewpoints, some governments encouraged the AB and used it to further their own policy,
cf: TUAC, f. “CSCM, Comité restreint,” ltr., 13.5. 1960, Büttner to Mittelsten-Scheid,
“Nächste Sitzung des Beirates der EPA;” ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di
lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,” ltr., circ. 669, Arnaud, 21.12. 1960,
“Groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP.”
165 TUAC, box “TUAC History,” note, s.d., s.l., s.a., 1964.
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EPA.163 This may have reflected the lack of real enthusiasm among the
employers for the business management activities of the agency and their
strong dislike of its TUP.
In the meantime, the Advisory Board, labor and management united, had
adopted a resolution protesting against budgetary cuts in the agency’s
traditional activities and the probable dissolution of the EPA. Among its
arguments were the consideration that productivity enhancement was
essential in order to match the rapidly growing technology of the Eastern
bloc, and was necessary in particular for the small and medium sized
enterprises which did not always have the means and know-how to improve
productivity.164 This was all to no avail. The EPA was wound up and most
of its activities discontinued. As a concession to organized labor, a few trade
union projects were carried over in the OECD, but on a considerably
reduced scale.165
G. Conclusion
The EPA was not a European tripartite organization where labor, manage-
ment and governments cooperated to promote productivity. The influence
of the Advisory Board, which was the formal link between the European
professional organizations and the agency, always remained limited. But
contacts were made and, in many cases, labor and management within the
Advisory Board united to defend common interests. This proved particularly
true from 1957 onwards, when the EPA’s secretariat and several large
European countries decided to switch the emphasis of agency’s program
away from productivity enhancement in its most narrow sense and instead
to focus on science, technology and aid to underdeveloped areas. The CEIF
and the JTUAC then found a common interest in countering this threat
against the traditional activities of the agency. But the agency also offered an
area where European trade unions and employers’ associations learned to
fight each another. In this battle, labor was more successful than the
employers. The trade unions got a far greater say in the EPA than could have
166 For example the future Danish social democratic prime minister Anker Jørgensen or
the SPD minister of finance, Hans Matthöfer.
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been expected, considering their relatively weak stand and lack of govern-
mental political support in Western Europe in the 1950s. In the area of
labor-management relations, the EPA less instituted a model of cooperation
than a spoils-system: business got one part of the cake, labor got another. But
the system had a peculiarity: only labor was really interested in having its
share. Business to a large extent let the agency run the business management
part and often had to be talked into accepting the EPA’s projects. This was
in stark contrast to the TUP, which was worked out in close cooperation
between the agency and the European trade union movement.
The interest of the trade unions in participating in the EPA’s projects was
not surprising. The EPA offered money as well as a psychological support
which was particularly useful in those countries where the non-communist
trade unions were weak. It is apparent, however, that quite a few trade
unions, especially in Northern Europe, had to be convinced of the EPA’s
utility. One of the EPA’s successes was that it actually managed to sell itself
to the unions, which ended up being among the agency’s fiercest defenders.
The strength of the trade union movement within the EPA was clearly not
due to the fact that it had imposed itself upon the EPA or that the national
trade union movements had forced their governments into pressuring the
EPA to adopt such a stance. It was first of all the result of the American wish
to see the EPA give high priority to trade union issues. This view seems to
have been accepted by the EPA’s leadership. The result was that the trade
unions got the TUP as an area where they could operate more or less
autonomously within the EPA. Trade unionists met, trans-European and
transatlantic contacts were created, experiences made, which would play a
role for several prominent labor leaders.166
1 A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in: Nick Tiratsoo and
Terry Gourvish (eds.), Missionaries and Managers: United States Technical Assistance and
European Management Education, 1945-1960, Manchester, 1998.
2 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957; ECHA, OECE, report, August
1965, “Répertoire des activités de l’AEP.”
3 DDE, Manuscripts, Clarence Francis Papers, box 3, f. “EPA,” memo, 17.12. 1959,
McCarthy to Dillon.
4 PRO, CAB134/1181, TA(L)(52)2, 18.1. 1952.
5 See Appendixes: Table A-5.
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VII. THE EPA AND MANAGEMENT
EDUCATION1
Among the most important of the EPA’s many activities was a regional,
American-inspired attempt to develop management education in Western
European countries.2 While this policy was experimental, it probably laid a
large part of the groundwork for the considerable development of manage-
ment education in these countries from the 1960s onwards.
The view which the US tried to export to Western Europe through the
productivity missions and its consultants’ tours in Europe was that “the
restrictive pattern of European industry stemmed at least in part from the
desire of managers-by-inheritance rather than managers-by-ability-and-
training for a protected situation where they would be untroubled by
problems of competition.”3 At the end of 1951, the MSA judged that
“beyond a certain point no advantage was gained by the transmission of
further technological information” and that this point had probably been
reached. It, therefore, decided to concentrate more of its efforts on labor
relations and management education.4 If the deficiencies of European
management were to be corrected, it had to be professionalized, which meant
that European management education had to be improved, through the
training of teachers and the creation of new teaching institutions. This
emphasis on business management remained an important feature of
American aid policy during the following years. Since aid to the EPA was
reduced after 1956, the Ford Foundation stepped in, and funded part of the
EPA’s activities to further management education. But still in 1957 and
1958, the US earmarked a sizable part of its EPA contribution to manage-
ment improvement and education.5
Although initially the Americans sensed that their push in favor of manage-
ment education found little support on the European side, things gradually
6 WNRC, Record Group 469, ODDTS, OPS, PADiv, FEEB, RRt EPA 1954-60, box 2,
f. “EPA,” memo, 28.5. 1954.
7 Gemelli, “The Ford Foundation and the Foundation of Social and Political Sciences in
Italy (1954-1973),” p. 79; McGlade, “The Illusion of Consensus,” pp. 461-67.
8 FFA, Richard M. Catalano, “European Management Education,” report no. 010733,
New York, July 1966.
9 MBZ, DGEM-archief 66, deel 2, f. “1470,” ltr., 30.9. 1952, Hummel to Smith.
10 BRDBA, B 102/37413, note, 2.5. 1956.
11 BRDBA, B 102/71114, King, 29.2. 1956, “Ausbildung für die Betriebsführung.
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changed. One of the factors behind the emerging European awareness of the
“management problem” was the productivity missions to the United States
which demonstrated the need for a professionalization in the management
field, the inadequacies of the European universities in this regard, and the
fact that there were skills to be learned from the Americans. In 1951,
endeavors to promote management education in different Western European
countries developed both outside and inside the OEEC. Among these
initiatives was the International Management Congress which was organized
by the International Committee of Scientific Management in Brussels in July
1951. It was followed up by the foundation of Inter-University Contact for
Management Education (IUC). At the University of Delft in June 1952, the
IUC held an “education for management conference,” the first international
conference on management education ever to be held in Europe.6 Another
strong impetus to European endeavors in this field was given by the Inter-
national Management Conference organized by the National Management
Council in New York during December 1951. This was the first conference
where American and European business leaders could discuss management
education in Western Europe.7 A few years later other initiatives followed,
notably the creation of the Industry-University Foundation for Management
Development in Belgium during 1956, and the establishment of the
European Association of Management Training Centres in 1959.8
Even before the agency was set up, contacts between existing centers had
been established under the auspices of the OEEC, and missions had been
organized to the US. The PRA committee had started to discuss the Euro-
pean need for management education and how this need might best be met.9
When the EPA was created it was clear that educating European managers
would be among its main objectives.10 Leaders of the agency subscribed to
the American idea that deficiencies in business management were part of the
reason for the relatively low European productivity. The EPA had according-
ly made it an important element of its program to challenge the opinion
common among European employers that leaders were “born not bred,” and
to convince them that management was a skill to be learned.11 The US
Tendenzen in den Vereinigten Staaten und Grossbritannien.” See also: ASCONF, box
70/18.2, f. “AEP. Consiglio Consultativo,” ltr., Valletta to De Micheli, 24.1. 1959.
12 See Appendixes: Table A-8.
13 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7601, 17.2. 1960, “Report on the Activities of the
EPA Unit of the OEEC Washington Office.”
14 BRDBA, B 102/37413, note, 2.5. 1956, betr.: “Besetzung Postens einens Leiters der
Management Division der EPA in Paris.”
15 FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962.
16 OEEC, The European Productivity Agency. Activities and Achievements.
17 BRDBA, DT/IND/62.5, 26.2. 1962.
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initially found it difficult to get their message through, but this changed: the
EPA’s business management activities, which in 1955-56 represented 13.5
percent of the agency’s operational budget, two years later accounted for
26.5 percent of the funds.12 During the three-year period of 1957-59, almost
half of all transatlantic missions dealt with business management topics and
about half of those concerned management education.13 In 1956, Edwin
Fletcher, deputy director of the EPA, called the Business Management
Section the “most important division of the EPA.”14 Two factors fueled this
expansion. First, the economic growth in Western Europe during the 1950s
created a demand for a greater variety of specialized skills at the middle
management level. Second, the moves taken towards integrating the eco-
nomies in Western Europe were viewed with apprehension by small and
medium entrepreneurs. One of the aims of the management education
program was to assuage these concerns by providing firms with the tools that
would enable them to confront the fiercer competition. As an EPA document
put it, the objective was to create “an atmosphere in which change was wel-
comed as an opportunity rather than feared as a difficulty.”15
The business management program of the EPA encompassed many different
activities. The emphasis of the first projects lay on the short term. In the
period 1953-57, 15,000 managers, mainly from small and medium-sized
firms, took part in 340 different short training courses which were organized
by the agency and which were geared to disseminate knowledge of American
business management techniques.16 While this effort was directed towards
educating European managers, the EPA increasingly favored an institutional
approach, encouraging other organizations to continue the various activities
which it had initiated. This led to the formation of about thirty national or
international associations active in the field of business management. The
agency gradually became a liaison and exchange center where these bodies
could work out ways to co-operate among themselves.17 Another feature of
the re-orientation of the EPA’s program was the shift from short training
courses towards the development of regular and comprehensive ones, which
18 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,”
“2ème Réunion du Groupe de Travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP, 7.12.
1957. Compte rendu des décisions;” ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività
dell’AEP. Interventi della Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrisponden-
za. appunti,” “Allocution de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2.
1956.”
19 DDE, Manuscripts, Clarence Papers, box 3, f. “EPA,” memo, McCarthy to Dillon,
17.12. 1959; ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi
della Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,”
“Allocution de Gregoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956.”
20 FFA, Slater Papers, box 17, f. “181,” memo, Nielsen to Stone, 27.6. 1959.
21 FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962. See also:
HM, j.nr. 88-5-56, no. 3255, Emb.Washington (Hoelgaard) to UM, 19.12. 1955.
22 FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, DT/Pr/E/1429, report, 22.5. 1962, “American
Professors of Business Management for European Universities and Training Centers.”
23 FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962; FFA, R-
0527, PA 57-265, Section 1, ltr., Caracciolo to Carroll, 16.4. 1957.
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were thought to have a greater and more durable impact.18 Efforts, therefore,
were increasingly concentrated on improving management education in
Europe on an American model.19 After a fairly tentative period, the EPA had
become “convinced that the best investment in terms of short and long range
return in economic development is to build a network of competent
institutions in Europe and to exploit their possibilities fully in the training of
outstanding individuals.” According to this view, the main brake on Western
European growth was neither capital nor technology but rather “the human
factor,” the shortage of “individuals able to conceive, organize and execute
development programs.”20 It thus became a one of the main purposes of the
EPA to further management education in Europe. The objective was both
to expand the body of available management teachers and encourage the
growth of management training establishments which could become
suppliers of European managers and centers of study and research for “the
application to European countries of the general theories of Management
developed in the United States.”21 A connected goal was to counter the
widespread academic skepticism towards management education, and to
establish higher teaching standards.22 This program, which was started in
1954, fostered the creation of several centers for management teaching.
However, these new institutions were confronted “with a serious shortage,
if not total absence, of suitable professors.”23 As a consequence, it was
decided that the EPA should devote more energy to developing the body of
European management teachers, without interrupting the efforts to assist the
creation of permanent institutions.
24 FFA, R-0068, PA 56-51, Section 4, memo, Harkavy to the files, 21.12. 1955.
25 BRDBA, B 102/37220, Schöne to Groeger, 8.7. 1954.
26 ECHA, OECE, report, August 1965, “Répertoire des activités de l’AEP.” There seems
to be some uncertainty as to the number of management training centers and business
schools in Western Europe at the end of the 1950s. Whereas the number 150 is often
cited (see for example: ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP. Consiglio Consultativo,” ltr.,
Valletta to De Micheli, 24.1. 1959) other sources mention the existence of 177 centers
in 1957 (see: FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 4, memo, Harkavy and Slater to Central
Files, 7.11. 1957) while Boltanski speaks of 150 management training centers in 1960...
in France (Luc Boltanski, Les Cadres. La formation d’un groupe social, Paris, 1982, p. 190).
This probably reflects different definitions of the term “management training center.”
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The EPA’s management education program had four salient features. First,
in the field of management education, as in other fields, the EPA functioned
as a vehicle for American influence. All participants in the EPA management
education program paid tribute to the American model. In 1955, King told
Ford Foundation representatives that an essential element in the “grand
strategy” of the EPA was to train new types of managers and thereby to “skip
20 years” compared to the course that had been followed by American
management education.24 As will be shown later, most of the EPA’s
management education activities involved some form of American assistance.
Second, the goal of the EPA management program was not only the
promotion of American-inspired models but also, as the concept of
management education slowly came to be accepted, a “Europeanization” of
this model. It aimed through the creation of new institutions to establish a
certain degree of European self-sufficiency. In 1954, Erich Mittelsten-Scheid,
a prominent member of the EPA’s Advisory Board, stated that the goal was
to understand, not to copy, the American system, and thereby to develop not
an English or a German system, but a European management education
model.25 This meant creating or improving European teaching centers, and
encouraging the exchange of information and experiences among the 150
centers of teaching and advanced teaching of the member countries, as well
as between these centers and those of the USA.26 To a certain degree this
“Europeanization” should rather be termed “nationalization,” since emphasis
was put on creating national training centers and business schools. Third, as
it was continuously stressed by the EPA’s secretariat, the agency’s activities
were experimental. European management education was still in its infancy.
There were so many possible ways to encourage its development, it simply
had to opt for a trial and error method. Lastly, the EPA saw itself as a
catalyst of activities to be continued by others. In a broad sense this applied
to all missions, seminars, courses, conferences, etc., organized by the EPA:
they were supposed to serve as an inspiration to nationals of the EPA
member countries who could then continue these activities in their own
27 PRO, CAB 134/1183, TA(L)(54)59, 5.5. 1954.
28 PRO, BT258/820, BT/EPA(57)65, 29.7. 1957.
29 BRDBA, B 102/71115, BIAC, 26.5. 1964, “Proposals Regarding OECD Action in the
Field of Management Development.”
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countries. More specifically, this led to the establishment of management
teaching institutions.
The EPA started its management education activities by organizing an
international conference at Henley-on-Thames in September 1953, with the
purpose of establishing contacts and facilitating exchanges of viewpoints and
information. This conference demonstrated that member countries were
interested in receiving assistance to further their management education. The
recommendations adopted encouraged the EPA to make such conferences
an annual event, and inspired many of the activities which the agency
launched afterwards: seminars, summer courses, missions and American
lectures.27
The following years saw conferences devoted to management education in
universities (1954) as well as training for experienced managers (1955), and
conferences concerned with management as a teaching discipline and the use
of quantified data and social sciences in business education (1956-60).28 The
conferences gathered representatives (at first mostly directors, after 1956
teachers were also invited) from management education centers and officials
from the NPCs. Their aim was to help the participants exchange information
and ideas, but often they also provided the forum where specialists could put
forward proposals for new activities to be pursued by the EPA. Thus, they
served to awaken the interest of government authorities, educational
establishments and industry to the problems of management training. At the
same time, they became one of the main driving forces behind the policy-
formulation of the EPA. They proved increasingly popular, and the number
of participating scholars and national representatives participating rose
steadily from forty-four in 1954 to 190 in 1960. After the EPA’s demise, the
Business and Industry Advisory Committee of the OECD stated that they
had “been exceptionally useful in that they [had] given an opportunity to the
participants of becoming informed of the very latest methods and ideas in
regard to management training.”29
Another early activity of the EPA was the organization of missions of teachers
or future teachers in management to the United States. They were trained
mainly at the Harvard Business School, with which the agency had a close
relationship, and at the University of Indiana. These courses started in 1954
30 ECHA, OECE, report, August 1965, “Répertoire des Activités de l’AEP.” According
to Caracciolo’s report, 350 European professors studied in the US under this program,
190 following the long courses, 160 following the short courses (FFA, R-0527, PA 57-
265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962).
31 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C(56)40, 20.2. 1956.
32 BRDBA, B 102/71114, King, 29.2. 1956, “Ausbildung für die Betriebsführung. Ten-
denzen in den Vereinigten Staaten und Grossbritannien.” It is unclear to what extent this
new perception altered the EPA’s program, and whether the EPA actually did put Euro-
pean teachers into contact with the newest American management techniques.
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and were expanded in 1956 when two types were created. There were long
ones (nine to twelve months) for prospective or junior management teachers
(usually young assistant professors in economics), who would specialize in
a particular area. These classes were mostly part of the International
Teachers program at the Harvard Business School. For senior professors,
having only little time at their disposal, there were short ones (lasting six
weeks to four months). After 1958, the proportion of short-term courses was
increased, because they were deemed more cost-efficient, and because it was
thought that a program aimed at senior professors would have greater
impact. All in all, during the period of 1954-62, there were 287 participants
in the courses, half of them in the short ones, the other half in the long ones.
On at least two occasions, these missions were followed up by a seminar in
Paris, gathering some sixty former participants as well as directors of
management training centers to discuss further ways to promote manage-
ment education.30
The EPA courses were to a large extent influenced by the case method used
at Harvard and many other American business schools. During a visit to the
US in 1956, King became aware of the limits of this method. Many
representatives of American business schools described to him the attempts
to develop new teaching methods and new management techniques, and
advised him that “particular attention should be given to the newer American
experiments in this field and to the work of specialist groups on the social
and industrial engineering fringe of the subject, rather than that of the
traditional schools even where they are successful.”31 The conclusions which
King and Grégoire drew from this visit reflected the growing feeling in
Europe that a servile imitation of American teaching methods would be
unsatisfactory, not least because all the cases were drawn from an American
business environment.32
From 1956 on, several new activities were developed by the EPA in the field
of management education. Summer courses for management teachers were
organized from 1956 until 1961 in cooperation with local organizations to
33 FFA, R-0068, PA 56-51, Grant attachments, PRA(56)9, 14.2. 1956.
34 ECHA, OECE, report, August 1965, “Répertoire des activités de l’AEP.”
35 FFA, R-0527, PA no. 57-265, Section 4, ltr., McMillan to Carroll, 14.10. 1959.
36 Ibid; FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962;
FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 1, ltr., 20.9. 1958, att.: “American Guest Professors
on Business Administration.”
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train European management teachers. One of the main motives for this
initiative was the assessment that the transatlantic location of the previous
courses had prevented many from participating.33 The interest in the summer
courses was sustained throughout the period: with an average of almost thirty
participants, 173 participated over the whole six-year period. Until 1959, the
instructors of these courses were purely American, in 1960, it was half
American and half European, and in 1961, it had been totally taken over by
Europeans.34
The US continued to exert its influence through visits by American pro-
fessors to European institutions. These professors had a dual role, since they
were acting both as lecturers at and advisors for European teaching in-
stitutions. From 1957 to 1960, many visits were financed by the Ford
Foundation through an exchange scheme administered through the EPA.
Some participants found that this program “was having substantial impact
on management education programs in Europe.”35 Proof of its success was
the fact that the demand for American teachers greatly exceeded the supply,
and that many requests for visits could not be met. In 1959-60, four
professors were recruited for the whole year and three under a short term
contract. In total, the Ford Foundation grants permitted the recruitment of
twenty-five American professors. The interest in this program was strong:
during the period 1958-59 alone, fifty management training institutions
(more than a third of those existing at the time) expressed their interest in
receiving an American guest professor. When it came to actual participation
in the program, Italy initially topped the list. In 1959, most of the American
guest professors went to Italy (61 percent) while the rest went to the United
Kingdom (17.5 percent), the Netherlands (15.5 percent), Sweden (5.5
percent) and Belgium (0.5 percent). An EPA survey revealed that this
concentration happened for three reasons: the urgent need for assistance to
new management education institutions in Italy, the absence of serious
language barriers in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, and the fact that
the pattern of management education developing in Italy and in the Northern
European countries was more similar to that of the US than in other
European countries. Subsequently the program expanded: in the following
year, eleven countries participated.36 During the period 1956-62, an intra-
37 ECHA, OECE, report, August 1965, “Répertoire des activités de l’AEP.”
38 BRDBA, B 102/37220, Schöne to Groeger, 8.7. 1954.
39 ECHA, note, King, “The Productivity Movement in Post-war Europe.”
40 BRDBA, DT/IND/62.5, 26.2. 1962. See also: ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE.
Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,” note, “10ème session du groupe
de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP (1.2. -2.2. 1960). Compte rendu des
decisions.”
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European exchange scheme was established, allowing European instructors
to visit other European management teaching centers. This scheme proved
increasingly popular, and in all benefited 139 teachers.37
The EPA, moreover, served as a consultant for the existing training centers,
giving advice and promoting contacts between them. This advisory service
was mostly carried out by American experts who promoted the exchange of
information between the 150 management training centers in the OEEC
countries and between these centers and American schools. In some cases,
this service assisted in the creation of teaching institutions.
At the beginning there was pressure on the EPA to establish a European
business school. According to its first director, Harten, this was one of the
important objectives of the agency.38 In particular, the French were
interested since they hoped that such a school would be located in Paris. But
this plan did not materialize. Instead, in cooperation with General Doriot,
the agency assisted in the creation of the European Institute of Business
Administration (INSEAD) at Fontainebleau.39 The pressure for creating a
European center for management training, nevertheless, persisted and a
working party was set up to examine the proposal. As the EPA was wound
up, one of the few of its activities which was considered likely to be
continued by the OECD was the setting-up of a research and training center
for professors of management. This time it was the Dutch who pushed for
the project, hoping to host it. The proposal was studied by an ad hoc
working group which assessed that during the following five years a total of
500 new management teachers would have to be trained to meet the needs
of the OECD countries. It concluded, however, that the best way to achieve
this goal was not to set up a European center since it “would experience the
greatest difficulties in carrying out its mission under satisfactory conditions.”
Industrial circles were also skeptical about the proposal for a European
school, and it finally had to be abandoned.40 In fact, most member countries
wished to build or strengthen their own institutions, a view which the agency
simply had to accept. According to one analysis, the EPA played a role,
41 FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962.
42 BRDBA, DT/IND/62.5, 26.2. 1962.
43 BRDBA, B 102/71113, 14.11. 1963, “Zusammenfassung der Antworten der Regie-
rungen der Mitgliedländer auf den Fragebogen zum Bericht ‘Fragen der Management-
Ausbildung’ (Platt-Bericht).”
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directly or indirectly, in the creation of most of the perhaps 175 management
institutions created during the period of 1953-61.41
Another institution fostered by the EPA was the European Liaison Commit-
tee for Management Education and Development (ELCMED), created in
1961. Its purpose was to stimulate the exchange of information amongst its
members, which were the European Association of Management Training
Centres, the European Committee of the International Committee of
Scientific Management, the Inter-University Contact for Management
Education, the Institute of Management Sciences and the European
Federation of Management Consultants Associations. Both the International
Labour Office and the European Economic Community had observers
attending the ELCMED meetings. An important motive for creating this
committee was the desire to pursue the management education activities of
the EPA, since it was clear that most of them would not be carried on within
the reorganized OECD.42
The advisory service also published documents, catalogues and studies about
business management education in Europe. Its last study, published in 1963,
was the so-called Platt report, a major survey of European requirements for
management education as seen by European industrialists and academics.
This report probably played an important role in subsequent efforts by the
Ford Foundation to develop management education in Western Europe.43
It is impossible to measure the impact of the EPA’s activities on the
development of management education in Europe. The effect of conferences,
seminars, lectures, discussions or visits cannot be quantified. Even a more
modest attempt at making an estimate is problematic, since the impact may
often have been very indirect. It would require detailed micro-studies of the
individual teachers and school directors participating in the EPA programs
as well as of the individual management training centers and business schools
in the EPA countries. One of the problems in making such an evaluation is
to find observers who are both well-informed and reasonably impartial. A
seemingly thorough report from 1958 originating in the French Productivity
Center, concerning the relations between industry and the universities and
more particularly management education in France, strongly underlined the
44 WNRC, Record Group 469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “EPA – Administration
– Governing Body,” EPA/D/5414, 8.9. 1958. A similar Belgian report was less hesitant
to acknowledge its debt, see BRDBA, B 102/11290, heft 2, EPA/D/5370, 9.8. 1958.
45 FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, ltr., Caracciolo to Gordon, 28.2. 1962.
46 Concerning the role of the Ford Foundation, see: Giuliana Gemelli, “American
Influence on European Management Education: The Role of Ford Foundation,” EUI
Working Paper, 1994.
47 ECHA, King, “The Productivity movement in Post-war Europe.”
48 BRDBA, B 102/71113, 14.11. 1963, “Zusammenfassung der Antworten der
Regierungen der Mitgliedländer auf den Fragebogen zum Bericht ‘Fragen der
Management-Ausbildung’ (Platt-Bericht).”
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role played by the French Productivity Center, but forgot to mention both
the EPA and the American input.44 On the other hand, it would hardly seem
surprising if former officials of the EPA thought highly of the role played by
the agency. In 1962, one such source stated in a report to the Ford
Foundation that “[t]he success of eight years of activities under the EPA’s
management education program can be measured by the fact that over 175
Schools of Management have grown up in Europe, largely under the original
stimulus by the EPA.”45 While this might well be, no further details were
given as to how the EPA played such a role. It is very clear that the EPA was
not alone in encouraging management education in Western Europe during
the 1950s. There were numerous other national initiatives, many directly or
indirectly American-inspired. There were even some other international
attempts through the International Committee of Scientific Management, the
Inter-University Contact for Management Education, and the International
Labour Office, which gave impetus to the development of management
education in Yugoslavia. But the EPA certainly provided the largest
organized attempt to encourage management education in Western Europe
during this period. It is clear that without the EPA, management teachers
would not have been trained, people would not have met, ideas would not
have been fostered, and business schools would not have been created to the
extent which they actually were. During the 1960s, The Ford Foundation
clearly built on the experience attained through the activities of the EPA
when it tried to develop management education in Western Europe.46
Many testimonies claim that the EPA’s management education projects were
successful. The former EPA deputy director, Alexander King, later deemed
them “one of the most successful of EPA activities.”47 After their discon-
tinuation, several OEEC countries mourned them.48 According to the
ELCMED, it was “[t]hanks mainly to the drive and activities of the
European Productivity Agency” that European industry and universities had
to a large extent recognized the need for making systematic efforts in the
49 WNRC, RG 469, ODDTS, OPS, PADiv, FEEB, Rrt EPA, box 1, f. “Europe. OEEC,”
ltr., Allen to Hall, 18.4. 1960.
50 Some teachers may have participated in several courses, conferences or missions, not
all participants were teachers, was the number of management teachers really only 500?,
etc.
51 BRDBA, DT/IND/62.5, 26.2. 1962.
52 WNRC, RG 469, ODDTS, OPS, PADiv, FEEB, RRt EPA, box 1, f. “Europe.
OEEC,” ltr., Allen to Hall, 18.4. 1960.
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training and development of managers. Numerous initiatives and many new
institutions were set up as a result of the EPA’s activities.
In 1960, the US found that there was evidence that the “considerable sums
of money” to further the development of management education in Europe
through the EPA and certain bilateral country programs had created a
“product” which “in certain instances, may be applicable to the needs in
other areas of the world, as well as more acceptable because of the prestige
attached to European education.”49 While it is unclear to what extent the
development of European management education actually did inspire
American activities in third world countries, it is noteworthy that the results
of some of the EPA’s activities in this field were already deemed successful
enough for export by 1960.
According to an estimate by the ELCMED, in 1962 the body of European
management teachers and researchers was still small, approximately 500 in
total. Judging from the number of participants in the EPA’s different
programs (190 in the largest of the seven international conferences, 287 on
a teaching mission to the US, 173 participants in the summer courses, 139
in the European Exchange program), even with some appropriate caveats,50
it would seem that a very significant proportion of management teachers
active in the 1950s were directly or indirectly affected by EPA projects.51 On
the basis of the scarce data available, the evidence indicating a powerful
impact seems strong.
If it can be concluded that the EPA had a significant influence on the
expansion of management education in Western Europe, the question that
still remains is what kind of education was promoted. To a great extent the
agency acted as a vehicle of American influence and the US experience was
one of the major stimulating factors furthering the growth of management
education in Europe. However, many perceived that the result was not an
American product, but rather an adaptation to, and fusing with, European
approaches.52 Moreover, the influence was reciprocal. Washington Universi-
ty’s Dean Ross Trump, president of the American Association of Collegiate
53 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7450, 12.3. 1960; FFA, R-0527, PA 57-265,
section 3, ltr., Grégoire to Nielson, 27.10. 1959. See also: UM, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4,
EPA/D/7601, 17.2. 1960, “Report on the Activities of the EPA Unit of the OEEC
Washington Office.”
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Schools of Business, realized that Europeans were teaching decision-making
by quantitative analysis techniques which the Americans did not. He thus set
out to adapt this European teaching practice to American circumstances.
There were other cases where American guest professors in Europe changed
their teaching and research programs as a result of their observations and
experiences in Europe. In particular, it seems that the encounter with Europe
produced an adaptation of the Harvard-inspired use of the case method in
management teaching.53 The Americans certainly exerted a strong influence
on the European scene through the EPA, but even in the 1950s US-
European relations in the field of management education were not a one-way
affair.

1 Kaufman, Trade and Aid, pp. 58-60. Robert E. Wood: From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis.
Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy, Berkeley, 1986, pp. 70-71.
2 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” “Allocution
de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956.”
3 WNRC, RG 469, ODDTS, OPS, PAD, FEEB, RRt EPA 1954-60, box 1, f. “Europe.
EPA Program FY 1959,” ecoto circ. A-5, USRO to ICA/W, 3.4. 1959, “Orientation of
EPA FY60 Program to Benefit Member LDC;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, EC/
M(59)2, 10.4. 1959, “Summary of the Statement Made by Grégoire, Director of the EPA
at the 249th Meeting of the Economic Committee Held on 6.3. 1959.” Italy’s situation
was special, since the Northern region was well developed and participated actively in
many EPA activities, whereas the Southern regions did not take part in any projects, see:
Paolo Terni, “Elementi per una storia generale del ‘Progetto Sardegna’ (1957-1962),”
unpublished report, Oristano, November-December 1962, p. 18.
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VIII. THE EPA AND DEVELOPMENT AID:
THE PILOT AREA IN SARDINIA
A. The EPA’s Assistance to Areas in the Process of Economic
Development
The EPA’s activities to assist underdeveloped areas in the member countries
were only initiated in 1955-56. They were the result of a combination of
external and internal pressures. Towards the middle of the 1950s it became
clear that the process of decolonization had opened a new arena for the Cold
War. Both the US and the Soviet Union were eager to acquire influence in
the newly independent countries. In this context, US development aid was
used in the hope of preventing third world countries from “going commu-
nist.”1 Such aid was seen as a countermeasure to the increased international
activism of the Soviet Union and to the perceived combined threat from
communism and nationalism in the third world. From the mid-fifties
onwards, the US pressured its Western European allies to follow suit and
increase their aid to third world countries. Endeavors to aid underdeveloped
areas in Western Europe took place within this general reorientation of US
policy. They aimed at achieving modernization and thereby social and
political stability.2 But the Cold War and American pressure were not the
only reason why the OEEC countries redefined their priorities. Other factors
were horse-trading among the member countries and empire-building on the
part of the OEEC/EPA. Early on, it had become obvious that the poorer
member states, namely Greece, Portugal and Turkey, were also those which
participated the least in the EPA’s projects.3 They were handicapped by
4 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development.”
5 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” “Allocution
de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956.”
6 SVUD, afd. H, grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Åsbrink to UD, 30.10. 1959.
7 See Chapter IV.
8 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958, “EPA’s
fremtid.” See also Chapter II.
9 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, EPA(57)9, 23.7. 1957, “Advisory Board, Annual Report on the
Activities of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956,
“Minutes of the 326th Meting Held on 11.5. 1956;” ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “AEP,
Avenir de l’agence, Groupe de travail no. 26,” EPA/GB/M(59)4, 9.12. 1959, “Minutes
of the 11th Session Held on 26.10. and 27.10. 1959.” A similar endeavor to reduce
regional differences was professed by the Treaty of Rome signed in March 1957.
10 PRO, CAB134/1183, T.A.(L)(54)48, note by the BOT, 5.4. 1954, “FOA Suggestions
on the Coordination of the EPA Program With National Productivity Programmes.”
11 See for example: PRO, BT258/820, BT/EPA(57)73, 7.10. 1957, “Report of UK
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extended areas with endemic underemployment where the immediate
problem was less to develop the productivity of labor than to promote
general economic development.4 They further lacked the institutional
network needed if the services of the EPA were to be fully exploited.5 Italy
likewise realized that its own underdeveloped areas drew no benefit from the
activities of the agency. Consequently, Southern European countries
requested that special programs be implemented to benefit poor regions.6
Their pressure was certainly welcomed by those within the OEEC who
looked for a long-term raison d’être for the organization. As early as 1954,
both King and OEEC Deputy Secretary General Colonna ventured the idea
that the EPA could become responsible for intra-European help.7 In July
1958, René Sergent, secretary general of the OEEC, proposed the transfor-
mation of the EPA into a European Development Agency.8 The program for
underdeveloped areas was “sold” to the Northern European member
countries as something more than an act of humanitarianism: it was the price
to pay if trade liberalization was to be furthered in Western Europe. Without
a reduction in productivity differentials, resistance in poorer countries might
endanger the whole liberalization process. This argument was more or less
grudgingly accepted by the richer member countries.9
In March 1954, the Americans proposed that the EPA extend aid to the less
developed countries within its ranks. This proposal was criticized by the UK
and several other OEEC countries.10 Some complained about their financial
difficulties. Others argued that the EPA was the wrong forum to implement
such a policy.11 The PRA Committee was generally skeptical. It largely
Members of the Governing Board on the 1st Session Held on 23.9.-24.9. 1957.”
12 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EPA/ABI/36, ??.1. 1955 (mailed by OEEC del. to UM on
15.2. 1955), “Draft Minutes of the 4th Session Held in London on 3.12. 1954.” Already
in 1951, William H. Joyce, assistant administrator for production in the ECA and
responsible for the productivity drive, had argued that the “more developed” European
countries should help the “less developed” ones. In particular, he thought that the
Scandinavian countries and Holland should assist France and Italy in spreading the
practice of collective bargaining (AN, SC, F60 ter, box 522, f. “Assistance technique 682-
683, crédits ouverts 1949-50; 684-1, 1950-54,” f. “Politique de productivité,” ltr.,
AF/1711, August 1951, “Développement de la productivité dans les pays bénéficiares de
l’aide américaine.”)
13 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 3-4; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/2, 31.8. 1956,
“Memo by the Italian Delegation on the Aims and Action of the EPA.” Parenthood of the
EPA’s program for underdeveloped areas has several claimants. Many documents
attribute it to the Advisory Board. This still leaves open the question who raised the
proposal in this body. The British generally found that the Americans used the Advisory
Board to push their proposals. Other candidates are Ottino Carraciolo di Forino and
Alexander King. See also next footnote.
14 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, EPA, box 6, C(61)119, 10.7. 1961, “Annual Report and Overall
Summary of Activities of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, EPA/ABI/63, 7.9. 1955, “Bi-
annual Report to the Council;” WNRC, RG 469, ODDO (1953-61), OAEO (1955-61),
ROS, SF 1948-57, box 76, f. “Less Developed Areas – General/1956,” memo, Kolar to
Bode, 27.1. 1956, “EPA and Underdeveloped Areas;” OEEC, Acts of the Organisation,
vol. 16, pp. 301-305. The OEEC Council was acting on a French proposal. France
wanted to gain political goodwill in less developed countries and to relaunch an
organization “going through a period of relative stagnation.” It also hoped that such a
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consisted of representatives who were engaged in traditional productivity
work in industry and commerce, and who had nothing to gain from a
reorientation of the EPA’s work. But the leadership of the OEEC did see
opportunities in this new field. In December 1954, Colonna proposed that
EPA should no longer see itself as a means of channeling American aid to
Western Europe, but as a channel of Northern European aid to Southern
Europe:
The Agency came into being as a result of the contribution of American capital
and represented the culmination point of the Technical Assistance which the US
began to give to Europe immediately after the end of the war – a form of assistance
which was on no less generous a scale than the original ‘Marshall Aid.’ The agency
could now become the channel through which the knowledge gained by the more
highly developed European countries would be directed towards the less advanced
countries to help them in their economic and social recovery program.12
This proposal was soon taken up by the EPA. It was notably championed by
the Italians, who saw a broader productivity concept as a means to alleviate
their problems in the Mezzogiorno.13 It was adopted by the Council of the
OEEC in November 1955.14
program would offer opportunities to demonstrate modern French agricultural techniques
and that it would benefit mountainous regions in central France (ECHA, EPA Archives,
f. “RE 5/7/09 Agence. (D),” ltr., Lamour to Sergent, 1.2. 1956, att.: “Note relative à
l’initiative française pour l’action de l’AEP dans les zones européennes sous-développées;”
MAE, DE-CE, 1945-1960, vol. 357, MAE (SCE) to Lamour, ltr., no. 730, 13.3. 1956.
15 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development.”
16 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 40, C(55)261, 6.10. 1955, “Report by the PRA
Committee on Countries With Underdeveloped Areas.”
17 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958,” OECD, August 1965, “Répertoire des
activités de l’AEP (1953-1961);” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21
(1st Revision), 1.12. 1959, “Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Develop-
ment.” After October 1957, Yugoslavia contributed to the agency and acquired the right
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The program for underdeveloped areas differed from others sponsored by the
EPA. It dealt with economic development in general rather than restricting
itself to the narrow field of productivity enhancement. Moreover, the rules
were more flexible than for other projects. Activities under this program
could indeed be carried out for the benefit of a single country, whereas a
normal project could not be adopted unless at least five countries took part.
The five-country-rule had been agreed upon to ensure that normal agency
work corresponded to a general need. But it could not be applied to activities
which were explicitly intended for a small group of countries. Finally, the
financial conditions of participation were favorable compared to other
projects.15
Since the rules applying to such activities were attractive, it was necessary to
specify the conditions under which a member country could participate in
the new program. The definition of “underdeveloped areas” agreed by the
Council was as follows:
Geographical areas where the standard of living is abnormally low, irrespective of
the reasons for this (surplus population in relation to the level of employment,
inadequate exploitation of natural resources, etc.) must be considered as regions
for which the agency could undertake common action. Nevertheless only countries
where the areas defined in the previous para are of such importance in relation to
the national economy that the general economic development is permanently
compromised can be considered as countries with underdeveloped areas [...].16
Later the stigmatizing expression “underdeveloped areas” (UDA) was
replaced by the more optimistic “areas in the process of economic develop-
ment” (APED). The countries participating in this program were Italy,
Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia (from 1957), Spain (from 1960), and Iceland
(from 1961).17
to participate in projects on equal footing with the member countries.
18 Some European countries complained about specific American programs (particularly
the Third Country Training program) or about the number of American experts used in
the EPA’s program for underdeveloped areas (see UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4,
PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957, “Minutes of the 54th Session Held on 6.5.-7.5. 1957.”
19 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “Ré-organisation de l’OECE: Notes diverses d’information
pour le Groupe des Quatre sur le travail de l’OECE,” f. “Replies to Questionnaire. No.
15,” memo, Black to Sergent, 1.3. 1960, att.: “Summary of Brief for US Deposition to
the Four Experts.”
20 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, EPA/D/9550, The Director of the EPA to Members of
the Governing Body, 15.6. 1961, “Report on the Work in Hand.”
21 See Appendixes: Table A-8. Concerning the operational budget (i.e., Part I of the
budget) see Chapter III.
22 This expansion took place among others at the expense of agriculture (whose share in
the EPA’s operational budget fell from one fourth in 1954/55 to one sixth in 1960/61)
and of the research projects concernng the economic factors in productivity enhancement
(see Appendixes: Table A-8 and A-9).
23 SAEF, B 46.467; f. “A 0.01, AEP. A 0 1 Correspondance AEP,” EPA/D/5400,
“Rapport sur les activités de l’AEP au cours de l’exercice 1957-58.”
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The US had played an important role in initiating the program, and sub-
sequently continuously encouraged the agency to give it a high priority. A
portion of the American funding to the EPA was earmarked for activities
assisting underdeveloped areas. While this role inevitably caused some
friction, it was decisive for the EPA’s efforts in this area.18 In 1960, US
governmental support was supplemented by a grant from the Ford Founda-
tion to assist teaching and research in the field of economic development.
The US, moreover, strongly supported the OECD making aid to underdeve-
loped countries one of its main objectives.19 The EPA’s activities in this field
thus prefigured what was to become one of the major preoccuptions of the
OECD in the 1960s.20
The first activities were initiated in 1955 and they were subsequently greatly
expanded. From a share of almost fourteen percent of the operational budget
in 1956/57, they rose to over twenty percent in 1959/60.21 The four countries
benefiting from these services – and which were free to participate in other
programs – subscribed less than ten percent of the annual revenue of the
agency.22 The aim of these projects was to promote economic development
through the provision of technical assistance and the establishment of trial
and demonstration areas.
When the agency was first set up, most of its activities were of the technical
assistance type and focused on the transfer of new techniques. In 1957, such
assistance had practically been abandoned. Its continuation in relation to
poor regions aimed at enabling them to catch up with richer areas.23
24 See Appendixes: Table A-10. See also: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC,
C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959, “Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process
of Economic Development.”
25 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development.”
26 See Richard S. Roberts, Jr., “Economic Development, Human Skills and Technical
Assistance. A Study of ILO. Technical Assistance in the Field of Productivity and
Management Development,” Ph.D. diss., University of Geneva, 1962; SAEF, B 46.467;
f. “A 0.01, AEP; A 0 1 Correspondance AEP,” EPA/D/5400, “Rapport sur les activités
de l’AEP au cours de l’exercice 1957-58.”
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Technical assistance involved providing experts and training of persons
nominated by the requesting country in various techniques. The cost was
substantial since it represented forty-two percent of the total available for the
UDA program and seven percent of the agency’s operational budget.24 It is
extremely difficult to evaluate the usefulness of the technical assistance given
by the EPA. As stated in an EPA report:
The answer is impossible to give by scientific proof. The effect of training takes
some years to show itself, and it is impossible for a central agency to keep trace of
the subsequent careers of all its trainees over such a period. The beneficiary
countries, however, are better placed, and it would be very desirable if the Council
would urge that eveluation of this sort should be undertaken at the national level.
The general impression – shared by the US authorities with their vastly greater
experience of this sort of training – is that there is on balance a very definite profit.
A certain wastage is inevitable, and some trainees either fail to respond to training
or subsequently change their careers so that the value of the experience is lost, but
the increased value of the trained personnnel far exceeds the cost of their
training.25
One of the problems confronted by the EPA and often discussed among the
member countries, was the need to avoid duplication of other organizations’
efforts. Technical assistance was a form of aid which had become widespread
after World War II. It was offered by the United Nations and its specialized
institutions as well as under bilateral agreements. The EPA, therefore,
established contacts with organizations such as FAO, ILO, UNESCO, etc.26
The most original element in the agency’s program was the creation of trial
and demonstration areas. The idea was to create pilot zones where the
agency with help from the national and local authorities would try to
promote growth and test methods which might be applicable in other areas.
These activities were guided by four main principles. The first was necessity
made virtue. The agency, which did not have the means to finance infra-
structural investments, stressed the importance of human ones which,
27 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 2, C/M(58)29(Prov.); ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958,” OECD, August
1965, “Répertoire des activités de l’AEP (1953-1961).”
28 Philippe Lamour, Le Cadran solaire, Paris 1980. In an interview with the author Ottino
Carraciolo di Forino was more dismissive of the project. See also Giulio Fossi,
“L’expérience OECE/OCDE des ‘zones pilotes’ en Sardaigne et en Epire,” Développement
et civilisations, no. 21, March 1965, pp. 61-69; Maurice Domergue, “The Pilot Area in
Epirus”, in: European Productivity, no. 37, winter 1960, pp. 47-52.
29 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “EPA, 1953-1958,” OECD, August 1965, “Répertoire des
activités de l’AEP (1953-1961);” SAEF, B 46.467; f. “A 0.01, AEP; A 0 1 Correspondan-
ce AEP,” EPA/D/5400, “Rapport sur les activités de l’AEP au cours de l’exercice 1957-
58.”
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conveniently, were much cheaper. The second principle was that economic
development formed a whole and that progress, therefore, had to be
simultaneously furthered in all sectors of society. The third principle was that
development of an area could not be imposed from the outside: it could only
succeed if carried out with the full consent and cooperation of the popula-
tion. Lastly, the trial and demonstration area had to be limited to a well-
defined and rather small geographical zone so that efforts could be concen-
trated.
Three criteria were important in choosing a site for a demonstration area. It
should appear possible to achieve improvements with limited resources. The
areas also would have to be representative so that they could serve as
laboratories in which methods could be tried out before they were put to use
elsewhere. And there would have to a be a national and regional plan which
could serve as general framework within which the pilot area could operate.
Trial and demonstration areas were created in Italy, Greece and Turkey.27
The Greek project initially seemed to fall victim to local political intrigues
which forced the agency to choose the area of Konitza-Zagoria-Paracalamos
in Epirus, which was not the one which had originally been contemplated.
The zone was started in September 1958. However, the EPA appointed an
independently minded expert to oversee the project, and it seems that he
subsequently achieved some success.28 Once the project had been launched,
the role of the agency was limited to giving technical assistance on the
request of the Greek authorities.29 The role of the agency in the creation of
the zone of Köycegiz-Dalaman-Mugla in Turkey was even more limited. It
facilitated the studies necessary for the creation of a zone. But the military
coup which overthrew the government in 1960 led to the abortion of the
project even before it got under way. The most successful pilot area was also
30 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, OEEC del. to UM, no 337, 23.1. 1959, “EPA, revideret
program og budget for 1958/59.”
31 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, OEEC del. to UM, no. 3899, 27.8. 1958, “EPA’s
fremtid;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting
Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, OEEC del.
to UM, no. 337, 23.1. 1959, “EPA, revideret program og budget for 1958/59;” UMA,
j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, OEEC del. to UM, 6.5. 1959, “EPA’s fremtid. Working Party no.
26;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, CES/9.055, 15.5. 1959, ltr., Danish OEEC del.
(Bartels) to the Chairman of Working Party No. 26, 14.5. 1959.
32 During the first eighteen months of the agency administration of the TCT program
1,149 trainees were placed in Europe. Subsequently, the annual rate was about 1,200,
which was about the same as the number of trainees placed in OEEC countries by the US
(cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development”).
33 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, 23.1. 1959, no. 337, “EPA, revideret program og budget
for 1958/59;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 3899, OEEC del. to UM, 27.8. 1958.
34 SVUD, Afd. H, Grupp 77, PP 49, ltr., Åsbrink to Swärd, 11.1. 1958, “Overföring af
TCT program til EPA.”
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the most ambitious. This was the Sardinian zone which will be examined
below.
Finally, an important element in the UDA program were the so-called Third
Country Training (TCT) program.30 It was initiated by the Americans and
later taken over by the EPA. The less developed countries which received US
technical assistance were known as “first countries.” Some of their trainees
chose to be trained in the US (the “second country”). But after the mid-
fifties an increasing proportion chose to go to “third countries,” i.e.,
countries other than the US. In many cases, the third country would be a
European one which would then receive trainees or send European experts
to the aid-receiving country. In 1958, at the request of the ICA, the EPA
took over responsibility for the administration of the TCT program.31 The
EPA’s role essentially consisted in finding member countries able and willing
to give the required training, plan the itineraries of the trainees and make
arrangements for their travel, reception, residence, etc.32 Several member
countries criticized the fact that the EPA took over a program which had
been conceived by the US, and of which they had little control. They further
disliked the administrative expenses – about fifty-five million francs a year –
which it occasioned for the EPA.33 Åsbrink, the Swedish chairman of the
Governing Body, saw the agency’s acceptance of the American proposal as
a plot by the secretariat to perpetuate itself, since it could create a moral
obligation to continue the EPA. The only acceptable reason to take over the
TCT program, in his view, was to do the US a favor, since this country had
done so much for the EPA.34 The program was defended by the secretariat
of the agency on several grounds. First, although only three of the seventy-
35 NARA, RG 59, 1955-1959, 840.00/12-1459, polto G-616, USRO Paris to State Dept.,
att.: “Help for Underdeveloped Countries;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC,
C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959, “Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process
of Development.”
36 WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, box 1, f. “EPA Advisory Board
Through 1957,” ltr., MacPhail to Francis, 4.12. 1956; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 51,
note, June 1959?, “The Sardinian Project.”
37 Piero Barucci, Ricostruzione, pianificazione, Mezzogiorno, Bologna, 1978, pp. 258, 347;
Klaus Künkel, “Der erste Zyklus der Mezzogiornopolitik – eine kritische Würdigung der
Mezzogiornopolitik von der Cassa per il Mezzogiorno zum Vanoni-Plan,” Ph.D. diss.,
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, 1964, pp. 193-95.
38 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 3; interview with Caracciolo di Forino.
39 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 10.
40 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 19.
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three “first countries,” namely Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, were
members of the agency, more than half of all trainees came from these three
countries. Taking over responsibility for the TCT program would allow the
agency to considerably expand its capacity to provide technical assistance to
some member countries. Such a step would also enable the OEEC countries
to show their willingness to assist underdeveloped countries. Lastly, the
agency was found better equipped than any non-European body to direct
trainees to appropriate European institutions.35
B. The Origins of the Sardinian Pilot Project36
After World War II, the Italian government took a series of initiatives to
develop the Mezzogiorno. Two important steps in this direction were the
creation of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in 1950 and the so-called Vanoni
Plan in 1954. Italy also tried to use the OEEC to alleviate its specific
development problems. It pleaded for freer movement of labor across the
borders of the OEEC countries. And it requested assistance for its economic
development.37 Within the EPA, Italy was the country most active in
promoting the idea of a special program for underdeveloped areas.38 In
March 1956, the Italian OEEC delegation requested that a trial and
demonstration area be created on Sardinia.39 It argued that the agency’s
money would be well-spent there since an economic plan was already being
implemented for the whole island. Allegedly, the regional plan was part of a
national one, namely the Vanoni Plan, which was implemented by the Cassa
per il Mezzogiorno.40 This soon turned out to be an embellished presentation
of the facts. In fact, no plan yet existed at the regional level. It was further
argued that the results obtained in Sardinia would be useful elsewhere since
41 Ibid., p. 12.
42 Ibid., pp. 13-17, 25-26. This area was situated on the western coast of Sardinia, it
covered 170,000 hectares, or about one tenth of the whole island, and had a population
of 110,000 in thirty-nine villages.
43 For a detailed study of the area, see: Anna Anfossi, Socialità e organizzazione in
Sardegna. Studio sulla Zona di Oristano-Bosa-Macomèr, Milan, 1968.
44 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 13-17.
45 Ibid., pp. 18-19 and p. 22; Emma Morin, “Progetto Sardegna,” unpublished report,
s.l., s.d., p. 15.
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the island was “highly representative”41 of other underdeveloped areas in the
member countries. Outsiders were often shocked by the extreme poverty on
the island. Forty percent of the adult population was illiterate. Nevertheless,
things had started to change. A few years earlier a Rockefeller health
campaign had wiped out malaria. Dams, irrigation, and tractors were being
introduced.
In May 1956, the agency sent a group of experts to Sardinia. The report of
this mission recommended the establishment of a pilot zone in a triangle
formed by the towns Oristano, Bosa and Macomer.42 This region was
allegedly selected because its problems were considered to be typical of those
found throughout the island. It was hoped that results could be reached
within a short period.43 The recommendation of the technical mission’s
report was swiftly endorsed by the OEEC Council, which in June 1956
accepted the Italian proposal and initiated the project no. 400.44
The energy displayed by the Council on this occasion seems to indicate that
the decision was made largely on political grounds. However, it soon turned
out that the speedy decision-making was based on false premises. The alleged
existence of a regional plan had been a decisive argument in favor of the
choice of Sardinia as the first place to create a pilot area. Unfortunately, the
development program for Sardinia only materialized in September 1962
under the name of Piano di Rinascità. The pilot zone, therefore, had to start
from scratch.45 It was to take eighteen months of negotiations between the
EPA, the Italian and the American authorities just to establish it.
C. The Sardinian Pilot Projet, 1957-1962
1. Organization
The financing of the pilot zone was agreed in July 1957, during a meeting in
Rome of US, Italian and EPA officials. It was decided to establish an
46 Members of the International Committee were: the EPA, the US government (US
Embassy in Rome and USRO from Paris), the Autonomous regional government of
Sardinia, the Sardinian Regional Productivity Committee, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno,
the Italian government (the Ministerial Committee for the Mezzogiorno), the Italian
National Productivity Committee and the Italian and International Assistance Activities
(AAI), which to different degrees participated in the financing of the project (see Terni,
“Elementi,” p. 34).
47 Interview with Nadine Ekserdjian; Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 150, 174-76.
48 Munir Benjenk later became vice-president of the World Bank.
49 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 66-70, 75, 123, 127-28.
50 Ibid., p. 92-93, 173; Morin, “Progetto Sardegna,” p. 211.
51 Ibid., pp. 76-78.
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International Committee to examine and approve the program and finances
of the project and to supervise its implementation. The committee was to
meet every three months. Philippe Lamour, director-general of the
“Compagnie Nationale d’Aménagement du Bas-Rhône-Languedoc” and a
member of the EPA’s Advisory Board, was chosen to head it.46 This
committee did not have the technical competence required for a detailed
supervision. But its existence was important because it created a formal link
between the Sardinian project and the authorities financing it. Moreover, it
acted as a public relations agent. This was important since no steps were
taken on the Italian side to ensure any kind of agreement or formal co-
operation with the pilot zone. In fact, the latter, which informally baptized
itself “Progetto Sardegna,” never acquired a legal status or an official name.47
While the International Committee’s role remained modest, it was hoped
that the director would provide firm and stable leadership. In November
1958, however, the director, Munir Benjenk,48 left for Paris to take over the
division for APED. His successor only stayed on for little more than a
month. After a period without any leader, Benjenk was reappointed head of
the project, but he stayed in Paris. Not until October 1960, was a director
nominated who actually was stationed in Sardinia.49 The effect of this lack
of stable leadership was amplified by the absence of any common goals.
Since there was no overall agenda, no criteria could be used to set priorities.
The director’s considerations, therefore, had to be mainly of a financial
character. As far as the substance was concerned, he had to endorse the
decisions made by the sectors themselves.50 In 1959, five different offices had
been established, namely in Oristano, Cagliari, Flussio, Ghilarza, and
Seneghe. Since there was practically no coordination between these,
centrifugal forces were further strengthened.51 Given the prolonged periods
without an effective directorship, an important role was played by the
administrative head of the project, the Secretary General Nadine
52 Ibid., p. 46; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12.
1959, “Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development.”
53 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 107-111, 176. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC,
C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959, “Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process
of Development.”
54 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 129.
55 Ibid., pp. 74, 86-88, 90.
56 Interview with Nadine Ekserdjian.
57 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 70-71.
58 Ibid., p. 75.
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Ekserdjian.52 In November 1959, Grégoire proposed and obtained the
creation of a technical committee to provide firmer supervision. This
committee consisted of the secretary general and of representatives of the
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and of the Sardinian government.53 It proved
short-lived, however, since the new director had it wound up in October
1960, probably because his ideas about how to reorient the project were not
shared by the committee.54
A main problem for the pilot zone was that it periodically had to justify its
own existence in order to retain its financing. Its position was precarious
since it was a de facto organization with no legal status within the Italian
political-administrative framework and which had to rely entirely on the
benevolence of the Italian authorities.55 The regional government was not
always well-disposed, so times were often hard. On several occasions, the
EPA was reduced to begging the Italians to pay what they had promised.56
In the beginning of 1959, the Sardinian project was close to bankruptcy.
Once again, the EPA had to exert pressure on the Italian authorities.57 In
March 1959, the International Committee decided that it should be
continued for another three years as of October 1959. However, at the end
of 1959, the pilot zone faced new financial problems because promised
funding was not forthcoming. While an intervention by Grégoire probably
helped save it, the lack of cooperation on the part of some of the local
authorities remained a problem.58
A main handicap for the Sardinian Project was indeed that it was perceived
as a foreign entity on the island. To some degree this may seem surprising.
The project had been requested by the Italians who also financed more than
half of its total cost:
59 Ibid., p. 186. The cost of the locally recruited staff, offices, etc., was borne by the
Italian authorities. The remaining costs were financed by the EPA and the US.
60 See below.
61 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 27. See also: Ibid., pp. 63-64.
62 Ibid., pp. 27-29.
63 Ibid., p. 75. In fact, it was largely assumed that the problems of underdeveloped areas
in the member countries were similar and that successful remedies in one area would also
be successful in other areas, see Ibid., p. 56. For the French model see: Ibid., p. 63. For
Lamour’s role, see Eric Roussel, Jean Monnet 1888-1979, Paris, 1996, pp. 493-94 and
Philippe Lamour, Le Cadran solaire, Paris, 1980, pp. 318-21, 340, 355-56.
64 This work was confided to Professor Orlando of the Istituto Nazionale per l’Economia
Agraria.
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Table 1: Contributions to the Progetto Sardegna during the period 1957-196259
(US dollars).
American authorities 120,000,000
Comitato Nazionale per la Produttività 50,500,000
Regione Sarda 254,000,000
Cassa del Mezzogiorno 147,500,000
Comitato dei Ministri per il Mezzogiorno 106,500,000
OECD/AEP/OECD 356,500,000
Total 1,035,000,000
However, while the Italian authorities were interested in aid, they were
suspicious of the cultural and educational aspects of the Sardinian project.60
2. Programming
The ambitions of the promotors of the project were high. The aim of “the
first major test area development program in the Mediterranean area” was
to make “a contribution of impressive importance to a million and a half
people who face severe difficulties.”61 However, no concrete plan was ever
worked out to determine what steps should be taken to attain this goal.
Numerous activities were initiated, but nothing was done to ensure that there
would be any coordination between them.62 Two sources of inspiration often
mentioned were the New Deal’s Tennessee Valley Authority project and the
development project initiated by Philippe Lamour in the Bas-Rhône-
Languedoc region.63 The Sardinian project differed in several ways from
these predecessors. It had no funds to invest in larger infrastructural projects
and it lacked clear political support. It tried to overcome these handicaps by
commissioning a plan for a territorial development in the pilot zone.64
However, while some studies were completed in 1960, their influence was
65 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 48, 90, 152. While the study initiated by the agency itself did
not produce any useful overall plan, a commission under the name of “Rinascità” was set
up for that purpose. It resulted in the Piano di Rinascità in 1962, three months before the
Sardinian project was wound up.
66 Ibid., pp. 23, 44, 62, 91.
67 Ibid., p. 112.
68 Ibid., pp. 131-37 and 145-48.
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nil.65 Yearly programs were prepared for 1957-58 and for 1958-59, followed
by a triennial program adopted by the International Committee in July 1959.
They were basically vague and general lists of activities, written separately by
the different sectors.66
One may distinguish between different phases in the Sardinian project’s life.
During the period of 1957 to 1959, emphasis was on the development of the
whole area. In 1959, however, a crisis took place. Funds from the Italian
authorities were withheld and it appeared that the pilot area did not have
means corresponding to its ambitions and that it would have to resign itself
to activities of technical and social assistance.67 During the period of July
1959 to October 1959, intense negotiations took place between heads of
sections who discussed how to concentrate their activities. They were,
however, unable to reach an agreement and the outlook was gloomy when
Roger Grégoire intervened in November 1959. In a letter to the International
Committee he proposed a concentration of the efforts in some villages and
in some important sectors. The acceptance of these proposals by the
International Committee amounted to a relaunching of the Sardinian project.
Another change occurred in October 1960 with the appointment of a new
director, who preferred a strategy “concentrated intervention.” This strategy
was mainly implemented in one village, Zeddiani. It was criticized by some
as a step backwards into “sectorialism,” since it was based on the belief that
it was possible to act at a communal level without any plan for a larger
territory. The Zeddiani activities did have some positive results. For the first
time a mayor was involved and the population participated more actively
than had been the case on occasions. But the impact outside Zeddiana was
scarcely perceptible.68
More generally, one may say that there were two conflicts. First, there was
a difference between those who mainly saw the pilot zone as an endeavor to
develop the whole area and those who primarily wished to test and demon-
strate methods in order to find out whether they would be applicable
elsewhere. The second was between those who preferred the technical
assistance aspect and those who preferred a more educational approach. The
69 Ibid., p. 172.
70 Ibid., pp. 153-56.
71 The Sindacato Autonome degli Impiegati del Progetto Sardegna was affiliated with the
Conferazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori.
72 One interviewee argued that it rather had the opposite effect.
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former dominated in the rural home economics and in the handicrafts
service. The latter were particularly strong in the adult education service.69
3. The End
In 1959, it had been decided to continue the Sardinian project until October
1962. This decision was not based on any analysis of the time required for
the project to mature but on purely financial considerations. As the end
approached, two initiatives developed to prolong its activities. The first
aimed at extending the trial and demonstration area to the whole island. This
never succeeded. It does seem that there were attempts to find a place for the
pilot zone within the Piano di Rinascita, but they failed. An idea to turn the
whole project into a training center for specialists in development was greeted
with enthusiasm within the Sardinian project. It was considered within the
OECD but was never followed up. Italian authorities themselves seem to
have been divided. Some were interested in having the project continued
while others were more reluctant. In order to ensure financing during the
following three years, the regional government of Sardinia prepared a law for
submission to the local parliament, and the Committee of Ministers for the
South declared that it would allocate sums allowing the activities to continue.
However, none of these initiatives were followed up.70
The personnel observed these salvaging attempts with hope. They felt that
promises had been made concerning job prospects after the winding up of
the project. But as it slowly dawned on everyone that such promises would
not be kept, there was a deterioration in the social climate and particularly
in the feelings towards the OECD, which was seen as the main villain. A
newly created trade union71 organized a general strike which failed to
convince the OEEC Council to continue the project.72 As a result, each
section of the pilot zone fought for itself, trying to ensure that at least its
work would continue. However, after the winding up of the project in
December 1962, it was largely forgotten by everybody except the former
participants.
73 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 187.
74 Ibid., pp. 48-51, 78-79, 96-97.
75 While one interviewee remembered that this had aroused some reluctance among men
in the zone, all other interviewees insisted that the strong emphasis put by the project on
activating women in the zone had been readily accepted by all, allegedly because of the
traditionally strong position of women in Sardinian society (see also: “Il primo anno del
progetto OECE per la Sardegna,” in: Produttività, vol. 9, no. 12, December 1958, p.
1006). It is worth noting that the secretary general (Nadine Ekserdjian), the head of the
Rural home economics service (Giuliana Minuti) and the head of Social service (Emma




The Sardinian Project consisted of different sections headed by EPA experts
and manned by Italian staff. The expenses were distributed as follows:
Table 2: Expenses of the Progetto Sardegna during its period of
activity, 1957-1962 (million lira)73
Agricultural consulting 244,000,000
Rural home economics 81,000,000
Handicrafts and small industry 144,000,000
Adult education 62,000,000
Social service 105,000,000
Visual aids, press and public relations 92,000,000
Studies and documentation 40,000,000
Vocational training 25,000,000
Administration, direction or external consultancy 242,000,000
Total 1,035,000,000
As far as handicrafts and small industries were concerned, the objective was
to modernize and commercialize the products of traditional female domestic
occupations such as weaving, carpet-making and basketry.74 These activities,
which aimed at providing very poor rural families with an additional income,
resulted in a rather radical change for the women involved. They had
previously worked at home, but were now organized in weaving cooperatives
equipped with modern machines.75 These cooperatives soon turned out to
be commercial successes, selling luxury textile products to the rest of Italy
and abroad. Basketry cooperatives were likewise established. The women
received training in industrial design, marketing and management techniques
and were soon exporting to the mainland. Rather quickly the previously
existing unemployment among basket weavers in the area disappeared. In
76 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 183.
77 Ibid., pp. 48, 51-52, 77-78, 94-95.
78 Ibid., p. 78.
79 Roger Marcellin, “La divulgazione agricola,” in: Ichnusa. Rivista della Sardegna, vol.
43, 1961, pp. 20-30. See also: Roger Marcellin, “Olive Growing in Sardinia,” OEEC/
EPA, July 1960.
80 Paul Lengrand is considered the “grand old man” in the field of adult education (I
would like to thank UNESCO’s chief archivist, Jens Boel, for this information). See
Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 79, 97-104.
81 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 181-82. See also: Elena Borghese, Antonio Cortese and Jacques
Mawas, “L’educazione degli adulti,” in: Ichnusa, vol. 43, 1961, pp. 63-77.
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1959, more than one thousand families had been involved in the handicrafts
project. All in all, fifteen centers (cooperatives or other forms of enterprises)
had been created. An umbrella organization was established to sell the
products.76
The agricultural activities were developed after the handicrafts program had
been initiated. Since the dominating economic sector in the region was
agriculture, this field was a prime target.77 The service’s projects were
primarily educational or advisory. The very first step was to locally recruit
twenty-two agricultural consultants who were then trained in agricultural
techniques and in methods of adult education. The goal was to improve the
selection of crops and the pastureland as well as to reforest. Endeavors were
also undertaken to regroup farms, to encourage mechanization and to
modernize farm buildings. Advice was given on the better use of existing
agricultural credit facilities and on farm accounting and management. New
crops were sown in experimental fields for demonstration. Poultry raising
was introduced to supplement fruit and vegetable growing and in a few years
the stock was raised from zero to 100,000.78 Other consulting activities
concerned irrigation, treatment of olive trees, the organization of agricultural
cooperatives and of markets as well as the creation of a laboratory for soil
analysis.79
The adult education element of the project were initiated by Paul Lengrand,
an official who was borrowed from UNESCO, where he had played an
important role.80 According to a later report by Paolo Terni, it was rather
successful. Terni primarily attributed this to the fact that its approach was
acceptable to both lay and catholic environments. Its work involved the
training of local teachers in the techniques of adult education. It also led to
the creation of several cultural centers which in 1962 joined in a federation.
Furthermore, the Sard Association for Adult Education was created, which
later organized training courses, seminars and fellowships for managers.81
82 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 79-82, 97-104. Among the partner organizations were:
Assessorat de la Jeunesse, l’Union contre l’Analphabétisme and the Ford Foundation,
UNICEF, the Foundation “Umanitaria” and UNESCO’s Assessorat pour l’instruction
publique.
83 Ibid., p. 182. See also: Emma Morin, “L’assistenza sociale,” in: Ichnusa, vol. 43, 1961,
pp. 78-92.
84 Filippo M. De Sanctis, “Gli ‘audiovisivi’ in un lavoro di sviluppo”, in: Ichnusa, vol. 43,
1961, pp. 56-62. Many locals had never watched a movie before (interview with Paolo
Terni, 30.7. 1995).
85 Newsletter from Sardinia edited in Italian, French and English.
86 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 80. 104-106, 183.
87 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 36, 62, 93; Marcellin, “La divulgazione agricola,” p. 20, Morin,
“Progetto Sardegna,” p. 214. One of the initial central ideas of the project was that of
community development. In the project’s first annual program (1957-58) it was stated
that one of the main aims of the project was the development of community activities
which by the United Nations had been defined as a process aimed at creating conditions
for economic and social progress for the whole community, with its active participation
and building to the maximum extent possible on the community’s own initiatives (Terni,
“Elementi”, p. 40.) However, the concept of community development was not taken
seriously within the project. It was used as packaging but otherwise disliked as an
American concept, not adapted to the Sardinian context (Ibid., pp. 23-24, 47, 55, 82,
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The activities of the social welfare service were twofold. It cooperated with
other services, for example in preparing courses or encouraging the formation
of groups of farmers interested in similar problems.82 Otherwise, it focused
its energy on educational institutions. Meals were introduced in all primary
schools throughout the zone and proved so successful that a bill put before
the Italian parliament provided for the system to be extended to the rest of
Italy. At the same time, a program for the regular medical examination of
school children was drawn up with the assistance of the Sardinian govern-
ment. Weekly broadcasts, regular press articles and inspections led to an
improvement in health, hygiene, child care and general nutrition.83
The section of rural home economics encouraged the creation of sixteen
cooperatives of women cattle breeders, who were grouped into one single
organization. The information activities involved meetings in the villages,
film shows,84 publication of a periodical bulletin85 and relations with the local
press, radio and television as well as tours for officials, teachers and visitors
from abroad.86 One of the original features of the Sardinain pilot zone was
the creation of the so-called équipes, or groups of integrated technical
assistance. The traditional practice in the Mezzogiorno had been to establish
an office in town where the locals could go and request advice. Instead, the
équipes actively sought contact with the population. They consisted of social
workers, adult education teachers and audiovisual aids experts. In some
villages, this interdisciplinary cooperation proved successful.87
112-113, 157; interview with Terni).
88 Interview with Nadine Ekserdjian. The EPA tried to overcome its handicap as an
outsider by stressing that on the part of the project there was no sense of superiority vis-à-
vis the assisted country or region, and emphasizing its aim of mobilizing the populations
concerned (Terni, “Elementi,” p. 56).
89 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 169 and 172.
90 Ibid., p. 168.
91 Ibid., p. 171.
92 Interview with Nadine Ekserdjian.
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E. Handicaps
The main weakness of the project was political. Although it was created at
the request of the Italian national authorities, there was no strong political
will or commitment behind it, especially not at the regional level. Since the
Sardinian project involved a very different kind of intervention from the one
previously practiced by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, strong support would
have been needed to force through the necessary changes. The Italians did
want the EPA to intervene, but not too much. As a result, the project was
more tolerated than welcomed by the regional authorities.88 In the absence
of a regional plan, there was no coordination between the project and the
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’s infrastructural investments in Sardinia. This
situation reflected differing views among Italian political and administrative
authorities. In the mid-fifties public planning was not a popular concept with
the governing Italian elites.89
Theoretically, the lack of domestic political will could at least have been
partially compensated by an international one. But in fact the EPA had no
clear ideas either, since the Sardinian pilot area was created at a moment
when Western countries were just beginning to think about aid to underdeve-
loped areas.90 This put the project in the awkward situation of having to hide
its true nature. In its relations with the regional authorities it presented itself
as an innocuous operation aiming at a more efficient use of existing
resources. It never advocated planning or structural reforms – at the most it
insisted on the need for studies. Once the contributions had been made, the
project enjoyed full freedom of action.91 However, this was far from being
fully exploited. First of all, the project did encounter different forms of
political resistance from local elites which feared the changes which could be
induced by the pilot area. The region was a Christian Democrat stronghold
and the local party bosses were not interested in awakening any activism
among the population. In some cases, priests saw the project’s representa-
tives as a subversive communist threat.92 This situation encouraged the pilot
zone to project a conformist look to outsiders, despite its efforts to achieve
93 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 170. One may also note that the project did not conform to the
vision which the PCI had for an Italian development policy which aimed at industrializing
the Mezzogiorno. Consensus among Italian economists in the 1950s was to see
industrialization as the solution to the problems of Southern Italy, see Barucci,
Ricostruzione, pianificazione, Mezzogiorno, pp. 350, 357.
94 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 171
95 Ibid., p. 92, 173.
96 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development.” See also: Fossi,
“L’expérience OECE/OCDE des ‘zones pilotes’ en Sardaigne et en Epire,” p. 65.
97 Terni, “Elementi,” pp. 24-25.
98 Ibid., p. 23.
99 It should be mentioned that locally recruited personnel did not receive salaries higher
than corresponding local salaries.
100 Interviews with Ekserdjian, Morin, Terni.
101 The last director of the pilot area was offered an office where he could write a report
about the experience of the Sardinian project. However, it does not seem that anybody
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real change.93 As a result, some local bureaucrats and politicians failed to see
any use for the project and thus had an excuse not to back it. Others did see
it, but disliked it and were determined to fight it.94
This political background explained many administrative deficiencies. The
absence of an overall plan for the area was a handicap and led to improvisa-
tion and arbitrary decisions.95 Moreover, because of the international control
of the operation, the project was looked upon by some of the local notabiliti-
es as a “foreign body.”96 It constantly had to justify its own existence in the
eyes of the public and of the political-administrative Italian authorities.97 In
general, one may say that there was a basic contradiction between the am-
bitiousness of the Sardinian project and the actual means put at its disposal.98
F. Impact Outside the Pilot Area
The project aroused a great deal of enthusiasm and idealism among those
active in it.99 Many former officials still remember it as an exceptional
opportunity for training and commitment. But the widespread feeling among
them was that while the project did achieve important results during its
existence these results were mostly forgotten after the pilot area ceased to
exist.100
The impact outside the pilot area seems to have been limited. Hardly any
account was taken of it in drawing up the Piano di Rinascità for the whole of
Sardinia.101 However, when the project was wound up both Giulio Pastore,
took notice of this account, which I have not been able to locate (cf. Terni, “Elementi,”
pp. 160-61, 189).
102 Ibid., pp. 65, 157-58, 163.
103 Otto Mathias Bucher, “Die Ursachen der ‘italienischen Südfrage’ und ihr Lösungsver-
such durch die Staatsintervention (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno),” Ph.D. diss., University
of Freiburg, Bern 1963, pp. 75-76, 98-99, 195-96
104 Fossi, “L’expérience OECE/OCDE des ‘zones pilotes’ en Sardaigne et en Epire,” p.
66.
105 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, OEEC, C/WP26/W/21 (1st Revision), 1.12. 1959,
“Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development.”
106 SAEF, B 46.467, f. “A 0.01, AEP; A 0 1 Correspondance AEP” EPA/D/5400,
“Rapport sur les activités de l’AEP au cours de l’exercice 1957-58.”
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minister for the Mezzogiorno, and Gabriele Pescatore, president of the Cassa
per il Mezzogiorno, praised the pilot zone and found that it had taught some
important lessons concerning the role of “civic growth” and the efficiency of
human investments.102 Since its creation in 1950, the Cassa per il Mezzogior-
no had almost exclusively concentrated on basic infrastructure.103 It seems
that the project’s demonstration of the efficiency of human investments
influenced the Cassa’s policy. Moreover, the use of pluridisciplinary teams
of technical assistance inspired similar actions by the Cassa per il Mezzogior-
no elsewhere.104 The pilot area prompted The Committee of Ministers for
Southern Italy to allocate three billion lire for setting up three development
areas in the sphere of agriculture, social welfare and education, based on the
model of the Sardinian project, but to be run exclusively by the Italian
authorities.
The Sardinian project achieved some degree of international fame since its
reputation spread beyond the borders of Europe. The number of visitors
from African territories, Israel, and other countries was “almost embarassing-
ly high” and constituted “a real problem for the limited staff in charge.”105
G. Conclusion
In sum, one may say that the project did testify to the fruitfulness of its
methods. These comprised adult education as well as the use of integrated
technical assistance groups and they were based on a global approach which
envisaged simultaneously all aspects of economic development in a geo-
graphically delimited area. The pilot zone had shown that significant results
could be achieved with relatively small resources.106 But it also illustrated the
problems which could be caused by political and socio-cultural resistances
to change. In particular, it demonstrated that such an endeavor could only
107 Fossi, “L’expérience OECE/OCDE des ‘zones pilotes’ en Sardaigne et en Epire,”
p. 69.
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succeed if there was a domestic political will to change existing conditions.107
This could hardly come as a surprise to its promotors, who had always
stressed that change could not be imposed from the outside. But in practice
the project had tried to avoid politics. While occasionally cooperating with
other organizations it had largely worked on its own, isolated from the
administrative-political framework on the island. However, its means were
not sufficient to achieve all the desired changes on its own. Therefore, the
pilot area showed the need for active participation not only by individuals but
also by organized social and political forces in the area. This was exactly what
the “Progetto Sardegna” had tried to avoid in order not to get entangled in
Italian domestic politics.
1 The best overviews of the agency’s activities are to be found in the following two reports:
WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, ROS, RRt EPA, 1953-1957, EPA: Advisory Board – EPA:
General, box 1, f. “EPA/General Through 1957,” EPA(57)11, 3.9. 1957; ECHA, EPA
Archives, OECE, August 1965, “Répertoire des activités de l’AEP (1953-1961).” Con-
cerning the change of emphasis in the program, see for example: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 1, OEEC del. to UM, no. 3899, 27.8. 1958.
2 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, OEEC del., no. 5595, 15.12. 1958, “EPA. Governing
Board. Mødet d. 4.12. og 5.12. 1958;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, ltr., HMPU (Rydeng) to
UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10. 1958, att.: memo, 26.9. 1958; ASCONF, box 70/14.1, f.
“Indici di produttività in Francia (studia),” ltr., CNP (Lusignoli) to CGII, 23.3. 1959.
3 At least according to the EPA’s own reports, cf. EPA Information Bulletin, Paris,
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IX. IMPACT OF THE EPA’S ACTIVITIES
This chapter will briefly describe those aspects of the EPA’s activities which
previously have not been presented and it will more generally assess the
agency’s impact.
A. The Projects1
The programs for management, trade unions and areas in the process of
economic development have already been examined. What will be introduced
below are the activities concerning the economic factors of productivity, the
development of applied research and its use, the food and agriculture
program and the information activities.
1. Economic Factors of Productivity
This part of the EPA’s program dealt with the methods of measurement and
with the study of the general economic factors influencing the development
of productivity. The measurement of the productivity of work was a central
task, since without reliable evaluations it would hardly be possible to assess
methods to increase productivity. However, it was also a controversial
activity. Many businessmen disliked the idea of comparing productivity and
they were reluctant to disclose the relevant information. This was a problem
particularly in Southern European countries.2
Several of the agency’s activities in this field were innovative. The productivi-
ty measurement advisory service which dealt with inter-firm comparisons and
more generally the use of mathematical methods in industry, was the only
international service of its kind. The Productivity Measurement Review was
widely read and highly influential among specialists.3 The activities of the
September 1961, “Eight Years of Promoting Productivity.”
4 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), note, Müller, 1.8. 1958, “Arbeit der EPZ;” SVUD, Afd. H,
grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956, att.: “Memorandum on
the Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National Productivity Center;”
ASCONF, box 58/4.2: CIFE, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno
1957,” note, “2ème réunion du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de
l’AEP, 7.12. 1957. Compte rendu des décisions.”
5 See for example: NLRA, Inv.nr.: 593-601, f. “594,” ltr., 24984, 8.2. 1952, de Milly to
Pen, att.: note, de Milly, 7.2. 1952, “Verslag van het Technical Assistance Symposium
officieel getiteld ‘Symposium on Productivity Through Technical Assistance’ en op
verzoek van OEEC Mission 100 op 30.1.-31.1. 1952 te Parijs gehouden.”
6 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, ltr., HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10. 1958, att.:
note, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960;”
UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, OEEC del., no. 5595, 15.12. 1958, “EPA. Governing
Board. Mødet d. 4.12. og 5.12. 1958;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, EPA/D/6373, 13.4. 1959,
“Advisory Board, 4th Session. Opinion of the CEIF on the Future of the EPA;”
ASCONF, box 58/4.2: CIFE, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno
1957,” note, “2ème réunion du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de
l’AEP, 7.12. 1957. Compte rendu des décisions.”
7 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-
1961,” note, “10ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de
l’AEP (1.2. -2.2. 1960). Compte rendu des décisions.”
8 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, ltr. HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10.
1958, att.: memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after
30.6. 1960.” However, not all Americans were satisfied. Some of them “found that the
purely symbolic activities of the EPA in the field of RBP was a violation of the agreement
between OEEC and the EU in the sense that it is much too limited” (cf. ASCONF, box
58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,” note, “12ème
session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP. Réunion des 30.5.-
31.5. et 1.6. 1960. Compte rendu des décisions”).
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agency – notably those conducted by experts from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics – were instrumental in introducing American measuring techniques
at the firm and at the national level in several European countries in the mid-
fifties. They were particularly appreciated by Germany and Sweden.4
The study of economic factors of productivity focused on the influence on
productivity of fiscal legislation, investments, capital resources and restrictive
business practices. Studies of the latter resulted from continuous US pressure
upon reluctant Western Europeans.5 During the Moody negotiations, the
American request that Western Europeans commit themselves to fighting
restrictive business practices had proven a major stumbling block. Since the
EPA was largely financed by Moody funds, the agency had to pay lip service
to this goal, but it only initiated a few activities in this field.6 Even so, they
were viewed with skepticism by the CEIF.7 It is hard to detect their practical
impact: they were generally dismissed by the member countries as window-
dressing aimed at making the Americans happy.8 But they contributed to
keeping the US anti-cartel crusade going in Western Europe.
9 See Chapter II.
10 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, C/M(56)27(Prov.), 18.7. 1956, “Minutes of the 332nd
Meeting Held on 29.6. 1956;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, PRA/M(57)4, 29.5. 1957,
“Minutes of the 54th Session Held on 6.-7.5. 1957;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2,
HMPU, note, 4.5. 1959, “OEEC doc. CES 9.047 af 23.4. 1959.”
11 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note,
“Allocution de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956.”
12 HM, j.nr 86 (1960), 86-1-60, ltr., HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Groot), 12.4. 1960.
13 The construction activities were the main “vertical” activities of the agency and as such
had their own chapter in the EPA’s program. They were discontinued in 1959, despite
vehement Danish protests.
14 ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti,” note,
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2. Development of Applied Research and its Use
As early as 1953, Alexander King stated that the development of applied
research was the most important task in Europe if productivity was to be
increased.9 However, the limited financial resources of the agency severely
constrained its research efforts. Moreover, while especially France wanted
the EPA to undertake research, this was strongly resisted by Germany and
the Scandinavian member countries who wished to keep all activities as
practical as possible.10 Rather than attempting to undertake research on its
own, the agency therefore tried to coordinate activities in the member
countries and to stimulate transnational research projects.11 In some cases
the topics investigated proved too controversial. Thus, while the agency
briefly devoted a great deal of attention to the process of automation, it
changed its mind when it realized that there were strong disagreements in
that field.12 Instead it focused on promoting European cooperation in the
field of applied research and encouraging the application of the results of
such research in industry. It did so by organizing studies, publications,
symposiums and courses and by forming mixed committees of parliamentari-
ans and science administrators to discuss national science policies. The
agency further assisted national institutions of applied research and helped
to create national information centers. It promoted the development of
international cooperative research efforts aimed at a more efficient use of
existing resources of manpower, facilities and funds for scientific efforts. It
notably dealt with problems such as road safety, fire fighting, air pollution,
noise, fatigue failure of metals, etc. The agency also encouraged studies to
improve building methods and achieved the adoption by the OEEC countries
of norms to standardize construction materials.13 As a result of its efforts, a
large number of research centers in the member countries started coopera-
ting.14
“Allocution de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du CIFE du 22.2. 1956;” UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8540, 20.10. 1960.
15 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, OEEC del., no. 5595, 15.12. 1958, “EPA. GB. Mødet
d 4.12. og 5.12. 1958;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, HMPU, note, 4.5. 1959, “OEEC
doc. CES 9.047 af 23.4. 1959.”
16 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), note, Müller, 1.8. 1958, “Arbeit der EPZ;” UMA, j.nr 86,
86-9-60, Sekretariatet for Danmarks Erhvervsfond, 10.2. 1961, “Skandinavisk
memorandum om det fremtidige produktivitetsarbejde under OECD.”
17 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, HMPU, note, 4.5. 1959, “OEEC doc. CES 9.047 af
23.4. 1959;” OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 13, pp. 66-67.
18 Initially this program represented twenty-five percent of the EPA’s operational activities
which was not far from the maximum foreseen by the US. It was down to approximately
fifteen percent when the EPA was wound up in 1961 (see Appendixes: Table A-8 and A-
9).
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The work in this sector was much debated among the member countries.
They appreciated the increased cooperation in applied research. But quite a
few countries were dissatisfied with the performance of the Committee for
Applied Research which was developing the program of the agency.15 From
1957 onwards, the US and the secretariat of the agency favored giving higher
priority to the scientific activities. Northern European countries were
reluctant to accept this because they feared it would happen at the expense
of projects in industry and commerce.16
The EPA’s activities in the field of research were taken over by the Direction
of Scientific Affairs of the OECD in 1961. The efforts to improve the
training and utilization of technical and scientific personnel were continued
first by the Office for Scientific and Technical Personnel (OSTP) which was
created in 1958 and after 1961 by the OECD.
3. Food and Agriculture
The program for the agricultural sector was prepared outside the EPA, by
the OEEC’s Committee of Deputies of the Ministerial Committee for
Agriculture and Food, but formally adopted and implemented by the EPA.17
It was initially given high priority, partly because of the Moody aid (the
Americans had foreseen that up to thirty percent of this aid could be used for
agricultural projects) and partly because OEEC countries believed that the
backwardness of the agricultural sector was one of the main socio-political
obstacles to the liberalization of trade in Western Europe.18 This program
aimed at promoting more efficient techniques in production, marketing and
distribution, through the organization of courses, conferences, studies,
missions, and pilot and demonstration projects and by providing advisory
19 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, CSA(59)45, note, 31.12. 1959, “Summary Report on the
Activities of the EPA in the Agriculture and Food Sector Since its Establishment.”
20 CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box 306, note, 18.7. 1959, Eidgenössisches
Volkswirtschaftsdepartement (EVD) to Bundesrat, “Weitere Teilnahme der Schweiz an
den Arbeiten der EPA.” In 1956, de Milly found that agricultural interests and trade
unions constituted “the pro-EPA lobby in Switzerland,” cf. MBZ, DGES-Archief,
996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., de Milly to Hausberger, 19.11. 1956; MBZ, DGES-
Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., de Milly to Grégoire, 15.11. 1956.
21 ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP. Consiglio Consultativo,” EPA/D/6364, 26.3. 1959,
“Conseil Consultatif. 4ème session. Resumé sommaire des opinions exprimées par les
organisations internationales non-gouvernementales representées au Conseil Consultatif.”
See also: ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di Lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno
1958-59,” ltr., Morelli to Valletta, 9.12. 1958, att.: note, 9.12. 1958; ASCONF, box
70/18.1, f. “EPA. Atti constitutivi. Consiglio Consultativo sull’AEP,” Karl Peter Harten,
23.4. 1954, “Obiettivi e funzioni dell’AEP;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3,
EPA/AB/M(56)2, 31.12. 1956, “AB Minutes of the 7th Session Held in Paris on 31.5.
and 1.6. 1956.”
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services to farmers. Steps were taken to improve the forecasting of produc-
tion. Standards were agreed upon for certified seed, fruits and vegetables. A
“Cold Chain” project was established to increase commercial exchanges
between Northern and Southern European countries by easing the distribu-
tion of frozen fish from Iceland and Norway to Southern Europe and
encouraging the export northwards of Italian, Greek and Turkish agricultural
produce.19 Training of agricultural personnel was developed and a Mediter-
ranean Center for Post-Graduate Education in Agriculture and Food was set
up. Through a bi-monthly publication, the FATIS Review, technical
information was disseminated in all member countries.20
4. Information
Since the EPA had relatively limited funds, one of the main means at its
disposal was information activities. These aimed at disseminating news
concerning productivity techniques and more generally at spreading the
“spirit of productivity”21 among populations in Europe. The rationale for the
agency’s information activities was formulated by the Advisory Board in
1957:
The prevailing system of western democracy and free enterprise does not permit
a too centralised initiative to be taken. The approach can only be by persuasion.
One of the most effective means of persuasion is the dissemination of facts and
figures, which can enable the reader to compare his own productivity against the
productivity of comparable enterprises, trades or groups. If these figures were
clearly defined and well classified, industry and public administrations would
22 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, EPA(57)9, 23.7. 1957, “Advisory Board, Annual Report
on the Activities of the EPA.”
23 The digests of technical articles prepared in English were republished in Spain, Greece,
Italy, Japan and Turkey and extracts were published in technical reviews in Austria,
Canada, France, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Norway, Portugal, South Africa and Yugoslavia.
24 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, ltr., HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10. 1958, att.:
memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6.
1960;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, no. 2790, OEEC del., 25.6. 1956, “PRA komité møde 11.-
12.6. 1956;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, C/M(56)27(Prov.), 18.7. 1956, “Minutes of the
332nd Meeting Held on 29.6. 1956.”
25 Concerning the Question and Answer service: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21: EPA, ltr, HMPU
(Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10. 1958, att.: memo, 26.9. 1958, “Productivity
Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2,
no. 5595, OEEC del., 15.12. 1958, “EPA. Governing Board. Mødet d. 4.12. og 5.12.
1958.”
26 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7450 – Sector I (1st Revision), 12.3. 1960,
“Revised 1960-61 Programme for Sector I: Industry and Commerce;” UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7952, ltr., Hall to Grégoire, 27.4. 1960.
27 See below.
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understand what could be done in their particular case – and would be encouraged
to take proper action.22
The agency published numerous reports as well as periodical publications
such as European Productivity, Trade Union News, Productivity Measurement
Review, FATIS Review, International Guide of Technical Information Sources,
and Technical Abstracts.23 It made use of both radio and television and it
established what was allegedly the biggest film library in Western Europe in
an attempt to further a psychological climate favorable to the entire
productivity campaign.24 Moreover, it tried to provide specialized knowledge
to small and medium sized firms through a “Question and Answer” service
which it took over from the US.25 It encouraged the use of Russian technical
literature and in 1960 it set up a European center for the translation of this
literature.26
B. Assessing the Impact
It is extremely doubtful whether an overall assessment of the EPA’s activities
is possible. There is no way to quantify the effect of the innumerable con-
ferences, travel missions, seminars, courses, etc., instigated by the EPA. Only
through analyses of the EPA’s influence in particular fields or countries will
it be possible to get some idea of the agency’s overall impact. But even such
exercises are fraught with difficulties. A major obstacle stems from the de-
ficiencies of the source material.27 Furthermore, sorting out the EPA projects
28 Some assessments may be possible, particularly in cases where the size of a field or a
country is small and good source material is available (see: Amdam and Yttri, “The
European Productivity Agency, the Norwegian Productivity Institute and Management
Education,” pp. 120-39).
29 It is revealing that the EPA is also ignored in a recent book about productivity policies
in Western Europe: Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay (eds.), Management, Labour and
Industrial Politics in Modern Europe. The Quest for Productivity Growth During the Twentieth
Century, Cheltenham and Brookfield, 1996.
30 Edward F. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ. Postwar Experience in Nine Western
Countries, Washington DC, 1967, pp. 283-86. In the French case Denison credited the
national French productivity drive with a probable positive impact on economic growth.
For Denison’s caveat concerning the possible delayed impact, see p. 286.
31 Michael Postan, An Economic History of Western Europe 1945-1964, London, 1967, pp.
22 and 49; Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, pp. 225-27.
32 Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, “Postwar Growth: an Overview,” in: Crafts and
Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth, p. 23.
33 Barry Eichengreen, Marc Uzan, “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and
Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR,” in: Economic Policy, vol. 14,
April 1992, pp. 14-75, cf. pp. 50-51. Eichengreen and Uzan give the Marshall Plan
(though without alluding to the “politics of productivity”) a large part of the credit for this
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from purely national ones is difficult. In many cases the source material
hardly allows such a differentiation which anyhow seems questionable: the
EPA projects were chosen because they fit into a national productivity drive
and they, therefore, ought to be analyzed within this national context.28
A list of all the projects implemented by the EPA would be daunting because
of its sheer length. However, these activities have failed to impress historians.
The literature concerning Europe’s postwar history almost totally ignores the
EPA. This silence amounts to an implicit assessment that the impact of the
agency was insignificant.29
The question of the factors behind the economic growth in postwar Western
Europe is still disputed. As far as the productivity drive is concerned, Edward
Denison belittles its role, except in France and Italy.30 Michael Postan, on
the other hand, concedes a significant influence to what he terms “growth-
manship,” the fact that “economic growth was so powerfully propelled by
public sentiments and policies.” He moreover emphasizes the American roots
of this “spirit” behind the growth.31 Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo also
seem to ascribe an important role to “the spread of the new productivity
ideology” for the postwar economic growth in Western Europe.32 In Barry
Eichengreen’s and Marc Uzan’s view, improved labor-management relations
after the war, and notably the willingness of labor to show wage restraint in
order to achieve high investment rates, was an important factor of economic
growth.33
improvement, which for the Netherlands is disputed by: Bart van Ark, Jakob de Haan and
Herman J. de Jong, “Characteristics of Economic Growth in the Netherlands During the
Postwar Period,” in: Crafts and Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth, p. 304; For Germany
Wendy Carlin ascribes labor’s wage restraint to union weakness rather than to a
conversion to the “politics of productivity” (cf. Wendy Carlin, “West German Growth
and Institutions, 1945-90,” in: Crafts and Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth, p. 467).
34 The Economist, 4.8. 1956.
35 Paul Albou, “Quelques secteurs de la recherche sociale dans l’industrie,” in: Bulletin
de psychologie, vol. 12, nos. 6-9, 1958, pp. 290-99, see pp. 290-91 and 295. See also:
Marcel Bolle de Bal, Relations humaines et relations industrielles, Bruxelles, 1969, p. 57.
36 See: Amdam and Yttri, “The European Productivity;” Giuliana Gemelli, “American
Influence on European Management Education. The Role of the Ford Foundation,” in:
Rolv Petter Amdam, Management Education and Competitiveness: Europe, Japan and the
United States, London and New York, 1996, pp. 43-45, 48-49; Bent Boel, “The European
Productivity Agency and the Development of Management Education in Western Europe
in the 1950s,” in: Tiratsoo and Gourvish (eds.), Missionaries and Managers, pp. 34-49.
See also: Luc Boltanski, Les Cadres. La formation d’un groupe social, Paris, 1982, p. 193.
Hubert Bonin credits the EPA with a role in conceiving new methods of management
training (see Hubert Bonin, Histoire économique de la IVe République, Paris, 1987).
37 Anthony Carew: Labour under the Marshall Plan. The politics of Productivity and the
Marketing of Management Science, Detroit, 1987, pp. 189-93, 222, 249-50.
38 André Lucas in: Alain Drouard (ed.), Le développement des sciences sociales en France au
tournant des années soixante, Paris, 1983, p. 89. See also contributions of Ilkka Kuorinka
(“Founding of the International Ergonomics Association: A Great Narrative”), Denise
Lecoultre (“The European Productivity Agency and Ergonomics”), W.T. Singleton (The
EPA Period of the IEA), Frederik Bonjer (“The EPA and Contacts With Human
Factors”), Bernard Metz (“Recollections From the Early Days of the IEA”) and Thomas
J. Smith (“Emergence of Ergonomics/Human Factors Science and the International
Ergonomics Association – Concepts, Perspectives and Debate”) to Ilkka Kuorinka (ed.),
History of the International Ergonomics Association: The First Quarter of a Century, Inter-
national Ergonomics Association Press, 2000.
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In 1956, The Economist wrote that “the evidence suggests that the Agency in
its three years of life has played a part, on the whole very intelligently, in the
spread of European awareness of productivity.”34 However, while raising
productivity consciousness was indeed a primary goal of the EPA’s efforts,
to sort out the precise role played by the agency in developing such a spirit
seems impossible. It is therefore not surprising that attempts at assessing the
impact of the EPA have been few and far between. They have concerned
specific fields or countries. Several sociologists have credited the EPA with
a major impact on the discussions of the 1950s on human sciences and their
application in industry.35 In the field of management education some
researchers have concluded that the EPA had a substantial influence.36
Anthony Carew credits the EPA with a major effect on trade union training,
management education and human sciences applied to industry during the
1950s.37 Others have found that the EPA played a major role in the
development of ergonomics in Western Europe,38 of national accounting and
39 Jean-Jacques Salomon, Seminar held on May 14, 1994 at European University
Institute, Florence.
40 Nick Tiratsoo, “British Business, Management Education and the American Model,”
paper presented at the seminar “The Development of Business schools in Europe. The
Impact of the European Productivity Agency and its ‘Satellites’ on Management
Education in Europe,” Bertinoro, 2.6.-3.6. 1995. See also: Charles Bean and Nicholas
Crafts, “British Economic Growth since 1945: Relative Economic Decline... and
Renaissance?,” in: Crafts and Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth, p. 142.
41 Amdam and Yttri: “European Productivity Agency.”
42 Giuliana Gemelli: “International Strategies and National Issues: CNP and its
Networks,” paper presented at the seminar “The Development of Business Schools in
Europe, Bertinoro,” 2.6.-3.6. 1995.
43 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 5, f. “1473,” note, King, 2.12. 1953,
“Notes on a Conversation Between Marjolin and King on 26.11. 1953.”
44 ASCONF, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-1961,” note,
“11ème session du groupe de travail institué pour suivre les travaux de l’AEP, 11.3. 1960,
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of trade unionism.39 Investigating the role of the EPA in specific countries,
Nick Tiratsoo judges that the impact in the UK was insignificant,40 while
Gunnar Yttri and Rolv Petter Amdam reach the opposite conclusion with
regard to Norway.41 Giuliana Gemelli stresses the strong impact which the
EPA had in Italy during the 1950s.42
Partial assessments may be feasible, but the general significance of the EPA
seems highly elusive. One way to appraise it is to focus on the agency’s
perceived impact. Though this is a less ambitious exercise, it remains a
difficult one. Tens of thousands of Europeans used the EPA’s services, but
very little material exists to document their assessments. The following will
focus on the perceptions of governmental authorities, of national professional
organizations and of EPA officials.
One of the most striking facts with which one is confronted in analyzing the
EPA is how little the agency knew about its own impact. Alexander King
emphasized from the very beginning that:
we should not give any impression that the Agency would yield spectacular results
by the end of three years. Indeed the main benefits of the work would be indirect
and not always recognizable as products of EPA activity. I felt however that if the
program were developed slowly and carefully a great deal of value would accrue
which although difficult to evaluate in concrete terms, should justify the ex-
penditure.43
However, in the EPA’s meetings it was a recurrent theme that several
member countries wanted some kind of formalized procedure to evaluate the
projects implemented by the EPA.44 In 1954, the Advisory Board called for
Procès-verbal.”
45 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EPA/ABI/63, 7.9. 1955, “Advisory Board, Bi-annual
Report to the Council.”
46 Ibid.
47 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, OEEC del. to UM, 4.11. 1955, “Referat af møde i PRA
Committee, 3.10.-5.10. 1955;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, no. 4651, OEEC del. to
UM, 16.10. 1958, “EPA. GB. Mødet d 9.10. og 10.10. 1958;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 3, EPA/D/7000, 1.9. 1959, “Report on the Activities of the EPA for the Fiscal Year
1958-59.”
48 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956, “Draft Report by the
Committee on the Objectives and Methods of Work of the EPA.”
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the development of methods to “[measure] the results of the Agency’s work.”
It conceded that it was:
doubtful that ordinary productivity statistics could be used as a direct measure of
the effect of this work, considering the many other factors which influence the
development of productivity, such as capital investment, level of utilization of
existing production capacity, and the movements of manpower between different
fields of economic activity.45
However, it insisted that:
[m]ore direct measures must undoubtedly be found for this purpose, which have
as specific a bearing as possible on the Agency’s main fields of endeavour. Such
indications might be for instance EPA engendered increases in the training
facilities available and in the number of people of different categories trained in
modern management and its various techniques; the use of technical exchange
services; the reach of information and other means of dissemination; and last but
not least case histories of productivity programs – directly or indirectly inspired by
EPA – in individual enterprises or economic sectors. The best means therefore of
judging the effect of the Agency’s efforts would seem to be a follow-up and critical
evaluation of the specific results of important projects and activities undertaken.46
Just as calls for an evaluation of the EPA’s achievements acquired a ritualistic
quality, so did the reactions of those member countries who argued that a
judgment was too difficult or cumbersome and that in any case the best
criteria for the EPA’s value or lack of the same was whether the member
countries went on using its services and backing its continued existence.47
In 1956, the PRA Committee stated that the results achieved by the agency:
cannot indeed by expressed statistically; the changes in outlook which must be the
aim of missions, training sessions, exchanges of views, etc., cannot be converted
into figures. Moreover, many projects only gradually made their influence felt.48
49 Ibid.
50 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, ltr., 4651, OEEC del. to UM, 16.10. 1958, “EPA. GB.
Mødet d 9.10. og 10.10. 1958.”
51 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note, de Milly to Grégoire,
Fletcher and King, 15.2. 1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, note, Friis, 6.1. 1960,
“Samtale d. 22.12. 1959 med EPA’s vicedirektør King.”
52 G.L.G. de Milly was at that time vice-chairman of the PRA Committee.
53 MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,” ltr., de Milly to King, 12.7.
1954.
54 MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel II, ltr., de Milly to King, 22.2. 1956. See also:
MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel I, 6.1. 1955 – 31.12. 1955,” note, no. 652, van
Blokland to van der Beugel, 19.3. 1955.
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The Committee’s report, nevertheless, concluded that “a considerable
proportion of the agency’s activities have led to positive results.” It found
that “the satisfaction expressed by the experts and the action taken at
national level to follow up the Agency’s work, are very clear indications of the
value of the results obtained.”49
As a result, the timid moves which the EPA made to evaluate its projects,
were few.50 It might seem surprising that the agency did not more vigorously
attempt to document its own effectiveness. While its annual reports of
activities were rich in descriptions and examples, they were not able to
silence those who questioned the agency’s legitimacy. The EPA indeed had
plenty of enemies and could thus have benefited from some supportive data.
Many macro economists were extremely doubtful that the agency was of any
use, and these experts were often placed in key decision-making posts. This
in particular accounted for the near-universal skepticism in the ministries of
finance.51 As G.L.G. de Milly52 pointed out in 1954, “[i]n circles not familiar
with [the agency’s] work, and this is still the case with the Council, change
of attitude, world reform and unpractical idealism are very closely associa-
ted.”53 Two years later, these same circles still did not take the EPA
seriously:
We are all still suffering from the great handicap that economic policy-makers are
used to consider us, productivity people, as an idealistic group of socio-psycho-
technical world reformers equipped with stop-watches who catch olive and warble
flies during weekends or, even worse, when serious people work.54
While a report by the PRA Committee in 1956 concluded that although the
efforts deployed by the EPA had been successful in “gaining wider acceptan-
ce for the principles and methods of productivity by management, labor, and
governments,” it conceded that “they have not yet succeeded in establishing
productivity as a fundamental problem in long-range European economic
55 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, EPA(57)9, 23.7. 1957, “Advisory Board, Annual Report
on the Activities of the EPA.”
56 Ltr., G.L.G. de Milly to Richard T. Griffiths, 10.5. 1995 (copy sent by de Milly to the
author).
57 While Grégoire was rather demure in his presentation of the agency’s achievements in
1955 and in 1956, the tone became more outrightly positive later on (cf. HM, j.nr. 88-5-
56, note, no. 3255, Hoelgaard, 19.12. 1955; ASCONF, box 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi
di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari,
corrispondenza. appunti,” note, “Allocution de M. Grégoire à l’Assemblée générale du
CIFE du 22.2. 1956;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, EPA(57)9, 23.7. 1957, “AB, Annual
Report on the Activities of the EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, EPA/D/7450, 12.1.
1960, “1960-61 Programme of the ‘New Agency’, First Draft for a General Introduc-
tion;” SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 5, Åsbrink to UD, 5.7. 1961, “Rapport ang.
sammentråda med EPA’s GB i Paris den 29.6. og 30.6. 1961.”
58 See ICA: European Productivity.
59 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Finansdepartementet (Wickman) to UD
(Swärd), 28.9. 1959.
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policy, as EPU policy has been established.”55 When de Milly in 1995 looked
back at the EPA’s history, he concluded that the EPA had been “killed” by
the macro economists.56
Faced with this mistrust on the part of the prime dispensers of national
funds, the EPA had a powerful interest in presenting its achievements in as
rosy a light as possible and it did so in many reports.57 This positive view was
to some extent shared by the American authorities58 and by former EPA
officials. While these assessments cannot be dismissed as pure propaganda
or self-deception, they must obviously be supplemented by the perceptions
of users of the EPA’s services, who had less at stake. Studying the perception
of individual member countries is a perilous exercise though. It is rare to find
a detailed official evaluation of the EPA. Detailed analyses were mostly
written by experts, while governmental institutions contented themselves
with brief and general statements. Moreover, within each member country
there were often highly diverging views on the EPA’s impact. While
ministries of finance were skeptical, the ministries of foreign affairs and the
ministries for economic affairs (or ministries of commerce or industry) were
often more positive.59 There were also differences between trade unions and
industrial federations, the former being generally more more appreciative
than the latter.
While the extreme diversity of the EPA’s interventions is hardly propitious
to any generalization about the perception of its impact, one may pinpoint
some general tendencies. The groupings which can be made of different
countries within the EPA depend very much on the criteria used. As far as
60 See UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, 20.10. 1958, ltr., no. 4712, OEEC del. to UM,
“EPA, Governing Board, Mødet d. 9.10. og 10.10. 1958;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
HMPU, note, 4.5. 1959, “OEEC doc. CES 9.047 af 23.4. 1959.”
61 Notably, the difficulties involved in assessing the national perceptions and the
differences within each group.
62 MBZ, box 345, 996.26, DGEM-Archief 66/PRA Algemeen deel 3, f. “1471,” 4.2.
1953, “Verslag van de vergadering van het PRA Committee op 25.1.-26.1. 1953.”
63 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 43, Embassy Washington (von Sydow) to OEEC Del.
(Swärd), 8.3. 1956; CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 16, f. “1952/54 (Jan.-Sept. 1952),
EE.20.90.,” ltr., SCEE (Kilchmann) to OEEC del., 10.9. 1952.
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the EPA’s role is concerned there existed a North/South divide. Most
Northern European countries expressed their preference for practical
projects, and favored the EPA’s sticking to the traditional productivity
enhancing projects, those concerning industry, commerce, agriculture and
distribution. Southern European countries favored a broad productivity
concept – involving aid to underdeveloped areas and later also the training
of scientific and technical personnel – and were to some extent more
interested in having the EPA initiate study projects.60 But when it came to
appraising the agency, the categories were quite different. For instance, while
the Scandinavian countries had rather similar views on what role should be
performed by the EPA, they disagreed about the agency’s effectiveness.
One may, with a certain number of caveats,61 distinguish between four
groups of countries: the skeptics (UK, Sweden and Switzerland), the
supporters (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Germany and Norway), the moderates (a
rather heterogeneous group consisting of Denmark, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Austria), and the “ghosts” whose participation in the EPA’s
activities was close to nil (Portugal, Iceland, Ireland and Luxembourg).
C. The Countries’ Perceptions
1. The Skeptics
The three EPA-bashers (the UK, Sweden and Switzerland), were from the
outset rather hostile to the creation of the EPA.62 They shared a basic distrust
of too great an entanglement in European cooperative efforts. They
particularly disliked having an international organization dealing with such
intimate domestic affairs as those relating to productivity questions. In their
view, such an enterprise was doomed to produce sterile academic discussions
rather than anything of practical utility.63 Moreover, they shared the feeling
that no national, state-inspired productivity campaign was needed in their
64 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956, att.:
“Memorandum on the Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National
Productivity Center.”
65 Ibid. In 1950, Sweden had the second highest productivity level of all European
countries, cf. Magnus Henrekson, Lars Jonung and Joakim Stymne, “Economic Growth
and the Swedish Model,” in: Crafts and Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth, p. 257. See also
Appendixes: Table A-13.
66 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1972/159, box 39, f. “PRA. Participation
suisse,” SCEE to OEEC del., 1.6. 1956; CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 17, f.
“1953/1954. EE.20.90.1.,” ltr., OFIAMT (Kaufman) to SCEE, 10.7. 1954, “Programm
der AEP für 1954/55;” CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 17, f. “1er semestre 1954.
EE.20.90.4.,” OEEC del. to OFIAMT, 8.3. 1954, “AEP;” CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1,
box 16, f. “1er semestre 1953. EE-20.90,” note, SCEE (Kilchmann), 22.1. 1953, “Notiz
über die Sitzung der Ständigen Verhandlungsdelegation mit den Interessiereten Stellen
zur Behandlung von Produktivitätsfragen der OEEC, abgehalten im Büro von Hotz 15.1.
1953;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/4, 19.10. 1956, “Memo by the Swiss
Delegation on the Objectives and Activities of the EPA.”
67 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1972/159, box 39, f. “Centre national suisse
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country. Given their comparatively high technological and economic
standard, they thought that nothing much was to be learnt from their
European partners.64 In the Swedish case, this was explained by the fact that
Sweden has a comparatively high technological, economic and social standard, and
we had no reconstruction problem after the war. It is possible that in our relations
with EPA we are more demanding than countries with great reconstruction tasks.65
The Swiss position (which to a certain extent was shared by the British and
the Swedes) was that productivity enhancement was not a task for a
governmental or an intergovernmental organization. It was a matter to be
taken care of by the private firms themselves.66
To some extent, this view functioned as a self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly
in the case of Switzerland which participated only modestly in the EPA’s
activities. This of course hardly gave the agency a chance to produce results.
Moreover, neither the UK, Switzerland nor Sweden lived up to the
Americans’ and the EPA’s expectations of how their NPC should work. The
UK had originally been a groundbreaker in the European productivity drive
with the creation in 1948 of the AACP and with sending the first missions to
the US. But the AACP had been wound up in 1952. Its successor, the British
Productivity Council was a purely private organization with no ambition to
initiate a national productivity drive. A Committee on EPA affairs was
created under the Board of Trade, but it was a low-status body, without
decision-making powers. The Swiss NPC was wound up already in July 1955
for lack of support from private firms and from the government.67 In 1956,
de la productivité,” ltr., Verein Schweizerischer Machinen-Industrieller to Sekretariat der
Handelsabteilung des EVD, 9.8. 1955.
68 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th
Meeting Held on 11.5. 1956.”
69 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 44, ltr., CP (Iveroth and Seth) to UD, 4.5. 1956, att.:
“Memorandum on the Future of the EPA, Submitted by the Swedish National
Productivity Center.”
70 CHBA, 7111(A) Lf. bzw. 1, box 17, f. “2ème semestre 1954. EE.20.90.4.,” ltr., OEEC
del. to SCEE, 10.11. 1954.
71 PRO, CAB134/1283. MAC(56)31, 16.2. 1956, note by the BOT, “The Future of the
EPA.” It should be noted that the UK remained throughout the EPA’s existence the
biggest contributer to the OEEC budget and thereby also to that of the EPA (since the
same scale of contributions applied, see OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 20, p. 351).
72 SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 54, note, Åsbrink, 28.9. 1960, att.: note, 25.9. 1960.
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the latter confirmed its view about the EPA, namely that “the whole
conception had been fundamentally wrong from the beginning.”68 The
Swedish NPC remained confined in the modest role of transmitting
information from the EPA to potentially interested parties in Sweden and
never came to play any independent role worth mentioning.69 In none of the
three countries did the government encourage firms to take an interest in the
European productivity drive. They agreed that the EPA was not the answer
to any general spontaneous demand originating from firms and that it was
not a governmental task to foster such a demand.70 It may be that their
preconceived negative position played a role in their subsequent dismissive
assessments. However, the three countries themselves found that their low
expectations were confirmed by experience. The British view, as expressed
by the Board of Trade in February 1956 was that:
[i]t is probably fair to say that the UK has in general much more to give than to
receive from the Agency’s activities, as compared with other member countries,
and that our contributions to its funds could almost certainly be used more
profitably on productivity activities in the UK.71
Nevertheless, both the UK and Sweden participated rather actively in the
EPA’s projects. In the UK’s case, the sheer size of the country may account
for its high degree of participation. The Swedish productivity committee
seems to have been quite efficient in diffusing information about the agency’s
activites.
Towards the end of the 1950s, a change occurred in the position of the three
EPA-skeptical countries. It was almost imperceptible in the Swedish case.
While this country remained skeptical as to the overall usefulness of the
EPA,72 it came to accept the view that some activities had merits. In the
73 See chapter II.
74 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE, Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,”
report no. 11, 23.8. 1956, “Compiti e struttura dell’AEP.”
75 PRO, CAB134/1283MAC(56)31, 16.2. 1956, note by the BOT, “The Future of the
EPA;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, OEEC del. (Friis) to UM, 6.1. 1960, “Samtale d.
22.12. 1959 med EPA’s vicedirektør King.”
76 See chapter I.
77 As early as 1956 a Dutch official said about Swiss trade unions and farmers organiza-
tions that they were the EPA’s “fifth column lobbyists in Switzerland (see MBZ, DGES-
Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., de Milly to Grégoire, 15.11. 1956).
78 CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw. 1972/168, box 307. f. “1960. EE. 801. AEP, programme
d’action et problèmes généraux,” ltr. circ., OFIAMT, 26.9. 1960; CHBA, 7111(B) Lf.
bzw. 1972/168, box 306, ltr., EVD to Bundesrat, 18.7. 1959; CHBA, 7111(B) Lf. bzw.
1972/168, box 307, f. “EE. 801. 1958. AEP – Programme d’action et problèmes géné-
raux,” EVD to Bundesrat, 9.6. 1958.
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British and in the Swiss case, the motivations behind this change was largely,
but far from exclusively, political. From 1958 onwards, both countries felt
a powerful interest in maintaining a strong OEEC as a link between the Six
and the Seven.73 In the UK, while the Federation of British Industries (FBI)
and the British Employers’ Confederation (BEC) found the EPA useless,74
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) evolved towards a somewhat more
positive view.75 The change was more pronounced in the case of Switzerland.
In 1956-57, the Swiss had been very close to killing the EPA, which they
considered a waste of money. From 1958 onwards, their view gradually
altered. Switzerland feared the division of Western Europe between the Six
and the Seven, and wished to maintain an active OEEC as a common forum
for all Western European countries.76 The change also reflected a growing
interest on the part of Swiss organizations in the agency’s programs for trade
unions and agriculture,77 as well as in those relating to business manage-
ment.78
2. The “Supporters”
The EPA might not have survived for long if the feeling that it was mainly an
irritant had been predominant. After 1956, the OEEC countries had even
less reason to condone the EPA’s deficiencies since they bore an increasing
share of the financial burden of the agency’s operations. Throughout the
years, the attitude of quite a few member countries became more, rather than
less, appreciative. Several member countries indeed found that the EPA
played a positive role in an accountant’s understanding of that word: they got
more out of the agency than they put into it. Political motives played an
important role in the establishment of the EPA, but the agency would not
79 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, C/M(58)29(Prov.), November 1958; SVUD, Afd. H,
grupp 77, PP 52, ltr., Åsbrink to UD, 30.10. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4,
PRA/M(56)10, 30.1 1957, “Minutes of the 50th Session Held on 3.-5.12. 1956;” UMA,
j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), 23.5. 1956, “Minutes of the 326th Meeting
Held on 11.5. 1956.”
80 Interview with Caracciolo di Forino; Philippe Lamour, Le cadran solaire, Paris, 1980,
pp. 358-60.
81 BRDBA, B 102/37052, note, Esche, 28.1. 1954.
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have survived if the member countries had not seen some practical advantage
for themselves in maintaining it. They generally tried to direct its activities
towards the fields where they could benefit most, but some member
countries were more successful in their endeavors than others. This role
diminished the status of the EPA in the view of some who dismissed it as a
cheap travel agency. Others, however, saw it as an asset. In any case, it was
clear that the less the EPA was seen as an intellectual guide for the producti-
vity movement in Europe and the more it was perceived merely as a provider
of services, the more it was vulnerable to accountants’ appraisal of its
economic value to the member countries.
The supporters constituted a very heterogeneous group since the warmth of
their feelings towards the EPA varied greatly just as did their motives. Most
grateful were the member countries having areas in the process of economic
development. But the interest of Greece and Turkey was rather unidimen-
sional: both countries focused on securing as much funding as feasible for
assisting areas in the process of economic development. Their own national
productivity machinery was extremely weak or non-existent.79 It is rather
difficult to make any estimate of the impact of the EPA’s activities in these
two countries. The enthusiasm displayed by both for receiving assistance is
no evidence that the aid did any good. While the impact in Turkey was
probably next to nil, the opinions concerning the Greek case are more
divergent, some dismissing the EPA’s pilot area as a failure, others seeing it
as a success.80
Germany was among the most consistent supporters of the EPA, while being
simultaneously highly critical of some aspects of its administration. Despite
initial doubts about the EPA’s usefulness,81 Germany became a very active
member. At least until 1956, it was the country which participated in most
of the agency’s projects. This high level of participation was seen by the
German authorities as an expression of the strong interest among profes-
sional associations for the EPA’s activities. Germany clearly thought that
these activities had an impact and more particularly praised the so-called
traditional activities – namely those in the fields of industry, commerce,
82 BRDBA, B 102/37413, BMW (Westrick) to Hamberbacher, “Besetzung des Postens
eines Stellvertretenden Direktors der EPZ bei der OEEC,” 25.6. 1955; BRDAA, PA, BR
401, box 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 1.6. 1959, “Besuch von Wilgress;” BRDAA, PA, BR 401,
box 357 88.129, OEEC del. (Werkmeister) to van Scherpenberg and Müller-Armack,
16.5. 1960; BRDBA, B 102/37396 (1), note to Hinsch, “10-Punkteprogram für die
Aufgaben der Produktivitätsförderung und ihre Institutionen in der künftigen OECD.”
83 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, ltr., BMW (Müller-Armack) to Bundesmi-
nisterium der Finanzen (BMF), 6.11. 1959; BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129,
BWZ (Dahlgrün) to AA, 9.4. 1956; BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), Hinsch to Seibt and
Luitjens, 12.9. 1958; BRDBA, B 102/37396 (1), note, “12 Thesen zur Notwendigkeit der
EPA in der neuen OECD,” September 1961.
84 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, box 91 AZ: 88.129, BWZ (Dahlgrün) to AA, 9.4. 1956,
“Zukunft der EPA.” See also: BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), Hinsch to Seibt and Luitjens,
12.9. 1958.
85 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 2, C/M(56)21(Prov.), “Minutes of the 326th Meeting Held
on 11.5. 1956.”
86 See for example: BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), Hinsch to Seibt and Luitjens, 12.9. 1958.
87 BRDBA, B 102/37396 (1), note, September 1961, “12 Thesen zur Notwendigkeit der
EPA in der neuen OECD.”
88 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, Bd. 91 AZ: 88.129, BWZ (Dahlgrün) to AA, 9.4. 1956.
89 Ibid.; BRDBA, B 102/70843, box 1, note, 22.10. 1959, “Ergebnisbericht über die
Besprechung vom 22.10. 1959 zur Vorbereitung der 11. GB meeting am 26.10. -27.10.
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agriculture and distribution – while being more skeptical towards the new
ones concerning science and technology as well as aid to areas in the process
of economic development.82 In internal governmental notes as well as in
official declarations it was repeatedly stated that the EPA had a beneficial
impact on productivity in the member countries in general and Germany in
particular, and numerous examples of this positive influence were given.
Basically it was felt that the Federal Republic did have things to learn from
abroad and that the EPA was a useful instrument in transferring such
knowledge.83 The agency was also found to play a politically important role
in promoting cooperation among Western European countries. In 1956, the
ministry for economic cooperation even called the EPA “one of the best
instruments to further European integration.”84 In stating its support for the
continuation of the EPA, Germany found “that the activity of the Agency
was of major importance to increased productivity in each country and
therefore to a higher standard of living.”85 This positive assessment of the
practical value of the EPA’s work was repeated on many other occasions.86
Fom 1958 onwards, the EPA was also appreciated as a valuable link between
the Six and the Seven, a bridge deemed indispensable as long as no common
economic organization had been created.87 It was further viewed as a useful
means in the social-economic competition with the Soviet Bloc countries.88
These views prevailed in the ministry for economic cooperation and in the
ministry for foreign affairs as well as in the trade unions.89 But there were
1959.”
90 BRDBA, B 102/37395 (2), no. 1149, OEEC del. (Werkmeister) , 1.8. 1958; BRDBA,
B 102/37395 (2), Hinsch to Seibt und Luitjens, 12.9. 1958. The BDI was dominated by
the more conservative German employers (see Volker R. Berghahn, “Technology and the
Export of Industrial Culture: Problems of the German-American Relationship 1900-
19060,” in: Peter Mathias and John A. Davis (eds.), Innovation and Technology in Europe
– From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day, Oxford, 1991, p. 160).
91 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, box 91 AZ: 88.129, ltr., Müller-Armack (BMW) to BMF, 6.11.
1959; BRDAA, PA, BR 401, box 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 22.12. 1959, “Verlängerung des
Tätigkeit der EPZ in der OEEC.”
92 PRO, FO371/150115, M557/19, ltr., CB/EPA, Crawford (UK del. OEEC) to Holliday
(FO), 7.5. 1960.
93 ASCONF, box 70/19.1, f. “Assistenza tecnica. Parte generale. Elaborazione dei
programmi di assistenza tecnica. Corrispondenza con le amministrazioni. Appunti.
Circolari,” ltr., Presidenza del consiglio dei ministri (Comitato ministeriale per la
Ricostruzione), to CGII, 17.3. 1952.
94 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, OEEC del., no. 4502, 6.10. 1956, “PRA Committee.
mødet d. 1.10.-4.10. 1956, EPA’s fremtidige aktivitet;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, no.
4046, OEEC del., 11.9. 1956, “EPA’s fremtidige program;” ACS, Inv. 29/1, box 7, f.
“1,” note, SG/10, Bardoscia to Marinone, 18.6. 1952, att.: note s.l., s.d., s.a.; ASCONF,
box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,” ltr., Valletta to
Morelli, 7.7. 1955, att.: note, 8.7. 1955, “Nota su alcuni aspetti della produttività.”
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dissenters. The German Industrial Federation (BDI) was ambivalent in its
attitude towards the EPA, where it disapproved the dominating role of the
Americans and disliked the close links established between the agency and
the trade unions.90 The ministry of finances considered the EPA a waste of
money. In October 1959, it proposed that the Federal Republic simply leave
the EPA.91 Though the ministry of finance was powerful, and blocked
acceptance of a new EPA budget for several months, it was isolated. In the
end it had to give in. Ludwig Erhard, minister for economic affairs,
personally intervened in favor of the EPA. In this action he was strongly
backed by the US and apparently also by the President of the Federal
Republic, Heinrich Lübke, who had a keen interest in scientific issues.92
Italy’s productivity campaign was started somewhat reluctantly under
American pressure. A productivity center was only created in 1951 and very
few initiatives developed.93 Italy considered that its problem was less to
increase productivity than to achieve economic development. Many Southern
Italian regions were indeed plagued by endemic unemployment, and in these
places increasing productivity of labor was not perceived as a primary
objective.94 The Italian government was clearly more preoccupied with its
fundamental macro economic problems than with the “luxury” of increasing
productivity. In July 1954, Italy tried to convince the other member countries
that the EPA should deal with methods to increase mobility of labor on an
95 UMA, j.nr. 73.C.41/19i, box 4, OEEC del., “Referat af møder 7.7. og 8.7. 1954 i
OEEC’s PRA Committee.”
96 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA. Anno 1957,” ltr.,
Mattei to Delfini, 5.12. 1957, att.: memo, 5.12. 1957, “Memo per la riunione del
‘Gruppo di lavoro sulla produttività’ operante presso il CIFE.”
97 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/2, 31.8. 1956, “Memo by the Italian
Delegation on the Aims and Action of the EPA.” This memo was largely based on a note
written by the Confindustria, cf. ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per
l’attività EPA, CGII, Considerazioni sull’attività dell’AEP”, note, 24.8. 1956.
98 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività EPA,” ltr., Mattei to
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operante presso il CIFE.”
99 ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di Lavoro per l’attività EPA,” ltr., Leali to
CGII, CIFE/1103, 3.12. 1958, att.: note, “Gruppo di lavoro del CIFE sulla produttività;”
ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP, Consiglio Consultativo,” ltr., Valletta to Arnaud, 8.4.
1959; ASCONF, box 58/4.2, f. “CIFE. Gruppo di lavoro per l’attività AEP. Anno 1960-
1961,” ltr., Valletta to De Micheli, 15.12. 1959; ASCONF, box 70/18.2, f. “AEP.
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international level. The proposal was thought to be so farfetched that nobody
took it seriously.95 Both government and firms at first seemed uneasy with
the EPA.96 But a few years later, in August 1956, a memorandum defined
Italy as “one of the countries which in general have derived the greatest
benefit from the services and activities of the EPA.”97 At this stage, what Italy
mostly appreciated about the EPA was its role as a link between NPCs as
well as its business management program. However, Italian employers and
government alike were mistrustful towards the EPA’s trade union projects.
A similar attitude was adopted towards activities in the retail sector and
notably towards the development of supermarkets, which were viewed as
inadequate for Italian needs.98
From 1957 onwards, a split occurred in the Italian position. The government
and Fiat’s president Vittorio Valletta backed the EPA’s new orientation,
which gave increased priority to larger economic problems not connected
with a narrow productivity concept, namely activities to assist areas in the
process of economic development and the training of scientific and technical
personnel. The Italian Federation of Industries, Confindustria, on the other
hand, backed the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF), which
tried to defend the traditional productivity activities benefiting industry and
commerce.99
The EPA’s best friend was Norway. Though far from uncritical, Norway
seems to have been the country which mostly adhered to the concept of the
100 BRDAA, PA, BR 401, box 91 AZ: 88.129, note, 1.6. 1959, “Besuch von Wilgress.”
101 NORA, box 122, f. “3,” note, Juel, 21.2. 1956, “Det europeiske produktivitetsorgans
fremtid.”
102 NOUD, 44.25/1, box 12, note, 9.8. 1958, Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt (Skogen),
“Spørsmålet om EPA’s eksistens efter 30.6. 1960;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, ltr.,
HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10. 1958, att.: memo, 26.9. 1958,
“Productivity Promoting Activities Within the OEEC after 30.6. 1960.”
103 ASCONF, box: 18.1, f. “AEP. Programmi di attività dell’AEP. Interventi della
Confederazione. Interventi del CIFE. Circolari, corrispondenza. appunti.,” note, Arnaud,
“Structure et rôle de l’AEP. Synthèse des avis formulés par les Fédérations industrielles;”
MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel II, DEA/TP, Inv.nr. 411,” note, no. 1584, de Milly
to DGEM, “Conferentie CEIF inzake EPA, 24.8. 1956.”
104 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/ deel I, ltr., Hendrickx (OBAP) to de
Milly, 24.2. 1956, att.: note, OBAP, 24.2. 1956, “Note concernant l’avenir de l’AEP;”
NORA, HD, Avd. for Utenrikshandel 1948-1961 II, box 122, f. “4,”
C/M(57)22(Prov.)Part I, “Minutes of the 372nd Meeting Held on 12.7. 1957.”
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agency as originally conceived. It was interested in maintaining a strong
OEEC and this was certainly a stimulus for acting to keep the EPA.100 But
the Norwegians also liked the agency for its own sake and sincerely found
that many of its projects were beneficial.101 They were mainly interested in
the traditional activities in industry and commerce. Norway launched a very
important national productivity drive and about half of all projects were EPA
ones. Some data indicate that Norway was by and large the country which
participated in most EPA projects per inhabitant. This among other things
seems to have reflected a strong feeling in Norway that it had been held back
during the war and that there was much to learn from abroad, in particular
from the Anglo-Saxon countries.102
3. The Moderates
The moderate group, which consisted of Belgium, the Netherlands, France,
Denmark, and Austria, was even more heterogeneous than the others. These
countries neither hated nor loved the EPA, but often had mixed feelings.
Belgium had a very active productivity center, the Office Belge pour
l’Accroissement de la Productivité (OBAP), which seems to have had great
success in promoting a Belgian productivity drive. Initially, the Belgians
mistrusted the EPA, especially during the Harten years, mainly because of
its alleged administrative flaws.103 However, their attitude changed. In 1956,
Belgium found that the EPA was a useful forum for European cooperation
in the productivity field and they praised the EPA’s projects concerning
information, education, cooperation in research, and trade unions.104 A few
105 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box nr. 4, OEEC del. (Riis) to UM, 21.3. 1960, “Notat vedr.
delegationschefmødet d. 18.3. 1960 om EPA’s fremtid.”
106 ECHA, EPA Archives, f. “Ré-organisation de l’OECE: Notes diverses d’information
pour le Groupe des Quatre sur le travail de l’OECE”, f. “23: Mr. Sergent (Work of the
OEEC) OEEC – Record of Discussions With GOFEO. Meeting No. 8: Activities of EPA
and OSTP, Grégoire, 22.2. 1960.”
107 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, no. 4697, OEEC del. to UM, 21.10. 1959; UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 2, note, HMPU, 4.5. 1959, “OEEC doc. CES 9.047 af 23.4. 1959;”
UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, no. 2926, OEEC del., 20.6. 1959, “Referat af mødet d.
16.6. 1959 med Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees om rapporten fra rådets arbejdsudvalg nr. 26 vedr.
EPA’s fremtid;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, ltr., HMPU to UM, 25.9. 1959.
108 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box. 6, Sekretariatet for Danmarks Erhvervsfond to UM,
February 1962, “OECD’s produktivitetsarbejde.”
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years later, it seems that the Belgian assessment was more outrightly positive,
in particular towards the traditional activities of the agency.105 In February
1960, the Belgian OEEC delegate thought that the success of the Belgian
productivity center “was very largely due to the role of the American
authorities and of the EPA.”106
Denmark was slow in initiating its own productivity policy and did so mainly
because of American prompting. A productivity committee was created as
early as 1949, but it only initiated a few projects. The decisive impetus was
given by the Moody aid in 1953. Subsequently, the Danish national
productivity program, measured in US technical assistance per capita,
evolved into the most important one in Western Europe. The Danes clearly
preferred cooperating with like-minded countries, notably the UK and the
other Scandinavian countries and saw no need for a European productivity
organization. However, they gradually came to see many of the EPA’s
activities as useful, especially the more practical ones.107 Towards the end of
the EPA’s existence, Denmark fought a stubborn but hopeless battle to have
the OECD continue the traditional productivity enhancing activities of the
EPA.108 Denmark had a strong national productivity program which may
explain why it could make such good use of the EPA’s activities and,
therefore, favored the agency’s continuance. But it might also be the reason
why at least some believed that the EPA’s contribution to the Danish
productivity campaign was marginal. The Danes felt more indebted to the
US than to the EPA. However, much of the American aid after 1955 was
received through the agency.
109 AN, F60 bis, box 518, f. “Assistance technique. Productivité. 6812. 1949-1950-1951
– CGP, Comité provisoire de la productivité, commission restreinte, Séance du mercredi
5.10. 1949,” ltr., Donn (Washington) to Fourastié, 22.9. 1949; SAEF, 5 A 156, f. “IV
Plan,” AFAP, November 1962, “Rapport d’activités 1961-1962.”
110 SAEF, 5 A 156, f. “IV Plan,” AFAP, November 1962, “Rapport d’activités 1961-
1962.”
111 Ibid.
112 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/1, 2.8. 1956, “Memo from the French
Delegation on the Lines of Action of the EPA.”
113 Ibid.; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, no. 3721, OEEC del. (Hjort-Nielsen) to UM, 28.8.
1956; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, no. 4502, OEEC del. to UM, 6.10. 1956.
114 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 3, no. 4697, OEEC del. to UM, 21.10. 1959.
115 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir
de l’AEP,” note, OEEC del., 1.10. 1959, “Entretien avec un haut fonctionnaire français.
(‘M. X.’).” It does seem that the French ministry of finance, like many other European
ministries of finance was very doubtful of the usefulness of the EPA (see for example
MAE, DE-CE, 1945-1960, vol. 356, f. 167-168, SCE (MAE) to ministère des affaires
économiques et financières, 11.9. 1953, “Contribution de la France au budget de
l‘AEP”).
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France was quick at developing its own productivity drive.109 An official
French report from 1962 acknowledged the decisive role played by the US
in this campaign and stated that the “discovery of America” was an
important factor in French economic recovery after World War II.110 But
while France played an important role in energetically supporting the
American proposal to create the EPA (and was rewarded with influential
posts in the agency), French assessments of the impact of the agency were
rare. The above-mentioned report stated that the EPA had played an
essential role during the “second phase” of the European productivity
movement, in furthering exchanges between the European countries and
between the US and Western Europe.111 In 1956, France expressed its
satisfaction with the performance of the EPA which had “been most useful”
in many areas.112 However, it suggested that the agency expand the scope of
its interest, linking problems of productivity to wider technical, economic
and social problems and giving higher priority to its function as a study
center.113 In October 1959, France went one step further arguing that the
EPA should now concentrate on scientific and technical personnel and
assistance to areas in the process of economic development.114 The tra-
ditional productivity projects should be discarded because it was “impossible
to ask from ministers of finance considerable sums for activities only
interesting a small number of specialists, the usefulness of which at the actual
stage nobody has been able to prove.”115 The only EPA related activities
which were worth continuing were the agricultural program, the Productivity
Committee, the OSTP (which was called “the best placement”) and aid to
116 CHBA, E 2200 Paris (OECD), Lf. bzw. 1975/90, box 17, f. “1957/59. B.23.3. Avenir
de l’AEP,” note, OEEC del., 1.10. 1959, “Entretien avec un haut fonctionnaire français.
(‘M. X.’)”
117 PRO, BT11/5574, GF/CR/12, “12th Meeting Held on 8.12. 1960.”
118 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box nr. 4, note, OEEC del (Riis) to UM, 21.3. 1960, “Notat
vedr delegationschefmødet d. 18.3. 1960 om EPA’s fremtid;” SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77,
PP 55, tel. no. 167, OEEC del. (Hägglöff) to UD, 3.7. 1961; SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77,
PP 54, desp. no. 179, OEEC del. (Hägglöff) to UD, 20.3. 1961.
119 SAEF, 5 A 156, f. “IV Plan,” AFAP, November 1962, “Rapport d’activités 1961-
1962;” SVUD, Afd. H, grupp 77, PP 55, desp. no. 167, OEEC del. (Hägglöff) to UD,
3.7. 1961.
120 The Netherlands were plagued by frequent conflicts of competence and policy between
the COP and the different ministries involved, cf. MBZ, box 050820, f. “996.26,
EPA/Algemeen, deel I,” note no. 652, 19.3. 1955, van Blokland to van der Beugel. See
also: MBZ, box 050820, f. “996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel I,” note no. 1454, de Milly to
van der Beugel, 13.7. 1955.
121 NLRA, 2.06.061, MEZ, AP, Inv.nr. 587, note, MBZ, DGEM, 21.5. 1953, “Het
Europese Productiviteitscentrum;” MBZ, DGEM-Archief 663/EPA Algemeen, f. “1477,”
note, van der Beugel to Kruisheer, 26.4. 1954, “EPA;” MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen,
deel I, DEA/T.P., note no. 111501, 25.11. 1954, “Enige Aspecten van de EPA.”
122 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., de Milly to Grégoire,
15.11. 1956; MBZ, 996.26, EPA/Algemeen, deel I, EPA Algemeen, note no. 1454, 13.7.
1955, de Milly to van der Beugel.
123 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., de Milly to Grégoire,
15.11. 1956.
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areas in the process of economic development (labelled “a duty”).116 While
Wormser speaking to the Group of Four in February 1960 did not rule out
keeping the EPA as a purely European organization if the Americans refused
to join it,117 this open door was soon shut. Indeed, during the following
negotiations the French did not hide their intention to get rid of the EPA.118
But even at this stage the French found many of the agency’s activities
useful. During the period 1960-61, the EPA accounted for almost half of all
French productivity missions abroad. The French also appreciated the EPA’s
role as a clearing house for the NPCs and insisted that the OECD create a
committee performing a liaison task similar to the one played by the
Productivity Committee of the EPA.119
The Dutch policy varied, which may to some extent be explained by
disagreements among those who were in charge.120 Initially the Netherlands
feared the over-expansionist ambitions of the agency and professed their
preference for a down-to-earth and practical program.121 However, they
found that the situation improved after Harten’s departure and in 1956, they
backed many EPA projects.122 According to the Dutch official de Milly,
“collective thinking in Paris” had influenced several high Dutch officials.123
And the leading Dutch personalities in matters of productivity enhancement
124 MBZ, box 345, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note no. 1506, de Milly,
9.8. 1956, att.: note, “Beland van de EPA van de OEEC voor Nederland.” See also:
MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., no. 18617, van Blokland to
Cottam, 10.2. 1956, att.: note, no. 133596, 7.2. 1956.
125 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note, de Milly to Grégoire,
Fletcher and King, 15.2. 1956.
126 MBZ, DGES-Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, note no. 1506, 9.8. 1956, de Milly,
att.: note, “Beland van de EPA van de OEEC voor Nederland.” See also: MBZ, DGES-
Archief, 996.256 EPA OEEC/deel I, ltr., no. 18617, van Blokland to Cottam, 10.2. 1956,
att.: note, no. 133596, 7.2. 1956.
127 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)48/6, 9.1. 1957, “Memo by the Netherlands
Delegation on the Objectives and Methods of Work of the EPA.”
128 NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590, note, Berger 8.9. 1960, “Bespreking bij Buitenlandse
Zaken.”
129 Ibid. Cf. also: NLRA, 2.06.061, Inv.nr. 590, note, 8.8. 1959, “Eindrapport over de
toekomst van de EPA van Werkgrop no. 26 van de Raad.”
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found the EPA useful.124 The Dutch, furthermore, found that the EPA
played an important psychological role for all NPCs. If the agency was
wound up they would lose a major raison d’être.125 Lastly, the EPA was seen
as contributing to European cooperation in fields such as research, industrial
organizations, trade unions, and universities.126 However, the Dutch
remained ambivalent. This was clearly expressed by a note in January 1957
which stated that “perhaps the most important lesson of the past” was that
“a central productivity organisation can carry out many useful activities
successfully without ever contributing to any degree of adequacy to the
solution of the basic productivity problem within its competence.”127
Consequently, they opted for a containment policy and tried to keep the
EPA’s activities within limits.128 In this field the attitude of the government
differed from that of the employers. While the latter backed the June 1960
CEIF resolution which favored continuing all the classical EPA activities, the
former preferred a slim cure.129
Finally, one should mention the “ghosts,” i.e., four countries which only
rarely participated in the EPA’s activities and hardly ever expressed any
opinions about its work. They were Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and
Portugal. Switzerland shared the low degree of participation in the EPA’s
projects, but it often forcefully voiced opinions concerning what the agency
ought to do.
130 UNESCO Archives, 3 A 5, f. “Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Productivity.
SS/Survey. Part I Up to 31.12. 1957,” note, 17.1. 1956, Berkeley to the Director Gen-
eral, “European Productivity Agency.” This ILO assessment was conveyed informally to
officials from the UNESCO.
131 See Chapter VI.
132 The following is partly inspired by the conclusions reached by the EPA’s Governing
Board in its final report on the activities of the Agency, cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6,
C(61)119, 10.7. 1961, “Annual Report and Overall Summary of Activities of the EPA.”
133 UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956, “Draft Report by the
Committee on the Objectives and Methods of Work of the EPA.”
134 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, ltr., HMPU (Rydeng) to UM (Hjorth-Nielsen), 3.10.




The wide gap between the views of the skeptics and those of the supporters
illustrates how varied the EPA’s impact was perceived to be in different
countries and in different fields. While the above analysis does confirm that
the EPA in some quarters was seen as a failure, it also shows that this
judgment was far from universally shared. Quite a few member countries
found that the EPA was not only of political convenience, but also of
practical use. In some cases they even judged its projects very valuable. While
outright positive views on the EPA were mainly to be found in the Southern
European countries, as well as in Germany and Norway, a rather large
number – namely Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Austria
– were at least in some respects equally positive in their assessment of the
EPA. The ILO in 1956 was “highly satisfied with their collaboration with
EPA, whose work is of the highest quality.”130 While the US was all too
aware of the need to “sell” the EPA to the Europeans in 1953, seven years
later quite a few countries had bought into the idea. In 1960, both the trade
unions and the CEIF protested vehemently against the decision to wind up
the EPA.131
Finally, some more general remarks about the impact of the EPA may be put
forth.132 The agency was involved in the creation of a large number of in-
stitutions. In the business management sector alone it contributed to the cre-
ation of about thirty national or international organizations as well as a large
number of business schools. It played a similar role in many other fields. It
was, moreover, the raison d’être of several NPCs which in turn often estab-
lished other organizations.133 Generally, the existence of a European pro-
ductivity organization within the OEEC encouraged all kinds of productivity
promoting activities during the 1950s.134 While some of the organizations
created on the EPA’s initiative can be named, many of them cannot. For the
135 See SAEF, B 26.567, f. “Prêts productivité,” f. “Divers – 1953-1966,” L’Européen,
October 1961.
136 Ibid, 2 articles about the EPA, one unsigned and one by Roger Grégoire: “8 années
de batailles pour l’expansion européenne.”
137 This was certainly the opinion within the EPA itself, cf. UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3,
PRA(56)68, 20.11. 1956, “Draft Report by the Committee on the Objectives and
Methods of Work of the EPA.” See also: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, EPA(57)9, 23.7.
1957, “Advisory Board, Annual Report on the Activities of the EPA.”
138 For the view that the EPA did foster European integration, see: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21,
box 1, EPA(57)9, 23.7. 1957, “Advisory Board, Annual Report on the Activities of the
EPA.”
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former, it is often quite impossible to assess the exact contribution of the
EPA.135
More informally, the EPA promoted exchanges and fostered various
networks. A large number of business executives, trade unionists, techni-
cians, university teachers and researchers were brought into contact with
each other through the agency. To assess the exact number of such networks
and exchanges is obviously impossible, just as it is impossible in most cases
to assess the exact role of the EPA in their creation. But, clearly, they were
numerous.136
The propaganda effort of the EPA was deployed in a large number of fields.
The EPA’s contacts with a large number of non-governmental organizations,
particularly the trade unions must also have had some kind of impact. Most
of the EPA’s projects aimed at provoking mental changes which must have
occurred in a certain number of cases.137
As far as fostering European integration is concerned, the EPA certainly
contributed to intra-European exchanges between individuals and organiza-
tions. Ideas circulated and contacts were created. Such exchanges cannot be
dismissed as mere “tourism” since many of them involved continued working
relations. The EPA further contributed to the reinforcement of transatlantic
ties. Institutionally, it created or encouraged links between different kinds of
European and American institutions, notably between universities. It also did
so at a more informal level, through the numerous exchanges of ideas and
individuals that it organized between the two continents. However, one
cannot assume that such contacts inevitably foster mutual understanding and
thereby social and cultural integration.138
Lastly, the EPA’s activities were an inspiration for other organizations. Most
obviously, the EPA helped foster the creation of other international
139 UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 6, C(61)128, 21.7. 1961, att.: memo, secretary general of
the Asian Productivity Organization (Oshikawa) to the secretary general of the OEEC
(Kristensen), 14.7. 1961.
140 SAEF, 5 A 156, f. “IV Plan,” AFAP, November 1962, “Rapport d’activités 1961-
1962.”
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productivity institutions, such as the Asian and Latin-American Productivity
Institutes. The former acknowledged the EPA’s experience as being crucial
for its own creation.139 The agency was probably also an inspiration for many
of the NPCs created throughout the world during the 1950s. All in all, sixty
such centers existed in November 1960.140 Furthermore, the EPA’s
endeavors were a major inspiration for the Ford Foundation which promoted
management education during the 1960s. In addition, the EPA took the
initial steps in the fields of science and technology and assistance to
underdeveloped areas, which were later continued by the OECD.
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CONCLUSION
This book has shown that the EPA’s history is worth telling for a number of
reasons. The EPA was the first intergovernmental organization ever created
to promote productivity in its member countries. It was also an important
aspect of European cooperation in the 1950s since it embodied the high
ambitions of some of its promoters and since its yearly budget represented
on average forty percent of the OEEC’s total expenditures. Moreover,
despite numerous shortcomings, the EPA achieved a good deal of success.
Institutions were created which otherwise might not have been created, ideas
and techniques were introduced which otherwise might only have been
known in Europe at a later stage. In some countries and in some fields, the
agency’s activities had a strong impact.
The history of the EPA sheds light on several important issues of Western
European early postwar history. First of all, it was an aspect of US-European
relations during the 1950s. Although it was not a central issue, it was a
revealing one. The EPA was the result of the merging of two major US
policies in postwar Western Europe: the productivity drive and the promo-
tion of European integration. It was an American success because the agency
was created at US prompting despite considerable European reluctance. The
latter accepted the idea out of regard for the US and for its economic aid.
But, as the Americans well knew, there was no ready-made market for EPA,
it had to be sold. In this respect one may speak about a success since the
Americans actually did manage to “sell” the EPA to the Europeans and to
convince many of them of its usefulness. When the EPA was finally wound
up, the decision was made because of US pressure despite some European
protests. However, the success should not be overstated. The EPA never
played the leading role in a truly European productivity drive which the
Americans had hoped for. This failure was mainly due to European
resistance. But it was also caused by the fact that the EPA was never given
high priority in Washington. The agency expressed “high politics” concerns
but it acted in the sphere of “low politics.” While some of its promoters
hoped that it would have high politics effects, this ambition was not widely
shared among leading decision-makers. Therefore, the agency was never
given the financial or political means to live up to its role of promoting a truly
European productivity campaign, European integration and labor-manage-
ment cooperation.
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The EPA was an agent of “Americanization” understood as a conveyer of
American ideas and techniques to Western Europe. It was also a forum
within which Europeans increasingly became self-confident and themselves
defined their own goals and the means to achieve them. It was in particular
a place where Europeans realized that European (or national) problems
called for European (or national) solutions. The EPA was thus both an agent
of “Americanization” and of “Europeanization,” It illustrated the strengths
and weaknesses of the US position in Europe as well as the awakening sense
of confidence of the Europeans. The lack of American coherence in backing
the agency with adequate financial and political means demonstrates that
while the “politics of productivity” is a useful concept in understanding the
US policy in postwar Europe, it would be problematic to overstate its
importance. Furthermore, it may be argued that in the case of the EPA the
process of “Americanization” was facilitated rather than handicapped by the
Cold War. The agency was indeed a product of the East-West conflict. While
its ambition was to contribute to the economic, social and cultural moderni-
zation of Western Europe, it would not have been created without the
Moody amendment which reflected the US Congress’ wish to reform
European societies and thereby vaccinate them against communism.
The EPA, moreover, sheds some light on the history of postwar European
cooperation, since it was an important part of the OEEC. The relation
between these institutions was complicated. To a large extent, the EPA was
dependent on the OEEC’s evolution. Its creation within the OEEC
demonstrated a desire to strengthen this organization, its survival was linked
to a wish to keep the OEEC as a forum for an all-Western European
cooperation. Its final winding up was the price to be paid to the Americans
and the French for keeping them within the new OECD. However, the
influence was reciprocal. Towards the end of the 1950s, the EPA gave
substance to the OEEC which badly needed it since it did not have many
other tasks left. The EPA, moreover, cleared new ground which was later to
be covered by the OECD, such as aid to less developed areas and the
promotion of science and technology. Much of the OECD’s expertise in
these fields had its roots in the EPA. The history of the EPA, moreover,
confirms the views of those historians who emphasize the role of the member
countries’ perceived national interest in the process of European integration.
It is indeed striking how strong national feelings were even in a low politics
area such as the one in which the EPA acted. This study also provides an
illustration of the conflicts among existing between Western Europeans. The
main division within the EPA was one between the most developed and the
less developed OEEC countries, i.e., between Northern and Southern
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Europe, rather than between the Six and the rest. This reflected the fact that
integration was not a key concern of the EPA and that questions of economic
policy to a large extent determined national policies in this area. Only during
the reorganization discussions did the split between the Six and the Seven
play an important role, since most OEEC countries wished to keep a strong
OEEC as a link between the two Western European blocs and therefore
wanted as many OEEC activities as possible to be continued within the
OECD.
The EPA achieved many results. They were recognized by a certain number
of countries, individuals, organizations. They were followed up either by the
creation of organizations inspired by the EPA or by institutions which
continued the work initiated by the EPA. However, it was later forgotten.
This was due to several reasons. First of all, the failures of the agency rightly
or wrongly have overshadowed its accomplishments. The administrative
deficiencies were a turn-off for quite a few of those who came into contact
with it. Worse, throughout its existence it had powerful enemies who in the
end got the upperhand. Ministries of finance disliked the agency, since many
of them did not believe that technical assistance projects could do much to
close the productivity gap between Western Europe and the US. The
deficiencies of the agency gave these enemies additional arguments when it
lost the support of the Americans and the French in 1959/60. It may thus be
argued that the EPA was “killed” by macroeconomists and that the historical
literature has simply accepted the view of the winners. However, one may
also argue that the very success of the EPA explained its oblivion. The EPA’s
aim was not to be a permanent organization but to start activities and
promote ideas and methods to be used, spread and continued by others. In
that sense its purpose was to make itself superfluous. The agency largely
managed to do so since it created a number of national and international
institutions which took over its own work. Its projects aimed at helping less
developed areas and promoting science and technology were continued by
the OECD. The first tentative steps in this direction were subsequently
forgotten.
Three general lessons may be drawn concerning technical assistance
activities. First of all, technical assistance can have a substantial impact. The
EPA did achieve much in many different fields and it did so with very modest
means. A second lesson is that an all-encompassing project like the EPA will
involve much wastage in the absence of careful planning. If one likens the
EPA to a shot-gun then one may say that it had surprisingly many hits but
inevitably also quite a few misses. The EPA’s projects were often not-related
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to each other or to activities undertaken by the member countries. The high
level of ambition thus became a problem since it resulted in a dispersal of
effort. Thirdly, the history of the EPA illustrates the problems which the
absence of a clear political will may cause. The EPA was indeed handicapped
by an original sin, namely its American origins. Although many European
countries did accept the EPA, the fact remained that the whole concept was
an imported one which, throughout the years 1953-61, encountered re-
sistance in national bureaucracies and often also among different professional
organizations. The agency, therefore, had a permanent problem of legi-
timacy, which was worsened by the uncertainty surrounding its future. This
weak political basis gave the EPA little authority to act and resulted in much
energy being invested in keeping the agency alive and devising new strategies
to attain that goal.
The first point, namely the usefulness of technical assistance activities, still
needs to be taken up by the historical literature. Its dominant implicit
assumption is that the EPA was a failure. As suggested earlier, this may be
an overly simplistic view. The story of the agency consists of failures and
successes. Since the former are being taken for granted by much of the
literature, the latter are the more noteworthy. They suggest that the EPA was
an integral part of the history of European cooperation and of the transatlan-
tic relationship which deserves more than a footnote in Western Europe’s
postwar history.
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APPENDICES
Table A-1. The Uses of the Moody and Moody-related Aid in the OEEC Countries as
of the Beginning of 1958 (Million US Dollars).
Country Productivity Productivity EPA Capital Total
Grant loan contributions
programs programs
Austria 4.74 6.73 0.80 12.27
Belgium 3.52 – 0.08 3.60
Denmark 8.18 0.59 0.24 9.01
France 26.10 – 2.40 28.50
Germany 3.62 23.80 0.80 28.22
Greece 0.14 1.18 0.08 1.40
Italy 13.81 10.52 1.76 26.09
Netherlands 10.63 0.41 0.24 11.28
Norway 4.26 1.52 0.32 6.10
Turkey 0.82 – 0.08 0.90
UK 5.48 2.80 0.72 9.00
TOTAL 81.30 47.55 7.52 136.37
Source: ICA, European Productivity, p. 27.
Table A-2: Allocation of 115k and Related Productivity Counterpart, 1953-57 (Million
US Dollars).
Counterpart funds provided
Country 115k 90% Other 90% Other 90% Total
dollar 115k under 115k counterpart
aid
Austria 10 9.0 – 3.27 12.27
Belgium 1 0.9 – 2.70 3.60
Denmark 3 2.7 1.89 4.42 9.01
France 30 27.0 – 1.50 28.50
Germany 10 9.0 19.22 – 28.22
Greece 1 0.9 0.50 – 1.40
Italy 22 19.8 0.84 5.45 26.09
Netherlands 3 2.7 0.29 8.29 11.28
Norway 4 3.6 0.40 2.10 6.10
Turkey 1 0.9 – – 0.90
UK 9 8.1 0.90 – 9.00
TOTAL 94 84.6 24.04 27.73 136.37
Source: ICA, European Productivity, p. 26.
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Table A-3. Budget: EPA and OEEC (Million French Francs).
Organization/Year 53/54 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 58/59 59/60 60/61 61/62
1. EPA/I* 0,6 0,8 0,6 1,3 1,1 1,4 8 8,9 n.a.
2. EPA/II** 0,2 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 7 7,5 n.a.
3. 1+2: EPA total 0,8 1,4 1,0 1,7 1,5 1,7 15 16,4 1,9
4. OSTP – – – – – 0,1 2,2 6,2 0,4
5. 3.+4.: EPA+OSTP 0,8 1,4 1,0 1,7 1,5 1,8 17,2 22,6 2,3
6. ENEA – – – – – 0,2 1,8 2,1 0,6
7. OEEC/General budget 1,3 1,3 1,5 1,6 1,6 2,0 24,0 22,5 6,0
8. 5.+6.+7.: OEEC total 2,1 2,7 2,5 3,3 3,1 4,0 43,0 47,2 8,9
9. %EPA (3.x100/8.) 38,1% 51,8% 40,0% 51,5% 48,4% 42,5% 34,8% 34,7% 21,3%
10. %EPA+OSTP
(5.x100/8.) 38,1% 51,8% 40.0% 51,5% 48,4% 45% 40,0% 47,9% 25,8%
* EPA/I: Operational expenses.
** EPA/II Non-operational expenses (see chapter III, footnote 69).
Sources: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vols. 12-21.
Table A-4. US Assistance to the EPA, 1953-1961 (Million US Dollars).












Table A-5. American Contributions to Specific EPA Programs, 1956-58: Earmarking per
Category of Projects (Thousand US Dollars).
Activity 1956/57 1957/58
Management, marketing
& distribution 325 300
APED 150 300





General contribution 400 125
--- ---
Total 1,500 1,100
Sources: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vols. 12-21; WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-
59, box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto A-523, 13.11. 1957, “Letter to OEEC on US FY 58
Grant to EPA;” WNRC, RG 469, OLA, LPD, RRt EPA Programs 1955-59, box 1, f.
“EPA – Administration – Governing Body,” ecoto circ. A-4, 20.12. 1958, “Summary
Report on 7th Meeting of the Governing Board of the EPA.”
Table A-6. EPA Sources of Income (Million US Dollars., Estimated).
53 53/54 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 58/59 59/60 60/61 total
OEEC countries 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.7 1,5 1,8 1.5 8.1
US 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.5 0.7 10.2
FF 0.2 0.2
initial capital 10,0 10.0
interests 0.4* n.a. 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9
TOTAL 29.4
* interests for the first 4 years (1953-57).
Source: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation.
141 During the financial years 1955/56, 1956/57 and 1957/58 approximately one third of the “Social
Factors” activities were considered “human factors” activities while about two thirds were “trade
union” activities, see UM, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1, CE/M(58)19(Prov.), 18.7. 1958, Compte rendu
succint de la 414ème séance tenue le 8.7. 1958; UM. j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, 18.11. 1958, Notits
vedr. GB møde d. 4.12.-5.12. 1958.
142 These totals do not always originate from the same sources as those indicated in Table A-9. The
two tables are thus not immediately comparable.
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Table A-7. Allocations to the Different Chapters of the EPA Programme, 1954-61
(Million French Francs).
FY: 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 58/59 59/60 60/61]**
Chapter
Business management 115 86 246 299 344 260
Human factors – – – – 72 75
Social factors 120 110 205 195141 – –
Trade union program – – – – 174 141
Applied research 90 32 56 74 91 39
Building 80 55 114 39 – –
Agriculture 200 158 231 179 226 190
Economic factors 40 33 40 47 – –
Distribution 80 45 166 – – –
Combined actions 5 20 – – – –
UDA/APED – – 180 213 260 230
Information 35 30 28 50 – –
NAT*** – – – – 165 142
Audio visual aids 35 66 38 33 – –
MOT**** – – – – 51 48
Total 800 635 1,304 1,129 1,383 1,125142
* From 57/58: 1 and 9 fusioned (cf OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, vol. 17, p. 59)
** For 1960/61 see table A-9.
*** National activities and information
**** Miscellaneous operational activities
Data in this table have been compiled from different sources: OEEC, Acts of the
Organisation, vols. 12-21; AEP, Deuxième programme d’action, 1954-1955, Paris,
September 1954; UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, EPA/D/340, 29.4. 1955, “Draft, Annual
Report 1954-55 and Programme for 1955-56;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 1,
CE/M(58)19(Prov.), 18.7. 1958, “Compte rendu succint de la 414ème séance tenue le
8.7. 1958;” UMA. j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, note, 18.11. 1958, “GB møde d. 4.12.-5.12.
1958;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 1, C(55)141(Final), “Annual programme of the EPA
for 1955-56;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 3, C(56)175(Final), “Annual Programme of the
EPA for 1956-57;” UMA, j.nr. 106.P.11, box 4, C(57)41(Final), 4.4. 1957; UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 1, C(58)8(Final) and C(57)253(Final), “Annual programme of the EPA
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for 1957-58;” UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2, EPA/D/6621, 3.6. 1959; UMA, j.nr.
106.O.21, box 3, EPA/D/7000, 1.9. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 2,
EPA/D/5750(Final), 14.4. 1959; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, CES/60.26, 16.3. 1960;
UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, C(59)284(Final), 19.1. 1960; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box
4, EPA/D/8079, 31.5. 1960; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, EPA/D/8340, 3.11. 1960;
UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, EPA/D/9550, 15.6. 1961; WNRC, RG 469, OAEO, SF 1955-59,
box 61, f. “Productivity,” ecoto A-523, Paris to ICA/W, 13.11. 1957. The nomenclature
used by the EPA for its budget varied over the years. Thus the same activities would be
labelled differently one year from another and sometimes even during the same year.
Moreover, the French franc was devaluated several times during this period. This makes
comparisons difficult and calls for caution when evaluating the evolution of the agency’s
program.
Table A-8. Allocation to the Different Chapters of the EPA Programme, 1954-61
(in percentage).
FY: 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 58/59 59/60 60/61]**
Chapter
Business management 14.4 13,5 18.9 26.5 24.9 23.1
Human factors – 5.7 5.2 5.7 5.2 6.7
Social factors 15.0 – – – – –
Trade union program – 11.6 10.6 11.6 12.6 12.5
Applied research 11.2 5.1 4.3 6.5 6.6 3.5
Building 10.0 8.8 8.7 3.5 – –
Agriculture 25.0 24.9 17.7 15.9 16.3 16.9
Economic factors 5.0 5.2 3.0 4.1 – –
Distribution 10.0 7.0 12.7 – – –
Combined actions 0.6 3.1 – – – –
UDA/APED – – 13.8 18.9 18.8 20.4
Information 4.4 4.7 2.2 4.4 – –
NAT*** – – – – 11.9 12.6
Audio visual aids 4.4 10.4 2.9 2.9 – –
MOT**** – – – – 3.7 4.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* From 57/58 the business management and distribution sectors were fusioned (cf.
OEEC, Acts of the Organisation, Paris, 1958, p. 59)
** For 1960/61 see table A-9
*** National activities and information
**** Miscellaneous operational activities
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Table A-9. Operational Budget, 1958-61 (Million French Francs).
Financial Year 58/59 59/60 60/61
Chapters
Industry and commerce 5,215 4,600 2,600
Agriculture 1,715 2,000 1,370
APED 2,500 2,100 3,410
Applied research 0,869 0,250 1,261
Common services projects 0,616 1,000 280




Industry and commerce 47.7 46.2 29.1
Agriculture 15.7 20.1 15.4
APED 22.9 21.1 38.2
Applied research 8.0 2.5 14.1
Common services projects 5.7 10.1 3.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: OEEC, Acts of the Organisation; UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 4, OEEC, CES/ 0.26,
16.3. 1960, “Finance of EPA and OSTP 1960/61.”
Table A-10. Allocation of Funds for Specific Technical Assistance Activities (Thousand
French Francs, Adjusted for Devaluation).
Country 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60
Greece 130 380 264 313
Italy 208 199 279 -
Turkey 130 222 314 305
Yugoslavia – 245 352 260
Total TA requests 468 1,046 1,209 878
Total APED 1,395 2,530 2,600 2,250
EPA operational
budget 10,810 12,770 13,830 11,251
Source: UMA, j.nr. 106.O.21, box 5, OEEC, 18.6. 1960, C(60)115, “Draft EPA
Programme for 1960-1961, Areas in the Process of Economic Development.” Concerning
comparisons between Tables A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-10 see Table A-7 and Chapter III,
footnote 69.
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Table A-11. Participants in Technical Assistance Teams.









1957 (through March) 1,157** 141
* Including Spain and Yugoslavia and OEEC/EPA projects
** Excluding Greece and Turkey
Source: ICA, European Productivity, p. 6.
















Source: John Killick, The United States and European Reconstruction 1945-1960, Edinburgh,
1997, p. 91.
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Source: Angus Maddison, “Macroeconomic Accounts for European Countries,” in: Bart
van Ark and Nicholas Crafts, Quantitative Aspects of Postwar European Economic Growth,
Cambridge, 1996, p. 45.
143 Terni, “Elementi,” p. 83.
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